



# Making Bad Urban Laws Better:

Can the Urban Physician Replace  
the Urban Politician in Africa?

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*“On second thought, let us not go to Camelot. It is a silly place.”*

*Monty Python and the Quest for the Holy Grail (1975)*

## 1. Introduction

In 2022, the Biden administration launched a new U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa that included, among other priorities, a tilt toward urban and away from rural priorities. This new policy paradigm reflects a growing trend among international organizations. Over the past few years, the World Bank, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and the UN Human Settlements Program (UN-Habitat) have all published big policy papers on African urbanization. These papers are not only long and detailed, but also endeavor to offer policymakers a comprehensive understanding of the importance of urbanization, detail the current dysfunctionality of African urbanization, envision urbanization’s potential to become an engine of economic growth and poverty reduction, and provide a checklist of policy reforms—i.e., bad laws that need to be made better to realize that potential. This combination of education, inspiration, and policy solutions represents what we call in this paper the “urban physician.” The urban physician is a rarefied technocrat who learns from and is motivated by outside expertise and then implements (often complex) policy changes in urban Africa. Their job is to make bad laws better by offering the wider urban population top-down leadership, translating technical advice into clear messages to ensure local support, and bringing the necessary local stakeholders on board.

This paper uses an extensive set of case studies of bad urban laws in Africa. In many cases, the skills of the urban physician are needed to reimagine, re-draft, and reform badly drafted or unfitting laws to support urban economic

growth and poverty reduction. This paper adds to this debate by making a case that the urban physician often needs to be accompanied by a skilled “urban politician” because simply characterizing laws as “bad” misses a lot: We also need to think carefully about why those bad laws exist, who benefits from their implementation, and what political strategies would be necessary to reform them. This may require hardnosed political skills to: 1) build a coalition for reform, perhaps by offering inducements to ensure the active support of groups who could otherwise stymie reform through indifference or active opposition; 2) identify and compensate those losing out; and 3) counter any opposition that mobilizes against reforms, whether in parliament, council chambers, the media, or the street. The urban physician is rarely enough; we also need the urban politician to guide reform through the twin demands and opportunities of street-level and high-level politics. We seek to show that the big policy papers need to extend their analysis beyond educating and inspiring urban physicians, think

more carefully about why bad laws exist, and consider the respective roles the urban physician and the urban politician have in reforming cities.

This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the big policy papers and their conventional wisdom about the central role of the urban physician; Section 3 discusses examples of bad laws that do need the urban physician to make them better; Section 4 discusses some of the big policy papers that acknowledge the urban physician may need support through capacity building; and Section 5 presents the problem of “white elephants,” an example of where the urban politician needs to be made subordinate to the urban physician. Sections 6 to 10 show how a better understanding of bad laws (their origin, impact, and support base) often necessitates an urban politician to manage the reform process. These sections discuss, in turn, colonial legacies, decentralization, property taxation, distributional impacts, and the friction between customary and statutory laws. Section 11 concludes.

## 2. Bringing the Urban Physician to Africa

The new U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa revolves around advancing “U.S. priorities in concert with regional partners in sub-Saharan Africa during the next five years.” These strategies encompass traditional U.S. goals related to open and democratic societies, security, and transitioning to less carbon-intensive energy systems, as well as the topical goal of post-pandemic recovery. The practical means to promote the strategy are structured around six elements: public diplomacy, sustainable development and resilience, U.S. defense tools, trade and commercial relations, digital transformation, and a rebalance toward urban hubs (White House 2022). This shift reflects a noted interest in the importance of urbanization (especially in Africa), its current dysfunction, and its potential to become an engine of economic growth and poverty reduction.

There has been a recent spate of big policy reports focused on urbanization. This paper examines two from the World

Bank, one from UN-Habitat, and one from the OECD. These papers were chosen because they were written to influence policymaking by major organizations with the reach, credibility, and acknowledged expertise to have a real impact on policy agendas. Scholars agree that key organizations, including the three in this study, “have come to the conclusion that the positive developmental effects of urbanization outweigh the human and social costs” (Turok 2014, 60). As such, the goal of these reports was not to inform an academic debate but to enlighten policymakers in the Global South about the potential of—and the policy reforms necessary to achieve—productive urbanization. These big policy papers can be structured around the themes of education, inspiration, and policy solutions, which collectively inform the urban physician.

The first paper is by Lall et al. (2021): *Pancakes to Pyramids: City Form to Promote Sustainable Growth*. Writing for the World Bank, these authors argue that all cities first exhibit a “pancake” expansion:

**“Cities with low productivity and income levels generally grow as pancakes—flat and spreading slowly. Low economic demand for land and floor space keeps land prices low and structures close to the ground, especially at the urban edge. Given slow expansion, growth in population density is often accommodated by crowding, starkly visible in the slums of developing country cities” (2021, 4).**

The trick is for local leaders to create the conditions necessary for such a city to transition into a “pyramid city.” “Cities with higher productivity may evolve from pancakes into pyramids—their horizontal expansion persists, yet is accompanied by infill development and vertical layering” (4). There is nothing automatic about this process, which instead depends on a city’s ability to encourage “highly productive economic activities that benefit from urban scale and agglomeration potential” (2021, 4).

Helpfully for the perusing city leader, there is a list of necessary reform-induced policy conditions that need to be in place to facilitate this transition. As Lall et al. explain:

“The other piece of the answer is found in laws, institutions, and capacity. Pyramids are more likely to evolve in countries and municipalities where property rights are clear, land values are transparent, land use and zoning are compatible with local preferences, and the enabling environment encourages durable investment in infrastructure—especially early investment, informed by forward-thinking urban plans” (2021, 4).

Good city planning also is necessary to allow firms to create clusters of productive activity, to allow the construction of suitably tall buildings, and to minimize employees’ eventual commute from residence to work (2021, 12).

City leaders and planners need to “allow the best use of land—but they must also allow changes in land use, and in users, as demand evolves further” (2021, 76). The regulatory structure should be “adaptable to changing demand and supply conditions, anticipating the emergence of new uses for scarce urban land” (2021, 13). This in turn requires that city leaders build good institutions, coordinate the provision of good infrastructure, and mobilize the necessary finance for durable investment. Most of all, it is extremely important to ensure the evolutionary adjustment from pancakes to pyramids is market-based:

“Plans that try to force a neighborhood’s vertical expansion through legal and regulatory incentives alone—without sufficient market demand for floor space, or without functioning factor markets and adequate private investment—will yield only ghost districts, their tall structures disused or underused. Such plans run afoul of basic principles of economic geography”: (2021, 73).

