

ASIA NEW ZEALAND FOUNDATION • BUILDING NEW ZEALANDERS' KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING OF ASIA

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19

*LINING UP A PERSUASIVE FRIEND: JAPAN'S EXPECTATIONS OF
HOW NEW ZEALAND CAN CONTRIBUTE TO ASIAN SECURITY*

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INTRODUCTION

In New Zealand, the country's Asian identity was clearly established through major debates in the years leading to the hosting of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting in Auckland in 1999.¹ On the other hand, most Japanese still do not consider Australia and New Zealand part of Asia. New Zealand is physically remote, culturally Western, economically small and politically invisible compared with Japan's major Asian counterparts, such as China and Korea. Nonetheless, growing diplomatic relations, educational exchanges, tourism, business relations and immigration have inevitably linked the security of New Zealand with the security of Asia and of Japan. Such recognition is growing among the small segment of Japanese policymakers, but it needs to be shared more broadly. At the same time, both countries need to recognise asymmetry in their security perceptions and economic, military and political capabilities, in order to find a complementary mode of cooperation that enhances mutual and regional security.

New Zealand lacks the economic and military power to be a significant international actor, except in the small island states of the South Pacific. Furthermore, New Zealand is overshadowed by Australia, which shares similar limitations to New Zealand in terms of becoming a significant player in Asia, but to a much lesser extent. Australia also augments its weakness with a close alliance with the United States, whereas New Zealand's relations with the US have been thinner since the suspension of the ANZUS alliance owing to New Zealand's refusal to let nuclear-powered US warships into its ports.

In the outside world, New Zealand is often regarded as an appendix to Australia, and this view does register among the Japanese. As Australia is a close friend of Japan with a sizable military, Japan is satisfied when New Zealand acts just like the Aussies. The two countries' troop dispatches to the United Nations peacekeeping operation (PKO) in East Timor and the Indian Ocean patrol mission against smuggling in conjunction with Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) along with the Japanese Self Defense Forces (SDF) are vivid illustrations of this point. Although small in scale, New Zealand's contribution to military security operations in Asia is welcomed by Japan.

In Japan's immediate neighbourhood of East Asia, the scale of potential military conflicts (take the Korean Peninsula, the Taiwan Strait and the East China Sea) is too large for the New Zealand military to make a significant difference. When a military conflict breaks out in East Asia, New Zealand will be an insignificant player. The likelihood of military conflicts involving China is rising, as the country is moving from its "peaceful rise" strategy to a more aggressive use of forces to back its expanding maritime claims. However, none of the countries in the Asia-Pacific region has determined that China is an irreversible threat and that it has to be contained with all available means. Japan fears China, and any help from New Zealand would be welcome in military contingencies. However, Japan does not expect New Zealand to be able to do anything to "deter" China militarily. This is a major difference from Japan's expectation of Australia.

The prevailing regional system is neither a new Cold War nor cooperative multilateralism. China is challenging the US dominance in East Asia in only a limited way, trying to sideline the US politically while threatening the Asian neighbours militarily, as seen in the South China Sea and East China Sea disputes. China pursues its mercantilist economic growth strategy, exploiting the shortcomings of multilateral rules in trade, investment and foreign exchange. Setting up more effective regimes, whether global or regional, to discipline China's military and economic behaviour is essential if the region is to avert the start of a new Cold War. Depending on how New Zealand applies its soft power, it can be an influential force in the making of such international regimes.

1 Rochelle Bright, "Is New Zealand an Asian Country? The 1993-1997 Debate", in Yongjin Zhang, ed., *New Zealand and Asia: Perceptions, Identity and Engagement*, Asia 2000 Foundation of New Zealand and New Zealand Asia Institute, Auckland University, 1999, pp.31-52.

“New Zealand’s soft power did make a major contribution to Japan’s effort when it ratified the protocol in 2002—five years ahead of Australia.”

The ways in which Australia and New Zealand differ offer a further insight into how important New Zealand can be in Asian affairs. New Zealand’s decision not to send troops to Iraq contrasted with the closer coordination of troop dispatches between Australia and Japan during the reconstruction stage of Iraq. The absence of New Zealand in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) was far less significant for the Japanese government under the conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) than the absence of Germany and France, despite the considerable voice of praise for New Zealand among liberal Japanese for skilfully defying the US.² Likewise, New Zealand’s past refusal to let nuclear-powered ships into its ports received lots of sympathy in Japan, but had little effect on either US policy or Japan’s policy in regard to US naval operations. The application or withdrawal of New Zealand’s physical power, no matter how noble the idea behind the decision, has little effect on traditional security issues involving the military rivalries of Northeast Asia. Nonetheless, the ongoing reinforcement of security relations with the US is likely to boost New Zealand’s credibility as a relevant security actor in Asia to some degree.

Meanwhile, New Zealand’s soft power in making international rules has been more successful and is more promising. In the making of the Kyoto Protocol to cap global carbon dioxide emissions, New Zealand’s soft power did make a major contribution to Japan’s effort when it ratified the protocol in 2002—five years ahead of Australia. Although Japan later thought it had made too many concessions (which the country eventually failed to meet) for the sake of reaching an agreement, and now seeks a new agreement with broader participation, this does not diminish New Zealand’s contribution of ratification and environmental norms to the cause of reducing global carbon dioxide emissions.

If applied in a way consistent with Japan’s interests, New Zealand’s weight in multilateral policymaking can make an important addition to Japan’s. New Zealand’s and Australia’s unconditional support for Japan’s candidacy to be a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council is perhaps the most important support Japan feels, especially because Japan’s close economic partners in ASEAN (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations) have betrayed Japan’s expectations of support in the face of the rising China and its opposition to Japan’s candidacy. From Japan’s perspective, New Zealand is an important actor that shares its democratic values. This is particularly important in Japan’s effort to discipline the behaviour of the Chinese Gulliver through multilateral and plurilateral (regional) institutions.

