


ASIA NEW ZEALAND FOUNDATION • BUILDING NEW ZEALANDERS' KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING OF ASIA

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FUTURE POTENTIAL AND THE INVISIBLE DIASPORA

NEW ZEALAND AND SOUTH ASIA DIASPORAS

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INTRODUCTION

In September 2009, the New Zealand Minister of Trade, Tim Groser, announced that India and New Zealand would open a Consulate-General in Mumbai later in that year. The announcement was made at a World Trade Organization meeting in New Delhi. Among the reasons cited for the additional representation was that “India is a market that has the potential to be of huge long term importance for New Zealand – it is expected to be one of the world’s three largest economies by 2050. Having an official presence in one of India’s largest cities will be hugely beneficial to our ability to make the most of the significant trade and business opportunities for New Zealand”.

The head at the Consul-General in Mumbai will be appointed by New Zealand Trade and Enterprise. This role will have primary responsibility for furthering trade and investment linkages between New Zealand and the Mumbai area. Mumbai is India’s major financial capital and the location of the ‘Bollywood’ film industry. Tim Groser noted further that “the new Consulate-General will also allow [New Zealand] to increase our visa processing capacity in India. In the long term, this has the potential to improve decision times for the important student and visitor markets”. In 2008, there were more than 6,000 Indian students studying in New Zealand and more than 22,000 Indian tourists visiting here. Both sectors are showing positive growth, despite the recession. In February 2009, New Zealand and India agreed in principle to begin negotiations for a Free Trade Agreement, subject to approval processes on both sides.

In making this announcement, the New Zealand Government recognised the growing potential of South Asia as an important part of New Zealand’s future relationship with Asia in the wider sense. This also points to the two areas of current activity – trade with India and travel of people from India to New Zealand. These are important aspects, but as this relationship develops there can also be expected to be increasing numbers of New Zealanders travelling to India to live, work or study, or as a tourist destination. A fundamental aspect of Free Trade Agreements is reciprocity and exchange of both commodities and people.

This in itself reveals an unusual aspect to the relationship – a relationship that would imply a pre-existing presence of New Zealanders and awareness about New Zealand in the region. However, the one thing that typifies the New Zealand diaspora in India is its invisibility in the data.

To some extent this future potential extends to Central Asia. This report considers aspects of the New Zealand diaspora in South Asia and Central Asia¹ and the South Asian and Central Asian diasporas in New Zealand. In taking this approach it forms a companion to the report on Southeast Asian diasporas², but the emphasis in this case sits with the future potential for a significant diaspora to develop rather than on New Zealanders already in the region. It needs to be noted, however, that the key focus is on India because this is not only the most populous country with more than one billion people and also the largest (3.3 million square kilometres) in the region, but also the largest South and Central Asian source of migrants to New Zealand and the most common destination in the region for New Zealanders. This is not to diminish the importance of other countries – Nepal ranks New Zealand as an important source of migrants, tourists and business connections, although the flows of people are small, while Kazakhstan has a large, resource-rich land mass (2.7 million square kilometres, roughly the same as that of Argentina) and a rapidly developing economy.

The context of this report, however, is quite different from the previous report on New Zealand’s diaspora in Southeast Asia for two important reasons. Firstly the history of migration from India to New Zealand has a longer and more complex history than the history of migration from Southeast Asia or from other parts of South and Central Asia. This has a strong influence on the relationship between the Indian diaspora in New Zealand and the other South and Central Asian diasporas. Secondly the number of New Zealanders living in South and Central Asia is currently very small and generally invisible in the data available. However, there are similarities.

1 Central Asia is included for completeness, but at the present time there are few Central Asians in New Zealand and very few New Zealanders living in Central Asia other than those connected with military action and humanitarian activities. However, trade links and exchanges of people show signs of becoming more significant in the future and Central Asia has been included, albeit tangentially, in this report.

2 Web feature: Outlook 11 – Intersections: Southeast Asia and diaspora engagement, by Robert Didham
<http://www.asianz.org.nz/our-work/knowledge-and-research/outlook-series>

“There remains ongoing conflict between and within most of the countries of the region.”

The South Asia region is, at least for the Indian heartland, one of rapidly growing economic, political and social importance, with multilateral Free Trade Agreements either in place or under active development, and home to a large number of multinational businesses that employ both local and foreign staff.

South Asia is a term that has come to refer to the group of countries that generally encompasses India, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Pakistan and Afghanistan. The Maldives and Iran are also sometimes included, with substantial justification in some definitions. Other definitions, especially those based on British colonial history, sometimes include Myanmar and Tibet (Xizang) in South Asia, but there are neither historical nor cultural reasons to do so. Myanmar is part of Southeast Asia in every sense and Tibet has more in common with Southeast Asia than with South Asia, despite some migrations southwards of Tibeto-Burman groups into north-eastern India, Bhutan and Nepal.

Central Asia comprises the predominantly Islamic Iranian and Turko-Altaic regions approximately north and east of Iraq and southeast of Russia across to the western border of China. Strictly speaking, western China is part of this cultural region but included in East Asia for the same geo-political reason that most of Central Asia was included in Europe when the republics were part of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Geographically, historically and culturally, the part of the Iranian world that incorporates Iran, Afghanistan and Tajikistan is in an ambiguous position of belonging to the worlds of both South and Central Asia. This ambiguity is apparent when it is recalled that Afghanistan is included as part of South Asia in all standard definitions of South Asia, whereas the culturally connected Tajikistan is not. However, linguistically, culturally and historically, the Indo-Iranian bloc has a reality that sits across the geo-political divisions approximately lying between the Dravidian world of southern South Asia and the Turko-Altaic world of Central Asia. The arbitrary separation of Iran into what has been called by various names, such as the Near East and the Middle East in the New Zealand Standard classification, was based on trade pathways rather than geographic connections. Baluchistan and Khorasan show the arbitrary nature of some of these boundaries.

This of course also is not unrelated to the boundaries of British versus French colonial histories and the relationship between these two colonial powers and Russia. Iran as a consequence was seen as quite separate from India, and Afghanistan took on a sort of buffer state status to the west of the Northwest Frontier.