The second paper, published by the OECD (2015), is *The Metropolitan Century: Understanding Urbanisation and its Consequences*. The paper makes clear that it aims to help “obtain a better understanding of urbanisation... [and] serve as a tool to seize the opportunities provided by urbanisation” (2015, 3). City governments need to reform existing policies “that are aimed at or result in preventing or containing urbanisation;” instead, these authorities “would be better advised to accompany and shape urbanisation to ensure that it results in well-functioning and environmentally sustainable cities” (2015, 13). Among the litany of good policies is “co-ordination between land-use planning and transport planning” (2015 60). The authors also explain that “smart urban planning policies”—such as building height regulations, minimum lot sizes, and greenbelt protection—“require careful building regulations that allow new developments to keep the costs of housing low, but minimise negative side effects” (2015, 66).

The third paper, published by UN-Habitat (2014), is *Urban Planning for City Leaders*. Urban planning is identified as “an important tool for city leaders to achieve sustainable development” because it helps “formulate medium- and long-term objectives that reconcile a collective vision with the rational organization of the resources to achieve it” (2014, 11). In turn, successful planning:

**“makes the most of municipal budgets by informing infrastructure and services investments, and balancing demands for growth with the need to protect the environment. It also distributes economic development within a given area to reach social objectives, and creates a framework for collaboration between local governments, the private sector and the public at large”** (2014, 11).

According to the report, “the correct policies on density, land use, public space and the layout of infrastructure and services can make a difference to the delivery of good quality of life at the right price” (2014, 13). Therefore, city leaders need to:

**“intensify the density of existing built-up areas through infill development and setting growth limits, which would need to be moved outwards at regular intervals to prevent land shortages. Intensifying density implies regenerating brownfields and replacing existing buildings with new ones that accommodate more people. Consolidating built-up areas needs regulations to preserve no-development zones and to control a trend towards the decline of density (of both people and buildings)”** (2014, 27).

In this context, good policy is about avoiding “complex or lengthy planning assessment processes; bottlenecks or surges in residential land availability; location imbalance with too much land available in one district; gaps in land supply sequences (long-term as opposed to short-term); and excessive or uncertain fees associated with planning approval” (2014, 91).

The fourth paper, *Africa's Cities: Opening Doors to the World*, was published by the World Bank and co-written by noted World Bank scholar Somik Lall with Vernon Henderson and Anthony Venables, two of the world's leading urban-economics academics. The paper is clear about the aim of policy reform: “To create an internationally competitive tradable sector, African cities must cease to be crowded, disconnected, and costly, and instead become livable, connected, and productive” (Lall, Henderson, and Venables 2017, 116). The authors argue that the solution lies in “swift action by mayors and ministers to enhance the functioning of land markets (the factor market most urgently in need of reform) and to strengthen urban planning, regulation, and enforcement—followed by actions to coordinate and scale up investment in cities' physical structures and infrastructure” (2017, 116). The number one reform priority, to create functioning land markets, “will enable investment and development, reward compliance, and ensure enforcement. Titles to property titles must be clear and secure. Real property transactions must not be unduly costly or burdened by bureaucracy” (2017, 136).

The content of these reports revolves around four big themes. First, they praise the potential of urbanization to promote economic growth, boost productivity, and reduce poverty. Second, they provide ample statistics to argue compellingly that urbanization will be a defining trend in the Global

South in the coming decades. These two discussions aim to educate the urban physician. Third, the reports aim to inspire the urban physician, repeating a ritual lament that urbanization faces significant challenges—such as crime, congestion, and housing shortages, which risk overwhelming those potential benefits and locking in dysfunctional urbanization. Fourth, the reports combine the preceding three themes to provide a checklist of suggested high-level policy reforms. Reform is perceived as a technocratic matter, and this report-based communication and learning from outside experts is explicitly directed toward leaders, politicians, and urban managers in the Global South.

land rights and practices, as well as the role of village elders (*sobas*) in adjudicating land disputes.



### **3. Where the Urban Physician Can Make Bad Policies Better**

Several real-world examples demonstrate how the reform focus of the big policy papers can provide useful solutions to promote more productive urbanization. This section discusses three such examples from Angola, Egypt, and Ghana. In each case, badly drafted laws need to be rewritten by an urban physician.

#### **3.1. Angola: Customary Laws Dictating Urban Occupation**

During the Angolan colonial era, the government encouraged Portuguese settlers to start plantations there. After Angola gained independence in 1975, there was a mass exodus of Portuguese residents, who abandoned their possessions—including almost half of the country's arable land. The new Angolan government issued a law through which abandoned private land could be appropriated if left vacant for 45 days. However, the legal framework guiding this appropriation was badly drafted, and most of the land was taken over through local customary practices. In response, the government introduced the Land Law of 1992 to govern land rights in the country (Republic of Angola 1992). Yet this law remained unclear about the legal status of communal land and failed to acknowledge customary

The state made a series of amendments to the 1992 legal framework but did not establish a robust strategy to “legalize” irregular settlements. In December 2004, both the updated Land Act and the Law of Territorial and Urban Management were introduced, according to which all Angolans have to register their land and secure its title within three years of purchase (National Assembly of Angola 2004). The laws place the responsibility of registration upon the local populace and stipulate that irregularly occupied land can be subject to forced evictions. The regularization process has been heavily criticized, in part because most Angolans are illiterate—lacking identification documents, let alone land titles (World Bank 2022).

These poorly conceived laws have left occupants of unregistered land in a precarious situation. In 2004, the government initiated a massive crackdown on irregular settlements in and around the capital city of Luanda—including 18 mass evictions and the

destruction of over 3,000 houses, affecting 20,000 people. Human Rights Watch noted that the modus operandi of conducting evictions was in “clear violation of international and Angolan law.” In addition, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Adequate Housing decried the use of excessive force to evict thousands of families from their homes (HRW 2007). Most evictions in Luanda occur without the government providing alternative shelters, conducting prior consultations, or ensuring due process. The evictions especially target poor residents who are unable to secure their tenure or find alternative accommodation.

### 3.2. Egypt: Inadequate Building Laws

Egypt’s building regulations are mainly derived from European laws rather than local customs and traditions. Specifically, Unified Building Law no. 119/2008, which lays down guidelines on design and construction-related activities ranging from building heights to street widths to architectural designs, aims to address the issue of informal construction. The law has not been adequately implemented, and violations have continued with impunity—there were 2.8 million violations between 2008 and 2018, according to one estimate by the Ministry of Housing, and the Built Environment Observatory believes the actual figure may be 8.2 million violations over the same period (Shawkat 2020).

Almost a decade after the law passed, the government decided to regularize the “illegal” buildings that have engulfed large swathes of agricultural and urban squatted land by enacting the Construction Violations Reconciliation Law no. 17/2019 (amended by Law no. 1/2020). However, this resulted in only 688,000 building regularization applications over six months despite the millions of estimated building code violations (Shawkat 2020). Hefty fines, excessive red tape, and an extremely technical regularization process resulted in this poor response and left occupants in a precarious situation. In July 2020, when the six-month grace period for the regularization process ended, the government initiated a crackdown against illegal

buildings, demolishing almost 11,000 structures between July and August (Mounir 2020).