This paper is organised in the following way. The first section illustrates Asia’s broader strategic environment and how New Zealand might fit into this picture through Japanese eyes. The second section lists and summarises various security issues in Asia that are perceived as important by the Japanese, and discusses perception gaps between Japan and New Zealand. The third section discusses security partnerships Japan has and how it uses these partnerships to cope with the regional security challenges described in the previous section. The fourth section of this paper discusses ongoing Japan-New Zealand security cooperation and its limitations. The final section concludes the discussion.

2 Daizo Sakurada, *Taipei koshou no sugoi kuni* [Countries with great diplomacy with the United States], Tokyo: Kobunsha, 2009.

SECTION 1:

ASIAN STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT AS JAPAN SEES IT

THE RISE OF CHINA

By far the largest change in Japan's perceived strategic environment during the past 20 years has been the rise of China. China's gross domestic product (GDP) measured by nominal exchange rate passed Japan's in 2010, making the former the second-largest economy in the world after the US. China's economic growth during the past 20 years has fuelled its ambitious military modernisation programme, converting a large yet obsolete army into a highly sophisticated comprehensive military. While Japan kept its military spending cap at one percent of its GDP and its GDP growth floundered, China's military spending grew at an average of 12.9 percent annually, outpacing its furious economic growth.³ As a result, China has been the world's second-largest military spender since 2008.⁴

The rise of China has also provided growing economic opportunities for all its trade partners, including Japan, the US and New Zealand. As hundreds of Japanese corporations relocated their production facilities to China in search of cheaper labour and location costs, China became their base for exports, not only back into Japan but also to the global market. Despite China's mercantilist trade policy, the growing middle class in China has developed a taste for luxurious Japanese products, from automobiles to fruit. Thus trade has grown in both ways between the two countries, sending the US into second position in Japan's overall trade portfolio since 2002. Meanwhile, China's growth has also been driven by the US appetite for Chinese exports. China has become the number one source of imports for the US. While China aggressively lures American investors, China also re-circulates its trade surplus back into US Treasury bonds. These Chinese moves have kept the East Asian economy from becoming a self-containing bloc. Politically, China has to some extent neutralised its dependence on the US by turning this relationship into mutual dependency.

BETWEEN A NEW COLD WAR AND A NEW TRILATERALISM

During the Cold War, the Soviet Union had few economic relations with the Western world. Without economic interdependence, the containment of the geopolitical rival was a relatively simple policy choice for the West. Today's China is different. Its location is more favourable for maritime expansion than Russia's. The Chinese economy is deeply integrated with both Japan and the US. In the strategies of Japan and the US, economic and military dynamics offer contradicting policy options.

Economically, East Asia is the fastest-growing region in the world. The high growth of China and Southeast Asian countries has compensated for Japan's slow growth rate. The region has grown to become a third pillar of the world economy, on a par with the European Union and the North American regions. While Japan represented East Asia in the old trilateralism (from which the G7 meetings for global governance were derived), China now claims an equal share of the East Asian leadership and is determined to oust Japan from the co-leadership when possible.

The strategic dilemma that Japan and the US face has tempted China to drive a wedge between the US and Japan. Exploiting domestic opposition within Japan to the relocation of the Futenma Marine Corps Airbase, China has questioned the necessity of the US bases in Okinawa. At the same time, China has provoked the Japanese Coast Guard and the Maritime SDF through multiple incursions into Japanese territorial waters around the Okinawan group of islands. This forced the Japanese government to seek a new expression of clear US commitment to the defence of the Senkaku Islands in the autumn of 2010.⁵

The prevailing strategic dynamics in East Asia are not quite a new Cold War, but not quite a steady progress towards community-building either. Despite the region's growing economic strength, the drive for regional cooperation among the ASEAN Plus Three (China, Japan and Korea) members, which was born out of the Asian Economic Crisis (1997-1998), has clearly run out of steam, owing partly to the internal division between Japan and China. Newer cooperative frameworks have either expanded further to dilute the Sino-Japanese rivalry (like the East Asia Summit [EAS]) or excluded China (like the Trilateral Security Dialogue [TSD]). Hence the original configuration of "East Asia", made up of the

3 Wendell Minnick, "China's Defense Spending Growth Slows", *Defense News*, 5 March 2010. <http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4527285>.

4 SIPRI Yearbook 2009. <http://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2009/05/05A>.

5 Hidetoshi Sotooka, "A soothing dose of diplomacy for maritime feud", *Asahi Shimbun* (English), 3 November 2010. <http://www.asahi.com/english/TKY201011020416.html>.

ASEAN Plus Three countries, has lost its identity as a coherent political grouping. The EAS, which was originally launched by the ASEAN Plus +3 members, Australia, New Zealand and India, has now decided to invite the US and Russia, which signed the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. Australia and New Zealand occupy very important places within this configuration. While Japan's primary security partnership has been, and continues for the foreseeable future to be, with the US, Australian efforts have been instrumental in anchoring a US commitment to regional security. New Zealand is expected by Japan to share this role, as it has revised its port call policy in regard to US nuclear-powered ships. This Japanese expectation of working together to anchor US commitment is shared by Australia and New Zealand, but not by India and Russia.

INDIA AND RUSSIA

Two of China's neighbours and geopolitical rivals, India and Russia are economically expected to be the next major powers as part of the high-growth BRICs group (Brazil, Russia, India and China). Militarily, both countries are wary of China's rise. Russia's ability to develop Siberia and keep the Russian population there suffered a blow when the cash-short Federal government cut subsidies to the region under economic reform. The infusion of ethnic Chinese into Russian Siberia, combined with the modernisation of the Chinese army, has had the Russians worrying about a possible loss of this resource-rich region. Meanwhile, India is worried about renewed Chinese claims over the disputed border areas and the Chinese navy's increasing activities in the Indian Ocean region.