Similarly Bhutan, which, as a Vajrayana Buddhist state, is clearly linked with Tibet, is nestled between China and India. This places Bhutan in an ambiguous position between South Asia and Southeast Asia with strong historic, cultural and economic links with Tibet. But Bhutan's dependence on Nepal and India for commerce and communication justifies its inclusion in South Asia.

The geographic complexity of the area is further exacerbated by the complexity of the political interrelationships. There remains ongoing conflict between and within most of the countries of the region, especially on the periphery, and few countries are independent of foreign involvement. This situation affects how diasporas behave, with a wide spectrum of outflows, including refugees, economic migrants, family migrants and lifestyle migrants, and less well established inflows.

This report is structured to look first at the South Asian communities in New Zealand and then consider the relationship between South Asia and New Zealanders at home and abroad. Then connections between the various diasporas are considered.

“South Asia is a term that has come to refer to the group of countries that generally encompasses India, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Pakistan and Afghanistan.”



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SOURCE: <http://www.mapcruzin.com/free-asia-maps.htm>

ORIGINS: THE EARLY SOUTH ASIANS IN NEW ZEALAND

New Zealand has had a long association with South Asia, longer than with East Asia. Primarily this was a consequence of New Zealand's joint imperial pasts as part of the British Empire. It was common from the 16th Century onwards for South Asians to be employed as seamen on British ships and for crews to be made up of mostly South Asians along with some Arabs. This group was referred to as Lascars, a word derived from *lashkar*, the Urdu word for soldier or sailor, and while the recruits were frequently from Gujarat others also came from Bengal and Assam, among other sources. The vast majority were Muslims³. It was from this background that the first recorded Asian in New Zealand came. His name is lost to history. He is simply recorded as a Bengali who jumped ship in 1809, to form a partnership with a local woman⁴.

It is unlikely, though, that this gentleman was the first person born in South Asia to settle in New Zealand. When Indians in New Zealand are discussed, the implicit assumption is that we are talking about people who are of one or more of the many diverse ethnicities in South Asia. Much has been written on these settlers, usually from the viewpoint of their position as visible minorities. However, this overlooks an equally important element of early settlement. There was a close connection between the colonial settlers in New Zealand and the British and French in India. The British East India Company also held the monopoly over the sealing industry in this region. Certainly over the following half century there was a steadily increasing exchange of people between New Zealand and India, both ethnically Indian and ethnically European. The early history of Indians in New Zealand is fairly well known⁵. A few quick glances through the *Te Ara: The Encyclopedia of New Zealand*⁶ also reveal a number of prominent Europeans who had either been born in India or migrated to New Zealand from India throughout the 19th Century.

Among these are people like George Vesey Stewart, who set up a protestant community around Katikati in the 1870s. His intention was to establish a town for sedentary migrants such as retired military and civil officers from India. Around that time too, Colonel de Renzie James Brett⁷ retired to Canterbury and set up Kirwee. The settlement still retains some of the features of his period, such as the Indian-style water races and the macrocarpa wind-breaks that Brett set out according to troop positions in the siege of the fort at Karwi during the Indian War of 1857-1858. Whereas Brett had been born in Ireland and spent time in India, John Cracroft Wilson had been born in India. Cracroft Wilson moved to Christchurch in 1853 to establish the Kashmir Estate, after which, in the 1890s, the hill suburb of Cashmere was named. Similarly in Northland, much of Kerikeri's horticultural industry was developed on land purchased by the North Auckland Land Development Corporation and on-sold to locals as well as to colonial families from India and China.

By the time of the 1878 Census, New Zealand was home to 905 people who had been born in India and 47 born in Ceylon (now Sri Lanka). It is not known how many children were born of parents born in South Asia in these early years, but parish registers and cemeteries attest to several offspring. One of the features that distinguish this population from the much larger China-born population of the time (4442 people of whom only 15 were female) is that the gender balance was fairly even: of the 905 India-born, 392 were female and of the 47 Ceylon-born, 23 were female. Moreover, they were more widely distributed throughout New Zealand rather than being associated with the goldfields.

From these diverse beginnings, throughout the 20th Century the number of people living in New Zealand who had been born in South Asia continued to grow. This was so of both those of South Asian ethnicities and those of other ethnicities. However, the later immigrants were more exclusively ethnic Indians, or 'Hindus' in the parlance of the early records; mostly Gujarati, Punjabi, Sikh and Tamil, although others such as Bengali and Sinhalese are noted.

3 Diane Robinson-Dunn (2003) 'Lascar Sailors and English Converts: The Imperial Port and Islam in late 19th-Century England'. Paper presented to the *Seascapes, Littoral Cultures, and Trans-Oceanic Exchanges Conference*, Library of Congress, Washington D.C., 12-15 February 2003.

4 Richard Cruise (1974) *Journal of Ten Months' Residence in New Zealand*. Capper Press, Christchurch.

5 Among the many valuable histories of the Indian communities in New Zealand is the recent and excellent history by Jacqui Leckie (2007) *Indian Settlers: the story of a New Zealand South Asian community*. Otago University Press.

6 *Te Ara: The Encyclopedia of New Zealand* www.teara.govt.nz.

7 In: *Dictionary of New Zealand Biography*. P.J Perry, Brett, De Renzie James 1809-1889: http://www.dnz.govt.nz/DNZB/alt_essayBody.asp?essayID=2B38.

THE CONTEMPORARY SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIAN DIASPORAS IN NEW ZEALAND

This section briefly outlines some features of the South Asian diasporas living in New Zealand to give a sense of context for the interconnections between New Zealand and South Asia⁸. A few comments are also included on Central Asians, but the data are much sparser and numbers generally too small to report on⁹.

The South Asian diasporas in New Zealand, defined in terms of South Asian ethnicities (rather than birthplaces), have three principal origins. They include people born in South Asia, people who identify with ethnicities associated with South Asia but born in other countries, and people of these ethnicities born in New Zealand. Among the South Asians born elsewhere are people born in Southern and East Africa and Fiji in particular, although they also include a smaller number of descendants of indentured labourers in Malaysia and of former migrants to Europe. Many prominent people in New Zealand are members of these communities. Among these we can readily count scientists and scholars, local and central government representatives, business and community leaders and sportspeople. Pre-eminent among these is the Governor-General, the Honourable Sir Anand Satyanand.

