



Elements paper for the outcome document of the Fourth International Conference on FfD

Inputs by Civil Society FfD Mechanism

2nd December 2024

This document has been collectively developed by the Civil Society Financing for Development (FfD) Mechanism, a broad platform of civil society organizations, networks and federations from around the world, that followed closely the FfD process since its origins, facilitated civil society's contribution to the 3rd FfD conference, and continues to provide a facilitation mechanism for the collective expression of civil society in the FfD Follow-up process. More information can be found on the Civil Society FfD Mechanism's website: <https://csoforffd.org/>

Summary

- The elements paper is entirely missing concrete decisions needed to establish UN intergovernmental processes, legal framework, norms and standards on FfD, which have been proposed in several civil society's and member states' submissions to the call for inputs. As civil society, we are calling for a transformative and ambitious FfD4 that democratises global economic governance.
- **Domestic Public Resources:** The key focus of the UN Financing for Development process should be on international cooperation. The section on "Strengthening fiscal systems" seems strongly focused on national policies in developing countries and is highly prescriptive. Given that developed countries also have significant problems with tax systems that are very ineffective and regressive, "capacity building" of developing countries will not solve the fundamental problems. Governments should focus on promoting international tax cooperation to address the systemic issues at the global level, including through the negotiation of a UN Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation. In terms of ensuring that national tax systems are progressive, effective and gender just, this is an issue which all governments should commit to.
- **Private Finance:** The private finance section is very weak and problematic. It does not reflect the need for the transformative approach that should guide proposals to be agreed at FfD4.
- Firstly, the proposals show a strong focus on private capital mobilisation, including by using public institutions and scarce public resources to serve that. This deepens existing strategies that have not delivered on commitments made in 2015. Private capital mobilisation should not

be seen as an end in itself, and should not be promoted without the necessary connection with a policy agenda aimed to deliver socio-structural transformation of countries in the Global South.

- Secondly, there is a need to rethink and transform the whole ecosystem of public development banks and agree on a UN intergovernmental process addressing the whole ecosystem of institutions – from global to regional, bilateral and national development banks – to cater for the needs of financing. FfD4 offers a unique space to reach a political agreement to bring the UNGA leadership back to the discussion on the role of IFIs and public development banks and holding them accountable to all member states. The rethinking must be guided by a comprehensive assessment of the needs of Global South countries to promote socio-economic transformation and by the Right to Development.
- Thirdly, the proposals under this section must recognise that the private sector is not a homogenous entity – Multinational Corporations are not the same as domestic Micro, Small and Medium enterprises. As such, differentiated strategies are needed as part of an expanded policy space to promote sustainable industrial policies across the Global South. A sectorial approach is also needed, as it is critical to protect essential public services, like education, health and water and sanitation, for instance, from further privatisation and financialization.
- Fourthly, the section on “Aligning private business and finance with the SDGs” must include clear commitments to set regulatory frameworks that align private investments with development objectives and monitor their development. Such frameworks must ensure that investments comply with ILO standards, responsible business-conduct and mandated due diligence, and require the respect of human and labour rights along the entire supply chain, through independent monitoring mechanisms and binding accountability frameworks. It is imperative to move towards the adoption of a binding UN treaty on multinationals and human rights.
- **Debt:**
- The paper acknowledges the need to improve the debt architecture for "quicker, fairer and deeper debt resolution" but the supporting recommendation is to continue and "improve" the existing flawed and failed debt resolution platforms by creditor/rich countries. Specifically, the paper supports continuing with the G20 Common Framework. It also reaffirms the Pact for the Future recommendation of assigning to the IMF, a sovereign debt architecture review, which will be one of the basis for the Secretary General to close the gaps through a multilateral sovereign debt restructuring mechanism. In effect, this implicitly recognizes the analysis and prominent role of the IMF as necessary and serves to dismiss any alternative debt architecture models. It also falls short when limiting the language to ‘explore the need’ for a multilateral sovereign debt restructuring mechanism, instead of capturing the call from several global south countries to pin down a decision on establishing such a mechanism (see the inputs to the elements paper by African Group, LDCs, Brazil, Pakistan, Egypt and Nigeria, Colombia, Iran and Zambia).

- The paper ignores the calls for a new legal framework (see Pakistan, Egypt and Nigeria inputs to the elements paper) that civil society argues should take the form of a UN framework convention on sovereign debt. Such a framework would open the door to real intergovernmental and democratic discussions and agreements on what are the reforms needed to improve the debt architecture.
- While the call for a new approach on DSA was included, the paper envisions it to be incorporated in the review of the IMF-WB's DSA. This reinforces the centrality of the IMF-WB on defining and determining sustainability and precludes the possibility of an independent (from creditors) global debt authority under the UN auspices, to set the standard of informing DSAs with human rights, climate change, inequality etc.
- Calls for debt cancellation were not picked-up, although LDCs, LLDCs, Mexico and Zambia support the need for debt relief in their inputs to the elements paper. The paper at most mentions debt restructurings for countries in need but does not offer a strong stance to put debt cancellation as part of the menu of options necessary for addressing the debt crisis. Proposal for a Debt Sustainability Support Service (DSSS) is a band-aid solution that remains limited to viewing the debt crisis as simply a problem of liquidity. It seeks to provide greater liquidity to indebted countries through enhanced coordination by official creditors, offer a range of financial and legal tools, etc. to prevent countries from defaulting. The DSSS is also envisioned to support scaling up debt swaps but without mentioning any prospects for debt cancellation.
- Calls to establish a UN intergovernmental process to regulate credit rating agencies has also not been picked up. FfD4 should establish a universal, intergovernmental commission under ECOSOC to regulate Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) including ESG rating bureaus, to examine needed international institutional innovations required to correct and avert the adverse impacts of CRAs, including establishing an international public credit rating agency at the UN.
- **IDC:** - FfD4 should agree on broadening the normative role of the UN in Development Co-operation through agreeing on a UN Convention on International Development Co-operation. We are encouraged by the inclusion of a section on the "Reform the Global Architecture". However, the proposals in the section do not match the ambition of the heading and instead restates the status quo, which is not democratic, weak on representation, and outdated. These proposals should instead more explicitly call for a new global governance of IDC through a legally binding convention housed in the UN system.
- There are welcome references in the elements paper that we would like to see in the final outcome, especially when it comes to setting "concrete and binding timeframes" on the existing ODA volume targets and should be operationalized through a legally binding UN Convention on IDC. We also welcome the references to Country Programmable Aid (CPA) and increased use of budget support, including setting targets for both.

A global financing framework (including cross-cutting issues)

Cross-cutting issues are mentioned without much elaboration. Here a few additional elements that need to be considered:

- The Elements Paper is completely decent-work blind, while the Addis Ababa Action Agenda (AAAA) includes “generating full and productive employment and decent work” and “social protection for all” among its priorities. It is therefore essential that the Global Financing Framework would deliberately support structural transformation, including the creation of decent and climate-friendly jobs with just transitions; rights for all workers, equality and non-discrimination; minimum living wages and universal social protection; and inclusion through social dialogue.
- A commitment to policy coherence among UN processes related to sustainable development should be added, to ensure coherence and leverage of commitments among key UN negotiations happening in 2025, such as the 30th anniversary of the adoption of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (March 2025) and the 2nd World Summit on Social Development (November 2025).
- It is important to have a wider ecological approach, rather than mentioning the climate emergency only. This means to always pair references to climate with wider notions of “ecology and ecological integrity” (i.e., refer to the integrity of the biosphere and the nine planetary boundaries, of which climate change is one of them, it also includes biodiversity integrity, which is referenced in the Elements paper).
- When needed, it is useful to be specific about the components of climate action (such as mitigation, adaptation and loss and damage), as well as the principles of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities, equity, fair shares, and the importance to promote a just and equitable transition. We also recommend referring not only to the UNFCCC, but to the larger UN system of entities and treaties on ecological and environmental integrity, including the Rio Conventions. We also recommend not to single out specific outcomes, such as the NCQG, the COP29 Presidency roadmap (given that their mandate is expiring) or even references to the Pact of the Future, since there is an entire UN system devoted to the entirety of the ecological and climate integrity agendas.
- On gender equality, it is important to include specific references to women and girls’ human rights and their empowerment. AAAA already includes women and girls’ human rights and FfD4 cannot backtrack from it and must reaffirm the urgency of addressing gender inequality and adopt a gender-transformative financing agenda. There is also an omission on the exploitation of unpaid domestic and care work, and the key role of social spending, including on public services, to tackle inequalities, including gendered ones.
- The Elements paper promotes women’s financial inclusion as a tool of economic empowerment. However, it has been proven that this only enhances the financialization of women’s lives, exposing them to the effects of larger speculative processes, increasing their risk of indebtedness and overall, this undermines non-monetized forms of economic reproduction.

The column in the middle contains alternative text suggestion. Text underline in red represents additions, ~~strikethrough~~ = suggested deletions. The column on the right contains summaries of comments – further elaboration is available on request.

Elements Paper	Alternative Suggestion	Comments
1. FfD4 - a renewed global financing framework		It would be useful to frame as many sections as possible in terms of efforts to support ecologically sustainable and just economic transformation underpinned by international human rights law - considering this essential for 'development'.
<p>a) FfD4 will reinforce and build on previous FfD outcomes, without backtracking on those commitments, and strengthen existing efforts and ongoing reforms by various stakeholders.</p> <p>b) A renewed global financing framework must:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o be underpinned by commitment to multilateralism and collective action, o align with national priorities, such as through Integrated National Financing Frameworks, o address the diverse needs of countries in special situations and those with specific challenges, and o support multi-stakeholder collaboration and engagement. 	<p>b) A renewed global financing framework must:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <u>prioritize public finance [investment] as the main source of sustainable development finance</u> - be underpinned by commitment to multilateralism, collective action <u>and equal footing between governments from the North and the South</u> <p>c) Effective mobilization and use of resources must be enabled by freedom, human rights, and national sovereignty, good governance, <u>democratic ownership</u>, rule of law, peace and security, combating corruption at all levels and in all its forms, and effective, accountable and inclusive democratic institutions.</p>	<p>We call on the outcome document to include a stronger and bolder political commitment with a structural reform of International Financial Architecture, to align it with social justice, democratic values and human rights.</p> <p>The Elements Paper is completely decent-work blind, while the AAAA includes “generating full and productive employment and decent work” and “social protection for all” among its priorities. Clear commitments on financing these demands must be included in the FFD4 outcome document, in line with the AAAA and the 2030 Agenda.</p> <p>Alignment with national priorities is critical to apply throughout the document.</p>

<p>c) Effective mobilization and use of resources must be enabled by freedom, human rights, and national sovereignty, good governance, rule of law, peace and security, combating corruption at all levels and in all its forms, and effective, accountable and inclusive democratic institutions.</p> <p>d) The renewed global financing framework must address cross-cutting priorities, including eradicating poverty and hunger, ensuring gender equality and women's and girl's empowerment, combatting climate change, reducing disaster risk, promoting inclusive and sustainable industrialization, advancing good governance and anti-corruption measures, and investing in sustainable and resilient infrastructure.</p>	<p>d) The renewed global financing framework must address cross-cutting priorities, including <u>tackling inequalities within and between countries, including women's unpaid care work</u>, eradicating poverty and hunger, ensuring gender equality and women's and girl's empowerment, combatting climate change, reducing disaster risk, promoting inclusive and sustainable industrialization, advancing good governance and anti-corruption measures, and investing in sustainable and resilient infrastructure.</p>	
<p>2. Achieving the Sustainable Development Goals</p>		
<p>a) FfD4 should address implementation gaps of the Addis Agenda as an integral part of the 2030 Agenda. The economic, social and environmental dimensions of sustainable development and all 17 SDGs are interdependent, inextricably linked and should be treated equally.</p> <p>b) The renewed global financing framework must consist of concrete policies and actions that address the gaps in the</p>	<p>a) FfD4 should address FFD4 should address <u>both governance dysfunctionalities and</u> implementation gaps of the Addis Agenda as an integral part of the 2030 Agenda. The economic, social and environmental dimensions of sustainable development and all 17 SDGs are interdependent, inextricably linked and should be treated equally. <u>All financial flows should support the realization of the 2030 Agenda.</u></p> <p><u>c) The renewed financial framework must fully integrate support measures to implement Member States'</u></p>	<p>UNGA resolution 77/281 on "Promoting the social and solidarity economy for sustainable development" states the following: "Recognizing further that the social and solidarity economy contributes to more inclusive and sustainable economic growth by finding a new balance between economic efficiency and social and environmental resilience that fosters economic dynamism, encourages a just and sustainable digital transition, social and environmental protection and</p>

implementation of the Addis Agenda and reflect new and emerging challenges, rebuild trust in multilateralism, and accelerate our collective efforts to realise the promise of the 2030 Agenda.	<u>commitments to promote the social and solidarity economy's contribution to more inclusive and sustainable economies.</u>	socio-political empowerment of individuals over decision-making processes and resources,”
Domestic public resources		
1. Strengthening fiscal systems and aligning them with the SDGs		
<p>a) Commit to a whole-of-government approach to strengthening tax systems, transparency and accountability in public financial management systems.</p> <p>b) Encourage progressivity throughout tax systems and commit to enhance capacity building related to progressive tax systems.</p> <p>c) Enhance international cooperation for domestic resource mobilization and strengthened tax policy and administration. Support developing countries to raise their tax-to-GDP ratios so that each country should have a tax-to-GDP ratio of above 15%.</p> <p>d) Promote budget transparency, accountability and efficiency by using performance indicators and aligning budgets with the SDGs, including through INFFs.</p> <p>e) Implement transparent procurement systems and encourage countries to strengthen, resource and professionalize Supreme Audit Institutions and</p>	<p>a) Commit to a whole-of-government approach to strengthening tax systems, transparency, participation and accountability in public financial management systems.</p> <p>b) Encourage progressivity throughout tax systems and commit to enhance capacity-building international cooperation related to progressive tax systems, including ensuring a fair allocation of taxing rights between countries, especially as a part of the negotiations towards a UN framework convention on tax. Deepen progressive tax reforms and reverse the reliance on indirect taxes in tax collection.</p> <p>c) Enhance international cooperation in line with states' obligations under UN human rights law, for domestic resource mobilization and strengthened tax policy and administration. Support developing countries to raise their tax-to-GDP ratios so that each country should have a tax-to-GDP ratio of above 15%.</p>	<p>a) The suggestion is to include a reference to civil society participation in the monitoring and oversight of public finances, including budgets and procurement.</p> <p>b) Progressive tax systems are not simply an issue of capacity building – tax systems are regressive in countries all around the world. This should be a key topic in the negotiation of a UN Framework Convention on Tax.</p> <p>c) FfD should focus on ‘international cooperation’ aspects of FfD. A 15% tax/GDP target introduces the risk of ODA conditionalities and forcing developing countries to introduce more regressive taxes.</p> <p>d) INFFs is a tool to domesticate FfD agenda into implementation in developing countries only. It is a tool to distract from the ‘international cooperation’ aspects of FfD and can be used by developed</p>