### 3.3. Ghana: Strict Building Codes

The most important framework governing land use in Ghana is Section 46(1) of the Local Government Act, according to which a municipal government has authority over physical planning in its jurisdiction. Ideally, the municipal authority would only issue building permits after a rigorous vetting process of building plans. However, despite legislation to implement necessary regulations and inspections, noncompliance with building codes remains widespread. For example, developers are required to obtain a permit before commencing construction or even making minor renovations such as increasing the size of windows. While the Act stipulates the approval process should last no longer than three months, developers claim it can take four to five years to get a building permit. The World Bank in 2012 ranked Ghana at 156 among 185 countries in dealing with construction permits. It took an estimated 218 days to process building permits to construct a warehouse in Ghana, from the acquisition of the land title to the certification of building completion—as a result, more than three-quarters of developments in Accra opt not to get a building permit (World Bank and IFC 2012).



This has negatively affected the quality of construction and building materials, leaving buildings structurally vulnerable. In November 2012, Accra's Melcom shopping complex collapsed, killing 14 people and injuring 82 others. The investigation team cited the use of substandard materials and glaring violations of the building code as the reasons for the tragedy. The incident inspired a renewed push to revise the laws governing the built environment and create a comprehensive and unified legal framework for the country. In 2018, the government unveiled a comprehensive new Ghana Building Code to regulate the country's construction industry—though it is hard to tell from its 38 sections over 1700 pages whether the code is “better” than previous laws (Akpalu and Kyei 2018).



### 3.4. Bad Policy: Discussion

The big policy papers are adept in identifying bad laws and advocating for their reform or removal by the urban physician. However, the reports offer a bewildering and overwhelming list of desirable outcomes rather than a clear strategy for policy reform. At first glance, it may appear that Lall, Henderson, and Venables (2017) is an exception. The report makes a careful effort to think about prioritizing reforms: first “formalize land markets, clarify property rights, and institute effective urban planning,” then “make early and coordinated infrastructure investments” that allow for “interdependence among sites, structures, and basic services” (2017, 28–29). In reality, there is no prioritizing, because each of these goals entail massive and complex interventions. The urban physician is not so much empowered with a clear agenda as overwhelmed. If everything needs to be fixed simultaneously, then urban reform is not possible.

None of the reports pay any attention to opportunity costs in the context of scarce resources. For example, the capacity of bureaucrats to reform bad laws and the political will to build coalitions to support those reforms are both limited. Using these resources to reform property rights, for example, will reduce their capacity to tax property. For instance, Zambia's

National Land Titling Program (NLTP), launched in 2014, aimed to make all land in the country titled at a small cost for local citizens—thereby increasing tenure security, reducing population displacement, and increasing tax revenue. The urban pilots proved quite costly, with each land title costing around \$90, and the project proved too expensive to scale up nationally. Today, more than 90 percent of land in Zambia remains untitled (Government of Zambia 2018).

Because every reform has an opportunity cost, it is that much more important to prioritize reforms properly. When the urban physician is ready to operate, they need a way to choose which operation should be conducted first! One method of doing this, growth diagnostics, was developed by Hausmann, Rodrik, and Velasco

(2005). This method seeks to derive policy priorities from understanding the binding constraints on economic growth for a particular country (or city). The policymaker is advised to choose those reforms that will produce the maximum impact on economic growth given initial endowments of capacity, political will, and time. Urban growth will depend on the return on investment, whether those returns go to the parties that financed the investment (i.e., whether there are external benefits), and the costs of financing that investment. The first step in growth diagnostics is to gauge which of these factors poses the most significant constraint on urban growth. We illustrate this below for the case of Lusaka, Zambia.

First, the return on investment may be reduced by high taxes, weak property rights, corruption, or the lack of complementary factors (such as skilled labor). In Zambia, the government was not appropriating investment returns through punitive taxation. In the World Bank's Doing Business Index, Zambia ranked 17 out of 190 countries in 2020, putting it on par with OECD countries—yet ranked 149 in registering a business and 130 in enforcing contracts (World Bank 2020, 4). In this context, Lusaka showed the symptoms of low appropriability of returns throughout the 2000s and 2010s, largely caused by poor property rights protection and contract enforcement. Specifically, lending for property in Lusaka was hindered by inefficient, unclear, and frequently disputed rights to land and land titling (World Bank 2020).

Second, private investment cannot reach its optimal level if private investors cannot appropriate all the gains from undertaking any investment. For example, building roads can create profitable investment opportunities in factories, or a first mover in an industry can demonstrate that a market exists and benefit subsequent copycat investment. However, there is little research on this question for Lusaka and little evidence to suggest that it was a key constraint. After 2011, Zambia launched a substantial infrastructure investment program. The country's seventh National Development Plan, released in 2017, promised that "investment in improved transport systems and infrastructure will drive

wider economic benefits, including supporting growth and creation of jobs, raising the productive capacity of the economy, driving efficiency and boosting international competitiveness" (Zajontz 2022).

Third, the costs of financing investment may be increased by high interest rates, the inability of city governments to issue infrastructure bonds, or constraints on attracting international finance—such as restrictions on foreign direct investment, macroeconomic risk, or an existing bad debt profile. The costs of financing investment were not a serious constraint: Zambia ranked 4 out of 190 countries in access to credit in 2020 and the mass debt relief it had received between 2004 and 2006 saw its sovereign credit rating raised to B+ in 2011, which has enabled the country to borrow Eurobonds on private capital markets in more recent years (World Bank 2020). Zambia also received large amounts of financing from China (Cheelo and Hinfelaar 2020). Interest rates remained relatively low and stable at around 8–11 percent between 2018 and 2023 (Trading Economics 2023b).

In Zambia, the proximate constraint on growth has been low investment, and its deeper causes lay in the lack of protection afforded to potential investors. The priority for the urban physician is to raise the return on investment by better establishing and protecting property rights.

## 4. Poor Forecasts, Excessive Optimism, and White Elephants

The practical manifestations of urban planning are frequently “white elephant” projects requiring expensive infrastructure and other urban investments that have little economic rationale. This is an enduring problem across Africa and beyond. As seen in this section, white elephants exemplify situations when policymaking needs less of the urban politician and for the urban physician to take charge. Cases from Angola and Côte D’Ivoire demonstrate such urban developments.

