

# SERIOUSLY ASIA REVISITED

POLITICS AND SECURITY  
BETWEEN AOTEAROA  
NEW ZEALAND AND ASIA

By David Capie and  
Bethan K. Greener

**Designed by**

Ocean Design | [www.oceandesign.com](http://www.oceandesign.com)

© Asia New Zealand Foundation

**Published**

March 2023

**ISBN (PDF)**

978-1-99-117185-6

Seriously Asia - Politics and Security - PDF

**ISBN (Print)**

978-1-99-117184-9

Seriously Asia - Politics and Security - print

**Disclaimer**

Comments made in this research report do not necessarily represent the views of the Asia New Zealand Foundation Te Whītau Tūhono.

**Photos**

Cover image: Omotesando Tokyo Street,  
Asia New Zealand Foundation supplied.

Page 3: Kyoto Prefecture, Japan by Andre Benz  
(Unsplash).

Page 6: Tokyo, Japon by Adrien Bruneau (Unsplash).

Page 8: Amber Palace, Jaipur, India  
by Frank Holleman (Unsplash).

Page 11: Wellington, New Zealand  
by Xylene Ladores (Unsplash).

---

## ABOUT SERIOUSLY ASIA REVISITED

In 2003, at the request of the then Prime Minister Helen Clark, the Asia New Zealand Foundation — at the time known as Asia 2000 — ran the Seriously Asia initiative. It was a project designed to inject new ideas and energy into New Zealand's connections with Asia. The initiative canvassed views from across the country and in Asia; helped to grow New Zealanders' understanding of the region; and developed a set of recommendations to guide New Zealand's engagement with Asia in the years that followed.

In recognition of the far-reaching changes that had taken place in New Zealand and Asia over two decades, in 2022 the Asia New Zealand Foundation launched Seriously Asia Revisited. This project brought together a cross-section of informed voices to discuss how to best position New Zealand for success in Asia in the coming decades.

Seriously Asia Revisited is structured around the themes of the original Seriously Asia project. They are:

- Society and Culture
- Politics and Security
- Trade, Tourism and Investment
- Innovation and Sustainable Development


---

## ABOUT THIS PAPER

The Asia New Zealand Foundation Te Whītau Tūhono commissioned this paper as one of four thematic reports that revisit the outcomes and recommendations of the 2003 Seriously Asia initiative. The papers reflect on how the context of New Zealand-Asia relationships have changed since 2003, what has been achieved and what could be done differently going forward. These papers informed a series of four hui held over the course of 2022. Hui participants shared their perspectives on the themes and contributed to recommendations on how New Zealand could best engage with Asia in the years ahead.

---

## EDITOR-IN- CHIEF



### Finlay Macdonald

Finlay Macdonald is an award-winning journalist, editor, publisher and broadcaster with 30 years' experience in the New Zealand media. He is senior editor at The Conversation NZ., and has been editor of the *NZ Listener* magazine, a publisher at Penguin Books and HarperCollins, a weekly columnist for the *Sunday Star-Times*, and has written and presented for television and radio.

## ABOUT THE AUTHORS



### Professor David Capie

David is Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies and Professor of International Relations at Victoria University of Wellington Te Herenga Waka. His research interests focus on conflict and security issues, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region, and New Zealand's foreign and defence policy. He has authored or co-authored three books and numerous articles and book chapters. His research has been supported by the Rockefeller Foundation, the East-West Center and the Royal Society of New Zealand's Marsden Fund. David has held visiting positions at the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs at Harvard University and at LUISS Guido Carli in Rome. He is currently regional co-chair of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) and was a member of the ASEAN Regional Forum Experts and Eminent Persons Group from 2012 to 2019.



### Professor Bethan (Beth) Greener

Beth is a Professor of International Relations at Massey University Te Kunenga ki Pūrehuroa. Her research focuses on how states and others seek to provide for security and what this means for world order. She has published widely on international security topics such as how states use various agencies for security provision, UN peacekeeping, Asia-Pacific security, New Zealand foreign and defence policy issues, and gender and security topics. Beth has been a member of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) since 2004, was nominated to act as New Zealand's ASEAN Regional Forum Eminent Expert Person from 2020 and has regularly engaged in Track II and Track 1.5 diplomatic efforts in the Asia-Pacific region.