<p>parliamentary oversight function, especially the public accounts committees.</p> <p>f) Increase transparency and improve oversight and management of tax expenditures and subsidies and agree on minimum standards for tax expenditure reporting.</p> <p>g) Provide developing countries with capacity-building and policy support tailored to their specific needs to formalize the informal economy and improve the administration of domestic taxation.</p> <p>h) Encourage digitalization of tax administrations, including commitments to provide developing countries with technical support and investments in IT-systems and artificial intelligence.</p> <p>i) Commit to enacting or strengthening taxes targeting high-net-worth individuals, including through international cooperation, with countries choosing the best policy mix for their economies.</p> <p>j) Promote gender-responsive budgeting and gender-responsive taxation through standards to incorporate gender considerations during policy design and implementation, along with capacity development.</p> <p>k) Identify and implement global solidarity levies / innovative taxes in the form of a Maritime and Private Air Passenger Fuel Levy, Fossil Fuel Windfall Profits Levy, Fossil</p>	<p>d) Promote budget and expenditure transparency, accountability and efficiency by using performance indicators and aligning budgets and procurement with the SDGs, including towards meeting international commitments on ODA and climate finance by Global North countries. including through INFFs. Budgets, procurement and public policies should be based on a human rights and gender perspective to ensure the optimal use of resources and establish mechanisms for enforceability and accountability, including through civil society participation. Budgets should reflect a strong commitment towards achieving the SDGs, and provide a legislative context that promotes transparency within financial systems.</p> <p>e) Implement transparent procurement systems and encourage countries to strengthen, resource and professionalize Supreme Audit Institutions and parliamentary oversight function, especially the public accounts committees. Adopt an “open by default” approach, supported by strong and clear standards for the disclosure of open, structured, and interoperable data across the entire Public Financial Management cycle. Engage civil society in monitoring of procurement processes.</p> <p>f) Increase transparency and improve oversight and management of tax expenditures and subsidies and agree on minimum standards for tax expenditure reporting including as a part of the negotiations towards a UN framework convention on tax.</p>	<p>countries as an ODA conditionality. Important to highlight the budget work needed by Global North countries to meet their international commitments. On procurement: it should be mentioned not only from the angle of compliance with transparency and integrity requirements, but as a strategic function towards the achievement of the SDGs, and the importance of involving civil society should be recognized.</p> <p>g) Extremely prescriptive towards developing countries. Replace with paragraph 11 from the UN Tax Convention Terms of Reference.</p>
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<p>Fuel Levy, or Carbon Damages Levy to finance the SDGs.</p> <p>l) Promote the inclusion of environmental and climate considerations in fiscal programming in line with national circumstances. Options include green budgeting, taxation, fiscal rules, tax incentives and subsidies, carbon pricing mechanisms, and taxes on environmental contamination.</p> <p>m) Phase out harmful and inefficient subsidies and tax incentives, including eliminating fossil fuel subsidies and subsidies that intensify the disruption of ecosystems.</p> <p>n) Enhance subnational finance by strengthening the capacities and technical knowledge of local authorities, helping them to diversify sources of income, and promote stable and transparent intergovernmental financial transfer systems and equalization mechanisms.</p> <p>o) Encourage national and local governments to prioritize and strengthen their policies, strategies, and practices to implement effective infrastructure asset management over assets' lifecycles.</p>	<p>g) Provide developing countries with capacity-building and policy support tailored to their specific needs to formalize the informal economy and improve the administration of domestic taxation. Fully recognize that inclusive and effective participation in international tax cooperation requires procedures that take into account the different needs, priorities and capacities of all countries to meaningfully contribute to the norm-setting processes, without undue restrictions, and support them in doing so, including giving them an opportunity to participate in agenda-setting, debates and decision-making, either directly or through country groupings, according to their preference.</p> <p>h) Promote technology transfer, including sharing of digital tools and IT systems that can support tax administration. Encourage digitalization of tax administrations, including commitments to provide developing countries with technical support and investments in IT systems and artificial intelligence.</p> <p>i) Commit to enacting or strengthening taxes targeting high-net-worth individuals, including through international cooperation as agreed in the Terms of Reference towards a UN Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation. These efforts much also include beneficial ownership transparency., with countries choosing the best policy mix for their economies.</p> <p>j) Promote gender-responsive budgeting and gender-responsive taxation through progressive tax systems, as</p>	<p>h) Extremely prescriptive towards developing countries. Replace with a commitment to technology transfer. It must be up to developing countries to decide whether they find artificial intelligence suitable for their tax administration.</p> <p>i) Through the ToR for the UN Tax Convention, it has already been decided that effective taxation of high-net worth individuals shall be addressed within the framework of the UN Convention on International Tax Cooperation. This debate should not be reopened. Beneficial ownership transparency is vital for combating international tax evasion, including by high-net worth individuals.</p> <p>j) Regressive tax systems exacerbate gender inequalities among other inequalities. Ensuring progressive tax systems is a key commitment that governments must take on, including to promote gender-responsive taxation. Governments must also commit to include the issue of tax and gender</p>
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	<p>well as through standards to incorporate gender considerations during policy design and implementation, along with capacity development. Ensure that the issue of tax and gender equality is clearly integrated in the future UN Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation.</p> <p>k) In the context of the negotiation of a new UN Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation, identify and implement global solidarity levies / innovative taxes in the form of a Maritime and Private Air Passenger Fuel Levy, Fossil Fuel Windfall Profits Levy, Fossil Fuel Levy, or Carbon Damages Levy to finance the SDGs and the fulfilment of the Paris Agreement, whilst ensuring that the polluter-pays principle is upheld by targeting undertaxed carbon-intensive industries.</p> <p>l) Promote the inclusion of environmental and climate considerations in fiscal programming in line with national circumstances, along with <u>the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, while also promoting the achievement of the global commitment to reduce inequalities both within and between countries.</u> Options include green budgeting, taxation, fiscal rules, tax incentives and subsidies, carbon pricing mechanisms, and taxes on environmental contamination.</p> <p>m) Phase out harmful and inefficient subsidies and tax incentives, including eliminating fossil fuel subsidies and subsidies that intensify the disruption of ecosystems, while ensuring full adherence to commitments related to development and reducing inequalities. Regressive</p>	<p>equality in the new UN Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation.</p> <p>k) These are important issues but they should be addressed within the negotiations of the UN Tax Convention. The ToR already include clear references to tax and environment, and there is therefore a clear mandate in the ToR to address these issues during the negotiation of the Convention.</p> <p>l) Any reference to climate measures should include explicit reference to CBDR. It is also important to ensure that climate policies do not exacerbate economic inequalities.</p> <p>m) It is important to ensure that the phase out does not exacerbate economic inequalities or undermine development.</p>
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	<p>incentives provided through other means including Special Economic Zones, should also be phased out.</p> <p>n) Enhance subnational finance by strengthening the capacities and technical knowledge of local authorities, helping them to diversify sources of income, and promote stable and transparent intergovernmental financial transfer systems and equalization mechanisms.</p> <p>o) Encourage national and local governments to prioritize and strengthen their policies, strategies, and practices to implement effective infrastructure asset management over assets' lifecycles.</p> <p>p) Ensure that taxing rights or tax revenues from new taxes, including taxes on high-net worth individuals and environmentally related taxes, are fairly shared across countries and devoted to reducing inequalities between and within countries, as well as the achievement of climate justice and the progressive realization of human rights.</p> <p>q) Support an enabling environment for civil society organizations to mobilize citizens and actively monitor tax policies, budget allocation, public procurement, and expenditure processes.</p>	
2. International tax cooperation		
<p>a) Commit to strengthen the voice and representation of developing countries in the international tax architecture.</p> <p>b) Support negotiations on the United Nations Framework Convention on International Tax</p>	<p>a) Commit to inclusive tax cooperation at the United Nations, including the finalization of a UN Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation and two early protocols in line with the adopted Terms of Reference strengthen the voice and representation of developing countries in the international tax architecture.</p>	<p>a) Some UN Member States have never endorsed the ToR for the UN Tax Convention, despite the fact that they all played a very active role in the negotiations, and had significant influence on the</p>

<p>Cooperation and commit to engaging constructively.</p> <p>c) Ensure all companies, including MNEs, pay taxes to the countries where economic activity occurs and value is created.</p> <p>d) Enhance tax transparency by assisting developing countries with the implementation of exchange of information standards through capacity development. Give special consideration to the challenges of countries in special situations, for example through grace periods for full reciprocity or further simplifying certain standards and conditions.</p> <p>e) Strengthen country-by-country reporting of MNEs and consider extending reporting obligations to high-net-worth individuals. Evaluate creating a central public repository for country-by-country reports.</p> <p>f) Commit to enhance ownership transparency, and design a global beneficial ownership registry for a wide range of assets.</p> <p>g) Commit to supporting developing countries that are implementing the “Two Pillar Solution” of the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting through demand-based technical assistance programs; support countries to analyze the implications of the implementation of the “Two Pillar Solution”.</p> <p>h) Ensure that the outcomes of the “Two Pillar Solution” are beneficial to developing</p>	<p>b) Support negotiations on the United Nations Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation and commit to engaging constructively.</p> <p>c) Ensure all companies, including MNEs, pay taxes to the countries where economic activity occurs and value is created.</p> <p>d) Enhance tax transparency by assisting developing countries with the implementation of exchange of information standards through capacity development. Recognise that current standards on automatic information exchange have not benefited all countries, and in particular not all developing countries, and commit to addressing these gaps in the negotiations towards a UN framework convention on tax. Give special consideration to the challenges of countries in special situations, for example through grace periods for full reciprocity or further simplifying certain standards and conditions.</p> <p>e) Strengthen country-by-country reporting of MNEs and consider extending reporting obligations to high-net-worth individuals. Evaluate creating a central public repository for country-by-country reports through the negotiations towards a UN framework convention on tax.</p> <p>f) Commit to enhance ownership transparency, including beneficial ownership transparency, and design a global public beneficial ownership system (registry) for a wide range of assets through the negotiations towards a UN framework convention on tax. Implement digital, standardised and central, high-quality beneficial ownership registers of corporate vehicles, where a wide</p>	<p>outcome. Committing to inclusive tax cooperation means fully endorsing the ToR.</p> <p>d) It’s highly problematic to suggest that the problem with information exchange is lack of capacity in developing countries. The current standards are designed in a way that does not work for most developing countries and therefore, the first vital step must be to reform the information exchange system, in the context of the UN Tax Convention negotiations. One central problem is that most developing countries have never gotten access to automatic information exchange, and therefore the word “automatic” is important.</p> <p>e) Country by country reporting is a vital concept, especially for combating international tax abuse, and it must be integrated into the UN Tax Convention negotiations and form a key part of the future framework. It is also important to maintain the point that CBC report should be made public.</p> <p>f) Beneficial ownership transparency is a vital concept, especially for combating international tax abuse, and it must be integrated into the UN Tax</p>
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<p>countries; for example, by increasing the Pillar Two minimum corporate income tax rate.</p>	<p>range of actors, including competent authorities, civil society and media, have access to timely, adequate, reliable, well-structured, accurate and up-to-date interoperable data to enforce tax policies and prevent tax evasion and IFFs. Ensure effective verification and data-sharing mechanisms of beneficial ownership information. Explore other tools, such as the creation of a global asset registry.</p> <p>g) Commit to supporting developing countries that are implementing the “Two Pillar Solution” of the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting through demand-based technical assistance programs; support countries to analyze the implications of the implementation of the “Two Pillar Solution”. Express concern at the biased outcomes of the OECD/G20 BEPS process that are not in the interest of most developing countries and commit towards agreeing a comprehensive UN framework convention on tax.</p> <p>h) Ensure that the outcomes of the “Two Pillar Solution” are beneficial to developing countries; for example, by increasing the Pillar Two minimum corporate income tax rate.</p> <p>i) Ensure that tax systems reflect the principles that the costs of pollution and environmental damage should be borne by those causing it, not those suffering its impacts (polluter pays principle), as well as the common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities of countries in relation to addressing international environmental challenges;</p>	<p>Convention negotiations and form a key part of the future framework. Incorporating specific language on implementing beneficial ownership registers of corporate vehicles links to existing commitments and lack of good implementation. The text should be more explicit on the potential of using and exchanging high-quality beneficial ownership data among countries to address transnational corruption and fight tax evasion and harmful tax practices.</p> <p>g-h) Both of these paragraphs are highly problematic and seem to ignore the very important discussions that there have been on this issue during the negotiation of the Terms of Reference for the new UN Framework Convention on Tax.</p> <p>There are strong concerns with the Two Pillar proposal – both from an effectiveness perspective, and from the point of fairness. The proposal was negotiated in a forum where developing countries were not able to participate on an equal footing, and the result is an outcome that is biased in favour of a small group of developed countries – especially those with harmful tax practices.</p> <p>It is also worth noting that there is no consensus among developed countries on whether to implement the Two Pillar proposal</p> <p>.</p>
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3. Combating illicit financial flows		
<p>a) Commit to national regulation of professional service providers, and enhancing international cooperation, to help curb IFFs and other illicit financial activities.</p> <p>b) Evaluate, strengthen, promote, and effectively translate international standards and accountability mechanisms for enablers into national legislation, including through an independent review of identities, roles, and regulatory frameworks, with the aim of initiating discussions towards global standardization of regulatory regimes.</p> <p>c) Establish an inclusive and legitimate global coordination mechanism at the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) to address financial integrity on a systemic level and exchange best practices and technologies for effectively tracking and curbing IFFs.</p> <p>d) Commit to supporting developing countries' full implementation of UN Convention Against Corruption, including by supporting that the next phase of the Implementation Review Mechanism is launched and efficiently support countries in preventing and combatting corruption.</p> <p>e) Enhance sustainable and transparent asset recovery and return practices by strengthening international cooperation,</p>	<p>a) Commit to national regulation and effective independent supervision of professional service providers that can be “enablers” of corruption, money-laundering, tax abuse and other types of illicit financial flows, including by improving their regulation, transparency and reporting requirements. Enhance, and enhancing international cooperation, to help curb IFFs and other illicit financial activities.</p> <p>b) Evaluate, strengthen, promote, and effectively translate international standards and accountability mechanisms for enablers into national legislation, including through an independent review of identities, roles, and regulatory frameworks, with the aim of initiating discussions towards global standardization of regulatory regimes.</p> <p>c) Establish an inclusive and legitimate global coordination mechanism at the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) to address financial integrity on a systemic level and exchange best practices and technologies for effectively tracking and curbing IFFs, in coordination with the UN Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) and its Review Mechanism, as well as all other relevant UN processes and bodies.</p> <p>d) Commit to supporting developing countries' by enhancing international cooperation to ensure full implementation of UN Convention Against Corruption, including by supporting that the next phase of the Implementation Review Mechanism is launched and efficiently support all countries in preventing and combatting corruption.</p> <p>e) Enhance sustainable and transparent stolen asset recovery and return practices by strengthening</p>	<p>a) The suggestion is to put stronger emphasis on the need to increase transparency and control of professional service providers that can be “enablers” of corruption, tax abuse and money laundering.</p> <p>d) Corruption is not just a problem in developing countries. The emphasis on corruption in developing countries alone while ignoring the role of secrecy jurisdictions that facilitate illicit wealth, many of which are in the developed countries, overlooks systematic financial opacity as a major enabler of IFFs. A comprehensive strategy must go beyond</p>