The number of people living in New Zealand who were born in South Asia trebled in the decade between 1996, with 20,892 people, and 2006, with 60,492 people. These figures include those born in Iran (Table 1). Three-quarters (76 percent) of those in New Zealand in 2006 had arrived within the previous ten years, and as such are regarded as recent migrants. The striking feature of this recent migration is that there are more males than females, contrasting with the migrant flows from other regions, especially other parts of Asia, which tend to involve more women than men.

TABLE 1: PEOPLE LIVING IN NEW ZEALAND AND BORN IN SOUTH ASIA, 2006 CENSUS

COUNTRY OF BIRTH	MALE	FEMALE	TOTAL
Bangladesh	801	636	1,437
Bhutan	6	9	15
India	22,641	20,700	43,341
Maldives	54	36	90
Nepal	333	246	579
Pakistan	1,236	975	2,211
Sri Lanka	3,654	3,603	7,257
Afghanistan	1,170	975	2,145
Armenia	15	18	33
Azerbaijan	24	27	54
Georgia	39	42	81
Kazakhstan	99	141	240
Kyrgyzstan	12	30	45
Tajikistan	6	12	18
Turkmenistan	6	6	12
Uzbekistan	63	72	135
Iran	1,551	1,242	2,793
Total	31,713	28,779	60,492

Source: Statistics New Zealand

⁸ For an overview of Asians in New Zealand, and of the South Asian communities within the broad grouping, see Richard Bedford and Elsie Ho, *Asians in New Zealand: Implications of a changing demography*, Outlook 07, Asia New Zealand Foundation, Wellington, June 2008 and also the four papers in the same series by Wardlow Friesen on the Asian communities in Auckland, Wellington, Christchurch and Dunedin. Web feature - <http://www.asianz.org.nz/our-work/knowledge-and-research/outlook-series>

⁹ This does not mean there are no stories that remain to be told. There were individuals, including one of this author's Russian teachers, who arrived, for example, following civil war in the Soviet Union, who had either lived in or been born in Central Asia. However, they spent most of their time being considered as members of the Russian refugee community and their Central Asian identity was largely subordinated.

“The reference to Fiji-born Indians is worthy of special note here, because of the proportion (almost 30 percent) of Indians in New Zealand who were born in Fiji.”

People born in South Asia, however, represent only part of the South Asian diasporas in New Zealand. In 2006, there were 122,340 people who identified with one or more of the South and Central Asian ethnicities, although the vast majority (119,428) belonged to the main South Asian groups.

As with other regions, not all of the people born in South Asia identify with ethnicities associated with that geographic region, although in this case there were few who did not have at least one ethnicity associated with the region. For example, of the 43,341 people born in India, almost all (41,304) identified with one or more Indian ethnicity. Among the others were people who did not specify their ethnicity or who had different ethnicities.

Unfortunately the data on people of Central Asian ethnicities is not available. The best information we have for 2006 is that 399 people were coded as having an ethnicity included in ‘Asian not elsewhere classified’, which the birthplace data suggests is likely to comprise largely people of Khazaki and Uzbeki ethnicities, but does also include Maldivian and Bhutanese amongst others.

Not all people of South Asian ethnicities were born in South Asia. Among the 104,583 people of Indian ethnicities living in New Zealand (Table 2), 23,832 were born in New Zealand (Table 3, page 7) with a further 29,736 born in Fiji. While the majority were born in India, there remain almost 10,000 people who were born in other countries, predominantly countries in East Africa and South Africa, but including almost 2,000 people born in Southeast Asia, 850 people born in other South and Central Asian countries and a further 700 born in Europe.

TABLE 2: PEOPLE OF SOUTH ASIAN ETHNICITIES LIVING IN NEW ZEALAND, 2006 CENSUS

ETHNICITY	MALE	FEMALE	TOTAL
Indian	52,935	51,648	104,583
Sri Lankan	4,161	4,149	8,310
Afghani	1,350	1,188	2,538
Bangladeshi	792	696	1,488
Nepalese	381	273	654
Pakistani	1,143	909	2,052
Total people	60,660	58,771	119,428

Source: Statistics New Zealand

The reference to Fiji-born Indians is worthy of special note here, because of the proportion (almost 30 percent) of Indians in New Zealand who were born in Fiji. Many arrived following political unrest in Fiji and include subsequent migrants who have moved for economic, social, political or family reasons. There is an interesting aspect to this migration. Although the earliest migrants (from 1879¹⁰) arrived as indentured labourers in Fiji from various parts of India, some arrived by way of New Zealand and other parts of the Pacific. There, Fijian Indians are also distinct in that the majority speak a local form of Hindi that has become sufficiently distinct to be accorded koine status as Fiji Hindi¹¹.

10 Brij V. Lal (2000) *Chalo Jahaji: on a Journey through Indenture in Fiji*. Fiji Museum, Suva.

11 Richard Barz and Jeff Siegel (1988) *Language Transplanted: the development of overseas Hindi*. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz.

“The Indian population of New Zealand is by far the largest of the South Asian communities.”

Tamil speakers in Fiji number nearly 7,000 and also have linguistic features that are distinct from colloquial Tamil spoken in India¹². The large majority speak English. In the present context this is significant because there is not only a second large source of Indian migrants to New Zealand but a source that is distinct from migrants from India. This group is also internally diverse. Moreover, this is an example of the way in which diasporas are interconnected. All too often diasporas are thought of as spreading from a core to multiple destinations, but less well studied are the movements between those external nodes in the global web of mobility.

The recent rapid growth of both the Indian and other the South Asian communities in New Zealand is reflected in the number of South Asian people born in New Zealand, together with small numbers of Central Asian ethnicities. Table 3, page 7, gives details for the main South Asian groups born in New Zealand, for comparison with Table 2. The number of Indians, for example, locally born and living in New Zealand at the 2006 Census had increased markedly (23,832 in 2006 compared with 14,619 in 1996), but the number of overseas-born in this group had more than trebled from 27,221 in 1996 to 80,751 by 2006. Diversification has also been taking place with people moving to New Zealand from other countries in the region, including the Inner Asian republics and Iran and Afghanistan as a result of increased globalisation, civil unrest and the involvement of New Zealand troops, peacekeepers and humanitarian aid workers in the region.