While possessing sizable military capabilities that can make a difference, if anti-Chinese containment becomes necessary Russia and India are still of unknown quality as far as cooperation with Japan is concerned. Russia continues to see the US as its most important threat in every direction, and Japan with a military alliance with the US has pursued the return of the Russia-occupied Krill Islands. The Russian position on this territorial dispute is hardening, as indicated by President Dmitry Medvedev's visit to the island of Kunasiri in late 2010. In the Indian Ocean region, India and the US are potential naval rivals, although the rising Chinese navy attracts more attention. Hence India and Russia cannot be counted on by Japan as reliable security partners that can add strength to the bilateral alliance with the US.

ENGAGING THE US IN THE REGION

Given the complex strategic environment of growing economic interdependence and military rivalry in East Asia, Japan has assigned foremost importance to strengthening the bilateral military alliance with the US. In order to dissuade the US from picking China as the most important security partner in Asia, Japan since the late-1990s has upgraded its overseas military missions in conjunction with US-led operations such as OEF and OIF. While the prospect of "Japan passing" by the US—the US directly discussing security matters with China, as US President Bill Clinton called China "a strategic partner"—has been made less likely by China's aggressive military postures during the past ten years, danger to the alliance is not nil.

There are two main sources of danger to the alliance. The first is the US losing interest in Asia. While the dynamic growth of East Asia has empowered US exporters over trade protectionists in US domestic politics, the growing US trade deficit with China has already become a serious political problem on Capitol Hill. The US decision to restrict trade with East Asia may translate into a decline in regional security interests. During the late 1980s, the height of Japan's trade wars with the US coincided with US consideration of a North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which was set in motion by bilateral trade agreements that Canada signed with the US and Mexico. Japan and Australia saw a common danger of economic isolationism by the US, which might have set a similar trend militarily. The two countries' joint efforts resulted in the creation of APEC. The more "Asian" New Zealand of today, in a similar vein, is an active promoter of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which advocates free trade across the Pacific.

The second danger to the US-Japan alliance involves the US continuing to engage in Asian security but picking China as the primary ally over Japan. Japan's strong anti-military pacifism still upholds its constitution as sacrosanct, which successive governments have interpreted as banning the country's participation in collective defence. Efforts by the "Japan hands" of the George W Bush administration to nudge Japan towards a "normal country", which uses its military without too much of a legal straightjacket, have lost momentum.

“New Zealand, in general, supports continued US engagement in the security of the Asia-Pacific, but does not seem to share the same degree of urgency with Japan.”

In contrast, China's shift from domestically focused defence to participation in UN PKOs and the anti-piracy operation off Somalia have demonstrated the country's decisiveness as opposed to Japan's reactivity and incrementalism.⁶

A perceived shortage of security contributions in the eyes of US policymakers is a common property of Japan and New Zealand. Japan under LDP rule has clearly understood the negative consequence of “G2” security dialogues between China and the US, and even the Democratic Party of Japan government of Kan oscillated back towards the LDP position after his predecessor Hatoyama flirted with the idea of Japan acting as a balancer. New Zealand, in general, supports continued US engagement in the security of the Asia-Pacific, but does not seem to share the same degree of urgency with Japan. Both Japan and New Zealand may discuss US participation in regional groupings (such as the EAS) as single members within a multilateral framework. However, Japan clearly places the US-Japan alliance as a solid bloc within the regional grouping, and increasingly expects Australia to join the bloc. Meanwhile, New Zealand seems to continue to enjoy more freedom of action, owing in part to its distance from the geopolitical hotspots of Asia and the relatively insignificant scale of its military.

6 For broad-based discussions of these features of Japanese foreign policy by multiple authors, see Akitoshi Miyashita and Yoichiro Sato, eds., *Japanese Foreign Policy in Asia and the Pacific: Domestic Interests, American Pressure, and Regional Integration*, New York: Palgrave, 2001.

SECTION 2:

JAPAN'S PERSPECTIVE OF SECURITY CHALLENGES IN ASIA

In Japan, cross-partisan consensus exists on the predominance of traditional military security issues. Territorial and maritime boundary disputes with Russia, China and Korea, naval competition with China, North Korea's nuclear development, and the security of energy transport weigh heavily in Japan's list of security concerns. At the same time, Japan has maintained a loosely defined "comprehensive security" orientation, incorporating various aspects of economic and human security. New Zealand's location far away from Japan's main strategic sea lanes leaves a large gap in its perceptions of traditional security concerns. On the other hand, a growing movement of people and goods in the region has created enough conversion of interest in regard to non-traditional security issues, which should motivate Japan and New Zealand to cooperate closely.

MARITIME BOUNDARY DISPUTES AND NAVAL RIVALRY WITH CHINA

China's growing interest in becoming a major maritime power challenges the existing co-hegemony in the maritime domain by the US and Japan in the Western Pacific region. Although New Zealand has been a beneficiary of the US-Japan co-hegemony, its self-perceived enjoyment has been largely limited to the Southern Hemisphere, notwithstanding the country's important trade ties with Japan and Korea. The growing New Zealand trade with China may encourage New Zealand to remain neutral in the maritime rivalry in Northeast Asia, but this in no way diminishes New Zealand's stake in peace and stability in Northeast Asia. As China increasingly reveals its aggressive posture towards the disputed maritime territories in the East and South China Seas, New Zealand may have to take sides politically and upgrade its security ties with the US and Japan.