<p>capacity building and piloting innovative approaches aligned with the SDGs.</p> <p>f) Explore a multilateral mediation mechanism to aid in resolving challenges related to asset recovery and return.</p> <p>g) Strengthen anti-money-laundering and counter-terrorism financing measures and cooperation, including considering effective implementation of the Financial Action Task Force standards and recommendations.</p>	<p>international cooperation, transparency and engagement with civil society. capacity building and piloting innovative approaches aligned with the SDGs.</p> <p>f) Explore a multilateral mediation mechanism to aid in resolving challenges related to asset recovery and return.</p> <p>g) Strengthen anti-money-laundering and counter-terrorism financing measures and cooperation, including considering effective implementation of the Financial Action Task Force standards and recommendations.</p>	<p>addressing corruption and consider structural reforms to dismantle these secrecy mechanisms.</p> <p>e) The correct term is “stolen assets”, which refers to the fact that there are assets in Global North countries that have been stolen from the Global South. When Global South countries demand those assets returned, they tend to be met with a large number of conditions or outright lack of cooperation from the Global North countries where the assets are located. It’s highly inappropriate to suggest that this issue relates to a lack of “capacity” in developing countries.</p> <p>g) FATF is an OECD-housed body that does not allow all developing countries to participate on an equal footing. Several developing countries have flagged concerns about the unfair blacklisting of developing countries for not following FATF standards.</p>
<p>4. Strengthening national development banks</p>		<p>This section can be strengthened and connected to the role of MDBs and DFIs as they should work as a system.</p>
<p>a) Countries that already have development banks should reinforce and strengthen their capacities to effectively contribute toward achieving the SDGs, e.g. by reviewing their mandates with a view to align them with the SDGs.</p>	<p>a) Countries that already have development banks should reinforce and strengthen their capacities to effectively contribute toward achieving the SDGs, e.g. by reviewing their mandates with a view to align them with the SDGs.</p> <p>Moreover, capacities should be strengthened to uphold the</p>	

<p>b) Countries that do not have development banks should consider establishing such institutions, potentially by leveraging international cooperation and partnerships with other countries to provide support and guidance.</p> <p>c) Establish a process to define regulatory requirements in line with national development banks' development mandate and the distinctive nature of their business models and risk profiles, that do not necessarily mirror all norms set for the private sector.</p>	<p><u>highest standards in line with the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights.</u></p> <p>c) Establish a process to define regulatory requirements including <u>strong governance and accountability frameworks</u> in line with <u>human rights</u>, national development banks' development mandate and the distinctive nature of their business models and risk profiles, that do not necessarily mirror all norms set for the private sector. <u>These frameworks should also regulate NDBs financing to the private sector.</u></p>	
Domestic and international private business and finance		
1. Developing domestic financial markets and enhancing access to finance		
A. <i>Strengthen enabling environments for sustainable development and develop domestic financial and capital markets</i>	<p><i>Strengthen enabling environments <u>and regulations</u> for <u>long-term</u> sustainable development and develop domestic financial and capital markets <u>that privilege public and long-term domestic private investment in SDG related activities</u></i></p>	<p>Developing domestic financial and capital markets should not further the financialization of development. Deepening the role of capital markets does not necessarily contribute to sustainable development and may in fact undermine real economy transformation. Access to finance and an enabling environment to national private sector, especially MSMES, should be differentiated from that of transnational corporations.</p>
a) Improve the business enabling environment – including through enhanced transparency, good		<p>The text is highly problematic, as it ignores the fact that the overt focus on an enabling environment for business often leads to dilution of national</p>

<p>governance, anti-corruption measures, the rule of law, investor and consumer protection, and fair competition – and evolve policy frameworks beyond an enabling environment for investment to an enabling environment for sustainable investment in the SDGs, developing a model framework</p> <p>b) Promote a sequential approach to developing local financial markets, starting with the domestic banking sector and the establishment of savings banks or cooperative banks, to build a domestic savings base, with strengthened capacity development following this approach. Expand long-term bond and insurance markets, and, where appropriate, stock markets, including building secondary markets, sequentially.</p> <p>c) Promote the creation of new domestic investment vehicles, such as development-oriented venture capital funds, with sound regulatory frameworks and adequate risk management.</p> <p>d) Support investments in development and digitalization of financial system infrastructure in developing countries and particularly in countries in special situations, including digital identification, payments infrastructure, and other digital solutions.</p>		<p>environmental and social policies, leading to human rights violations and abuse.</p> <p>It would be important to emphasise regulation/structures designed to ensure financial market resources support the ‘real economy’ and economic transformation.</p> <p>The concept of sustainable investment is highly problematic, as efforts to realize SDG goals are perceived from a commercial point of view rather than from a human rights and socio-economic transformation perspective.</p> <p>A policy to hold the private sector accountable and to protect the rights of communities is critical. The regulatory aspects should not be used to advance profit seeking interests of the large-scale business sector.</p>
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<p><i>B. Financial inclusion, remittances and correspondent banking</i></p>		<p>It seems important to note that development of ‘financial inclusion’/ access to finance initiatives are informed by negative experiences in the sector, including its financialisation. Note that regulation of the sector is imperative and benefits of use of public institutions for such purposes.</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) Expand access to financial services, particularly for women and marginalized groups, and strengthen financial health through consumer protection, financial literacy, and regulation. b) Leverage emerging digital technologies, including digital public infrastructure, to deepen financial inclusion. c) Promote capacity building for entrepreneurship and promote SME’s access to affordable credit, including through the banking system and mobile network operators, development banks, postal and savings banks, and microfinance institutions. d) Review the impact of prudential frameworks on SME lending in developing countries. e) Develop comprehensive risk management and insurance solutions for smallholder farmers and other stakeholders to protect against production risks, price volatility, and climate hazards. f) Enhance efforts to reduce remittance costs to less than 3 per cent of amounts 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) Expand access to <u>concessional</u> financial services, particularly for women and marginalized groups, and strengthen financial health through consumer protection, financial literacy, and regulation. b) Leverage <u>Regulate</u> emerging digital technologies, including digital public infrastructure, to deepen financial inclusion <u>while securing the right to protection of personal data.</u> c) Promote capacity building for entrepreneurship and promote SME’s access to <u>affordable insurance solutions and</u> affordable credit, including through the banking system and mobile network operators, development banks, postal and savings banks, and microfinance institutions. e) Develop comprehensive risk management and <u>affordable</u> insurance solutions <u>and affordable and concessional credit</u> for smallholder farmers and other stakeholders to protect against production risks, price volatility, and climate hazards. 	

<p>transferred by 2030, including by promoting digital technologies, competition among money transfer operators, transparency requirements for fees and commissions charged, and by working with international standard setters to ensure a proportionate application of regulations on private money flows.</p> <p>g) Support correspondent banking relationships through technical assistance programs, building on existing global efforts.</p> <p>h) Facilitate diaspora investment, including through investment agencies and innovative instruments.</p>		
2. Scaling-up private long-term investment in the SDGs		
<i>A. Foreign direct investment (FDI)</i>		<p>More FDI should not be an end in itself. FDI tends to materialize in countries where returns on investments are guaranteed, not in areas where investment is most needed. This means relying on FDI risks directing investments into development models/infrastructure that might be profitable for investors but divergent from national priorities and people's needs/rights. FDI strategies should be explicitly designed to contribute to economic transformation and to the creation of decent jobs.</p>
a) Scale up FDI in developing countries, including in LDCs, LLDCs and SIDS.	a) Scale up FDI <u>with technological transfer and local capacity building</u> in developing countries, including in LDCs, LLDCs and SIDS.	<p>There is a need to incorporate concrete language/proposals to emphasise the quality of FDI. Point b could be a good first step.</p>

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> b) Promote quality FDI by measuring the contribution of FDI to the SDGs. c) Establish an international investment support centre for LDCs, which harnesses available technical assistance and investment-related support to ensure long-term support for LDCs. d) Establish an infrastructure investment financing facility for LLDCs. 		
<p><i>B. Private capital mobilization (PCM)</i></p>		<p>PCM should be guided by principles of quality and not quantity, and all the mechanisms established to mobilise capital should have specific requirements to that effect. More de-risking for the sake of increasing private sector profits is deeply problematic.</p> <p>LMICs should be provided with technical support to ensure PCM contracts and tools provide adequate protection of public interests.</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) Focus blended finance on sustainability impact, including by aligning transactions with national priorities and industrialization strategies focusing MDB incentives on impact rather than volumes. b) Promote standardization of blended finance instruments, to create effective and replicable structures for different country contexts; utilize innovative structures, including equity instruments, 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) Focus <u>Regulate</u> blended finance <u>to ensure</u> on sustainability impact <u>and adherence to social and development standards</u>, including by aligning transactions with national priorities and industrialization strategies focusing MDB incentives on impact rather than volumes. 	<p>It is important to challenge the notion of blended finance as key for sustainable development. Frame policies to regulate the blended financing to ensure adherence to social and development standards. The same approach should be considered for other mechanisms designed to mobilise private finance, like public private partnerships and guarantees.</p> <p>Given the proliferation of these instruments - and even before thinking about scalability and replicability - there is a need for a comprehensive and independent review of the sustainable</p>

<p>in blended finance to ensure that both risks and rewards are shared fairly.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> c) Establish pools of catalytic capital seeded by national governments, MDBs, DFIs, foundations and philanthropies, with standardized, simplified and transparent access requirements. d) Develop repositories of guarantee instruments building on the World Bank Guarantee Platform. e) Work with DFIs to support the development of cost-effective, long-term foreign exchange risk mitigation and hedging solutions for investments in sustainable development, as laid out in the international development cooperation action area. f) Reevaluate capital requirements for guarantees and blended finance mechanisms in financial regulation and in credit rating methodologies. g) Work with institutional investors, such as pension funds and insurers, including by improving the availability, quality and accessibility of data, to pave the way for more investments in developing countries. h) Provide quality disaggregated data, including from the GEMs database, and develop harmonized impact metrics for PCM to provide a basis for target setting. 		<p>development outcomes, fiscal, labour and human rights impacts, including impact on women which can shed light on how to apply rigorous government regulation of private actors, including to ensure that their fiscal impact is fully accounted for, and high transparency and accountability standards.</p> <p>There is no section to adhere to human rights and other development standards.</p>
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<i>C. Capacity building</i>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) Establish a Pooled Technical Assistance Platform to bring together resources and partners to originate, prepare and support high-impact infrastructure projects, with a focus on “hard to reach” sectors and developing countries, particularly countries in special situations. b) Utilize or create spaces at the regional and international levels, including the SDG Investment Fair, to develop concrete investment opportunities and connect with investors. 		
3. Aligning private business and finance with the SDGs		
<i>A. Driving impact and promoting long-term incentives</i>		Not enough to promote long-term incentives there should also be disincentives/regulation to curb short-term profit oriented investments
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) Building on the Pact for the Future, support efforts to define the private sector's accountability in contributing to UN frameworks. b) Accelerate the development and use of impact valuation methodologies to price externalities and facilitate their integration into financial models and transactions. c) Broaden awareness and adoption of impact investment strategies among investors, spanning impact funds, green 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) Building on the Pact for the Future, Support efforts to define the private sector's accountability in contributing to UN frameworks <u>and ensure its compliance to international human rights law.</u> 	Voluntary standards are not enough to prevent greenwashing. Robust regulation of businesses, including the financial sector, are needed to ensure consistency with human rights standards and accountability for rights violations, especially to women in the Global South. Regulation should include, among others, social and environmental safeguards; mandatory environmental and human rights due diligence; and democratic and meaningful consultation and complaint processes, inclusive of women, youth, and Indigenous Peoples.