TABLE 3: PEOPLE OF SELECTED SOUTH ASIAN ETHNICITIES, BORN IN NEW ZEALAND, 2006 CENSUS

ETHNICITY	MALE	FEMALE	TOTAL
Indian	12,141	11,691	23,832
Sri Lankan	528	516	1,044
Afghani	174	168	342
Bangladeshi	102	135	237
Nepalese	57	36	93
Pakistani	198	192	390
Total people	13,165	12,708	25,873

Source: Statistics New Zealand

The Indian population of New Zealand is by far the largest of the South Asian communities. Despite the long history of the community in New Zealand, the effect of recent migration has been dramatic. Figure 2, page 8, shows the age-sex structure of the community, and super-imposed on the pyramid is the pyramid for those in the community who were born in New Zealand, which likely includes both those born to immigrants and those born to people who have been in New Zealand for several generations. In the adult ages, the relatively stable New Zealand-born component of the community reflects the long-established settlement, whereas the larger and rapidly expanding component in the younger ages reflects the children of more recent migrants. Although the older ages are largely people who have been settled in New Zealand for many decades, many people at all ages are recent migrants. Overall 73 percent of those of Indian ethnicity born overseas have been in New Zealand for less than ten years, although among those aged 55 years and over more than half have lived in New Zealand for longer than ten years.

12 Sanford Steever (2006) *The Dravidian Languages*. London, Routledge.



Source: Statistics New Zealand

Ethnic intermarriage is common in New Zealand¹³. However, among South Asians this is less marked than among some other groups, although still an important feature of the community, as Edwina Pio notes in her discussion of Indian women in New Zealand¹⁴. Table 4, page 9, shows the ethnic relationship between the male and female partners as reported in the 2006 Census. A very high percentage of partners both belong to the same group, with 82 percent of Indian male partners having Indian female partners despite a long history of settlement in this country. In some cases this is the result of ethnic mobility, with one partner adopting the ethnicity of the other, but the majority of cases among these communities are not due to ethnic mobility. Ethnic mobility is a feature of ethnic reporting which describes the situation where a person may adopt new or additional ethnicities, cease to identify with one or more ethnicities, or change the ethnicities they identify with. While inter-ethnic partnering is a common trigger to this, other factors such as peer-group associations, changing social and political environments and personal preferences all play a role. This is a feature of the South Asian groups that contrasts strongly with Southeast Asian groups. Among couples with at least one Thai partner, for example, the proportion of couples with both partners of Thai ethnicity is merely 18 percent.

13 Paul Callister, Robert Didham and Deb Potter (2005) *Ethnic Intermarriage in New Zealand*. Working paper, Statistics New Zealand, Wellington.

14 Edwina Pio (2008) *Sari: Indian women at work in New Zealand*. Dunmore Press, Wellington.

“Inter-ethnic partnering is an important component for the development of diaspora engagement, because it is a major mechanism whereby barriers are broken down and interconnections between groups develop.”

For the Filipino ethnic group this is 39 percent. These are both examples of ethnic groups with similar migration histories to some of the South Asian groups. Moreover, there is a completely different pattern by gender. In the case of the Thai and Filipino couples, over 93 percent of the couples where one partner only is respectively Thai or Filipino have a female partner of that ethnicity. In the case of South Asian couples where one partner only is of that ethnicity, less than 30 percent are females in all cases, except for Indians (51 percent) and Nepali (67 percent).

TABLE 4: ETHNICITY OF MALE AND FEMALE PARTNERS IN OPPOSITE-SEX COUPLES, 2006 CENSUS

ETHNIC GROUPING	BOTH PARTNERS	MALE PARTNER ONLY	FEMALE PARTNER ONLY	TOTAL BOTH PARTNERS SPECIFIED ETHNICITY	PER CENT OF COUPLES BOTH BELONG TO GROUP
Afghani	369	24	9	402	92
Bangladeshi	297	42	12	351	85
Indian	22,170	2,325	2,457	26,952	82
Sri Lankan	1,710	222	204	2,136	80
Nepali	114	18	36	168	68
Pakistani	336	99	45	480	70
Iranian	408	207	84	699	58

Source: Statistics New Zealand

These differences are driven partly by cultural norms and partly by the very different historical relationship that exists between South Asia and New Zealand compared with the relationship with Southeast Asia. Many migrated as couples and there has been insufficient time for children to form partnerships or for re-partnering following separations to occur.

Inter-ethnic partnering is an important component for the development of diaspora engagement, because it is a major mechanism whereby barriers are broken down and interconnections between groups develop.

CONNECTIONS 1: NEW ZEALAND AND SOUTH ASIA

A major problem common to all studies of diasporas is the lack of data sources, and in the case of this region the problem is extreme. While there are ex-pat associations throughout the region, these tend to be small and have generally irregular meetings, with the groups in Delhi and Mumbai, for example, consisting of fewer than ten families. The majority of ex-pats living in the region seem to have no contact with these groups because either their interests lie elsewhere or they are simply too busy in their roles such as teachers, nurses, doctors, religious practitioners, students and engineers. Few too keep in touch with the embassies and consulates in the region except in times of extreme civil unrest, and then usually only if they are in the same area as one of these agencies. Moreover, a large proportion of the remaining ex-pat population has integrated into the religious and cultural communities of India and Sri Lanka and maintains no contact with New Zealand. Communication and distance are likely to be factors also – the region is very large and politically fragmented.

Currently, as far as can be ascertained, there are only very small numbers of New Zealanders living in South Asia¹⁵. Table 5, below, shows that during the five calendar years from 2004 to 2008, there was a major imbalance between citizens of South and Central Asia arriving in New Zealand and New Zealand citizens departing. At least some of the departures were people who had previously migrated to New Zealand and left as New Zealand citizens.