---

## INTRODUCTION

Much has changed in the 20 years since the 2003 launch of the first Seriously Asia project, and this short paper explores New Zealand's evolving political and security relationship with Asia over the past two decades. It starts with how things looked in 2003; then takes stock of New Zealand's position today; and finally outlines some future challenges and opportunities. This paper therefore identifies what were seen as the most pressing issues in the political and security sphere in 2003, what has endured and what has fallen away, and what new dynamics have emerged. Finally, it makes some suggestions about what is needed for New Zealand to thrive into the future.



---

## SERIOUSLY ASIA: 2003

In 2003, New Zealanders were starting to recognise that building political and security relations in Asia was a “prime objective” and that this goal was based on the idea that New Zealand’s future security and prosperity relied on Asia-Pacific security. At the time, much was being made of the promise of a liberalising India and the rise of China. In a 2003 speech marking the 30th anniversary of New Zealand–China ties, then-Prime Minister Helen Clark said, “The next decades in China will be exciting to watch, and will be of the greatest importance to New Zealand. New Zealand’s future prosperity and the world’s prosperity are linked to China’s growth and development.”

While the shock of the 9/11 terror attacks propelled counter-terrorism cooperation to the forefront of international security engagement, New Zealand had cause to be cautiously optimistic about the future of the Asia-Pacific region and New Zealand’s place within it. Even as it was shrugging off the effects of the 1997 financial crisis, in 2003 Asia was taking 36 percent of New Zealand’s exports and was a major source of immigration, tourism and foreign students.

China was a rising power viewed as an emerging driver of change and growth in the region, while being seen to take a “cautious and constructive” approach to Taiwan. Regional stability was buttressed by the United States (US) as the dominant balancing power and by Japan’s regional diplomatic engagement.

The dominating concerns of 2003 were not therefore those related to competition between countries, but rather to the risks of terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction and the destabilising impact of internal conflicts – such as those in Aceh (Indonesia) and Mindanao (Philippines).

New Zealand’s approach to defence and security was also in a dynamic phase. The despatch of a battalion of troops to East Timor in 1999 marked the military’s largest deployment since the Vietnam War. Labour’s Clark government dismantled New Zealand’s small air combat capability and instead focused on low-intensity conflicts, peace operations and disaster relief. And despite the emphasis placed on Asia as being key to New Zealand’s own security, in practice Defence would spend much of the next two decades focused either on operations in Afghanistan and the Middle East, or in the South Pacific.

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum (ARF) and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) were identified in 2003 as valuable institutions, albeit constrained by the need for consensus building. The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation was seen as a useful platform from which to discuss evolving counter-terrorism issues and as an important arena for developing Sino–Russian relationships. The ASEAN Plus Three initiative (including ASEAN members as well as China, South Korea and Japan) was viewed positively, as another grouping able to augment regional security and prosperity. The 2002 Declaration of Conduct on the South China Sea, signed by ASEAN and China, was viewed as a “modest welcome step” towards increased peace and security in the region.

At the time, the fluid and open nature of the international and regional geopolitical situation was one shaped and anchored by a backdrop of US hegemony. The broad enabling environment created by this context provided space for participants in the 2003 Seriously Asia discussions to ask what New Zealand’s distinctive style of engagement in the region should be, and whether lessons could be learnt from Australia. They suggested New Zealand would have to prioritise diplomatic efforts and that East Asia would be our most important site of engagement.

---

## CONTINUITY AND CHANGE SINCE 2003

Over the past 20 years since Seriously Asia began in 2003, there has been both continuity and change. Most importantly, Asia remains vital for New Zealand's prosperity and security. More than half of the country's exports go to Asia, and political ties have deepened both bilaterally and through the plethora of multilateral institutions that give New Zealand a voice in regional conversations. New Zealand's diplomatic footprint in Asia has also expanded, with new posts opened in Chengdu, Guangzhou, Colombo, Yangon and Dili, along with the appointment of a dedicated ambassador to ASEAN based in Jakarta.

The focus on Asia as central to New Zealand's interests has become solidly bipartisan too. National Party then-Prime Minister John Key told the Council on Foreign Relations in 2016, "New Zealand sees itself very much as Asia these days". Polls showed that ordinary New Zealanders were more equivocal, but more than ever the public understood that New Zealand's interests were linked to the prosperity, peace and stability of this wider region.