<p>bonds, sustainability bonds and social bonds including SDG bonds, innovative investment lenses and impact-linked finance.</p> <p>d) Expand the use by institutional investors of sustainability rating methodologies, including SDG-aligned benchmarks, and reference indices.</p> <p>e) Prevent impact washing and greenwashing by standardizing SDG fund terminology and classification and streamlining voluntary sustainability standards.</p> <p>f) Commit to taking concrete steps towards eliminating gender-based price differentiation.</p> <p>g) Adopt national sustainable finance mobilization strategies including to support organizations' transition planning, as part of Integrated National Financing Frameworks.</p>	<p>e) Prevent <u>and fine (including revoke business permits)</u> impact washing and greenwashing by standardizing SDG fund terminology and classification and streamlining voluntary sustainability standards.</p> <p>f) Commit to taking <u>Take</u> concrete steps towards eliminating gender-based price differentiation.</p>	<p>UN member states should constructively engage in the ongoing process towards a legally binding instrument to regulate, in international human rights law, the activities of transnational corporations and other business enterprises - UN Treaty on Business and Human Rights.</p>
<p><i>B. Interoperable sustainable business and finance legislation</i></p>		
<p>a) Accelerate the global adoption of sustainable business and finance legislation that is country-led and context-specific, with capacity building for developing countries.</p> <p>b) Adopt sustainability disclosure legislation based on double materiality to enhance transparency on the SDGs, by transposing</p>	<p>a) <u>Regulate businesses, including the financial sector, to ensure consistency with human rights standards and accountability for rights violations.</u></p> <p>b) Adopt <u>social and environmental safeguards; mandatory environmental and human rights due diligence; and democratic and meaningful consultation and complaint</u></p>	

International development cooperation		Set out the ambition of IDC in the context of International Financial reform and the changing Development Co-operation Landscape and the world we want see. Note that the entire section is gender blind and inequality blind.
1. Official development assistance (ODA)		<p>There should be an opener outlining the purpose of ODA including addressing poverty eradication, gender equality and addressing inequality</p> <p>Proposals from (a) to (e) set a good starting point to discuss what FfD4 should deliver on ODA quantity and quality. Yet, more ambition is needed to ensure that the Sevilla conference is not another meeting in which commitments are restated, but then not delivered.</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) Achieve the target of 0.7% of ODA/GNI and at least 0.2% of ODA/GNI to LDCs. b) Set concrete and binding timeframes for achieving existing ODA targets. c) Increase the share of ODA programmed at the country level and focused on long-term sustainable development that responds to the needs and priorities of recipient countries. Country Programmable Aid could be used as a proxy. Consider setting a target to increase the share of CPA in ODA. 	<p>Donors should significantly increase funding to social protection to reach at least 7 per cent of ODA allocated to social protection by 2030, and gradually increase this to 14 per cent.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. While achieving these long-standing targets is welcome, there needs to be a recognition of the trillions in unmet commitments owed to the global south since this target was first established. b. As a way forward we strongly support this proposal and language. c. References to CPA are welcome with a caveat - CPA definitions are in the hands of DAC, which is now considering broadening by including core contributions to Multilaterals and decentralised aid. It is also important to recognise that CPA is a metric generated after volumes are reported by consolidating and quantifying flows that are fall under the CPA definition - this is to say it is not a

<p>d) Increase the focus of ODA on core capacities, systems and institutions strengthening, including by increasing the share of budget support in ODA.</p> <p>e) Establish an enhanced transparency framework, in the UN Development Cooperation Forum (DCF), to harmonize concepts and standards related to SDG 17.3.1, TOSSD and ODA.</p>		<p>measure or standard that donors keep on their own books.</p> <p>d. This is a welcome proposal, and it could even perhaps be strengthened by suggesting a minimum target/floor for the use of budget support</p> <p>e. We support an enhanced role for the DCF IF the DCF itself is strengthened to be an intergovernmental decision making/rule setting body that is adequately resourced to serve as the institutional space to hold actors to account.</p> <p>ODA should be directed towards supporting including older persons rights to social services, key SDG 8 related policies, such as decent jobs creation, full employment, social protection, occupational health and safety, education and life-long learning, equal pay for work of equal value, formalization, decent work for migrants and youth, formalization, eradication of forced labour, social infrastructure, quality public services including the care economy and just transition.</p>
<p>2. South-South and triangular cooperation</p>		
<p>a) Increase the quantity and quality of South-South cooperation and encourage multi-actor partnerships for funding.</p> <p>b) Building on the existing UN Conceptual Framework to measure South-South Cooperation, and the results of the pilot project, encourage broader reporting by South-South providers to facilitate a</p>	<p>b) Building on the existing UN Conceptual Framework to measure South-South Cooperation, and the results of the pilot project, encourage broader reporting by South-South providers to facilitate a better understanding of the <u>role and</u> impact of SSC on</p>	<p>This section is very consistent with AAAA and welcome just the same. It is important to keep the reference to the pilot, which is led by UNCTAD. A general consideration linked to the reform of the global architecture is that there is a need to think about how SSC and TrC would be tackled under a new overarching IDC governance. There will be a need to understand how its distinct but</p>

<p>better understanding of the impact of SSC on sustainable development.</p> <p>c) Consider establishing a triangular cooperation marker in reporting.</p>	<p><u>inclusive</u> sustainable development, <u>with emphasis on tackling poverty and inequality, including gender.</u></p>	<p>complementary role to traditional development cooperation can be evaluated.</p>
<p>3. Financing for climate, biodiversity and ecosystems</p>		
<p><i>A. Increase volumes in line with needs</i></p>		
<p>a) Promote resource mobilization for both the climate and development agendas by developing complementary targets and enhancing consistency and transparency in ODA and climate finance reporting, taking into consideration the outcomes of the UNFCCC COPs.</p> <p>b) Call for new and additional grant-based or highly concessional finance and non-debt creating instruments for just and equitable transitions, biodiversity conservation, and restoration.</p> <p>c) Urgently scale up contributions to the Loss and Damage Fund in line with the projected economic cost of \$1-1.8 trillion by 2050, and ensure inclusive design and equitable allocation of funding both at national and sub-national levels.</p> <p>d) Ensure vulnerable countries such as LDCs, LLDCs and SIDS, receive sufficient climate finance to support mitigation,</p>		<p>Express profound disappointment at the conclusion of the latest COP29, which agreement to mobilise US\$300bn by 2035 is woefully insufficient. Call on the FFD4 to raise the ambition on climate finance: governments should provide at least US\$5 trillion per year to the Global South in public finance for adaptation, loss and damage, and a just transition. The use of these resources must support Just transition Plans and guarantee the creation of decent jobs, in line with the ILO Guidelines for a just transition.</p> <p>Climate and environmental finance should center principles of Common But Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR), equity, fair shares, human rights, gender equality, ecological integrity and system change, and guarantee direct access windows, especially for those groups that are in the frontline of the crises.</p>

adaptation and resilience-building, including via financing instruments (e.g. carbon finance, risk insurance, catastrophe bonds, climate resilience funds, and debt swaps) that can adequately respond to their needs and priorities, including ocean-economies for SIDS.		
<i>B. Simplify access to climate finance and reduce administrative costs for recipients</i>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) Encourage vertical climate and environmental funds to harmonize and simplify application requirements, eligibility criteria and administrative procedures; remove access barriers for developing countries; enhance alignment with national priorities; enhance cooperation with MDBs and national development institutions; and encourage use of domestic implementation agencies. b) Increase capacity building at the country level to access climate finance, including for LDCs c) Reduce fragmentation by i) agreeing to incorporate new climate and environment finance initiatives within well-functioning existing structures and organisations rather than creating additional entities, and ii) calling for a process to assess the current landscape 		<p>It is important to limit the role of MDBs in ecological integrity and climate finance, as well as their mega-projects approach. MDBs provide mostly non-concessional loans as climate finance, which is the opposite of the demand of developing countries. SDRs should be granted in a highly concessional way, without conditionalities and prioritizing access to developing countries that have more need and/or are more vulnerable to climate change.</p> <p>Always favour UN FUNDS (GCF, Adaptation Fund, Loss and Damage Fund, etc) to channel ecological integrity and climate finance, as more democratic spaces. There is a need to include direct access windows for groups that are more impacted by climate impacts, such as Indigenous Peoples, local communities, women, youth, people with disabilities, workers, and others. None of these financial entities should operate majorly in the form of loans.</p>

of vertical climate and environment funds and windows with a view of identifying opportunities for consolidation (building on G20 review on vertical climate and environment funds).		
4. Multilateral development banks and the system of public development banks		<p>See comment above about economic transformation. MDBs and PDBs should have an explicit focus on economic transformation - and should measure their performance accordingly. All MDBs and PDBs should develop and be guided by explicit HR policies that go beyond 'do no harm'.</p> <p>Add something about establishing norms/ parameters for de-risking focused on development/ economic transformation impact.</p> <p>There is an urgent need to agree on a UN-led intergovernmental process to review and rethink the ecosystem of public development banks and financial institutions. The FfD4 offers a unique space to reach a political agreement to rethink the international financial architecture for development. And the UN, as the only multilateral space that has the mandate to advance on global economic governance issues while having every country at the table, is the most democratic and appropriate forum to do so. The rethinking must be guided by a comprehensive assessment of the needs of Global South countries to promote socio-economic transformation.</p>

<p>A. <i>Improve the financial capacity of MDBs and enhance quality of MDB financing</i></p>	<p>A. Improve the financial capacity of <u>Review and transform the governance and mandate of MDBs</u> and enhance quality of MDB financing</p>	<p>These elements cannot be properly defined without a comprehensive transformation of the MDBs through the afore-mentioned UN intergovernmental process to review and rethink MDBs.</p>
<p>a) Advocate for further ambitious implementation of the G20 Capital Adequacy Framework Review Recommendations, while ensuring that this does not harden lending terms.</p> <p>b) Accelerate proposals to channel SDRs via MDBs for countries in a position to do so.</p> <p>c) Commit to support MDB capital increases, appreciate successful replenishments and establish sustainable pathways to replenish concessional windows.</p> <p>d) Improve lending terms including longer loan tenors to better meet local development needs</p> <p>e) Increase MDB capacity to lend and offer products in local currency:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Issue local bonds, which can also help develop the local markets; o Create a MDB liquidity pool to better manage local currency risk across the MDBs, building on work done by the EBRD and AIIB; o Take a portfolio approach to currency risk management across the MDB system (e.g. in MDB liquidity pools noted above), by utilizing diversification, thus lowering the cost of hedging. The risk can be further 	<p>c) Commit to support MDB capital increases, appreciate successful replenishments and establish sustainable pathways to replenish concessional windows. <u>initiate a UN intergovernmental process to review and transform the governance and mandate of International Financial Institutions and MDBs:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o <u>Renew MDBs missions and visions, as well as their policies and practices to build more inclusive, transparent, accountable and democratic institutions, with a rights-centered responsive to national and regional dynamics.</u> o <u>Abandon the one-dollar, one-vote governance structure of IFIs and MDBs, which has proven to be inconsistent with democratic principles.</u> 	<p>FfD4 is the moment to agree on bringing UNGA leadership to the discussion on the role of IFIs/MDBs and holding them accountable to all member states.</p> <p>The FfD4 offers a unique space to reach a political agreement to rethink the international financial architecture for development. And the UN, as the only multilateral space that has the mandate to advance on global economic governance issues while having every country at the table, is the most democratic and appropriate forum to do so. The rethinking must be guided by a comprehensive assessment of the needs of Global South countries to promote socio-economic transformation. An inclusive and development-oriented process addressing the whole ecosystem of institutions – from global to regional, bilateral and national development banks – is needed to cater for the needs of financing, on the basis of the right to development principle.</p> <p>Such a process must:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Transform the international financial architecture for development, including by empowering national public development banks with the finance and tools needed to better serve national development needs. • Overhaul IFIs and MDBs’ missions and visions, as well as their policies and practices to build more

<p>reduced by hedging with G10 currencies; o Scale up subsidies for currency platforms when needed.</p> <p>f) Study ways to expand the use of originate-to-distribute and securitisation models by individual MDBs and by working together as a system to create an emerging market asset class, which would free up MDB/DFI capital for additional lending.</p> <p>g) Develop and align MDB impact measurement frameworks with the SDGs, measuring both positive and negative impacts, and ensuring adherence to ambitious environmental, social and governance standards and safeguards in all operations.</p>	<p>g) Develop and align MDB impact measurement frameworks with the SDGs, measuring both positive and negative impacts, and ensuring adherence <u>and commitment to stronger and more</u> ambitious environmental, social and <u>governance standards, accountability mechanisms</u> and <u>safeguards with strong attention to gender</u> in all operations.</p>	<p>inclusive, transparent, accountable and democratic institutions, with a rights-centered approach to development and a focus on public investment and ownership of public goods, responsive to national and regional dynamics.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Abandon the one-dollar, one-vote governance structure of IFIs and MDBs, which has proven to be inconsistent with democratic principles. • Assess the development impacts of the current financing model, which has proven incoherent with sustainable development, the rights of working peoples and especially women's human rights, including universal and high- quality public services. <p>This solution is central to an agenda that commits to transformative policies that address the root causes of global economic disparities and prioritize the wellbeing of people and the planet.</p>
<p><i>B. Expand access to concessional financing, including for smooth transitions for graduating countries</i></p>		
<p>a) Reiterate the call made in the Pact for the Future for MDBs, in partnership with the UN Secretary General, to present options and recommendations on new approaches to improve access to concessional finance for developing countries, including projects with positive externalities in middle-income countries, enhancing alignment and</p>		

<p>synergies for shared goals and coherently agreed policies.</p> <p>b) Consider using complementary measures of progress that go beyond GDP, including the multidimensional vulnerability index, as a complement to existing policies and practices, to inform development cooperation policies and access to concessional financing.</p>	<p>b) Consider <u>Use</u>ing complementary measures of progress that go beyond GDP, including the multidimensional vulnerability index, as a complement to existing policies and practices, to inform development cooperation policies and access to concessional financing.</p>	
<p>5. Reforming the international development cooperation architecture</p>		<p>We support this heading, but the proposals that follow are hardly what we consider ambitious reform, and are in most cases a reiteration or rehash of standing commitments and the status quo. The idea of a UN framework convention on IDC can push the ambition beyond the status quo and should be strongly considered. Linked to this we would move this to the top of the section with an IDC Convention/IDC governance reform as the overarching commitment at FfD4 with the subsequent sections as elements to be considered under the convention/reform.</p>
<p><i>A. Agree on fundamental attributes for effective development cooperation today</i></p>		
<p>a) Elevate country leadership by developing countries, and policy and system coherence by development partners, and mutual accountability as core tenets of effective development cooperation, and agree to use evidence</p>	<p>a) Elevate country leadership by developing countries, and policy and system coherence by development partners, and mutual accountability as core tenets of effective <u>finance for development</u> development cooperation, and agree to use evidence of sustainable development impact as a basis for</p>	<p>We emphasize that countries should be in the driving seat of their financial strategies, not only of their development cooperation plans</p>