Short-term travel, however, does suggest that there are a number of New Zealand citizens living in South and Central Asia making visits to this country, but it should be noted that these are the number of visits and not the number of individuals – people may have made several visits to New Zealand during this period. What is clear though is that the number of people arriving permanently or for the long term is much larger than the number departing, and return migration is a feature of the flows – both New Zealanders returning to New Zealand and South and Central Asians returning to South and Central Asia. The vast majority of this traffic is between India and New Zealand.

TABLE 5: INTERNATIONAL TRAVEL, COUNTRY OF LAST/NEXT PERMANENT RESIDENCE SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA (SCA), 2004-2008

Class of traveller	NZ CITIZEN		SCA CITIZEN	
	Arrivals	Departures	Arrivals	Departures
Short-term overseas visitor	3,452	3,907	104,734	97,144
Permanent migrant	140	284	7,555	902
Long-term overseas visitor	35	20	13,112	1,071
Long-term NZ resident migrant	686	1,136	1,017	720

Source: Statistics New Zealand

To some extent this situation is not unlike the situation in East and Southeast Asia as it was a few decades ago. New Zealanders living in the region tend to be associated with religious institutions, missionary work and military involvement, with short-term travel in this case associated with adventure tourism. This is, of course, a tentative statement, although based on anecdotal knowledge, in light of the fact that there is very little sound information on either numbers of people or their activities.

However, this situation is rapidly changing and there are signs that the direction of change is similar to the recent past experiences of migration to China and to Southeast Asia, and this is inextricably linked with the economic development of the subcontinent of India.

¹⁵ It might be safely assumed that there are approximately as many New Zealanders as Australians living in India, for example, and India is likely to account for the majority of New Zealand ex-pats in the region. Graeme Hugo posits around 1,000 Australians living in India. This is also likely to be the upper limit of the number of New Zealanders. Graeme Hugo (2006) 'An Australian diaspora?' *International Migration*. 44(1): 105-132.

“India is currently the second-ranked source of permanent and long-term arrivals to New Zealand behind the United Kingdom and ahead of China and the Philippines.”

India is currently the second-ranked source of permanent and long-term arrivals to New Zealand behind the United Kingdom and ahead of China and the Philippines¹⁶. India is also in the top ten source countries for visitors to New Zealand and an important destination for New Zealanders travelling overseas. Increasing flows in both directions greatly increase awareness and contact. It is expected that this trend will develop as trade, multinational business activities and connections between new migrants to New Zealand and their families in the subcontinent develop.

From a social perspective, the recent increase in migration between India and New Zealand has had an interesting consequence. The long-established Indian communities in New Zealand, as with other communities, have maintained a level of cultural awareness and identity that has developed at a pace out of step with the homeland. This has resulted in what Sekhar Bandyopadhyay¹⁷ has described as re-invented identity based on an imagined homeland, often based on historical experience but modified by influences of partial insights based on Bollywood movies and travel documentaries. Neither of these sources provides rounded views of the real India, or more correctly ‘Indias’ since the diversity within India is at least as great as the diversity between India and the rest of South and Central Asia. Here too we see echoes of the situation as the recent inflows of Chinese settlers in New Zealand started to arrive and interact with those settled here in earlier generations.

New migrants, though, bring contemporary, real-life experiences of the homelands with them. Two different issues derive from this. Communication between the new arrivals and the older, established communities is constrained because of differences in experiences, expectations and aspirations. This can lead to different ways in which the communities integrate into New Zealand society. This is not to suggest that this has everything to do with Indianness or the different origins within India of the old and the new – although of course these are factors. It is rather that the newer arrivals tend to be more globalised, have specific purposes such as study that do not necessarily involve established communities, and come from a world that has moved on from the imagined homelands of the earlier migrants.

But there is also a converse outcome. Family and business migration modifies this. Marriages are frequently arranged between families internationally, with subsequent migrations of other family members. While this is by no means as developed as it might be, very strong ties are formed between the more established families in New Zealand and the new migrants and their families, often still living in India. These ties frequently include remittances both to and from India¹⁸, business connections and widening circles of influence between the migrants and the local populations at both locations, which in turn leads to engagement with both diasporas.

16 International travel and migration statistics, November 2009. www.stats.govt.nz.

17 Sekhar Bandyopadhyay, ‘Re-inventing Indian identity in multi-cultural New Zealand’. In: Henry Johnson and Brian Moloughney (eds) (2006) *Asia in the Making of New Zealand*. Auckland University Press, pp 125-146.

18 It has been estimated that migrant remittances to India, at \$400 billion per year, amount to four times the total aid given by western countries. Binod Khadria, Perveen Kumar, Shantanu Sarkar and Rashmi Sharma (2008) ‘International migration policy: issues and perspectives for India’. *IMDS Working Paper Series*, Working paper 1, December 2008, International Migration and Diaspora Studies Project, New Delhi.

CONNECTIONS 2: THE COLOMBO PLAN, STUDENTS AND AID

Important among the exchange of people between this region and New Zealand, as setting the groundwork for long-term inter-regional connections, are students, with upwards of 6,000 Indian students studying in New Zealand in 2009¹⁹. This continues a long tradition of New Zealand as an education provider to the region, primarily under the Colombo Plan, although currently many international students come under auspices other than the Colombo Plan. Nonetheless the Plan was a very important component in making this market possible.

The Colombo Plan for Cooperative Economic Development in Asia and the Pacific came into force in 1951, as the Colombo Plan for Cooperative Economic Development in South and Southeast Asia²⁰. The organisation's headquarters are in Colombo, Sri Lanka. The original formulators of the Plan were a group of seven Commonwealth nations, but this has expanded so that currently Australia, Japan, New Zealand and the United States are the largest donors. The focuses of Colombo Plan activities are wide ranging, covering the educational aid programmes familiar to Australia and New Zealand over more than half a century, and the lesser known but no less important health aid, training programmes, loans, food supplies, equipment and technical aid provided in recipient countries. In recent years there has been an increasing emphasis on local programmes designed for eventual devolvement to local self-sustaining initiatives. Originally in 1951, it was intended that the Plan have a life-span of six years, but this was extended several times until 1980, whereupon it was extended indefinitely. However, even long-standing relationships are subject to change in social and economic conditions and this may also engender elements of disharmony from time to time.