By 2022, the Asia New Zealand Foundation's annual Perceptions of Asia and Asian Peoples poll found that 79 percent of New Zealanders – the highest number ever recorded – believed it was important to develop political, social and economic ties with Asia.

At the same time, the relative optimism of 2003 has given way to a more mixed appraisal of New Zealand's political and security environment. Much of this has to do with shifts in the regional and global balance of power, driven by China's rapid rise.

From around four percent of the global economy 20 years ago to around 18 percent today, China's growing economic and strategic heft has been the single most important factor transforming regional and global politics, and indeed security.

For much of the past 20 years New Zealanders have viewed China (and accordingly Asia) primarily through a lens of economic opportunity, with high-level political engagement providing the means to move the relationship forward. In 2008, the New Zealand–People's Republic of China Free Trade Agreement (FTA) was signed, alongside other 'firsts'. As a result of thriving economic ties, the two countries agreed a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in 2014.

In 2015, the Key government even concluded a defence agreement with the People's Liberation Army. The 2016 Defence White Paper repeated the language that China was a "strategic partner" but by 2015 and 2016, ministerial speeches were also starting to be peppered with references to Beijing's assertiveness in the South China Sea.

After 2018, with a new New Zealand government in power, these comments would be increasingly joined with expressions of concern about China's repression in Xinjiang and the loss of autonomy in Hong Kong. By 2020, some commentators were suggesting that New Zealand's "unique profile" of strategic economic dependency on China was of particular concern. "Decoupling" became a more common term to describe countries seeking to reduce their reliance on the Chinese economy.

Although recognising that China had upheld much of the rules-based order, the 2018 Strategic Defence Policy Statement noted that the Chinese Government held "views on human rights and freedom of information that stand in contrast to those that prevail in New Zealand".

As China's material power has grown, US's role as an Asia-Pacific power has increasingly come into question. At the turn of the 21st century, Washington had been described as the world's first "hyperpower" and there was debate about whether the post-Cold War "unipolar moment" might turn into a unipolar era. This notion was quashed by the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, which not only affected the US economy, but also fed a growing sense in Asia that America was a declining power.

Bogged down in Iraq and Afghanistan, President Obama's 'pivot' to Asia failed to gain traction. In an effort to balance China's growing influence, the Obama administration had declared a strong intention to reinvigorate and grow relationships in Asia. The most notable legacy of these efforts was an enduring relationship with ASEAN-centred

institutions via joining the East Asia Summit (EAS), but little else. Questions raised about the commitment of the US to the region were then further amplified when the Trump administration walked away from the Trans-Pacific Partnership and criticised long-standing US alliances. The sharp deterioration in US and China relations that started under President Trump has continued under President Biden.

For much of the past two decades, The US's China policy had been predicated on the idea of "engagement" and belief that Beijing could be brought into the existing institutional and normative order under US leadership. This was a comfortable world for New Zealand, in which there seemed few contradictions between closer economic ties with China and the deeper security relations with the US that had developed since the signing of the Wellington Declaration in 2010.

But the perceived emergence of a "new era of great power competition" soon meant New Zealand's positions on a range of issues - 5G technology, human rights, the origins of the COVID-19 pandemic - were increasingly scrutinised through the lenses of Sino-US and, more recently, Sino-Australian relations. There was growing talk of New Zealand potentially having to make a hard choice between its economic and security interests, although the lodestar of New Zealand's "independent foreign policy" continued to be called to help guide the way.



---

## ASIA BEYOND CHINA

Shifts in the balance of power have also complicated regional cooperation. In 2003, fallout from the Asian Financial Crisis pushed regional states towards closer integration on an East Asian or “ASEAN Plus Three” (ASEAN as well as China, Japan and South Korea) basis. This posed a dilemma for New Zealand officials, who were comfortable with existing Asia-Pacific frameworks such as the ARF and APEC, and who feared being excluded.

When some Asian partners extended an invitation to New Zealand, Australia and India to join a nascent East Asia Summit (EAS) without the US in 2005, then-Prime Minister Helen Clark quickly signalled enthusiasm, in contrast to Australia’s more hesitant John Howard. New Zealand’s instinct as a ‘compulsive joiner’ continued when it followed Canberra to become a member of the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) in 2009 and joined a new 18-nation ASEAN “defence ministers plus” process in 2010.