### 4.1. Angola: Absence of a Mortgage Law

In 2009, seven years after Angola’s civil war ended, the government launched a big initiative to build 1 million homes in the country. However, its Housing Development Fund estimates that the country still has a shortfall of more than 1.7 million housing units, with about one-third of the population lacking access to affordable housing (Cain 2019). One way the government has tried to address this is to build multi-story apartments, for example in Kilamba, a new residential development located 18 miles from the country’s capital. The development was designed to house up to half a million people, with apartments initially priced between \$120,000 and \$200,000. However, together with the cost, the absence of any mortgage laws relating to bad debts and lending made the city unaffordable to most Angolans. Although some banks offer mortgage loans to employees or individuals who meet their stringent mortgage application criteria, most Angolans do not have access to this financing, as two-thirds of the population earns less than \$2 per day. Without a legal framework, banks can charge high interest rates—an average of 19.295 percent in 2019—that make loans inaccessible to most of the population (Redvers 2012). Local banks are reluctant to grant mortgages to most Angolans because there is no legal framework to collect significant debts. In 2013, President José Eduardo dos Santos ordered that an existing state-backed mortgage scheme for public employees be made available to all Angolans, and the price

of the cheapest units in Kilamba was reduced to \$70,000. Kilamba suddenly became Luanda’s most accessible property market.

### 4.2. Côte D’Ivoire: Cathedrals in the Jungle

Yamoussoukro, the home village of former President Félix Houphouët-Boigny of Côte D’Ivoire, was expanded into a capital city through large public-led investment. The city rapidly built:

“a towering Catholic basilica nearly the size of St. Peter’s in Rome; a conference center bearing a striking resemblance to the Lincoln Center in New York; a luxury high-rise hotel that serves cuisine straight from Paris, a sprawling university campus, and a presidential palace surrounded by a moat filled with dozens of man-eating crocodiles” (Witt 1990)

The construction of Yamoussoukro was initially financed by cocoa export revenue in the 1970s—yet when cocoa prices dropped in the 1980s, the country could not afford to continue construction or pay off the debt that had already been incurred. By the late 1980s, Western reporters noted, “Grass and weeds poke through the cracks in the smooth concrete of boulevards as broad as the Champs Elysees. Goats and cows and barefoot villagers roam where cars and trucks and buses were supposed to be” (Witt 1990). There was no economic rationale to construct Yamoussoukro; rather, it was the president’s vanity project—a failed endeavor of the urban politician.


### 4.3. A History of Infrastructure in Africa

The 1960s and 1970s saw massive investment in African urban infrastructure, largely financed by international donors. In Ghana, 80 percent of government expenditure in the late 1950s was directed to infrastructure and social services; (Mold, 2012, 241). In Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo), U.S. and European financiers committed to more than \$2 billion for infrastructure between 1970 and 1980; and infrastructure financing made up nearly 60 percent of total aid to sub-Saharan Africa in 1973 (Mold 2012, 242). However, infrastructure building increased national debt in sub-Saharan Africa from \$7 billion (11 percent of the continent's GDP) in 1970 to \$61 billion (22 percent) in 1980 and \$176 billion (58 percent) in 1990 (Mold 2012, 242). Overall, the economic benefits of infrastructure did not offset the increased cost of debt servicing. Many projects proved unsustainable, as they were generally not adapted to local markets, the surrounding infrastructure, or existing management and maintenance capacities. The lack of local engineers and technicians resulted in heavy dependence on expensive foreign expertise (Wethal 2019).

In oil-rich Nigeria, domestic investment grew from 16 percent of GDP in the 1960s to more than 50 percent in the 1970s (Mold 2012, 242). This massive investment but failed to yield long-term growth because much of the spending was directed to vanity projects such as “parliamentary buildings, stadiums, theatres, unused dams, and the new capital city in Abuja” (Mold, 2012, 241). This contributed to “a profound pessimism about development prospects for the region” (Mold 2012). The problems of infrastructure in the 1960s and 1970s were blamed on the failure to carry out rigorous project assessment and poor project management more generally, the absence of good data, a failure to provide for subsequent maintenance costs, and the lack of managers with relevant skills and experience. Casting the blame on such technical issues was akin to blaming the failures on the technocrat-in-chief—i.e., the urban physician.

If misleading forecasts were truly caused by technical problems, lack of data, and mistakes alone, we would expect

a non-biased distribution of errors in forecasts with a zero mean. In practice, we see a systematic bias in the direction of the error. Flyvbjerg (2009), using a dataset covering 258 projects in 20 nations across five continents, showed that infrastructure costs are systematically underestimated and benefits systematically overestimated throughout the world: “Cost overruns in the order of 50 percent in real terms are common for major infrastructure, and overruns above 100 percent are not uncommon.” Benefits are equally overestimated. For rail, actual passenger traffic tends to be more than 50 percent lower than estimated traffic, resulting in large shortfalls. For roads, actual vehicle traffic is an average of 9.5 percent higher than forecasted, but “50 percent of road traffic forecasts are wrong by more than  $\pm 20$  percent.” And if “imperfect forecasting techniques, inadequate data..., [and] lack of experience” were the main explanations for inaccuracies, we would also expect an improvement in accuracy over time—since the urban physician would learn from errors (informed by reading more of those big policy papers), recognize new errors and their sources, and address them through the refinement of data collection and forecasting methods. However, the data shows no trend improvement over time (Flyvbjerg 2009).





Instead, biased cost–benefit analyses are caused by perverse incentives that encourage promoters of infrastructure projects to underestimate costs and overestimate benefits when seeking approval and financing for their projects. Competition between different authorities anxious to secure funding for their own infrastructure projects creates “an incentive structure that makes it rational for project promoters to emphasize benefits and de-emphasize costs and risks.” In this context:

“experienced professionals... know that outturn costs will be higher than estimated costs, but because of political pressure to secure funding for projects they hold back this knowledge, which is seen as detrimental to the objective of obtaining funding.... Local authorities, local developers and land owners, local labour unions, local politicians, local officials, local MPs, and consultants all benefit from a project that looks favourable on paper and they have little incentive actively to avoid bias in estimates of benefits, costs, and risks” (Flybvjerg 2009).

The problem is that of the urban politician lacking the realism of an urban physician.

There is some scope for intervention by the urban physician:

“Cost–benefit analysis and other types of ex ante appraisal should be shifted from promoters to more neutral ground [i.e., urban physicians].... Forecasts and business cases should be made subject to independent peer review.... For publicly funded projects, forecasts, peer reviews, and benchmarkings should be made available for public scrutiny, including by the media, as they are produced, along with all relevant documentation. Public hearings, citizen juries, and the like should be organized to allow stakeholders and civil society to voice criticism or support of forecasts.... Professional and occasionally even criminal penalties should be enforced for managers and forecasters who consistently and foreseeably produce deceptive forecasts. The decision to go ahead with a major infrastructure project should, where at all possible, be made contingent on the willingness of private financiers to participate without a sovereign guarantee for at least one-third of the total capital needs.... The result would be added pressure to produce realistic forecasts and reduced risk to the taxpayer” (Flybvjerg 2009, 360).