Recent (2009-2010) mistreatment of Indian students in Australia indicates some underlying xenophobia that has potential to threaten a very significant economic connection between India and Australia. The spate of physical attacks became sufficiently serious for Sujatha Singh, the Indian High Commissioner to Australia, to investigate, and she has been quoted in the media (10 February 2010) as saying:

*... that the anxious parents of over 120,000 Indian students in Australia are asking for clear answers to certain questions: "Are our children safe in Australia? Why does it seem that only, or mainly, Indians are the victims? Are the assailants being caught? Are they being punished? Is the situation becoming better or worse?"*²¹

Subsequent statements to the Senate from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade in Canberra have acknowledged that the relationship between Australia and India has been damaged as a result.

There are two lessons to be drawn from this unfortunate set of incidents. The most important lesson is the fragility of the relationship between host and home countries and the need to be vigilant in protecting the rights of the students, and indeed other people, and the quality of service provided to them. This lesson should not be lost on New Zealand in light of isolated experiences in this country of poor service to Chinese students and the huge effort needed to turn that situation around. The second lesson is that students are mobile and there is real potential to promote New Zealand as an alternative and more conducive market for these disaffected students and their peers.

For New Zealand, from the outset the most visible public face of the Colombo Plan was the placement of students from Asia into New Zealand schools and universities. Andrew Butcher cites the first Colombo Plan newsletter, published in 1956, as noting that at that early stage there were 300 Asian students either in New Zealand or who had already completed qualifications and returned home²². Important for diaspora engagement is that most, although not all, of the students returned to their birth countries and maintained close connections with their former universities and host countries, as the various alumni associations attest. Having said this though, the centrality of the connection is less overt than we find in Southeast Asia.

19 Anand Satyanand *India Business Luncheon Speech*, 27 November 2008, Government House, Auckland. Among these were 4,761 tertiary in 2009 and 53 school students as at June 2009 enrolled as international students from India (www.educationcounts.govt.nz).

20 The Colombo Plan, www.colombo-plan.org.

21 This had very wide media coverage. A typical media report can be found in *Thaindian News*, 2 June 2009: http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/world-news/attacks-overblown-as-racist-says-indias-first-student-to-oz_100199656.html#. The media report of the response by the Indian High Commissioner to Australia can be found in DNA India, 10 February 2010: http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report_indian-high-commissioner-to-australia-to-appraise-govt-about-student-security_1346128.

22 Andrew Butcher (2003) *No Place like Home? The experiences of South-east Asian international university students in New Zealand and their re-entry into their countries of origin*. PhD Thesis, Massey University, Albany.

“The importance of international education programmes such as the Colombo Plan cannot be underestimated.”

In part this is because the focus of interest in South Asia has not yet developed the sense of trans-regional connectedness that we find in Southeast Asia, where the importance of inter-regional linkages is both recognised and fostered. There are glimmerings of this sense emerging in Sri Lanka, and the relationship between Myanmar and South Asia suggests that there is an underlying trend in this direction. The importance of international education programmes such as the Colombo Plan cannot be underestimated. This is a theme for the future of India in particular.

Central Asia sits apart for the moment. Formerly international education was sourced in other parts of the then Soviet Union and the political locus for the Central Asian region remains Russia with increasing connections with the United States and with other European countries. However, in recent years the number of Central Asian migrants to Australia and New Zealand has started to increase, partly as refugees but also as skilled migrants choosing a more secure place to live. It remains to be seen whether this will in turn lead to greater trans-regional awareness and integration of aid programmes.

CONNECTIONS 3: DOING BUSINESS

For New Zealanders doing business with South Asia, there are well known difficulties with scale, access and bureaucracy. New Zealand businesses are also not widely known in the region, and at least one reason for this is the general lack of engagement between New Zealand businesses and the New Zealanders in the region. Among South Asians in general, there is little awareness of New Zealand except among those with family living in New Zealand. Moreover, small operators dominate the field and this is perhaps part of the reason for low visibility. The scale of South Asian markets is immense compared with those in New Zealand and breaking in effectively is often cited as an impediment to achieving traction. There are signs of small beginnings though, and there are several Indian business associations in Auckland currently actively seeking to initiate or strengthen links with businesses in India, assisted in no small measure by arrangements such as the sister-city agreements, with associated benefits. For example, Waitakere City has been a sister city of Amritsar, in the Punjab, since early 2009 and this strengthens ties in agriculture and aviation training²³.

Some New Zealand companies have achieved major success in niche markets, while others have struggled. In terms of diaspora connections, these are likely to form the pathway to much wider relationships because there is a link between market penetration and the local presence of people from the source of the product. This can be most clearly seen in food industries, where a diaspora at least partially creates a market. In South Asia the development of a globalised mall culture and a taste for exotic foods and drinks are at least in part the consequence of the presence of significant international migrant communities.

Interestingly, one of the more successful entries into the diaspora of businesses has been in the food industry. New Zealand Natural India²⁴ is offering franchises throughout the region and has made some inroads into the major cities by selling New Zealand ice-cream and dairy products directly to the public, primarily in food courts in malls around India. This is interesting for two reasons. First, India is not generally recognised for the global phenomenon of malls, and while this is a recent development it is one that is rapidly changing consumer behaviour in the region, as has already happened in the major cities in China and other parts of Asia. Secondly, New Zealand dairy products are very well received in a country where there is extensive competition from other multinational providers.