<p>of sustainable development impact as a basis for decisionmaking on allocation and modalities of development cooperation delivery</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Development partners to engage in ways that strengthen country leadership and ownership rather than undermine it, for example by: i) responding to country plans and strategies; ii) strengthening existing national systems when there are gaps or limitations rather than establishing parallel systems; iii) reducing fragmentation, including by prioritizing core contributions to multilateral institutions and multi-donor and inter-agency pooled funds, and by leveraging the strengths of both horizontal aid providers (i.e., MDBs) and vertical platforms; iv) committing to multi-year cooperation agreements that provide more stable and predictable funding in line with national priorities; v) improving coordination and collaboration among development partners by streamlining and harmonizing procedural and policy requirements; vi) ensuring 	<p>decisionmaking on allocation and modalities of development cooperation delivery</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Development partners to engage in ways that strengthen country leadership and ownership rather than undermine it, for example by: i) responding to <u>aligning with</u> country plans and strategies; ii) strengthening existing national systems when there are gaps or limitations rather than establishing parallel systems; iii) reducing fragmentation, including by prioritizing core contributions to multilateral institutions and multi-donor and inter-agency pooled funds, and by leveraging the strengths of both horizontal aid providers (i.e., MDBs) and vertical platforms; iv) committing to multi-year cooperation agreements that provide more stable and predictable funding in line with national priorities; v) improving coordination and collaboration among development partners by streamlining and harmonizing procedural and policy requirements; vi) ensuring effective knowledge transfers and capacity building in all interventions to foster self-reliance. 	
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<p>effective knowledge transfers and capacity building in all interventions to foster self-reliance.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Commit to supporting policy coherence at all levels to ensure development partners' policies strengthen rather than weaken development cooperation, including by: i) promoting local procurement, local audit, and the involvement of local actors; ii) reconfirming commitments to untying aid and reducing the number of exemptions; iii) adopting a whole-of-government approach in delivering development cooperation, in line with principles of Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development. o To maximize development impact of development cooperation, establish a process to determine suitable measure(s) of development impact to guide allocation and delivery of all types and modalities of development cooperation, building on ongoing efforts by MDBs. 		<p>The reference to the whole of government approach is a powerful reminder of the fact that this document is fundamentally blind to the role of CSOs and other non-executive actors and to the fact that civic space is under threat. In this respect we encourage a whole-of-society approach.</p> <p>References to policy coherence for development at all levels should be maintained and even strengthened, as well as proposals to maximise the development impact of development cooperation.</p>
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<i>B. Rationalise national level architectures</i>	Align and integrate with national level Architectures	This segment must be consistent with the demand for country ownership and leadership
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Strengthen the commitment to sovereign, country-led financial planning frameworks at the national and sub-national levels, for the SDGs and Nationally Determined Contributions, and as a basis for engaging with all development partners. Commit to inclusive nationally led platforms for improved country-level coordination that: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> place developing countries in the driver's seat, with country-led plans and strategies at their core (e.g. INFFs), ensuring that such plans and strategies are placed at the heart of MDB, broader PDB, and development partner collaboration; include all relevant actors – MDBs, other PDBs, the UN system, bilateral partners, private sector actors when appropriate, and other partners; ensure an efficient and effective division of labour, promoting a 	<p>a) Strengthen the commitment to sovereign, country-led financial planning frameworks at the national and sub-national levels, for the SDGs and Nationally Determined Contributions <u>owned development plans</u>, and as a basis for engaging with all development partners.</p> <p>b) Commit to inclusive nationally led platforms for improved country-level coordination that:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> place developing countries in the driver's seat, with country-led plans and strategies at their core (e.g. INFFs), ensuring that such plans and strategies are placed at the heart of MDB, broader PDB, and development partner collaboration; include all relevant actors – MDBs, other PDBs, the UN system, bilateral partners, private sector actors and <u>civil society organizations</u> when appropriate, and other partners; ensure an efficient and effective division of labour, promoting a bottom-up approach, according to each partner's comparative advantage and knowledge of the local context (e.g. utilizing NDB knowledge in developing project pipelines and project preparation), further strengthening <u>effectiveness</u>, efficiency, coordination and co-financing. 	Using language from AAAA, which is much clearer.

<p>bottom-up approach, according to each partner's comparative advantage and knowledge of the local context (e.g. utilizing NDB knowledge in developing project pipelines and project preparation), further strengthening efficiency, coordination and co-financing.</p>		
<p><i>C. Reform the global architecture</i></p>		
<p>a) Commit to broaden the normative role of the UN in development cooperation, making the most of established platforms.</p> <p>b) Strengthen dialogue, accountability and follow up as part of the FFD process, including through a strengthened Development Cooperation Forum (DCF), to i) deepen exchanges among providers, including traditional and non-traditional donors, MDBs, and others, as well as between providers and recipients; ii) monitor the delivery and impact of development cooperation in all its forms; iii) enhance accountability of all relevant actors to their commitments - drawing on all available evidence including from the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation, and iv) further promote coherence in development cooperation, guided by an</p>	<p>Commit to broaden the normative role of the UN in Development Co-operation through a UN Convention on International Development Cooperation</p>	<p>We would encourage stronger and more deliberate language here. The proposals in the section do not match the ambition of the heading to "Reform the global architecture". These proposals should more explicitly call for a new global governance of IDC housed in the UN system. We do appreciate that the existing structures shall continue to offer their particular value, but going forward they must all be housed under a single intergovernmental, institutional governance at the UN.</p>

expert technical group, focused on issues such as coherent financing of development, climate, and humanitarian needs; and appropriate use of delivery modalities in different circumstances.		
International trade as an engine for development		
1. A rules-based, non-discriminatory, transparent, open, and fair multilateral trading system	1. A rules-based, non-discriminatory, transparent, open, <u>democratic</u> and fair multilateral trading system	
A. Revitalize the multilateral trade system through the WTO	A. Revitalize <u>and democratize</u> the multilateral trade system through the WTO	FFD4 should move beyond the reduction notion that trade multilateralism begins and ends with WTO and rather embrace an ecosystem approach that includes UNGA, ECOSOC and the UNCTAD's Trade and Development Board, and may even consider establishing new institutions
a) Recommit to a universal, rules-based, non-discriminatory, transparent, open, fair, predictable, inclusive and equitable multilateral trading system with WTO at its core b) Support the full implementation of WTO agreements on Trade Facilitation, Fisheries Subsidies and Investment Facilitation for Development, including	a) Recommit to a universal, rules-based, non-discriminatory, transparent, open, fair, predictable, inclusive and equitable multilateral trading system with WTO <u>with appropriate, inclusive and democratic institutions</u> at its core. b) Support the full implementation of WTO agreements on Trade Facilitation, Fisheries Subsidies and Investment Facilitation for Development, including through capacity building to developing countries.	a) See overall comment above b) All these agreements have major concerns from a developing country perspective. It is also important to remember that the fisheries Subsidies Agreement is not even ratified by the necessary 110 WTO Members, and the negotiations on Part 2 are still ongoing. Therefore, calling for its implementation is prejudging the actual conclusion and coming into

<p>through capacity building to developing countries.</p> <p>c) Accelerate the accession of LDCs aiming to join the WTO.</p> <p>d) Convene an independent expert group to review the role of trade as an engine for sustainable development and the SDGs and make recommendations on WTO reform to improve its functions to address current challenges and strengthen its development dimension, building on ongoing work of the WTO's General Council and ongoing discussions at the G20.</p>	<p>c) Accelerate the accession of LDCs aiming to join the WTO <u>and ensure they enjoy at least the same level of flexibilities accorded to the LDCs that form the original Membership of the WTO.</u></p> <p>d) Convene a n independent expert group to <u>democratic, representative, participatory and transparent inter-governmental review under the aegis of the UN</u> of the role of trade as an engine for sustainable development and the SDGs and make recommendations on WTO reform to improve its functions to address current challenges and strengthen its development dimension, <u>recognising previous agreements and</u> building on ongoing work of the WTO's General Council and ongoing discussions at the G20.</p>	<p>force. Finally, the investment facilitation agreement is a plurilateral agreement and many issues have been raised about the illegal manner it is being pushed into the WTO, and there is no question of implementing it by the full UN Membership at the moment.</p> <p>c) Accession negotiations proved long and onerous and may impose less advantageous terms than it was provided to the original members</p> <p>d) Rather than an expert process, the review should be intergovernmental under the aegis of the UN, to ensure a democratic, participatory and developmental focus</p>
<p><i>B. Deepen regional trade integration through regional trade agreements</i></p>		
<p>a) Consolidate regional trade agreements, including the expansion and deepening of African Continental Free Trade Area to boost intra-Africa trade, and support ongoing inter-regional trade agreements to promote inclusive growth and sustainable development.</p>	<p>a) Consolidate <u>Support and prioritise</u> regional trade agreements, including the expansion and deepening of African Continental Free Trade Area to boost intra-Africa trade, and support ongoing inter-regional trade agreements to promote inclusive growth and sustainable development <u>within developing countries and in their LDC partner countries.</u></p>	

C. Strengthen special and differential treatment for the most vulnerable countries	<i>C. Strengthen special and differential treatment for <u>developing countries, especially</u> the most vulnerable countries</i>	
a) Encourage the WTO to strengthen special and differential treatment for developing countries, in particular LDCs, LLDCs and SIDS. b) Commit to a review of the rules of origin to enable developing countries to take full advantage of preferential trade. c) Take steps to provide special and differentiated treatment for developing countries that are net importers of food products to strengthen food security.	a) Encourage the WTO <u>Establish a multilateral agreement that reaffirms, updates and strengthens special and differential treatment in international, regional and bilateral trade agreements</u> for developing countries, in particular LDCs, LLDCs and SIDS. <u>This agreement must ensure that S&DT provisions are precise, operational and effective enough to provide the necessary flexibilities and policy space to enable developing countries particularly LDCs, LLDCs and SIDS to achieve their economic development objectives.</u>	
D. Uphold policy space in trade agreements		
a) Ensure that developing countries have sufficient policy space, including to enhance food security, and that new sustainability and trade liberalization measures respect policy space in all countries. b) Reform the mechanisms for investor-state dispute settlements in trade and investment agreements through a multilateral approach, and establish an advisory support service for developing countries for international investment dispute settlements.	a) <u>Establish a multilateral agreement for non-compliance or breach of existing commitments under trade and investment agreements, including intellectual property rights regulations, if they eliminate or limit policy space for pursuing public policy goals. This agreement will</u> ensure that developing countries have sufficient policy space, including to enhance food security <u>and support their national industrial policies</u> , and that new sustainability and trade liberalization measures respect policy space in all countries. b) Reform the mechanisms for investor-state dispute settlements in trade and investment agreements	

<p>c) Invite UNCTAD to conduct a review of obsolete trade and investment agreements, with the view to accelerate the replacement and termination of obsolete agreements.</p>	<p>through a multilateral approach <u>Establish a UN multilateral agreement for the coordinated and permanent cessation of Investor-State-Dispute Settlement (ISDS) provision in international investment agreements (IIAs)</u> and establish an advisory support service for developing countries for international investment dispute settlements <u>agree on a standstill of all pending ISDS cases until such an agreement is achieved.</u></p> <p>c) Invite UNCTAD to <u>Conduct an inter-governmental</u> review of obsolete trade and investment agreements <u>from a sustainable development perspective</u>, with the view to accelerate the replacement and termination of obsolete agreements.</p> <p>d) <u>Trade agreements including WTO rules must not restrict the space for national governments to meet their legitimate obligations under international agreements to fulfil the rights and needs of people, workers, women, etc provided this does not effectively become a protectionist measure against developing countries and their quest for structural transformation.</u></p>	
<p><i>E. Limit trade measures which restrict or distort trade</i></p>	<p>E. Limit <u>Ban</u> trade measures which restrict or distort trade <u>are inconsistent with the principles of international law and the Charter of the United Nations</u></p>	<p>Unilateral trade measures that do not adhere to the principles of international law and the Charter of the United Nations, must simply be rejected. This has also been a clear demand from many developing countries and the African Group. Any such measure must fulfil the conditions mentioned under para e and uphold human rights principles.</p>
<p>a) Call for independent, transparent and inclusive impact assessments of unilateral</p>	<p>a) Call for independent, transparent and inclusive impact assessments of unilateral environmental trade measures on developing countries</p>	

<p>environmental trade measures on developing countries.</p> <p>b) Scale up aid-for-trade support for adjustments linked to unilateral environmental trade measures (e.g., support to develop traceability systems and compliance infrastructure, and reduce the emissions intensity of production)</p> <p>c) Invite the ECOSOC FfD Forum to consider the impact on sustainable development of unilateral economic, financial or trade measures that are inconsistent with the principles of international law and the Charter of the United Nations, building on the work of the United Nations System.</p>	<p>b) Scale up aid for trade support for adjustments linked to unilateral environmental trade measures (e.g., support to develop traceability systems and compliance infrastructure, and reduce the emissions intensity of production)</p> <p>c) Invite the ECOSOC FfD Forum to consider the impact on sustainable development of unilateral economic, financial <u>Ban unilateral</u> trade measures <u>on grounds of sustainability</u> that are inconsistent with the principles of international law and the Charter of the United Nations, building on the work of the United Nations System</p> <p>d) <u>Adopt a balanced and equitable approach to trade and sustainability. Any measure premised on sustainability should be multilaterally agreed, transparent, democratic, based on the principle of CBDR and balance the three dimensions of sustainable development, namely economic, social and environmental.</u></p> <p>e) <u>Welcome the process towards defining Guiding Principles on Sanctions, Business and Human Rights to ensure the promotion, protection and respect for human rights and to fulfil obligations under international law in the sanctions' environment and to eliminate and/or minimize over-compliance with unilateral sanctions in accordance with para. 27 of the Human Rights Council resolution 55/7</u></p>	
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2. Enhance productive capacities to trade		
<i>A. Increase aid-for-trade and adapt it to new challenges</i>		
a) Develop trade-related physical and digital infrastructure, with attention to transport corridor development and trade facilitation, including trade facilitation agreements. b) Support digital trade and strengthen multilateral and regional collaboration on digital trade regulations, cross-border e-commerce rules, and interoperable systems. c) Help producers meet sustainability standards and access green markets. d) Support inclusive and sustainable industrialization, agricultural production and transformation of natural resources.	b) Support digital trade, <u>while retaining policy space for domestic regulations</u> , and strengthen multilateral and regional collaboration on digital trade regulations, cross-border e-commerce rules , and interoperable systems, <u>provided that such cooperation and support arrangements do not undermine but rather strengthen domestic providers and suppliers of services</u> . e) <u>Strengthen regulation and international cooperation to identify and prosecute trafficking of wildlife, illegal logging and mining, illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing and to build the capacity of local communities to contribute to public oversight of natural resources management</u> .	
<i>B. Strengthen trade finance and other measures</i>		
a) Expand trade finance facilities by development banks to enhance access to financing for MSMEs to better integrate in regional and global value chains. b) Provide financial and risk mitigating instruments to support women's economic	a) Expand <u>and improve</u> trade finance facilities by development banks to enhance access to financing for MSMEs to better integrate in regional and global value chains <u>while at the same time ensure that trade finance goes in line with human rights commitments and does</u>	