The deeply political problem of white elephants stems from the urban politician being in charge. Political leaders gain benefits from more than just profitable and productive investments:

“Many leaders... want to be famous and talked about, and prefer being viewed as powerful, capable, and affluent. Large buildings – but also other remarkable projects and events such as high-speed trains, enormous dams, and major sports events where leaders can attend and lead ceremonies – function as expensive symbols.... In other words, buildings may serve as specific and identifiable representations of the country and its leadership that help make them visible and alter their reputation abroad or among certain domestic audiences. Illustratively, many expensive buildings are aptly named after the leader” (Gjerløw and Knutsen 2017, 4).

For example, skyscrapers can be easily recognizable symbols for a city and its political leadership—and “when countries become more autocratic, they subsequently build more new skyscrapers, controlling for other relevant factors, such as level of income and urbanization” (Gjerlow and Knutsen, 2017, 2). This is not a simple governance story; there is no clear evidence that democracies per se build fewer skyscrapers and there is no relation between corruption and the construction of skyscrapers. Rather, the constraint on building skyscrapers (and white elephant projects in general) comes from “well-functioning checks and balances – stemming from institutions and actors outside the executive being empowered to affect policy making and veto executive decisions” (Gjerløw and Knutsen 2017). In other words, the urban physician needs to be empowered in order to prevent excessive white elephants. How the state relates to the wider political settlement is vitally important, as a comparison between urban planning in Kampala and Kigali shows (see Section 9.3).

## 5. Where Capacity is Weak, Build Capacity

Even once a city government has chosen a reform priority, it does not necessarily have the capacity to implement it. Is the urban physician ready and able to operate on bad laws? The literature on the developmental state provides a useful framework for thinking about “state capacity,” defined here as the criteria necessary for a state to promote urban reform agendas effectively. These criteria include leaders, who have a politically driven desire to promote economic growth; autonomous state institutions; a competent bureaucracy insulated from politics; a weak civil society; and widespread state legitimacy, whether democratic or not (Leftwich 1995 405). This combination allows the bureaucracy or political leadership to combine a motivation to reform with the autonomy to do so and the capacity to take a long-run, growth-promoting view of urban development that is not sidetracked by short-term, populist demands. Yet the importance of a “weak civil society” from the developmental-state literature is particularly contested by many urban planners, who advocate the importance of grassroots planning and community engagement.

Across the four big policy papers, little attention is paid to the government’s capacity to implement policy reform. UN-Habitat (2014) does note that “often cities have insufficient human resources to develop plans and implement them. Developing such capacities within local planning departments, by using other agencies and by engaging the community and interest groups, is a key strategy to address this and produce better plans” (19). Meanwhile, the OCED (2014) asserts that good governance ensures “policy makers have the necessary information, the required powers and the proper incentives to make decisions that are best for a city. While good governance structures are no guarantee for good policies, it is very difficult to design and implement good policies without them” (55). Lall et al. (2021) note that “many developing countries thus lack the capacity to systematically record and manage information on land transactions” and that “to be both viable and strong, urban land use planning institutions must have a unique power of enforcement” (80–81). However, these casual asides about the urban physician are perfunctory relative to the rich analysis of how states have acquired and utilized the capacity to pursue growth-promoting reform agendas. One such influential debate comes from the developmental state literature. This section introduces examples from Kenya and Somaliland, where lack of state capacity—the absence of the urban physician—allowed laws to go bad, then discusses government effectiveness and capacity building from a more general African perspective.

## 5.1. Kenya: Confusing Building Regulations

In Kenya, the rapid urbanization accompanying economic growth has been structured around the Physical Land Use Planning Act of 2020. This law provides the framework for building regulations, quality standards, and inspection processes, which are then enforced by local governments and the National Construction Authority (Kiteme 2021). Local governments are tasked with issuing a certificate of occupation once a building is completed, even though they are largely uninvolved in the national-level inspection processes (Cruise 2015). This confusing division of labor has resulted in lower-quality buildings being approved for inhabitation, some of which ultimately collapse.

## 5.2. Somaliland: Nonexistent Land-Ownership and Property-Tax Register

Somaliland is one of the world's poorest and least developed countries, with a GDP per capita of around \$428 in 2021 (Trading Economics 2023a). Amid years of war, the land-registration system was destroyed, and very few properties were registered for tax purposes. Somaliland's decentralized governance structure makes the provision of local public services contingent upon local sources of revenue. The capital, Hargeisa, does have its own property-tax system, but its revenue was only \$169,062 in 2005 despite an estimated population of 396,000 (UN-Habitat 2011). A significant reason for this is the country's poor fiscal and administrative legal framework. According to Law No. 17/200, the local government is responsible for ensuring the registration of land; if owners fail to either develop the property or pay taxes within two years of registering, they risk losing ownership of the plot (Ali 2021). This law has discouraged people from registering their land, and there were only 15,850 registered properties in Hargeisa as of 2004. Subsequent efforts by UN-Habitat to use satellite data to build capacity and identify properties led to a sharp increase in revenue from property taxation in 2005 (Collier et al. 2018).




### 5.3. Government Effectiveness and Capacity Building: Discussion

As well as the case study evidence, there is more rigorous quantitative time-series data on government capacity in sub-Saharan Africa. Figure 1 depicts the stagnation in the World Bank’s measure of “government effectiveness” in sub-Saharan Africa (except Rwanda and Kenya) between 2005 and 2020. This metric “captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies” on a scale typically ranging from -2.5 to +2.5 (World Bank 2023). This stagnation occurred despite the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and African Union (AU) strongly emphasizing the good-governance agenda.

**Figure 1: Government Effectiveness in Five Sub-Saharan African Countries**

Source: World Bank (2023)



The blithe suggestion from the big policy papers that states should build capacity and create more urban physicians fails to recognize the deep problem of building capacity in practice. The stagnation or even decline in government effectiveness in Zambia occurred despite extensive donor engagement with capacity building, including by the publishers of these big policy papers. Between 1981 and 2011, there were at least 615 donor projects in Zambia related to civil-service reform (Williams and Yecaló-Tecle 2019, 5). These projects focused on such efforts as staff reductions, organizational restructuring, decentralization, performance management, requiring annual confidential reports to discuss and appraise performance, setting targets, and realigning incentives through performance-based salary supplements. The major projects included the IMF-backed Public Sector Reform Program (PSRP), which focused on staff and expenditure cuts from 1993–99, and the World Bank-backed Public Service Capacity Building Program (PSCBP) from 2000–05 (Williams and Yecaló-Tecle 2019).



The enduring inability to expand the state's administrative capability to implement effective policies has been called a 'capability trap' (Pritchett et al. 2010). Even if they improve at the average pace for all countries, it will take states such as Zambia, Senegal, Nigeria, and Tanzania 377 years to reach Singapore's 2010 level of state capacity (Pritchett, Woolcock, and Andrews 2010 13). How does such long-term engagement by donors and recipient countries on issues of capacity have so little positive impact?