Others have had a slower start. For example, wine distributors have successfully marketed New Zealand wines to India²⁵, but the market is very volatile because the size of the affluent western and westernised communities remains relatively small and mobile. The volume of wine sales almost trebled between 2004 and 2005, but subsequently halved in 2006 to less than 7,000 litres. Market conditions remain very difficult because of the relative price of New Zealand wines on the Indian market²⁶. Clearly there is a need to address the relationship between price and quality, and improve efficiencies in delivery to the market. This implies that there need to be new bureaucratic mechanisms to ease trade processes²⁷, to the benefit of inter-regional and intra-regional free trade. Even on the scale of the New Zealand market, 7,000 litres is a tiny volume. Nevertheless, there is huge potential for the development of the market for high-end produce for an industry that would benefit from a new large and growing market. India and Sri Lanka are the two potential markets in the region for New Zealand wines, because these are the locations of the largest affluent societies. As Indian and Sri Lankan societies become more globalised, the demand should increase if the marketing efforts are consistent. The central theme of marketing commentators for the region is patience, persistence, consistency and integrity. Above all else, what is needed is time. Although the region is not known for wine consumption, even minor inroads have potential for huge volumes relative to the scale of New Zealand production capacity.

In a different field, Vista Entertainment Systems²⁸ has achieved, in conjunction with the Indian company Bigtree Entertainment Pvt Ltd, approximately 60 percent market share for its cinema software in Indian multiplexes. The model this represents of a foreign company and local associations is typical of successful enterprises for the region. The labour force tends to be locally sourced because of cost and the ready availability of skilled people.

23 *Times of India*, 27 February 2009: <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/indians-abroad/NZs-Waitakere-Amritsar-declared-sister-cities/articleshow/4202306.cms>.

24 New Zealand Natural India: www.newzealandnaturalindia.com.

25 *Indian Wine*, 21 November 2008. http://indianwine.com/cs/blogs/indian_wine_news_and_messages/archive/2008/11/21/bringing-new-zealand-to-india.aspx.

26 New Zealand Trade and Enterprise (2008) *Sector Profile for Wine in the Indian Market*. Wellington, New Zealand Trade and Enterprise.

27 Bureaucratic impediments to ease of doing business are often cited in this context. See, for example, Swati Nagar (2008) *New Zealand Businesses in India: opportunities and challenges*. MPhil thesis, Auckland University of Technology and A D Manikandan (2006) 'Performance of foreign multinationals and domestic companies in India since liberalisation: a comparative study'. Conference paper presented to *Globelics India 2006: Innovative systems of competitiveness and shared prosperity in developing countries*, Trivandrum, Kerala, 4-7 October 2006.

28 Swati Nagar and Peter Enderwick (2009) 'India: the next big opportunity for New Zealand business?'. *University of Auckland Business Review*. 11(1) 1-11.

“The concordance of outward and inbound FDI provides a mechanism for direct engagement between a diaspora and the home country and between diasporas.”

The Indian movie business also contributes to New Zealand in a different way – a number of Bollywood movies are being shot on location in New Zealand. This not only provides New Zealand with revenue and the Indian film industry with a major source of spectacular scenery, but the movies also implicitly promote New Zealand as a tourist destination, benefiting both countries.

In South Asia there are many hundreds of major multinationals, especially those based in the United States and in Europe. Included among these are a few of the larger New Zealand companies that have a minor presence, such as Fisher and Paykel Healthcare Ltd based in Bangalore, which is already the heartland of the Indian information technology (IT) industries and is rapidly developing into a major economic powerhouse. However, when we think of multinationals, it is common to think of East Asian, European and American companies operating globally. But just below the radar are a number of Indian-born enterprises that have strong a multinational flavour. Notably in 2007, India and China were both in the top 15 nations for outward foreign direct investment (FDI). Ravi Ramamurti²⁹ has studied emerging home-grown Indian multinationals in some depth in light of this observation. He notes a raft of home-grown multinationals in India differ markedly from China's. They tend to be smaller and they also tend to be developed entirely by private entrepreneurs, unlike the state-supported enterprises of China. Importantly for India, inbound and outward FDI grew apace at the same time, unlike China, which had a springboard of inbound FDI a decade or more preceding the growth of outward FDI. Alongside this exchange of capital, Indian money was quietly investing in major resources globally³⁰.

The significance of this is that the concordance of outward and inbound FDI provides a mechanism for direct engagement between a diaspora and the home country and between diasporas. The history of developments such as this suggests that skilled labour will be sought globally. This implies that India has the potential to be a destination country for skilled migrants once the current pool of overseas skilled Indians has been exhausted. The internal supply of migrants is largely unskilled and poor³¹, in contrast to internal migrants in other parts of Asia. The demand will exceed supply and India at least, if not yet the rest of South and Central Asia, will enter the competitive world of attracting migrants. These migrants are likely to be drawn from the developed world, including New Zealand, building on the existing linkages set in place by FDI connections and by relationships between Indian migrants in New Zealand and their families in India, and by New Zealanders living and working in the region and their contacts in New Zealand.

Implicit in this process is one of the intriguing aspects of transnationalism in relation to Asia, namely the way in which tradition, language and thought condition how people communicate. As Robin Cohen has pointed out,

“... transnational bonds no longer have to be cemented by migration or by exclusive territorial claims. In the age of cyberspace, a diaspora can, to some degree, be held together or re-created through the mind, through cultural artefacts and through a shared imagination”³².

This is in contrast to earlier times when travel limited the capacity of people effectively to move freely and rapidly on a global scale, or to communicate with each other in real time. One outcome is that most of the communication tends to be in one or other of the global languages such as English. Deeper cultural awareness and empathy though, implicitly needed for long-term sustainability, requires closer, more intimate contact, which is enabled by the physical exchange of engaged people in both locations.

29 Ravi Ramamurti (2008) *India in Transition: made-in-India multinationals*. University of Pennsylvania, Center for the Advanced Study of India. <http://casi.ssc.upenn.edu/iit/Ramamurti>.

30 'India's mini-multinationals make waves in Western markets' *New York Times*. www.nytimes.com/2005/08/31/business/worldbusiness/31iht-rupee.html.

31 Priya Deshingkar and Shaheen Akter (2009) *Migration and Human Development in India*. Human Development Project Research Paper 2009/13, UNDP

32 Robin Cohen (1996) 'Diasporas and the nation-state: from victims to challengers', *International Affairs*, vol. 72, pp. 507-520. Cited by Steve Vertovec (1999) 'Conceiving and researching transnationalism', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 22(2).