New Zealand remained one of the most enthusiastic supporters of the inclusive ASEAN-centred architecture. Attending the EAS (where regional security is a feature of discussions) became an essential appointment for any prime minister. But as the South East Asian bloc struggled to address internal challenges like Myanmar, and faced the competing pressures of great power competition, others grew frustrated with the limitations of its consensus-based decision-making.

Attempts to create a ‘one-stop-shop’ regional organisation in 2008 were proposed, in the form of then-Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd’s Asia-Pacific Community, but such ideas fell on barren ground. New forms of cooperation sprang up instead, but unlike the institution-building of the 1990s and early 2000s, these were not inclusive forums. They were also not based on the familiar idea of the Asia-Pacific.

Rather, the term “Indo-Pacific” became the preferred frame for New Zealand’s closest partners in Canberra and Washington, along with Japan and India. New Zealand was initially cautious about the new term, preferring to stick with Asia-Pacific, in part because of what the new term seemed to imply about a more confrontational posture towards (or exclusion of) China, and in part because of the potential for the broadening of the region to signal even less of a focus on the Pacific part of the nomenclature.

But by mid-2021, then-Prime Minister Ardern had signalled her government’s support for the idea of an open and inclusive Indo-Pacific region as constituting New Zealand’s “wider home”, even though Wellington was not always included in the new forms of cooperation that emerged in the region, such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue or “Quad”.

In September 2021, the surprise announcement of the Australia–United Kingdom–United States (AUKUS) security agreement created further divisions. While Wellington was not in the market for nuclear-powered submarines and not looking to assert itself against China in a hard security arrangement like the Quad, these groupings were nonetheless starting to discuss areas of interest to New Zealand such as emerging technologies, cybersecurity, the pandemic response, supply chains and climate change. The idea of finding ways of engaging with these groups, even if not as a member, began to be discussed.

## SOUTH AND SOUTHEAST ASIA RELATIONS UNEVEN

Northeast Asia continued to dominate the New Zealand public's perceptions of Asia, with South East Asia relations with countries such as Indonesia described in a 2005 report as "weak" compared to relations with Singapore and Malaysia. By 2020, little had arguably changed. While Wellington and Hanoi included a 'strategic partnership' in 2020, reflecting Vietnam's growing role as a significant economic partner as well as a prominent voice in regional organisations, bilateral connections to Kuala Lumpur and Singapore continued to dominate, supported by frequent visits and historical defence ties such as the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA).

If political and security ties with Southeast Asia remained uneven, the same could be said of New Zealand's relationship with India. In 2003, then-Prime Minister Helen Clark said: "Our perceptions of India and its potential need to be radically and rapidly revised and updated". In the decades since, India's relations with Washington and Canberra have been completely transformed. But while New Zealand's economic and political ties with China had multiplied, efforts to repeat the trick with New Delhi have been unsuccessful. In 2021 an experienced observer called for a re-framing of the country's approach to India, noting that engagement focused on the elusive goal of a FTA had "been as much disappointing as it had been self-defeating".



---

## ASIA IN THE PACIFIC

Finally, compared with 2003, in 2022 Asia's geostrategic challenges no longer seemed so distant. As China's influence grew worldwide, so too did its presence in the South Pacific. Much of China's initial focus was on its diplomatic rivalry with Taiwan, but it also maintained significant flows of new migrants, diplomats, capital, loans and trade. The spirit of engagement initially saw New Zealand and China work together on a joint aid project with the Cook Islands in 2014, but the project's poor execution later caused frictions.

Other efforts were made in defence diplomacy, with New Zealand looking to include Australia, China and the US in joint exercises. But as relations with Beijing became more complicated, these efforts struggled to gain traction and support.

China's expansion of its Belt and Road Initiative across the Pacific (including to the Realm nations of Niue and Cook Islands) prompted additional reflection in Wellington. In 2018, then-Foreign Minister Winston Peters announced a "Pacific Reset", promising greater attention and increased resourcing for the Pacific, in part because of concerns that New Zealand's influence and security were being undermined in the region.

As Pacific states switched diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to Beijing, fears were raised that China might seek a military base in the region. Such concerns were typically dismissed as unfounded, but a leaked security agreement between China and the Solomon Islands in 2022 made apparent some of Beijing's ambitions to play a greater security role in the region, prompting the then-Adern government to express "serious concerns".