The paradox of external assistance not alleviating the enduring capability trap has been explained in two contexts. The first is the encouragement to import other states' and organizations' best practices that have proved to work elsewhere—and the widespread acceptance that development is about transplanting that best practice. This process has been labeled “isomorphic mimicry,” wherein governments are encouraged to adopt best-practice reforms without actually creating the conditions in which reforms can emerge, be evaluated, and scaled up (Pritchett, Woolcock, and Andrews 2012, 20). Second:

**“An inadequate theory of developmental change reinforces a fundamental mismatch between expectations and the actual capacity of prevailing administrative systems to implement even the most routine administrative tasks. This leads to premature load bearing, in which countries are pressured to take on tasks before they are ready. Wishful thinking about the pace of progress [as reflected in the big policy papers’ long lists of recommendations] and unrealistic expectations about the level and rate of improvement of capability lead to stresses and demands on systems that cause capability to weaken.”** (Pritchett, Woolcock, and Andrews 2010, 37).

The typical responses to the capability trap are to propose new policies, build capacity, or create a parallel delivery system, such as by channeling funds directly to communities without thinking about how to then scale up the intervention (Pritchett, Woolcock, and Andrews 2010, 19). This thinking

revolves around the central figure of the urban physician, who is ostensibly empowered to implement policy reform through learning about best practices. In one alternative model, “donors and recipient countries would agree on a set of performance targets; countries would then be allowed to pursue the target in any way they chose, with financial support following demonstrated success” (Pritchett, Woolcock, and Andrews 2012). This would motivate recipient countries to engage in the process of endogenous learning and incremental reforms within a context of realistic expectations regarding improving organization performance (Pritchett, Woolcock, and Andrews 2010, 45).

## 6. Colonial Legacies

Bad laws in Africa have often become bad because of a change in the political context. Laws formulated and implemented to serve a colonial state often became outdated or irrelevant after independence. This section presents the legacy of colonial urban-planning laws in Algeria and Kenya as examples, then discusses the validity of the frequently made claim that colonial legal frameworks have locked African countries into bad urban-planning regimes. The implication is that the urban physician needs to understand this damaging legacy and reform urban-planning laws to better reflect contemporary African realities.

## 6.1. Algeria: Strict Building Regulations


In Algeria, as in other former French colonies, most major cities owed their existence and subsequent evolution to French colonial planning efforts, in which building standards and housing codes were based on a strict separation of industrial and residential areas (Njoh 2004).

Even though Algeria gained independence in 1962, much of its current legal framework still stems from the French colonial era, including the *code de l'urbanisme*, which contains the guiding principles for land development and construction in Algeria. Many of its provisions were designed to produce the type of house found in the suburbs of French cities. This means certain design practices contradict the cultural norms of a conservative Muslim country, such as the requirement to have large windows that open onto the streets (Wikiprocedure 2020). Rapid urbanization in the 1990s, when many new immigrants moved from the countryside, also left people unable to afford to follow the regulations when building houses or participating in the formal housing market, so they built what they could, resulting in the growth of informal settlements (Naceur and Belmessous 2018). This informality, stemming from strict and foreign building regulations, keeps residents from accessing the formal housing market and undermines the provision of basic services such as running water, electricity, and sewer systems.

## 6.2. Kenya: Imported Building Codes

Like many sub-Saharan African countries, Kenya has developed according to British urban-planning principles. During the colonial era, a British urban physician who was part of the city administration copied the existing bylaws of Blackburn (his hometown) for Nairobi's regulations word for word. This introduced requirements that were absurd in the Kenyan context. For example, roofs have to be able to withstand six inches of snow even though Nairobi has a warm and temperate climate, there needs to be at least 20 feet between houses and streets, and each house needs to have at least two bedrooms and a separate kitchen with flue

ventilation (Agevi 1995). These strict requirements make it too expensive to build a house for most of the low- and middle-income inhabitants of Kenya's urban areas. Many citizens ignore the regulations, sometimes building houses without even basic sanitation and water access. Although changes to the building regulations started to be implemented in the 1970s and were revised in 2009—with more changes proposed in 2020—the colonial legacy of the British urban physician in Nairobi remains evident (Erastus and Wuchuan 2014).



## 6.3. Colonial Legacies and Reforming Urban Laws: Discussion

In the 1950s and 1960s, when many African countries were achieving independence, colonial legacies were still strong, making it much harder for the urban physician to reform existing laws. At the time of independence, many of these countries were wholly dependent on their former colonizer in terms of trade, aid, military support, and political advice. After gaining independence in 1960, Côte D'Ivoire embarked on a strategy of close collaboration with France in exchange for aid, personnel, and investment; as

a result, the number of French expatriates increased from 10,000 at the time of independence to 50,000 in the 1970s (Meredith 2005 286). In Guinea—even though around 3,000 French civil servants, technicians, and businesspeople who had lived in the country left when it gained independence in 1958—France still provided wide-ranging financial, technical, and military assistance. The French continued to dominate industry, banking, and trade long after independence, and elite groups in Guinea grew accustomed to collaborating with them (68).

The urban physician faced not just the material constraints of continued colonial influence but also a more direct influence on modes of thought. Colonizers' enduring schools of thought supplemented their continuing geopolitical influence. One example, documented by Seidman (1984), is philosophical positivism, a European maxim that “the problems of the human condition were capable of rational solutions by rational men,” which implies that good laws are always applicable even though using them “as a guide to social change... is an unmitigated disaster.” Even decades after independence, many African lawyers maintained this mindset, and when “put to the task of drafting a new law for a particular purpose, they all but invariably copy the laws of some metropolitan country, not infrequently with sad or ludicrous results.” The colonial ethos was further imparted through schooling, such as the British-style Achimota School in present-day Ghana; at one point during the Kwame Nkrumah presidency, every member of the cabinet was an alumnus of Achimota, including the president. Other examples included Kings College and Ibadan in Nigeria, Tabora Boys School in Tanzania, and universities such as Ibadan in Nigeria, Legon in Ghana, and Makerere in Uganda (Seidman 1984). It was challenging to reform urban laws when the colonial source of those laws still had so much physical presence and enduring psychological influence.

It was easy in the early years after independence to make a case that a country's continuing neo-colonial legacy locked in the urban physician's planning choices. However, as the years went by the capacity of the African urban physician to reform colonial-era laws was subject to two key trends that hurt and helped their work.