CONNECTIONS 4: FUTURES

The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) is likely to take a more central role in the future, especially given the current extension of observer membership to countries surrounding the region. SAARC developed from a proposal by Ziaur Rahman, then president of Bangladesh, in the 1970s for a regional trade bloc. This resulted in a meeting in Colombo in April 1981 of the foreign secretaries of Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, Maldives, India, Sri Lanka and Pakistan and the subsequent Declaration of South Asian Regional Cooperation in New Delhi in 1983.

The objectives of the Association as defined in the Charter are:

- to promote the welfare of the people of South Asia and to improve their quality of life;
- to accelerate economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region and to provide all individuals the opportunity to live in dignity and to realize their full potential;
- to promote and strengthen collective self-reliance among the countries of South Asia;
- to contribute to mutual trust, understanding and appreciation of one another's problems;
- to promote active collaboration and mutual assistance in the economic, social, cultural, technical and scientific fields;
- to strengthen cooperation with other developing countries;
- to strengthen cooperation among themselves in international forums on matters of common interest; and
- to cooperate with international and regional organisations with similar aims and purposes³³.

The organisation has continued to expand, with observer status being granted to the United States, China, Japan, South Korea and the European Union by 2006 and the formal admission of Afghanistan as a member from April 2007. Iran, Indonesia, Russia and South Africa have also applied for observer status, while Myanmar has applied for full membership. The history of SAARC has been one of opposition to such agreements, but there was a significant change in direction following the signing of the South Asian Free Trade Agreement by SAARC countries from January 2006. This indicates the significance placed by South Asian neighbours and major trading partners on regional free trade and the removal of tariffs. This links with the set of Free Trade Agreements between the South Asian region and other countries, including New Zealand, recently developed or coming into force. One of the more significant consequences of local regional agreements interconnecting with agreements with other countries is that the way is increasingly opened not just for the development of business and trade links but also for the development of the exchange of people as employees, entrepreneurs, advisors and settlers. In this sense the diasporas of business and the development of trade are precursors to diasporas of people.

However, currently, according to the Overseas Mercantile Trade data from Statistics New Zealand³⁴, no South Asian country features in the top 25 trading partners of New Zealand. This is not to say that the trade component is insignificant, but it does tend to suggest that if this region is one of the fastest-growing economic forces, the potential for future development is enormous. Coupled with this is the establishment of the Free Trade Agreements. In terms of merchandise trade for the year ended September 2009, India features as the 13th largest destination and 21st largest source for merchandising trade, with a value of \$NZ681 million in exports from New Zealand compared with \$NZ341 million in merchandising imports³⁵.

33 Charter of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation. Article 1. <http://saarc-sec.org/main.php?id=10&t=3.2>.

34 Overseas Mercantile Trade, Statistics New Zealand, www.stats.govt.nz.

35 Overseas Merchandise Trade Hot Off the Press, September 2009. www.stats.govt.nz/browse_for_stats/imports_and_exports/overseas_cargo/OverseasMerchandiseTrade_HOTPSep09/Tables.aspx.

CONCLUSION

The central theme with respect to diasporas and diaspora engagement in South and Central Asia is one of nascence. While there is a large and extremely complex set of diasporas of people directly or indirectly from the region in many parts of the world, including New Zealand, there are only small, scattered and disconnected diasporas in the region from other parts of the world, except for areas contiguous to the region. It is a history largely of outflow.

For this reason this paper's title points to a duality: not only is it a diaspora with 'future potential', it is with equal validity 'the invisible diaspora'.

However, this future potential may not be that far off. The development of Free Trade Areas and the increasing strength of the economies of the region are already showing signs of attracting migrants. Already this is obvious in the IT industry, especially around Bangalore, which has attracted large numbers of return migrants and growing numbers of other migrants, but the growth of home-grown multinationals and the increasing activities of international multinationals are laying the groundwork for some major changes in the social aspects of migration to the region in the coming decades. It remains to be seen whether this can expand into a region-wide process because the prerequisite political stability and administrative infrastructure are not yet in place across much of the region. This applies to both individual countries, such as Afghanistan, as a whole and to regions outside the major international gateways in other countries, such as parts of India, Iran and Kazakhstan.

With respect to the New Zealanders in the region, there is a dislocation between the economic futures and the current activities. New Zealanders in the region are not generally engaged or trained to be engaged in commercial development. For this reason it is likely that their engagement will remain in the very valuable humanitarian work and with various aspects of South and Central Asian cultures. This is clearly true of the New Zealanders in India associated with ashrams and with humanitarian organisations, but it appears to extend to other migrants, including return migrants to India.

The New Zealanders in other parts of the region are too scattered and too few to have yet developed a sense of a community of migrants.

Sitting outside the diasporas but with a presence that impacts on the relationship between ex-pats and the rest of society are the people involved in various international military activities. There is expected to be ongoing military, policing and peacekeeping roles in much of the region for New Zealanders, and this has potential to spawn awareness of New Zealand as a provider of opportunities for education and business among the local population. Because the personnel are generally in the region for relatively short periods of time, they maintain close ties with New Zealand. On the other hand the level of intimate social contact with the locals and the ability to live as members of the local communities that are typical of real diasporas are severely constrained by the circumstances that put them in the region.

The situation in the western and northern parts of the region are not entirely dissimilar to that which was seen in Southeast Asia some 40 years ago. Lessons learnt from that history suggest that connections with the region have the potential to develop in a similar way if New Zealand maintains an independent relationship across the region and neighbouring regions.

PROFILE: ROBERT DIDHAM

Robert Didham is a geographer and Buddhologist based in Christchurch. He works as a senior demographer with Statistics New Zealand and is a senior research associate of the Institute of Policy Studies, Victoria University of Wellington. He has extensive interests in cultural diversity and history within New Zealand, and has a long association with the theory and expression of ethnicity and identity and with the analysis of population mobility.

He has written on many aspects of demography, including ethnicity, language, intermarriage, fertility and migration. Among his current research themes are questions concerning ethnic mobility, ethnogenesis, language retention and acquisition, and religion, and how these themes contribute to an understanding of population change. Of particular interest is how changes in these features of the population relate to both internal and international migration patterns and how diasporas modify cultural relationships.

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