<p>empowerment through trade, and improve access to finance for youth-owned businesses.</p> <p>c) Re-evaluate risk ratings for trade finance in regulatory systems, such as Basel III.</p> <p>d) Strengthen disaggregated data, for example on gender or race, to guide the formulation and implementation of effective trade policies.</p>	<p><u>not contravene outcomes of multilateral environmental agreements.</u></p> <p>d) Strengthen disaggregated data, for example on gender, or race <u>or disability</u>, to guide the formulation and implementation of effective trade policies.</p>	
4. Trade in critical minerals and commodities		
<p>a) Encourage development partners and international financial institutions to engage in Global Commodity Partnerships to support production, refining and processing of critical minerals in developing countries, and support value-added activities by providing innovative risk-mitigating financing such as guarantees, syndicated finance, technical assistance, and market linkages.</p> <p>b) Provide support to countries to negotiate contract terms that provide predictability and stability in commodity exports, while also providing flexibility to respond to economic changes.</p> <p>c) Promote regional arrangements between commodity-rich and, where applicable,</p>	<p>a) <u>Resource rich developing countries and LDCs must have full policy flexibility to determine their own trade policy with regard to their critical minerals.</u> Encourage Development partners and international financial institutions to engage in Global Commodity Partnerships <u>to should</u> support production, refining and processing of critical minerals <u>within resource rich</u> developing countries <u>and LDC in manners conducive to the structural transformation of their economies and sustainable development</u>, and support <u>beneficiation and</u> value-added activities <u>within those countries of origin</u> by providing innovative risk-mitigating financing such as guarantees, syndicated finance, technical assistance, and market linkages.</p> <p>b) Provide support to countries to negotiate contract terms that provide predictability and stability in commodity exports, while also providing flexibility to respond to</p>	<p>Critical minerals represent an opportunity for African and other developing countries to (a) finance their development from their own resources as well as (b) for these minerals to serve as a vector for industrialisation and transformation of their primary commodity export economies</p> <p>To this end, international finance, trade and investment rules must enable and support the full implementation of such initiatives as the African Mining Vision, and the related African Green Minerals Strategy. Third country laws like the European Critical Raw Materials Law, which seek undisturbed access by European countries to developing country critical minerals as raw materials and thereby perpetuate the primary commodity export syndrome must be discouraged.</p>

<p>neighbouring countries, including for transport infrastructure, processing and resource extraction technology.</p> <p>d) Support the recommendations and guiding principles of the UN Secretary General's Expert Panel on Critical Energy Transition Minerals.</p> <p>e) Encourage collaborative efforts involving governments, regulators, industry stakeholders, and civil society to foster fair, transparent, and resilient commodity markets that benefit all participants and contribute positively to global economic stability and sustainability.</p>	<p>economic changes. Protect and enhance policy space for countries to pursue industrial policies to tackle commodity dependence by promoting commodity-driven industrialization</p> <p>d) Support <u>Take note of</u> the recommendations and guiding principles of the UN Secretary General's Expert Panel on Critical Energy Transition Minerals.</p> <p>f) <u>Ensure publicly accessible information and accountability of the extractive industries – oil, gas and mining companies – allowing for public oversight and independent monitoring, including by local communities, to prevent revenue losses in the countries where resources are extracted from.</u></p>	
<p>Debt and debt sustainability</p>		
<p><i>1. Sustainable and responsible borrowing and lending, and debt crisis prevention</i></p>	<p><i>1. Sustainable and responsible borrowing and lending, and debt crisis prevention <u>and resolution</u></i></p>	
<p>a) Assess, update, and develop a consolidated set of globally endorsed principles on responsible sovereign lending and borrowing through an inclusive process.</p> <p>b) Based on the updated principles, create a working group to design tools for</p>	<p>a) Assess, update, and develop a consolidated set of globally endorsed <u>and binding</u> principles on responsible sovereign lending and borrowing through an inclusive process <u>within a UN Framework Convention on Sovereign Debt</u>.</p> <p>b) Based on the updated principles, create a working group <u>agree onto design</u> tools for monitoring and implementation across the different stages of a sovereign debt cycle,</p>	<p>Voluntary approaches to responsible lending and borrowing principles haven't delivered on an improved quality of financing. The UNCTAD principles should be reviewed and upgraded to binding principles, and define tools to track implementation and ensure compliance.</p>

<p>monitoring and implementation across the different stages of a sovereign debt cycle, including issuance, management, sustainability, repayment and restructuring.</p> <p>c) Enhance debt transparency by both borrowing countries and creditors by improving disclosure, reporting and data reconciliation, for example, through streamlining existing debt databases of IFIs and creating a single global central debt data registry to harmonize debt data reporting.</p> <p>d) Commit to increased transparency and accountability over domestic and external debt issuance and use, particularly through enhanced parliamentary oversight and strengthened public investment management systems.</p> <p>e) Commit to capacity building initiatives to help developing countries better manage their debt and effectively invest the borrowed resources, including understanding the benefits of domestic debt issuance as well as the risks of excessive domestic borrowing.</p> <p>f) Mainstream the inclusion of standardized state-contingent debt clauses, such as climate resilient debt clauses, pandemic clauses and debt standstills during global crises that are</p>	<p>including issuance, management, sustainability, repayment and restructuring.</p> <p>c) Enhance debt transparency by both borrowing countries and creditors by <u>binding improving disclosure, reporting and data reconciliation, accessible to the public, kept at a permanent institution and with the necessary funding for example, through streamlining existing debt databases of IFIs and creating a single global central debt data registry to harmonize debt data reporting in consultation with parliaments and civil society. Such registry should include all debt operations and current holders of outstanding debt and apply to all lenders, including bondholders and other commercial lenders. Registering should be binding for all debt creating operations, and debts not included in the registry should not be enforceable by national courts.</u></p> <p>d) Commit to increased transparency and accountability over domestic and external debt issuance and use, particularly through enhanced parliamentary oversight and strengthened public investment management systems <u>by promoting legislation, both in lender and borrower countries, that mandates transparent, responsible and fair governance and management of sovereign debts.</u></p> <p>e) Commit to capacity building initiatives, <u>following the needs expressed by borrowing countries,</u> to help developing countries better manage their debt and effectively invest the borrowed resources, including understanding the <u>benefits and risks</u> of domestic debt issuance as well as the risks of excessive domestic borrowing.</p> <p>f) <u>Establish an automatic debt service standstill mechanism for all external debt that protects Global South countries from extreme climatic, environmental, economic, health, food and</u></p>	<p>Transparency in public debt is vital for citizens to be able to hold governments and lenders to account for decisions over lending and borrowing policies, and to ensure borrowed resources are used well. Voluntary approaches, like the OECD debt registry, have failed in providing comprehensive transparency. So we value as very positive the proposal for a global binding public debt data registry.</p> <p>A UN framework convention on sovereign debt could promote a protocol or model for domestic legislation on transparent, responsible and fair governance and management of sovereign debts</p> <p>Capacity building initiatives should be defined following borrowing countries' needs and not led by creditors, but by UN agencies or regional institutions.</p>
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<p>not covered by standard force majeure clauses in debt contracts, starting with official lenders; support analysis of obstacles and solutions to help mainstream state-contingent clauses into commercial debt contracts, which could be part of the IMF's debt review in follow-up to the Pact for the Future.</p> <p>g) Encourage official lenders to increase lending in local currencies to address currency risks.</p> <p>h) Explore measures to curb corrupt lending and borrowing, including through a protocol to the UN Convention Against Corruption that makes such contracts unenforceable.</p> <p>i) Encourage the creation of, and support existing, platforms for borrower countries to discuss technical issues, coordinate approaches, and share information and experiences in addressing debt challenges.</p>	<p><u>security shocks, and m</u>Mainstream the inclusion of standardized state-contingent debt clauses, such as climate resilient debt clauses, pandemic clauses and debt standstills during global crises that are not covered by standard force majeure clauses in debt contracts, starting with official lenders; support analysis of obstacles and solutions to help mainstream state-contingent clauses into commercial debt contracts <u>and all public lending, including multilateral and IMF lending, which could be part of the IMF's debt review in follow-up to the Pact for the Future.</u></p> <p>g) Encourage official <u>multilateral and bilateral</u> lenders to increase lending in local currencies to address currency risks, <u>without increasing the borrowing costs.</u></p> <p>h) Explore <u>binding</u> measures to curb corrupt lending and borrowing, including through a protocol to the UN Convention Against Corruption that makes such contracts unenforceable.</p>	<p>Beyond the promotion of CRDCs and other state-contingent debt clauses, FfD4 should agree on advancing towards an automatic debt service standstill mechanism to be applied to all creditors on the wake of external shocks.</p>
<p>2. Expand fiscal space for investment in SDGs in countries facing severe debt challenges and high cost of debt servicing</p>		
<p>a) Encourage official creditors to provide coordinated and enhanced liquidity and liability management support to developing countries committed to ambitious development objectives</p>	<p>a) Encourage <u>Agreement with</u> official <u>and private</u> creditors to provide coordinated and <u>unconditional debt cancellation for global south countries to be able to comply with the 2030 agenda and the Paris Agreement and fulfil fundamental human rights obligations.</u></p>	<p>Civil society proposal is to “Deliver immediate cancellation of all unsustainable and illegitimate debts, from all creditors, consistent with states’ human rights obligations.” LDCs, LLDCs, Mexico and Zambia support the need for debt relief in their inputs to the elements paper. Debt cancellation</p>

<p>through the use of financing tools such as guarantees, credit enhancements, debt swaps and buybacks, etc., as well as legal instruments such as seniority clauses during buybacks to incentivize private creditor participation.</p> <p>b) An institutional home can be created, or an existing facility within an IFI can be scaled up, to support the above initiative. This strengthened facility would:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o coordinate liquidity support from multilateral and bilateral creditors; o coordinate development of term sheets for net present value-neutral rescheduling; o offer a range of financial and legal tools to facilitate or incentivize liability management, without necessarily triggering defaults; o provide countries with technical assistance, capacity support and legal advice, including on the effective use of financial instruments and dealing with sophisticated creditors; o engage with credit rating agencies to address concerns over adverse rating impacts of official debt programs. <p>c) The initiative can also support scaling up debt swaps, when appropriate, and maximizing their impact, including by</p>	<p>and enhanced liquidity and liability management support to developing countries committed to ambitious development objectives through the use of financing tools such as guarantees, credit enhancements, debt swaps and buybacks, etc., as well as legal instruments such as seniority clauses during buybacks to incentivize private creditor participation.</p> <p>b) An institutional home can be created, or an existing facility within an IFI can be scaled up, to support the above initiative. This strengthened facility would. <u>Global north countries, multilateral development banks and the IFIs should support countries facing liquidity constraints by providing sufficient grant-based development and climate finance that does not worsen debt vulnerabilities.</u></p> <p>ELIMINATE SUB-BULLET POINTS</p> <p>ELIMINATE C)</p>	<p>should be unconditional and Member states should agree on eliminating detrimental loan conditionalities that divert crucial resources from ensuring sustained fulfilment of fundamental human rights, SDGs and climate action. Several resolutions of the UNGA and HRC reiterate the obligations to ensure that “debt service does not result in violations of human rights and human dignity and does not prevent the attainment of international development goals” (A/HRC/40/57 and A/HRC/20/23).</p> <p>Liquidity challenges must be addressed by fulfilling the existing commitments on official development finance, paying up the aid debt and climate debt owed to the global south, and by enhancing commitments on climate finance, by providing non-debt creating public finance.</p> <p>Hosting a new financing / liquidity support facility within an IFI will only increase the impact of harmful conditionalities being pushed by IMF and World Bank in particular, including austerity measures, privatisation and PPPs, false market solutions and green conditionalities.</p> <p>Debt swaps have been proved inadequate to address debt vulnerabilities and to provide sufficient resources to tackle liquidity constraints. Before continuing pushing for debt swaps, FfD4 should open a critical analysis of the real impacts and results of existing initiatives.</p>
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simplifying their design, reducing transaction costs and increasing efficiency.		
3. Improve the debt architecture for quicker, fairer and deeper debt resolution to restore countries to a path of sustainable development	Reform to Improve the debt architecture for a timely -quicker, fairer, comprehensive and deeper debt resolution to restore countries to a path of sustainable development and climate action	
<p>a) Building on ongoing efforts, further strengthen the G20 Common Framework:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o encourage debtor countries that need debt relief to actively seek debt treatments, and encourage pre-emptive debt restructuring; o expand coordinated debt treatments to highly indebted countries which are currently ineligible; o standardize debt service suspension during negotiations; o commit to an accelerated, well-defined timeline and defined steps, with enhanced transparency and information sharing; o develop an accessible guideline for assessing comparability of treatment (CoT), including on how changes in different CoT parameters count towards a creditor's contribution to the 	<p>a) on ongoing efforts, further strengthen the G20 Common Framework <u>Initiate an intergovernmental process in the United Nations to review existing debt architecture with the aim to establish a UN Framework Convention on Sovereign Debt that addresses the necessary reforms in the global debt architecture for the prevention and resolution of debt crises by:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o encourage debtor countries that need debt relief to actively seek debt treatments, <u>Establish a fair and transparent multilateral sovereign debt resolution mechanism in order to deliver on sufficient debt restructuring and cancellation for the borrowing countries to be able to fulfil its international human rights obligations, achieve the SDGs, ensure gender equality, and implement the necessary climate actions</u> and encourage pre-emptive debt restructuring; o expand coordinated debt treatments to highly indebted countries which are currently ineligible; <u>Agree on the principles and parameters that should guide a fair debt restructuring, including the need for unconditional debt cancellation, from all creditors, to all countries that need it.</u> o ELIMINATE THE REMAINING SUB-BULLET POINTS 	<p>Building on a fail creditor-led scheme like the Common Framework is woefully inadequate. Fails to address the systemic and recurring nature of debt crises and to acknowledge the need for a comprehensive reform of the debt architecture, leaving behind creditor-led solutions and building a new multilateral governance of sovereign debt issues.</p> <p>The proposal for the UN Framework Convention on Sovereign Debt builds on the Monterey Consensus, and the proposals included by Pakistan, Egypt, Nigeria and Zambia in their inputs to the elements paper calling for a legal framework. Such a Framework Convention would allow to discuss and agree, in equal footing, on the reforms needed through the whole debt cycle, including the necessary establishment of a multilateral sovereign debt resolution mechanism, as supported by the African Group, LDCs, Brazil, Pakistan, Egypt and Nigeria, Colombia, Iran and Zambia, in their inputs to the elements paper.</p> <p>The need for the UN to support passing domestic legislations in creditor countries, particularly major financial jurisdictions, to prevent holdout creditors to disrupt debt restructuring, is very much welcomed.</p>