Between Japan and China, the maritime exclusive economic zone (EEZ) boundary is disputed over a long range rather than over sovereignty of a few islands and their surrounding waters. As China claims the extension of the continental shelf to the Ryukyu Trough while Japan insists on the equidistance approach between the two baselines, the territorial dispute over the Senkaku Islands constitutes only a small part of the Sino-Japanese maritime dispute. During the past ten years, China's exploitation of natural gas from the seabed in the East China Sea has grown into a major dispute between the two countries. The exploitation has been taking place near the maritime EEZ border that Japan claims, but on the Chinese side. Japan's argument that the gas field likely spreads over the boundary has been rebuffed

by China's claim that the gas field is deep inside the Chinese EEZ. Although China in 2007 agreed in principle to seek a joint venture at one of the four known gas fields near the Japan-claimed EEZ boundary, negotiations since then have made little progress, while China keeps building its gas rig towards full-scale commercial exploitation. At least on two occasions, China has dispatched warships to the contended gas field to demonstrate its military control.

In the autumn of 2010, the collision of a Chinese fishing boat with a Japanese Coast Guard patrol boat within the territorial waters around the Japan-controlled Senkaku Islands, and the resulting arrest of the Chinese crew, ignited protests in both China and Japan. The incident is widely viewed in Japan as a deliberate provocation by the Chinese boat, although the Japanese government released all crew and then the captain of the boat without charging them for diplomatic considerations. The Japanese government's decision to withhold the video recording of the incident made by the Coast Guard was sabotaged by the segments being posted on YouTube by a Coast Guard officer. The Chinese government initially postponed various diplomatic and military exchange events in protest, but responded to the Japanese gesture by informally resuming high-level meetings on the side of multilateral meetings, such as the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM). However, China announced its plan to expand its maritime patrol force in response to the incident, further alerting the Japanese.

SEA-LANE SECURITY

Competition for maritime supremacy extends beyond the Western Pacific. China's growing imports of petroleum and other natural resources from the Middle East and Africa have elevated the importance of the Indian Ocean in its strategic considerations. Japan has depended on the US naval force for security of the sea lanes in the Indian Ocean for the same resource dependency. US requests for increased burden-sharing in the distant area security (i.e. Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia) and the increased Chinese naval activities in the Indian Ocean have prompted the Japanese government to extend its naval activities beyond the Malacca Strait into the Indian Ocean. Japan's refuelling of the coalition ships in conjunction with OEF, transporting of the Iraq-deployed ground force's equipment into Kuwait, and anti-piracy patrolling of the Sea of Aden can be seen in this context.

“From Japan’s perspective, New Zealand’s consideration of Japan’s realpolitik in criticising Myanmar but not Japan is well appreciated.”

In addition to direct military participation in maritime security activities in the Indian Ocean region, Japan has quietly worked on closer diplomatic relations with the key regional partners. Smaller yet strategically located littoral states, such as Sri Lanka and Djibouti, have been awarded disproportionate shares of Japanese overseas development assistance, as Japan has shifted its aid focus from solely economic considerations to security ones.⁷ China’s increasing naval presence in the Indian Ocean, including installations in Pakistan, Myanmar and Sri Lanka, has driven Japan into competing behaviour and efforts to line up a similarly alarmed India into a coalition.

The Royal New Zealand Navy dispatched a frigate to participate in a coalition effort to stop smuggling by the Taliban and Al Qaeda in the aftermath of the simultaneous terror attacks in September 2001. However, this naval dispatch overstretched the nation’s limited defence resources—tying up one of the only three frigates its navy possessed. Despite this precedence, Japan does not expect a significant New Zealand role in the Indian Ocean sea-lanes’ security. On the other hand, Japan has maintained an accommodating foreign policy towards countries in this region that have had dubious human rights records, in order to balance China’s increasing influence. From Japan’s perspective, New Zealand’s consideration of Japan’s *realpolitik* in criticising Myanmar but not Japan is well appreciated.

ENERGY SECURITY

While sea-lane security is important for Japan, in large part due to its dependence on imported petroleum from the Middle East, the maritime transportation of petroleum occupies only one part of Japan’s overall energy security interests. A steady supply of petroleum involves exploration, production, transport and stockpiling, which involve numerous diplomatic partners. Furthermore, petroleum meets only one half of Japan’s overall energy needs, supplemented by nuclear, coal, natural gas and other sources. The issue of climate change and the global effort to reduce carbon dioxide emissions also poses challenges to Japan’s economic security, especially in relation to the increased cost of industrial production vis-à-vis the developing countries such as China and India, which continue to run factories in a less energy-efficient manner.

7 Yoichiro Sato and Masahiko Asano, “Humanitarian and democratic norms in Japan’s ODA distributions”, in Yoichiro Sato and Keiko Hirata, eds., *Norms, Interests, and Power in Japanese Foreign Policy*, New York: Palgrave, 2008, pp.111-128.

Japan and China engage in rivalry over contracting new oil and gas field explorations in the Middle East, Central Asia and Africa and securing the sea lanes via maritime military activities and diplomatic initiatives towards the littoral states. In the East China Sea, the maritime boundary dispute is in part fuelled by the hydro-carbon potential of the region. On the other hand, framing the energy issue as a zero-sum competition between Japan and China misses its cooperative potential. A buyer cartel between these two large user countries would increase the bargaining power vis-à-vis the producing states over licensing and purchasing prices. A regional joint stockpiling of oil has been discussed among Asian countries, including both Japan and China. Furthermore, improving China’s energy efficiency is a positive-sum undertaking for Japan, as pressure on international energy prices would ease and pollution over Japan would reduce. The last area is where New Zealand can make a significant contribution through its scientific talents, despite the small size of its economy.