The first was the effect that colonial-era laws had on the political economy. Once drafted, a bad law can change politics and create “a polity which then defends and protects the distorted incentives that have created it” (Toye 1993, 160). Even freed from a colonial mindset, the urban physician may be taken over by events. What started as bad colonial laws in need of re-drafting evolved into laws that required the skills of an urban politician. For example, as discussed above, Angolan property developers had a vested interest in preserving badly drafted colonial-era laws that made it difficult for poor people to regularize their property because this made it easier for them to acquire that land at low cost.

The second trend—the declining influence of the former colonial rulers—has made legal reform progressively easier. By 2016, France had fallen off the list of Mali's top five trading partners (World Bank 2023). This was a significant change from when Mali obtained independence in 1960, at which time France still exerted significant influence through African currency arrangements. For decades, Mali and a number of its neighbors used the African Financial Community (CFA) franc, which was dominated by France. In a sign of the country's waning influence in Africa, members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) agreed in 2019 to rename the currency the “eco” and remove French officials from its governing bodies; the organization hopes to launch the eco by 2027 (King

2022). France's role in African foreign affairs has similarly declined even though the country has long been accustomed to intervening militarily. For example, France sent 5,000 troops to Mali in 2013 at the request of the government to help fight an armed rebellion there. However, in 2022 Mali expelled the French envoy over comments by the French Minister of Foreign Affairs questioning the legitimacy of the country's new leadership (Associated Press 2022). That February, due to tensions with Mali's military-led government, President Emmanuel Macron of France announced the troops would leave (BBC 2022).

A similar trend is evident of the United Kingdom's effect on urban planning laws, as demonstrated by the comparative cases of Zambia and Zimbabwe. Both countries inherited spatial-planning legislation from the British Town and Country Planning Act of 1948. Zambia's post-independence government was able to amend this inherited legislation, notably by passing the Housing (Statutory and Improvement Areas) Act of 1974 and the Urban and Regional Planning Act of 2015, which have helped it develop slums and upgrade informal housing. Meanwhile, Zimbabwe's more authoritarian government retained the colonial planning system. This left it free(r) to launch Operation Murambatsvina in 2005, which demolished around 700,000 unregistered structures, destroying the livelihoods of the residents—many of whom were supporters of the Movement for Democratic Change, an urban-based opposition party. Zambia and Zimbabwe both shaped their colonial planning laws according to the dictates of local political priorities (Chigudu 2021). The urban politician was in charge!

In place of traditional colonial influence, a variety of new economic powers—particularly Brazil, South Africa, Turkey, Russia, and India—are dramatically increasing their presence across the continent. African countries are now legally (if not economically) independent. This means multinational corporations have to strike bargains with local elites for access to resources, which is granted in exchange for the companies paying these local elites a share of the resource rents (Carmody 2017). Donor aid comes from an equally diverse range of entities, including the United Kingdom, the

European Union, Norway, India, Russia, China, and the Gulf States (Chen 2021).

A big factor in the declining influence of the former colonial powers is the rise of China. It is an open question whether this provides leverage for African urban physicians to be more selective in their legislation or locks Africa into new urban-planning practices imported from Chinese cities; scholars have suggested both as possible outcomes. The urban politician has an obvious role in negotiating these new opportunities and constraints. The arrival of China is not likely to prompt the kind of legal reform undertaken during the colonial years. Instead, the practice of urban planning will be influenced by Chinese firms and lending banks, construction contracts, and government-to-government negotiations. Ethiopia demonstrates some of the ways Chinese influence is being felt. A new Addis Ababa–Djibouti railway line “involves Chinese standards and specifications entailing wholesale export of other Chinese firms and products in the construction, operations and maintenance and the supply chain.” At the same time, Ethiopia has promoted a policy of deliberate diversification of donors, foreign investors, construction investors, and diplomatic engagement, including with India, Turkey, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and South Korea. From 1992 to 2016, China was the leading but not dominant investor in Ethiopia, providing funding for 20.7 percent of projects equivalent to 17.9 percent of capital invested (Chen 2021).



## 7. Decentralization and Reform

Over the past three decades, decentralization has become one of the most powerful reform movements worldwide. This trend was “initiated in the 1970s, picked up momentum in the 1980s, and accelerated after 1990” (Bardhan and Mookherjee 2006, 1). By the end of the millennium, “between 80 and 100 per cent of the world’s countries were implementing decentralization in one form or another”—as reflected in Latin America, where “between 10 and 50 per cent of all central government revenues in Latin America [were] now spent by subnational governments” (Faguet 2023, 2). The supporters of decentralization promised transformative change, but outcomes were often disappointing. During the early 2000s, hundreds of research papers were published in academic journals and policy papers by multilateral organizations such as the World Bank and Asian Development Bank (ADB). The results have been “contradictory, confusing, and indeterminate” (Faguet 2023, 2).

Although they do not take decentralization as part of their analytical remit, the big policy papers offer some strong hints that they are part of this mainstream thinking that decentralization is good. For example, the OECD asserts, “It would seem in the best interest of central governments to accompany these shifts by modernizing and adapting administrative structures to better reflect the needs of metropolitan agglomerations and to ensure that the functions that are best carried out at the metropolitan level are actually located there” (OECD 2015, 122).

This section shows, using examples from Uganda and Senegal, that decentralization has failed to achieve its stated goals across much of Africa. Here, there is less need for the urban physician. Laws relating to devolving authority to cities and other forms of local government are often good but are routinely ignored. An urban politician is required to understand why and to devise a strategy for making these good laws work in practice.

### 7.1. Uganda: Administrative Recentralization

Article 176 2(B) of the 1995 Constitution of Uganda devolves fiscal and administrative functions from the central to the local government, intended to enhance public service delivery. This was further consolidated in the Local Government Act of 1997, which clarified the local government functions and gave it greater autonomy. However, the central government of Uganda started backtracking on decentralization and local autonomy. In 2009, the central parliament—dominated by President Yoweri Museveni’s National Resistance Movement (NRM)—passed the Kampala City Act, which stripped the city council of many of its powers, granting them to the Kampala Capital City Authority (KCCA). The elected office of mayor became a ceremonial position, while the executive director of the KCCA, appointed directly by the president, has executive authority in Kampala (Madinah et al. 2015). This move helped weaken the political and fiscal powers of the local government, which is dominated by the opposition Democratic Party. Good laws that had empowered local democracy were ignored and rescinded by the central government.

## 7.2. Senegal: Municipal Bond in Dakar

Senegal's central government has adopted decentralization policies such as the 1996 Municipal Code to help strengthen local government. Despite these good laws, local authorities systematically lack the necessary funding to carry out their developmental obligations because the central government is reluctant to financially empower opposition parties at the local level. They rely on the central government—which has been happy to decentralize responsibility but not autonomy over tax policy and collection—for about 90 percent of their revenue (ICED 2017). In 2009, the newly elected mayor of Dakar, Khalifa Sall, attempted to bolster the city's financial independence. With the assistance of the World Bank, he established the Dakar Municipal Finance Program (DMFP), which planned to launch the first-ever African municipal bond program. After many years of careful planning, securing investment-grade credit ratings, and budgetary review, the DMFP was ready to go in 2015. Two days before the official launch date, the Senegalese Ministry of the Economy rescinded its approval of the program, citing fears that the nation might be liable for any defaults on payments, and Dakar had no choice but to suspend it (Gorelick 2018). Nonetheless, other African countries learned from this experience; both highly centralized Cameroon and decentralized South Africa have successfully developed a municipal bond program to aid urban development.