<p>overall debt treatment, and refine tools for enforcing CoT;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o enhance technical support for debtor countries (which could be through the above facility), including development/use of a user manual for debtors with clear timelines. <p>b) Encourage passing domestic legislations in major financial jurisdictions to limit holdout creditors and facilitate effective debt restructuring.</p> <p>c) Set up a working group to develop a model law on debt restructuring for Member States to consider adopting as part of their domestic legislation, including to guard against disruption of debt restructuring processes by holdout creditors.</p> <p>d) Strengthen contractual provisions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o assess and refine contractual provisions (such as most-favored creditor clauses, claw back clauses and loss reinstatement features) that incentivize and ensure participation of private creditors in debt restructuring processes; o encourage continued adoption of collective action mechanisms, including majority voting provisions in loan agreements, to 	<p>b) Encourage passing domestic legislations, <u>at least</u> in major financial jurisdictions, <u>that are responsive to future improvements in the international debt architecture</u> to limit holdout creditors and facilitate effective debt restructuring.</p> <p>c) Set up a working group to develop a model law on debt restructuring for Member States to consider adopting as part of their domestic legislation, including to guard against disruption of debt restructuring processes by holdout creditors.</p> <p>f) Look forward to the review of the sovereign debt architecture by the IMF, as envisioned in the Pact for the Future.</p> <p>g) Building on existing work, the review of the sovereign debt architecture and the Secretary General's update on progress and proposals, initiate an intergovernmental process in the United Nations to follow up, <u>Initiate an intergovernmental process in the United Nations to review existing debt architecture with the aim to establish a UN Framework Convention on Sovereign Debt</u> to closing gaps in the debt architecture and to explore the need for <u>establish</u> a multilateral sovereign debt restructuring mechanism.</p>	<p>SEE PROPOSAL FOR a)</p> <p>We welcome the inclusion of a multilateral sovereign debt resolution mechanism, as envisioned in the Monterrey consensus. We understand that the outcome of the FfD4 conference cannot be yet another 'follow up' and 'explore' the need, but an agreement for setting up such a mechanism.</p> <p>(ITUC) International debt architecture must be urgently and structurally reformed, to provide for quick, fair and sustainable debt resolution. In our view, the G20 Common Framework for debt treatment has thus far proven inadequate in fulfilling this task. The FFD4 must deliver a clear commitment to set up a permanent multilateral process to tackle sovereign debt challenges led by the UN. Moreover, multilateral institutions and governments should proactively work to hold private creditors accountable for their share of debt relief and discourage holdouts. Debt relief and new multilateral financing should ensure equal treatment of national and international creditors, be additional to existing commitments and used alongside international tax reform and an expansion of public development finance to ensure adequate investments in recovery and to avoid debt traps while creating fiscal space for investments in the SDGs</p>
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<p>minimize the risk of hold-out creditors;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o review the design of value recovery instruments negotiated during debt restructurings and develop operational guidelines for their use. <p>e) Support entities such as the African Legal Support Facility, which provide legal and financial advice to developing countries during negotiations and structuring of complex debt transactions and work outs with creditors; and/or utilize the above facility for this purpose.</p> <p>f) Look forward to the review of the sovereign debt architecture by the IMF, as envisioned in the Pact for the Future.</p> <p>g) Building on existing work, the review of the sovereign debt architecture and the SecretaryGeneral's update on progress and proposals, initiate an intergovernmental process in the United Nations to follow-up, with a view to closing gaps in the debt architecture and to explore the need for a multilateral sovereign debt restructuring mechanism.</p>		
4. Debt sustainability assessments		
<p>a) Build on the ongoing LIC-DSF review by the IMF and World Bank, refine debt sustainability assessments to: 1) better account for SDG spending needs; 2)</p>	<p>Build on the ongoing LIC-DSF review by the IMF and World Bank, refine debt sustainability assessments to: 1) better account for SDG spending needs Develop a new approach to assess Build on the ongoing LIC-DSF review by the IMF and World Bank, refine debt sustainability assessments to: 1) better account for SDG spending needs and human rights; 2) better capture climate</p>	

<p>better capture climate and nature risks; 3) account for investments (e.g. in resilience, nature protection, and productive capacity) and their impact on long-term growth and sustainable development, which requires a longer-term perspective; 4) more accurately distinguish between solvency and liquidity; and 5) develop and implement the revised methodology in an open and transparent manner.</p>	<p>and nature risks; 3) account for investments (e.g. in resilience, nature protection, and productive capacity) and their impact on long-term growth and sustainable development, which requires a longer-term perspective; 4) more accurately distinguish between solvency and liquidity; and 5) develop and implement the revised methodology in an open and transparent manner <u>and 6) include ex-post and ex-ante gender, human rights and environmental impacts assessments and audits to identify illegitimate debts.</u></p>	
Addressing systemic issues		
1. Modernized global economic governance	1. Modernized Democratize global economic governance	
<p>a) Further IMF quota realignment to enhance developing country voice and better reflect members' relative positions in the world economy, while protecting the shares of the poorest members; consider restoring IMF basic votes back to their original share of the total.</p> <p>b) Conduct a speedy and successful World Bank Shareholding review in 2025 that ensures a more equitable balance of voting power at the institution.</p> <p>c) Consider increasing the size of the board of directors at the IFIs; commit to improving diversity and gender balance in the executive boards of international organizations.</p> <p>d) Regular reviews by international organizations, in collaboration with shareholders, on diversity in executive</p>	<p><u>As proposed under the MDB section of the IDC action area there is an urgent need for:</u></p> <p><u>UN-led intergovernmental process to review and rethink the ecosystem of public development banks and international financial institutions. The ecosystem review will also include, in a proper wider context, the review of the mandates and governance structures of IFIs: which will aim to:</u></p> <p><u>a) Re-purpose and re-structure IFIs to support sustainable development progress in the context of the overall financing ecosystem</u></p> <p><u>b) Democratize the governance of IFIs, including by adjusting the size of their boards, adequately redistributing voting rights, eliminate veto powers, among others</u></p> <p><u>c) Enhance transparency and ensure adequate public scrutiny of the decisions, policies and programmes of IFIs</u></p> <p><u>d) Establish adequate and independent accountability mechanisms that can address and redress complaints by</u></p>	<p>The IMF's 16th quota review failed to generate a new formula to increase the vote share of under-represented members, or adequately redistribute voting rights. The imperative for expansion and redistribution of voting power is therefore on the table for FFD4. However, FfD4 should break the cycle of past promises, failed attempts and proposals for what ultimately may prove to be only minor adjustments.</p> <p>Time has come for a profound review of the IFI/MDB ecosystem and such a system review needs to be undertaken by the UNGA.</p>

<p>and senior leadership to address geographic underrepresentation, including by adding a fifth Deputy Managing Director at the IMF for Africa.</p> <p>e) Enhance transparency, accountability of decision making at international organizations.</p>	<p><u>communities and social groups affected by IFI programmes and decision-making</u></p>	
<p>2. Revamping the global financial safety net</p>	<p>2. Revamping <u>Strengthen</u> the global financial safety net for <u>developing countries</u></p>	<p>The financial safety net for developed economies is large and solid, as demonstrated during the COVID-19 crisis and beyond. This section needs to deliberate address the weak financial safety net for developing countries</p>
<p>a) Welcome IMF facilities reviews in 2023 and 2024, and discuss creating much larger pools of resources, accessible to all countries, for fast disbursement in response to shocks and emergencies, for example through an IMF multilateral swap line or regional arrangements.</p> <p>b) Provide emergency and stand-by IMF resources based on need rather than borrowing limits.</p> <p>c) Welcome recent action on IMF surcharges and call for more action to help vulnerable countries.</p> <p>d) Ensure Resilience and Sustainability Trust is not tied to short-term balance of payment financing.</p>	<p>a) Welcome IMF facilities reviews in 2023 and 2024, and discuss creating much larger pools of resources, <u>particularly those</u> accessible to all <u>developing countries and LDCs</u>, for fast disbursement in response to shocks and emergencies, for example through an IMF multilateral swap line or regional arrangements.</p> <p>b) Provide emergency and stand-by IMF resources based on need rather than borrowing limits, <u>making sure that emergency lending neither creates additional debt not be attached to fiscal consolidation conditions that create and exacerbate intersectional inequalities, in particular gendered inequalities.</u></p> <p>c) Welcome recent action on <u>Take definitive action to eliminate</u> IMF surcharges and call for more action to help vulnerable countries.</p> <p>d) Ensure Resilience and Sustainability Trust is not tied to short-term balance of payment financing <u>and does not</u></p>	<p>On (d) IMF's recommendation to legislate carbon pricing and markets, which is a feature in some RST lending frameworks, must be assessed and reviewed for its impacts on environmental, climate and economic outcomes.</p> <p>With regard to the PRGT review in (e) the longstanding reality of fiscal consolidation conditions and its well-documented impacts on inequalities through the channels of public budget cuts, regressive taxation and privatisation schemes must be addressed.</p> <p>Regarding (f) on SDR, rechannelling needs to take place outside of loan facilities. Welcome (g) on new playbook through review of SDRs with a focus on decoupling SDR allocation from quotas and assessing</p>

<p>e) Welcome the recent PRGT review and call for increasing the IMF's self-sustaining capacity to lend concessional resources.</p> <p>f) Invite issuance of new SDRs to help address the developing country debt crisis and encourage countries in a position to do so to commit to rechanneling 50% of current unused SDRs expeditiously.</p> <p>g) Welcome IMF SDRs issuance in 2021 and review SDRs to create a new playbook that strengthens their role, including:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o a rules-based approach to SDR issuance decisions to speed up approval of issuances; o create international commitment based on voluntary ex ante agreements to facilitate expeditious re-channelling of unused SDRs to countries in need; o consider approaches that allow SDR allocations that respond specifically to the need of vulnerable countries during future financial crises and shocks. <p>h) Strengthen existing regional arrangements that serve as layers in the safety net and close gaps in coverage by supporting the creation of robust new regional arrangements, for example in Africa.</p>	<p><u>involve conditionalities on policy reforms, including legislations on carbon pricing and markets</u></p> <p>e) Welcome the recent PRGT review, <u>provided it includes an independent assessment on the impact of fiscal consolidation conditions on inequalities</u>, and call for increasing the IMF's self-sustaining capacity to lend concessional resources</p> <p>f) Invite <u>Demand</u> issuance of new SDRs to help address the developing country debt crisis and encourage countries in a position to do so to commit to rechanneling 50% of current unused SDRs expeditiously, <u>outside of loan facilities and without conditions</u>.</p> <p>g) Welcome IMF SDRs issuance in 2021 and review SDRs to create a new playbook that strengthens their role, including:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • a rules-based approach to SDR issuance decisions to speed up approval of issuances; o create international commitment based on voluntary ex ante agreements to facilitate expeditious re-channelling of unused SDRs to countries in need; • consider approaches, <u>like decoupling from IMF quota system</u>, that allow SDR allocations that respond specifically to the need of vulnerable countries during future financial crises and shocks. <p>h) <u>Establish new robust agreements, for example for Africa, and strengthen existing ones so that they can serve as a safety net against financial and economic crises stemming from the fragility of the international monetary system based on the US Dollar.</u></p>	<p>a needs-based formula through examining liquidity gaps.</p> <p>With regard to regional arrangements for safety net in (h) to re-examine previous regional arrangements that were not operationalized or were prematurely closed down.</p>
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3. Regulation for a sustainable financial system		
<p>a) Launch a review of the potential mispricing of risk in international risk-weighting frameworks used in regulation, such as Basel III, to ensure that weightings correctly reflect risks in different country contexts, including for guarantees and blended finance, SMEs, infrastructure, and trade finance.</p> <p>b) Amend international risk weighting frameworks, building on the above review and to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o reduce mechanistic reliance on credit-rating agency assessments, further change references to credit ratings to address increases in capital charges from downgrades and challenges from the sovereign ceiling, building on existing global commitments; o include sustainability factors in risk weightings. <p>c) Develop a prudential regulation framework for LDCs and less developed markets with different risk profiles.</p> <p>d) Create or find a space for regular dialogue among Member States, credit rating agencies, regulators, standard setters, long-term investors, and other public institutions, initial discussions could address, for example, more appropriate</p>	<p>Para to (b), (d) and (e) to be replaced as follows (para (a), (c) and (f) to be integrated in the work of the commission):</p> <p>a) <u>Establish a universal, intergovernmental commission under ECOSOC to regulate Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) including ESG rating bureaus, to examine needed international institutional innovations required to correct and avert the adverse impacts of CRAs</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o <u>address current dysfunctions, from a developing country perspective, in terms of bias and pro-cyclicality in ratings, market concentration and dominant position, and conflicts of interest</u> o <u>study proposals such as establishing an international public credit rating agency at the UN to provide more transparent and equitable assessments of creditworthiness</u> o <u>review the potential mispricing of risk in international risk-weighting frameworks used in regulation, such as Basel III, to ensure that weightings correctly reflect risks in different country contexts, including for guarantees and blended finance, SMEs, infrastructure, and trade finance (current sub-para a)</u> o <u>develop a prudential regulation framework for LDCs and less developed markets with different risk profiles (current sub-para c)</u> 	<p>On (b), there is widespread agreement on the need to regulate CRAs. While this is a long-lasting issue, recent pandemic and debt crises exposed the current dysfunctions, from a developing country perspective, in terms of bias and pro-cyclicality in ratings, market concentration and dominant position, and conflicts of interest. Current debates are largely focused on soft interventions and voluntary measures, often with the direct participation of those same market actors that need to be regulated. The UN should lead in furthering CRA supervision and regulation, including ESG rating bureaus, by convening a universal, intergovernmental commission under ECOSOC to examine needed international institutional innovations required to correct and avert the adverse impacts of CRAs. The Commission should also further study proposals such as establishing an international public credit rating agency at the UN to provide more transparent and equitable assessments of creditworthiness</p> <p>Welcome (a) on review of potential mispricing of risk and (c) on developing a prudential risk framework for LDCs and urge that the review process is conducted with inclusion of LDC nations and (f) on incorporating climate and urge the examination of how climate-induced disasters lead to rating downgrades with a view to correcting this trend.</p>