NUCLEAR AND MISSILE PROLIFERATION

Since the mid-1990s, Japan has constantly remained vigilant against North Korea’s nuclear weapon and ballistic missile development. The test explosions of nuclear bombs in 2007 and 2008 and the extending range of North Korea’s newer ballistic missiles have elevated the level of Japan’s threat perception, which is shared across the domestic party lines. Japan has supported the Six-Party Talks framework, while simultaneously placing emphasis on trilateral coordination of the negotiating front among Japan, the US and South Korea. The repeated stalemates in the Six-Party Talks in the past ten years, especially over the issue of the abduction of Japanese citizens by North Korea, have hardened Japan’s negotiating position. Prior to 2002, Japan did take a major part as a financial contributor to the Korea Energy Development Corporation (KEDO), which was to build two light-water nuclear reactors for power generation in North Korea. Since the George W Bush administration of the US revised the previous administration’s North Korea policy in 2003, Japan has opposed the resumption of aid to North Korea, which would give it nuclear-power-generation capabilities. Japan’s distancing itself from a KEDO-like framework has been more consistent than the US policy itself, as the Bush administration during its last days in 2008 attempted to jump-start the Six-Party Talks by offering aid in return for the destruction of a mere cooling water tower at the plutonium-enrichment facility in Yongbyoung.

“Japan expects New Zealand to lend absolute morale and diplomatic support in such forums as the ARF and the UN General Assembly, and is satisfied.”

Although China has been the host of the Six-Party Talks and its pressure is one of the reasons for North Korea coming back to the talks in the past, China's divergent geopolitical interests have worked against the application of coordinated diplomatic pressure against North Korea by the five other countries. Japan has also been actively bringing the North Korea-related agenda into multilateral forums, including the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEM and G20 Summit. However, Japan's efforts are distributed in the order of bilateral coordination with the US, trilateral coordination with the US and South Korea, the Six-Party Talks and other multilateral forums.

New Zealand made a small contribution to KEDO, but has had little involvement since its dissolution in the face of North Korean defiance of the Agreed Framework. New Zealand still makes a good partner with Japan in more generalised non-proliferation efforts through the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and the International Atomic Energy Agency.

TRANSNATIONAL AND STATE-SPONSORED CRIMES

As an archipelagic nation, Japan has been relatively shielded from transnational crimes that require physical transportation, such as the smuggling of illicit goods and people. Nonetheless, the presence of states with poor and corrupt law enforcement and the criminal state of North Korea in the neighbourhood expose Japan to various types of transnational and state-sponsored crime. The largest source by far of illegal human entries into Japan is China. Organised Chinese crime syndicates are behind human smuggling into Japan. Human trafficking into Japan is also problematic, for both Japan and the source countries, as the trafficked persons are coerced, deceived and held against their will. Many trafficked victims are from China and Southeast Asia. The smuggling of weapons from loosely regulated countries, like the Philippines, is a major issue for Japan. The economic losses of Japanese companies owing to pirating of copyright have become a security issue as the Japanese economy has moved into the post-industrialisation stage. China's and Southeast Asia's lax law enforcement and North Korea's state-sponsored efforts at pirating Japan's intellectual property rights, copyright and trademarks have cost Japan billions of dollars.⁸

8 The software industry estimates that 86 percent of the business applications used in China are pirated, costing the industry would-be sales of 3.9 billion US dollars in 2005. The loss figure does not include pirated software used in North America and other non-China markets. Candace Lombardi, “Study: Software piracy costs \$34 billion,” *CNET News.com*, 23 May 2006. Cited in Kristina Sepetys and Alan Cox, “Intellectual property rights protection in China: Trends in litigations and economic damages”, Nera Economic Consulting. http://www.ipeg.eu/blog/wp-content/uploads/NERA-IP-Protection_China_2009.pdf.

The North Korean state's involvement in transnational criminal activities poses multiple threats to Japan. The North Korean production and distribution of counterfeited cigarettes, money and synthetic narcotics are serious regional security issues. For Japan and South Korea, the North Korean insertions of spies and special agents for sabotaging activities and abductions of their citizens have been major security threats. Despite Kim Jong-Il's admission of the abduction activities and the return of five Japanese abductees in 2002, Japan suspects that many more unaccounted-for Japanese either live in North Korea or have been killed there. South Korean governments in the past have not strongly pursued the abductions of their citizens by North Korea in order not to cool the reconciliation mood, but the change of government leadership to conservative Lee Myung-Bak has opened the way for Japan-Korea cooperation on this issue. Japan expects New Zealand to lend absolute morale and diplomatic support in such forums as the ARF and the UN General Assembly, and is satisfied.

TRANSNATIONAL POLLUTION, SAFETY OF IMPORTED FOOD AND PANDEMICS

Development in China has been both an increased economic opportunity and an environmental problem for Japan. Deforestation and the resulting expansion of the Gobi Desert in Western China have increased the volume of yellow sand that reaches Japan's sky and causes hazy and hazardous conditions for air and ground traffic.⁹ China's industrial burning of coal also increases the sulphur content in the regional atmosphere and causes acid rain over Japan, and deforestation. The volume of coastal trash originating in China has also increased.

As Japan's imports from China have increased, the safety of imported food has also become a major concern. High levels of residual pesticide in imported farm products have often been reported, and even the use of domestically banned chemicals has been detected. A case of pesticide contamination of frozen dumpling products became a politically contested issue, in which the Chinese authority initially denied the Japanese charge but later quickly arrested and prosecuted a former employee of the dumpling factory as the dumpling issue became a sore spot in the improving bilateral relations.

9 Eric Johnston, “Yellow dust storms getting worse”, *Japan Times* (online), 22 April 2008. <http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20080422i1.html>.