Shared concerns about Beijing's growing influence have helped provide an impetus for deeper cooperation between New Zealand and other partners in the region such as Japan and other founding members of the "Partners in the Blue Pacific", including Australia, the US and UK. The Ardern government continued to stress, however, the ongoing importance of an inclusive approach to diplomacy, noting that "even as China becomes more assertive in the pursuit of its interests, there are still shared interests on which we can and should cooperate".

Notably, too, there has been a revived emphasis on reminding those partners about New Zealand's "independent foreign policy", albeit with a new focus on bringing Māori values to the fore by emphasising manaakitanga, whanaungatanga, mahi tahi and kotahitanga, and kaitiakitanga.

In 2022, there was more of Asia in the Pacific, although the Pacific is often separated off from regional concerns in New Zealand policy. A more connected world has also increasingly meant that security challenges do not stop at New Zealand's borders. In addition to the security implications of climate change and public health emergencies, from 2017 onwards stories have proliferated about foreign interference and pressure on New Zealand's diaspora communities. Russia, China and North Korea have all been named by New Zealand agencies as being behind malicious cyber activities, while disinformation and misinformation in general have become a new and growing concern.

The line between 'domestic' and 'international' has also blurred in the economic realm. Some of New Zealand's regional partners such as Japan have initiated a more securitised approach to economic issues since the COVID-19 pandemic and its attendant supply chain issues. The trilateral supply chain resilience initiative between Australia, Japan and India has sought to address this, while also serving to reinforce political and security ties between Quad members.

Looking back, the political and security challenges defining New Zealand's relations with Asia in 2003 are markedly different from those of today. Then, challenges centred on weak states, internal conflicts and terrorism, and today there is a clear shift towards the influence of strong states, coercion and the myriad ways in which power is exercised.

---

## LOOKING AHEAD

In 2003, a number of broad recommendations were made in relation to New Zealand's political and security relations with Asia, including:


1. Mapping New Zealand's future with Asia
2. Optimising New Zealand's influence by enhancing political and security relations with Asia (for example, by high-level visitor/visit programmes, Track II diplomacy, academic and business exchanges, and focused engagement in regional bodies and other consultations)
3. Strengthening policy analysis capability
4. Projecting a forward-looking profile reflecting New Zealand's distinctive identity
5. Ensuring New Zealand institutions operate effectively as NZ Inc.

Considerable effort and investment have gone into these areas, yet most of these recommendations remain equally important today. Indeed, in some areas (for example, academic expertise on key regional countries such as China and India) New Zealand has arguably lost ground in the past two decades. To the recommendations put forward in 2003, we add the following:

1. Continue to be active and present in the region and invest in developing deeper relationships with key governments in Asia. There is significant goodwill towards New Zealand in much of the region, but after two and a half years of closed borders, the country has ground to make up. There will be a temptation in the wake of COVID-19 and in the face of carbon emissions targets to move towards more online engagements. But 90 percent of success comes from showing up. Despite valiant efforts at piloting different forms of online diplomacy, nothing beats in-person interactions for building trust and encouraging frank discussion. The discussions held at the roundtable launch for this paper confirmed that turning up is not a perk; it is a necessity.
2. Shore up relationships with a range of small - and middle - power states with similar concerns about the challenge of great power competition. Where there are strong common interests (for example, between Australia, New Zealand and Singapore) it may be possible to have regular trilateral interactions. While the inclusive ASEAN-centred regional architecture will continue to be of value, New Zealand also needs to reflect on the connections it wants to have with the region's increasingly important mini-lateral groups, including the Quad and AUKUS. More can be done to leverage alternative forms of diplomacy such as defence diplomacy, while governments can usefully 'scale up' existing approaches to working with small states in the Pacific to other small partners in the Indo-Pacific.
3. Support the development of academic expertise on Asia's political and security landscape, including experience grounded in a deep understanding of the region's cultures and languages. New Zealand governments have invested significantly in promoting business understanding and knowledge transfer events through the Centres for Asia-Pacific Excellence (CAPEs) but have done less to encourage original research on Asian politics and security. Alarming, academic expertise in some key areas (such as China) is declining, with retirements not being replaced. Better leverage diasporic communities, alumni and experts.
4. It is vital that New Zealand develops its own analysis of regional trends rather than having to rely solely on the assessments of partners whose interests or perceptions are not always identical to our own. Encouraging deep but focused expertise (for example, on the interests and activities of Asian states in the South Pacific) would not only be valuable for New Zealand policy-makers but also provide insights of interest to international partners.
5. Support a broader public conversation about the region's security challenges and how these impact on New Zealand's national interests. These include traditional and non-traditional threats, including vulnerabilities in a range of 'grey' security areas: economic risk, cyberattack and the proliferation of misinformation among them. The principles that New Zealanders value as being integral parts of democracies,