<p>rating actions during debt swaps/restructurings.</p> <p>e) Promote transparent, objective and long-term model-based ratings; implementation could be by rating agencies themselves, through consistent regulatory regimes for ratings agencies, or through a public entity.</p> <p>f) Incorporate climate transition plans and climate stress testing into financial regulation.</p> <p>g) Consider a global agreement on the importance of capital account management.</p> <p>h) Consider a global regulatory framework for the asset management industry.</p>	<p>o <u>Incorporate climate transition plans and climate stress testing into financial regulation (current sub-para f)</u></p> <p>b) Consider a global agreement <u>under the aegis of the UN</u> on the importance of capital account management.</p> <p>c) Consider a <u>Establish a UN</u> global regulatory framework <u>to adequately regulate and supervise</u> for the asset management industry.</p>	<p>Very much welcome the inclusion of (g) and (h) to reform the current monetary and financial frameworks that undermine the economic, monetary and financial sovereignty of developing countries, trapping them into currency hierarchies, liquidity challenges and tight monetary policies that restrict their policy and fiscal space for structural transformation and economic diversification, with real-economy effects on the cost of living, employment opportunities and social expenditures. It is essential for all UN Member States to assess the current system from both developmental and global financial stability perspectives and undertake decisive steps towards financial regulation, recognizing the limitations of voluntary non-binding measures.</p>
<p>4. Enhancing public payment systems with digital technologies</p>	<p><u>This section might be better integrated with the one on Technology in order to ensure adequate assessment of digital technologies, from a developing country perspective, and ensure technology regulation and governance.</u></p>	
<p>a) Invite further discussion on how to create central bank digital currencies that harness the benefits of digital technologies, increase efficiency of cross-border payments, and address potential macro risks.</p> <p>b) Capacity building to assist developing countries to make robust design and implementation decisions about central bank digital currencies.</p>		

Science, technology, innovation and capacity building		
1. Closing the digital divide in support of financing for development		
<p>a) Increase investment in resilient digital public infrastructure and digital public goods, including within the framework of national STI4SDG roadmaps. As part of the roadmaps, countries are encouraged to articulate strategies and programmes to identify gaps, ensure gender inclusion, develop financing plans (linked to INFF, where possible), and coordinate investment and technical support from partners through a country-led platform.</p> <p>b) Enhance international collaboration between national governments, DFIs, and private actors to design digital infrastructure financing models and impact measurement in support of the Global Digital Compact's commitment to develop innovative and blended financing mechanisms that can close the connectivity gap and improve the quality and affordability of connectivity. Leverage existing initiatives, including broader blended finance initiatives, to mobilize resources to accelerate investment in digital infrastructure.</p> <p>c) Invite countries to include updates on their progress made on investment in digital infrastructure and digital public goods in the</p>	<p>a) Increase investment in resilient digital public infrastructure and digital public goods, including within the framework of national STI4SDG roadmaps. As part of the roadmaps, countries are encouraged to articulate strategies and programmes to identify gaps, ensure gender <u>and disability</u> inclusion, develop financing plans (linked to INFF, where possible), and coordinate investment and technical support from partners through a country-led platform. <u>This should include investing in and deploying satellites and local network initiatives, that provide safe and secure network coverage to all areas, including rural, remote and "hard-to-reach" areas in support of the Global Digital Compact's commitment.</u></p> <p>b) Enhance international collaboration between national governments, DFIs, and private actors to design digital infrastructure financing models and impact measurement in support of the Global Digital Compact's commitment to develop innovative and blended financing mechanisms that can close the connectivity gap and improve the quality and affordability of connectivity. Leverage existing initiatives, including broader blended finance initiatives, to mobilize resources to accelerate investment in digital infrastructure. <u>International collaboration and initiatives on digital infrastructure financing should be transparent and publicly accountable.</u></p> <p>d) Invite countries to introduce and implement comprehensive digital literacy programmes that target all segments of society, including women, <u>persons with</u></p>	<p>This is also a commitment of the Global Digital Compact right after the one on blended finance that is cited in the Elements paper: <i>c) "Invest in and deploy resilient digital infrastructure, including satellites and local network initiatives, that provide safe and secure network coverage to all areas, including rural, remote and "hard-to-reach" areas, and promote equitable access to satellite orbits, taking into account the needs of developing countries. We will aim for universal access at affordable rates and at sufficient speeds as well as reliability to enable meaningful use of the Internet (SDGs 9 and 11)</i></p> <p>This also was included in the submission to the inputs for the Element Paper from the "Impact Coalition on International Finance Architecture and Financing for Development"</p> <p>Digital infrastructure initiatives and collaborations involving governments, DFIs and private actors need to be transparent and accountable.</p>

<p>Financing for Development Forum and the SDG Investment Fair.</p> <p>d) Invite countries to introduce and implement comprehensive digital literacy programmes that target all segments of society, including women, youth, and marginalised communities.</p>	<p><u>disabilities, youth, and other marginalised communities without undermining the provision of basic services and social protection.</u></p> <p>e) <u>Bridge the digital divide across gender, communities and countries by addressing the underpinning inequalities in access to and control over resources</u></p> <p>f) <u>Education systems must ensure the right to education and provide free and open, easily accessible, contextually relevant curricula and support high-quality digital education content for learners, teachers, parents, and communities in public education systems. Governments must legislate and enforce effective regulatory measures for private sector providers to ensure the right to education and that education remains a public good.</u></p>	<p>Implementation of comprehensive digital literacy should not be at the costs of reducing resources and investments intended for basic services and provision of social protection to marginalized sectors, in the context of shrinking public investments. Funds for programs in digital literacy should be in addition to resources allocated for education and literacy.</p> <p>The digital divide is essentially about the Development Divide. In order to bridge the digital divide in a sustainable way, inequalities in access to and control over resources need to be addressed.</p> <p>The rapid spread and increase of EdTech programmes have also led to broader discussions about the future of education and ultimately learners, both children and young people and adults' rights. Many EdTech providers are non-state actors working within the education sector in a given context[1]. Many of these companies utilise business models that sell EdTech solutions without an open-source license[2] directly to schools, other learning institutions, students, learners and parents. Governments must push back against the privatization and commercialization of education through EdTech.</p>
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2. Leverage technological advances for sustainable development		
<i>A. Strengthen technology transfer, knowledge sharing, and capacity building</i>		
<p>a) Ensure intellectual property regimes and the application of the TRIPS flexibilities contribute to innovation and sustainable development.</p> <p>b) Develop a common understanding of “incentives” provided by developed countries – many of which would be financial in nature – for their enterprises and institutions to promote and encourage technology transfer to LDCs, which are obligated in the TRIPS Agreement.</p> <p>c) Enhance national and international cooperation between actors in the ecosystems for open science, open data, digital public goods, affordable and open-source technology, research, and education.</p> <p>d) Develop and implement better models of collaborative international research and development that foster innovation and ensure accessibility to countries in need.</p> <p>e) Operationalize Online University for LDCs to promote STEM education.</p>	<p>c) Enhance national and international cooperation between actors, <u>including civil society and non-state actors</u>, in the ecosystems for open science, open data, digital public goods, affordable and open-source technology, research, and education.</p> <p>d) Develop and implement better models of collaborative international research and development that foster innovation and ensure accessibility to <u>developing</u> countries, in need particular LDCs.</p> <p><u>f) Promote and support South-South sharing, exchanges and mutual learning in science, technology and innovation</u></p> <p><u>g) Enable and support for community/local innovations that respond to actual needs of people, utilize local capacities and sustainably use resources</u></p> <p><u>g) Support for development of endogenous technologies particularly in developing countries and LDCs</u></p>	<p>We advocate for open data and digital public goods to bolster the integrity of public financial management, including public procurement, and development finance.</p> <p>We would like to see clearer reference to engaging with civil society to leverage open data for development.</p> <p>Technology transfer, knowledge sharing and capacity building should be multi-directional (i.e., South-North, North-South, South-South, triangular, local to international, etc.) and also be based on recognition of and promotion of diverse sources of knowledge, including indigenous and traditional knowledge systems.</p>

<p><i>B. Leveraging STI for achieving SDGs</i></p>		
<p>a) Support countries to develop and implement national STI4SDG roadmaps that foster an enabling environment to incentivize innovations aligned with sustainable development; provide expert support and training on strategic STI governance, regulation, and institutions for STI policy in developing countries, especially in SIDS, LDCs, LLDCs, and Africa.</p> <p>b) Call for strengthened competition laws that are adapted to the digital economy, to protect innovation and technological development, and deepened international cooperation between national competition authorities, given the global reach of major technology firms and the impact of regulatory spillover.</p> <p>c) Promote equitable access to AI; ensure adequate financing for capacity building for AI adoption, for development of a regulatory ecosystem that promotes safe, secure, and trustworthy AI systems, and for facilitating developing countries' participation in the global AI dialogue, while taking into consideration the previous internationally agreed outcomes.</p>	<p>To add:</p> <p><u>d) Institutionalize technology foresight and horizon scanning capacities and mechanisms at the national, regional and global levels to anticipate technologies that may have impacts on the environment, climate, health, livelihoods and society.</u></p> <p><u>g) Ensure that new and emerging technologies do not lead to further depletion of resources, the climate and biodiversity crises ,and destruction of the environment.</u></p>	<p>To effectively leverage STI for achieving SDGs, capacity for technology foresight and horizon scanning need to be ensured at different levels. The environmental costs and impacts of new and emerging technologies need to be understood and analyzed to ensure that they do not undermine the SDGs.</p>

<i>C. Financing for STI and capacity building</i>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) Enhance access to STI funds, ensuring that resources are directed to countries and regions with the greatest need. b) Strengthen the capacity of the Technology Bank for LDCs and the UN Technology Facilitation Mechanism (TFM) with adequate resources so they can effectively fulfill their mandates. c) Call for the IFIs to enhance support to STI projects in developing countries. 	<p>Add:</p> <p><u>d) Provide financing to local innovations including through direct access for communities to global and regional funds for STI and capacity building.</u></p>	<p>Local communities should be provided with direct access to funding facilities at the regional and global levels in order to support endogenous innovations and build capacities.</p>
<i>D. Strengthen the UN Technology Facilitation Mechanism (TFM)</i>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) Enhance collaboration among the STI Forum, the Commission on Science and Technology for Development, and other international platforms. b) Undertake an assessment of the major obstacles that hamper international diffusion of technologies for the SDGs, especially green technologies, through the Interagency Task Team on STI for the SDGs. c) Mandate the STI Forum to promote digital infrastructure-related knowledge sharing, including on investment risks and opportunities, among DFIs and other partners. d) Under the TFM, establish a global sustainability science centre that can drive demonstration projects in 	<p>Add:</p> <p>a) Enhance collaboration among the STI Forum, the Commission on Science and Technology for Development, and other international platforms, <u>including by working together towards the establishment of an inclusive, transparent and participatory global mechanism at the UN for the evaluation of new and emerging technologies, inter alia artificial intelligence, and their actual and potential impacts on society, economy, environment and the climate.</u></p> <p>b) Undertake an assessment of <u>Understand and address</u> the major obstacles that hamper international diffusion of technologies for the SDGs, especially green technologies, through the Interagency Task Team on STI for the SDGs.</p>	<p>There are already several CSTD Resolutions on the need to establish a global mechanism on technology assessment and UNCTAD has completed a pilot project on technology assessment in Africa. The rapid advances in frontier technologies including artificial intelligence, there is urgency in creating a global mechanism on technology assessment under the UN.</p> <p>Original formulation is too operational level details addressed to the TFM that should be converted to more strategic elements.</p>

agriculture, health, water, sanitation, energy, climate, and biodiversity.		
3. Realizing the full potential of financial technology in achieving financial inclusion and financial health		
a) Support countries in creating an enabling environment for fintech development, underpinned by adaptive regulatory frameworks that effectively manage the opportunities and risks of new technologies. b) Encourage countries to foster partnerships between local banks and fintech firms to expand financial inclusion services' reach, especially in rural areas.	a) Support countries in creating an enabling environment for fintech development, underpinned by adaptive regulatory frameworks that effectively manage the opportunities and risks of new technologies <u>while ensuring that the interests and welfare of people are protected.</u> b) Encourage countries to foster partnerships between local banks and fintech firms to expand financial inclusion services' reach, especially in rural areas <u>with particular attention to gender and disability inclusion.</u>	
Data, monitoring and follow-up		
2. Data frameworks for sustainable development, accessibility and innovation		
a) Continue to strengthen the SDG indicator framework, including support for enhancing the consistent reporting on and use of SDG indicator 17.3.1 and prioritization of high-quality, disaggregated data collection, including on gender and vulnerable groups. b) Promote open, interoperable data platforms and standards to improve data sharing and accessibility, addressing challenges for developing countries.	Continue to strengthen the SDG indicator framework, including support for enhancing the consistent reporting on and use of SDG indicator 17.3.1 and prioritization of high-quality, disaggregated data collection, including on gender and vulnerable groups <u>income, age, race, ethnicity, migratory status, disability, geographic location, and other characteristics.</u>	

<p>c) Enhanced coordination on data among IFIs, the UN, Member States, and development agencies should be encouraged.</p> <p>d) Leverage innovation in non-traditional data sources like citizen-generated data and remote sensing, supported by public-private partnerships and SMART indicators.</p>		
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