“New Zealand and Japan will likely be working side by side in coalition relief missions more frequently, and as such it is desirable to upgrade their cooperation through an acquisition and cross-servicing agreement.”

While both Japanese and Chinese companies were implicated in separate scandals concerning milk products in Japan, the Chinese company's deliberate mixing of melamine (which resulted in hundreds of kidney failure cases in Chinese children) set new heights of disgust for the Japanese, who had previously boycotted a domestic milk producer for recycling expired milk but causing no long-term health problems. Case-by-case resolutions of these food-contamination incidents have not improved Japan's trust in Chinese food products, but rather raised the question about broader Chinese governance.

China's poor handling of contagious diseases has also been a major concern for the Japanese. The outbreak of sudden acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in 2003 in China and its global spread shed light on the poor response to the initial outbreak by the local medical authority in China, which allowed the otherwise containable disease to spread globally. Here again, the Japanese see lack of transparency in local administration and politicisation of routine administrative matters by the Communist Party members in China as a source of concern. Because migratory birds from China carry the avian flu virus, the anticipated mutation of this virus to enable human-to-human transmission and a resulting global pandemic is also a serious concern for the Japanese.

The issues in this group offer a win-win-win opportunity for Japan, New Zealand and China to enhance security for all and share diplomatic credits, as discussed in Section 4 of this report.

TERRORISM, NATURAL DISASTER AND TOURIST SAFETY

Japan's and New Zealand's cooperation in a coalition naval operation to stop smuggling by the Taliban and Al Qaeda has been previously mentioned. Although the simultaneous terror attacks in New York and Washington DC grabbed world attention in 2001, Japan has dealt with terrorism throughout the Cold War period. Furthermore, the sarin gas attack by the Aum Sinrikyo cult group against Tokyo's metropolitan subway commuters in 1995 brought about a new perspective on terrorism, which was no longer bound by the left-right ideological confrontation of the Cold War period. Although Japan has successfully maintained its perceived neutrality between the Islamic world and the Judeo-Christian world, terrorism in the Islamic countries such as Egypt and Indonesia has taken the lives of Japanese tourists. Previously, Japan's strictly defence-only defence posture had kept the country from adopting distant-area military operations, even for the evacuation of its own citizens. An increase in Japanese tourists and business people overseas motivated Japan to revise the missions of the SDF to include evacuations of its nationals in the event of large-scale disasters and political turmoil. As Japan's long-distance logistical capability is limited, New Zealand's proximity to South Pacific islands and the significant presence of Japanese tourists in this region make their interests mutually complementary.

Disaster relief in Asia continues to require large contributions from the US, but Japan has been increasing its burden-sharing in this field. The 2004 amendment to the country's SDF law upgraded disaster relief from a secondary duty to one of the primary duties, and SDF members have been actively dispatched to places like Pakistan (earthquake, 2005; flood, 2010) and Indonesia (tsunami, 2005; earthquake, 2009). New Zealand and Japan will likely be working side by side in coalition relief missions more frequently, and as such it is desirable to upgrade their cooperation through an acquisition and cross-servicing agreement.

SECTION 3:

JAPAN'S PERSPECTIVE OF KEY SECURITY PARTNERSHIPS IN ASIA

US-JAPAN ALLIANCE

In order to cope with the expanding and diversifying scope of security threats it perceives during the post-Cold War period, Japan has first and foremost attempted to cement a bilateral alliance with the US. The process of revising the scope of the alliance in terms of its geographical applications and the types of threat it envisions went through the immediate post-Cold War period of the 1990s and the early 2000s with a strong assumption that the relative bargaining position of Japan within the alliance has declined owing to the emerging unipolar world power structure. Japan cautiously revised its strictly territorial defence posture and expanded its military activities in cooperation with US forces in distant areas, such as the Indian Ocean and Iraq, and passed legislation to enable rear support of US forces in regional security contingencies. The US since the 1970s has strongly demanded increased burden-sharing by Japan, but the Japan hands of the Bush administration found that encouragement rather than criticism worked well to increase Japan's military contribution to collective security.

US-JAPAN-AUSTRALIA TRILATERAL SECURITY DIALOGUE

Cementing the US security commitment to the Asia-Pacific region into the post-Cold War period has been a common interest of Japan and Australia. The two countries have taken initiatives in launching regional multilateral frameworks, such as APEC and the ARF. These regional multilateral forums have largely failed to meet the post-Cold War expectation of cooperative security, and state-to-state rivalries have strongly defined regional security, especially in Northeast Asia. Bilateral cooperation between Australia and Japan to cope with various non-traditional and transnational security threats (such as illegal migration, drug and weapon smuggling, money laundering and pandemic diseases) incrementally progressed throughout the 1990s and 2000s. However, it was significant that such cooperative measures were compiled, repackaged and endorsed for further growth by the summit-level political commitment in 2007 between Prime Ministers John Howard and Shinzo Abe—representing the conservative opinions of each country.

The closer bilateral security relations between Australia and Japan enabled consolidation (although limited) of the two “spokes” (the Australia-US alliance and the Japan-US alliance) into one trilateral framework. The TSD has brought together foreign and defence ministers of the three countries four times since 2006. While the three countries emphasise their cooperation against transnational threats, the grouping coincides with the growth of the Chinese military power. In the discussions at the TSD meetings, the three countries carefully avoided directly discussing China, although it would be impossible to discuss such issues as North Korea's and Iran's nuclear development without making any reference to China.