such as openness and rights like freedom of speech and expression, are also vulnerable to distortion or even destruction. Misinformation, political donations and corruption, propaganda platforms and divisive identity politics were not foreseen as being central political and security issues in the 2003 paper but are now of serious concern and will be even more so in future.

6. In contrast to the vulnerabilities at play in New Zealand, the rise of nationalism in Asia as a cohesive and potentially assertive force looks set to further complicate New Zealand's relations with important regional states. As one prominent Chinese academic noted, "Post-millennial students usually have a strong sense of superiority and confidence, and they tend to look at other countries from a condescending perspective". Nationalism has also surged in India under Prime Minister Narendra Modi's BJP government and is increasingly playing out in its foreign policy. In the face of such rising nationalism, and in response to malicious attacks via misinformation or targeted campaigns of intimidation, New Zealand governments will need to clearly identify and pursue key values and interests while being willing to seek commonalities where possible. Civic education, at schools but also beyond, and clear messaging from incumbent governments will be vital to build trust at home and to navigate relationships abroad. Attaining biculturalism is necessary to achieve multiculturalism.
7. Build social cohesion in the face of rising racism within New Zealand. The COVID-19 pandemic exacerbated racism towards people of Asian heritage, with almost a quarter of respondents in a Massey University Te Kunenga Ki Pūrehuroa study stating they had been discriminated against because of COVID-19. Instances of racism and discrimination could provide a point of leverage for external actors seeking to disrupt domestic stability. Further promote the celebration of all cultures.



---

## ABOUT THE SERIOUSLY ASIA REVISITED THEMATIC PAPERS AND HUI

### Society and Culture

In this paper, authors Professor Sekhar Bandyopadhyay and Dr Andrew Butcher discuss how New Zealand's demographic profile has changed in the past two decades and how this has impacted relationships with Asian countries and New Zealand's cultural landscape. It provides a summary of developments in immigration, international education, education initiatives and the media. The hui for this theme was held on Friday 29 July 2022 in Auckland.

### Politics and Security

Authors Professor David Capie and Professor Bethan K Greener examine how the political and security situation in Asia has changed since 2003, and the implications for New Zealand's engagement with the region. The hui for this theme was held on Friday 19 August 2022 in Wellington.

### Trade, Tourism and Investment

Authors Professor Natasha Hamilton-Hart and Shamubeel Eaqub assess how New Zealand's trade, tourism and investment relationships with Asia have performed since 2003, and discuss the opportunities and challenges in the decades ahead. This hui was held on Friday 9 September 2022 in Christchurch.

### Innovation and Sustainable Development

Authors Kenneth Leong and Hone McGregor examine the growth of innovation in Asia, the opportunities for New Zealand, and how Te Ao Māori perspectives on sustainable development are shaping relationships with Asia. This hui was held on Thursday 29 September 2022 in Queenstown.



# ABOUT THE ASIA NEW ZEALAND FOUNDATION

The Asia New Zealand Foundation Te Whītau Tūhono is New Zealand's leading non-partisan, non-profit authority on Asia. We were set up in 1994 to build New Zealanders' knowledge and understanding of Asia. We provide experiences and resources to help New Zealanders build their knowledge, skills, connections and confidence to thrive in Asia.

We work in partnership with influential individuals and organisations in New Zealand and Asia to provide high-level forums, cultural events, international collaborations, school programmes and professional development opportunities. Our activities cover more than 20 countries in Asia and are delivered through programmes with a focus on arts, leadership, entrepreneurship, sports, business, media, education, research and informal diplomacy (Track II).

**Website** [asianz.org.nz](http://asianz.org.nz)

**Email** [asianz@asianz.org.nz](mailto:asianz@asianz.org.nz)

**Phone** +64 4 471 2320