SECTION 4:

JAPAN'S EXPECTATION OF NEW ZEALAND ROLES IN ASIAN SECURITY

Given the partly overlapping but divergent security interests, as well as the gap in capabilities between Japan and New Zealand, Japan's expectation of New Zealand in Asian security matters is modest. For traditional military affairs, the US remains the primary partner of Japan. Australian cooperation with Japan in this area is incrementally increasing, but the primary focus of this bilateral cooperation has been limited to non-traditional security issues. Japan's expectation of New Zealand is to match closely Japan-Australia cooperation on non-traditional security issues. Although New Zealand's participation in security issues that cross the boundary between traditional military affairs and non-traditional or transnational problems (such as the PSI) is welcome, Japan does not expect a rapid growth in New Zealand's military involvement in such issues. On traditional security issues, Japan's expectation of New Zealand is limited to being a close political ally.

THE RISE OF CHINA, REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND NEW ZEALAND

Given the scale of the maritime rivalry in East Asia, New Zealand's small navy does not heavily factor into Japan's calculations. This does not mean there is nothing on which the two countries can cooperate. As seen during the maritime patrol operation in conjunction with OEF, Japan's refuelling support for the coalition ships (including New Zealand's frigate) is one illustration of mutually beneficial cooperation. Instability and natural disasters in the South Pacific are the most likely causes for New Zealand naval dispatches abroad, and joint operations (together with Australia and Japan) for non-combat operations (logistics, medical support, civilian evacuations, humanitarian aid, etc) would be effective.

New Zealand's role in specifically controlling North Korea's nuclear and missile proliferation may be limited, but its contributions to more general global efforts at such are well recognised. The country's regular participation in PSI exercises with coalition partners including Japan is improving the maritime interdiction capabilities of the participating states and sending deterrence signals to the would-be proliferators.

Pollution and food safety are the areas in which New Zealand can make great contributions to Asia in cooperation with Japan. The strong appeal of "clean green New Zealand" is effective not only for bringing in Asian tourists but also for setting standards in such areas as the management of animal husbandry, forestry, fishery and eco-tourism. Although New Zealand's trade volume is small, the introduction of clean green food from New Zealand has raised the standard of the growing middle-class consumers in China. This will in turn contribute to an overall improvement in food safety standards in China. As the contaminated Fonterra milk imports from China were a food safety issue for New Zealand, Japan and New Zealand can work together to set higher food safety standards in parallel with their free trade negotiations through bilateral, regional and multilateral venues.

BILATERAL JAPAN-NEW ZEALAND DISCUSSIONS

On the issue of global warming, New Zealand Prime Minister John Key pitched the New Zealand proposal for a "Global Research Alliance" concept during a visit to Tokyo in October 2009, and requested Japan's participation in this initiative. Prime Minister Hatoyama welcomed the request and expressed Japan's willingness.¹⁰ During a meeting in Tokyo, Japan's Foreign Minister Okada and New Zealand Minister of Trade and in charge of International Negotiations on Climate Change, Groser, agreed on further cooperation towards the conclusion of a Copenhagen Climate Change Conference (COP 16) agreement, and Groser expressed his appreciation for Japan's support for the New Zealand-proposed Global Research Alliance concept.¹¹

10 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Japan), "Nichi-New Zealand shuno kaidan (gaiyo) [Japan-New Zealand Summit Meeting (Abstract)]", 29 October 2009. http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/nz/visit/0910_sg.html.

11 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Japan), "Okada gaimu daijin to Groser New Zealand boeki daijin ken kiko hendo mondai kokusai kosho daijin to no kaidan [A meeting between Foreign Minister Okada and New Zealand Minister of Trade and in charge of International Negotiations on Climate Change]", 4 February 2010. http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/press/release/22/2/0204_02.html.

“The greatest benefit to Japan of Japan-New Zealand cooperation is likely to be the protection and evacuation of Japanese tourists from South Pacific islands by the New Zealand military in the event of natural disasters or political turmoil.”

New Zealand Prime Minister John Key's visit to Japan during October 2009 was not very productive in winning expanded trade access to Japan. Key expressed New Zealand's interests in signing a free trade agreement or economic partnership agreement, but Hatoyama explained to him Japan's political sensitivity in liberalising the farm-sector trade.¹² During the ASEAN Summit meeting in Viet Nam on 30 October 2010, Prime Minister Kan and New Zealand Prime Minister Key met. Kan expressed his hope for closer cooperation with New Zealand on stabilising the Pacific island region. Key expressed New Zealand's interests in enhancing economic ties with Japan and especially Japan's entry into the TPP agreement. Kan merely promised a closer exchange of information.¹³

As Japan's request to sit as an observer in the TPP negotiations was declined by the core members of the negotiation and it became clear that the TPP would move with or without Japan, Prime Minister Kan seems to have started domestic preparations to bring Japan into TPP negotiations in the near future.¹⁴

The earthquake that hit Christchurch on 22 February 2011 highlighted the interdependent nature of security between the two distant friends of Japan and New Zealand. With an estimated 3000 Japanese nationals present in Christchurch during the earthquake, of whom 27 were missing the following day, Prime Minister Kan requested of the New Zealand government protection for these Japanese nationals. Meanwhile, the New Zealand government positively responded to the Japanese government's offer of sending an emergency relief mission, and the mission arrived at Christchurch within approximately 40 hours of the earthquake (ahead of the US and United Kingdom teams).¹⁵

On 11 March 2011, an even stronger earthquake hit the north-eastern coast of Japan. The tsunami generated by the quake instantly took lives of thousands and the damaged nuclear reactors in the region are facing possible core meltdowns. New Zealand has decided to divert one-third of its entire emergency relief team to Japan.¹⁶ The size asymmetry between the two countries is obvious and New Zealand contributions will be a drop in the bucket by any measure in such a large-scale catastrophe. Yet, the immeasurable amount of friendship expressed through an offer like this has encouraged the Japanese and arguably urged other less friendly countries like China to join the international rescue efforts.

TERRORISM, NATURAL DISASTERS, POLITICAL INSTABILITIES AND TOURIST SAFETY

Both New Zealand and Japan suffered casualties in the terrorist bombing of the Sari Club in Bali in 2002. As tourists from both countries frequent resort destinations throughout Southeast Asia and the South Pacific, the prevention of terrorism and post-incident crisis management are two areas in which the two countries can cooperate. Such cooperation can spread across a broad range of governmental functions, from customs and immigration control, transportation safety, evacuations and crowd control to the investigation and prosecution of the criminals. Through sharing best practices, the two countries can contribute to both improving their own security forces and building capacity in the tourist destinations.

The greatest benefit to Japan of Japan-New Zealand cooperation is likely to be the protection and evacuation of Japanese tourists from South Pacific islands by the New Zealand military in the event of natural disasters or political turmoil, because of New Zealand's proximity to the tourism centres in the region and the sizable yet manageable scale of Japanese tourism there. Tsunamis, coups and ethnic conflicts are common in the South Pacific. Although bilateral cooperation exists in some small pockets of the two bureaucracies, giving a high-level political commitment to boosting such cooperation (as was the case between Japan and Australia) is helpful. Furthermore, as more Chinese tourists visit the South Pacific region in coming years, there is an opportunity for New Zealand to be the primary protector of both Japanese and Chinese tourists there.

12 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Japan), “Nichi-New Zealand shuno kaidan (gaiyo) [Japan-New Zealand Summit Meeting (Abstract)]”, 29 October 2009. http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/nz/visit/0910_sg.html.

13 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Japan), “Nichi-New Zealand shuno kaidan (gaiyo) [Japan-New Zealand Summit Meeting (Abstract)]”, 30 October 2010. http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/kaidan/s_kan/newzealand_1010.html.

14 The appointments of Banri Kaieda as Minister of Economy, Trade, and Industry and Michihiko Kano as Minister of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishery in the reshuffled cabinet in January 2011 are interpreted as moves to examine participation in the TPP positively. *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 15 January 2011, p.2.

15 *Asahi Shimbun* (online), 24 February 2011. <http://www.asahi.com/special/newzealand/TKY201102230522.html> (accessed on 24 February 2011); *Yomiuri Shimbun* (online), 23 February 2011. <http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/politics/news/20110223-0YT1T00392.htm> (accessed on 23 February 2011).

16 *Yomiuri Shimbun* (online). 13 March 2011. <http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/world/news/20110313-0YT1T00542.htm> (accessed on 15 March 2011).

TRANSNATIONAL CRIMES

Other forms of transnational crime, such as drug smuggling, human smuggling and trafficking, and money laundering, are also common between New Zealand and Japan. Information-sharing on these matters will enable each country to focus on high-priority areas, maximising collective efficiency.¹⁷ Here again, building a broad-based web of bilateral and multilateral security cooperation requires a high-level political commitment. Although New Zealand is not part of the TSD, this should not stop the country seeking a joint statement with Japan at the highest political level to boost security cooperation. The ongoing cooperation between the two countries' customs departments is an example of bilateral security cooperation in non-traditional areas.

¹⁷ Stuart McMillan, "Non-conventional security issues", in *New Zealand and Japan: What Next?* Proceedings of a seminar held in Wellington, 21 February 2000, New Zealand Japan Centre, Massey University, p.62.

CONCLUSION

Although New Zealand is geographically distant from Northeast Asia, Japan's commonalities with New Zealand as a developed country, an increasingly liberal capitalist country, and a democracy make New Zealand an important partner in Asian affairs. New Zealand's increasing economic ties with China and its safe geographical distance from the growing Chinese military sphere of influence mean that the country is not likely to share Japan's most immediate concerns about the Chinese military activities in East Asia. New Zealand's small economy and military mean that New Zealand cannot add much firepower to deal with Japan's traditional security concerns—to deter China or North Korea militarily from acting aggressively—even if New Zealand wanted to. However, New Zealand's votes and ideas in multilateral forums to set the rules of engagement for China (economically, militarily and otherwise) carry important weight.¹⁸ For this reason, it is very likely that Japan will encourage New Zealand into many "Asian" regional forums and work closely with New Zealand in order to lead the course of discussions and rule-making in these forums.

In non-traditional security areas (such as food safety, tourist safety, terrorism and disaster relief), a bipolar framework of security is either irrelevant or only partially applicable, even when China is a party to the issue. In fact, improving security in non-traditional issues can be framed as a "common goods" agenda, and even China can be invited into cooperative frameworks. As the US reduces its relative dominance in providing non-traditional security in the Asia-Pacific region through increasing burden-sharing with its allies and friends, there is a growing opportunity to embed Chinese activities in regional non-traditional security selectively into the web of bilateral and multilateral cooperation. Starting from those issues that are least relevant to the bipolar military rivalry (such as tourist safety and disaster relief), China can be gradually socialised into the norms in which Japan and New Zealand cooperate to develop.¹⁹ At the same time, Japan and New Zealand may leave China outside their cooperative frameworks on those issues that are closely tied with the bipolar structure (such as the PSI).

18 Hoffman's work on New Zealand's role in the formation of a regional human rights regime is consistent with my assessment of New Zealand's soft power. Elizabeth Hoffman, "Towards a regional human rights regime: New Zealand and the Asia Pacific forum of NHRIs", in Zhang, ed., pp.99-120.

19 Such a layered approach to regional security has been expressed by several scholars and practitioners. See, for example, Victor Cha, "Complex patchworks: U.S. alliances as part of Asia's regional architecture", *Asia Policy* 11 (January 2011), pp.27-50 (downloadable at <http://asiapolicy.nbr.org>).

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Outlook

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