## 7.3. From General Decentralization to Special Jurisdictions: Discussion

The OECD quote noted above is typical of big policy reports, which assert that when good policy (decentralization) has gone bad, the best response is to bring out the urban physician, pass more good laws, decentralize revenue and spending obligations, and build local government capacity. While big policy reports call for the attention of the urban physician, the case studies of Uganda and Senegal show that an urban politician is necessary to devise a way to make decentralization work.

When the generalized devolution of authority stalls in response to political opposition, a more politically tractable method is to create a new city with new rules in a delimited geographic area (Freiman 2013). These greenfield cities will not threaten the gains elites made from exploiting existing patterns of governance and corruption such as those that stalled decentralization in both Uganda and Senegal. Decentralized power is instead granted to a “special jurisdiction” or a charter city:

**“The legal and administrative blank slate allows the charter city to develop a governance system from scratch. Benchmarking to global best practices enables the charter city to quickly become an excellent destination not just for foreign and domestic investment, but also for the average resident to more easily start a business or find employment. The legal framework includes simple, low-cost business registration, tax administration, labor law, and dispute resolution, among others”**  
(Mason and Lutter 2020, 5).

One role for the urban politician is to ensure the new city's growth creates benefits for existing local and central elites. While general decentralization (such as in Uganda and Senegal) implied the loss of central political power or tax revenue, central elites stand to gain from a charter city. Possible mechanisms include transferring a fixed proportion of

annual tax revenues to the host government or giving the host government an equity stake in the city's development company (or both). Another mechanism is to list the developer on the host country's stock exchange. If the company is publicly listed, developers and stakeholders have no incentive to expropriate funds, which would threaten their financial standing. In addition, pension funds and other entities that buy large amounts of stock would use their political influence to limit any activities that could harm their interests. In some cases, these stockholders are the people themselves: About half of the Saudi population applied to purchase shares in King Abdullah Economic City (KAEC) when it made its initial public offering in July 2006 (Moser, Swain, and Alkhabbaz 2015).

Once a charter city is well-established, the urban physician can then use it as a laboratory to observe and evaluate how different laws operate in different contexts. Successful charter cities can expand, be replicated nationally, and/or inspire national-level policy reform. The city of Shenzhen in China was created as one of four new special economic zones (SEZs) in 1980, expanding from a cluster of fishing villages into a modern city of more than 12 million people. The SEZ idea was replicated, and by 2004 there were an estimated 7,000 industrial parks of some form in China (Zeng 2015). Shenzhen also inspired national-level policy reform, such that by the 2000s, China could be described as one "super SEZ" (Ge 1999). Managing the competing demands and ideological beliefs of the Communist Party; the central government; domestic, foreign, private, and state-owned enterprises; state governments; and local governments was the arch-urban politician Deng Xiaoping (Vogel 2013).

## **8. Property Owners and Tax Revenue**

Sometimes the correction of bad laws imposes costs on particular groups, so the transformation of bad into good laws requires more political calculation than an urban physician could offer—as is the case, described below, of outdated property-tax rolls in Kenya. Economic theory posits that land taxes, such as those on property, should

be an efficient and equitable source of tax revenue (beloved of the urban physician), but in practice it can be difficult to collect for practical political reasons (requiring the skill of the urban politician).

### **8.1. Kenya: Outdated Property-Tax Rolls**

With its new 2010 Constitution, Kenya created a two-tier framework comprising the national government and 47 county governments, leading to a more decentralized system. County and local authorities became responsible for providing basic infrastructure, including water, waste management, local roads, and early childhood development—as well as property-tax collection. Kenya practices a land-value model of taxation, which can be traced back to the British colonial administration. Currently, the Valuation for Rating Act is the legal framework counties use to evaluate property rates based on their market values, which they are required to revise every ten years (McCluskey, Franzsen, and Olima 2017, 235). However, the rates have not been revised since 1982, and current property values are around 20 to 30 times higher than reflected in the rolls (Kopanyi and Murray 2016). Historically, "the property tax has been an important source of revenue for Kenyan local authorities. For example, before independence in 1963, the city of Nairobi generated 45 percent of its revenue from rates," compared to 23

percent in the 2014–15 fiscal year (McCluskey, Franzsen, and Olima 2017, 232–33). At the national level, in 2012, total taxes accounted for 15.6 percent of GDP, while property taxes accounted for only 0.01 percent (McCluskey, Franzsen, and Bahl 2017, 34).

## 8.2. Taxation and Local Government: It's About the Politics, Stupid!

The big policy papers see tax collection as being entirely a technocratic exercise of the urban physician: “For municipal taxes, an effective collection system is essential; billing should be reliable and timely to allow households to plan, and convenient places to pay are important to eradicate a culture of non-payment” (UN-Habitat 2014, 128).

It is also argued that giving city residents more information about investment plans and local budgets, as well as opportunities to voice their opinions, means they will not oppose taxation but instead be inclined to comply with tax demands. In other words, “Collection of fees and other charges is much improved when residents can see how the money collected is used and when there is a clear link with locally significant improvements” (UN-Habitat 2014, 130).

There are striking ways in which the technocratic reforms of an urban physician—especially those that utilize modern technology—can help mobilize property taxation. As a detailed ethnography of property taxation in Pakistan concluded:

**“Digital technologies have greatly improved the prospect of assessing and collecting urban property taxes more reliably, efficiently, and transparently. Geographic information systems make it easier and cheaper to identify – and to some extent to classify – properties liable to taxation. Bill management can be automated. Property tax information can be cross-checked with relevant information from, for example, household utility bills, the census, or taxes on the legal transfer of property”** (Piracha and Moore 2015).

Certainly, there is some scope for the urban physician, but such measures alone are not enough.

Land-value taxation in particular is often seen as “efficient and fair.” The fixed supply of land means taxation does not hinder production, and the value of land mostly rises due to “public investment and population growth” in a broader neighborhood instead of private development. “Often governments tax the value of properties built on land as well. This is administratively easier and allows policymakers to progressively tax individuals with higher value property at a higher rate” (Collier, Blake, and Manwaring 2018, 6).

The exclusive focus of the big policy papers on such technocratic solutions misses the necessary role of the urban politician. Globally, governments often fail to collect significant revenue from property taxes for three main reasons: First, “property owners dislike property taxes and tend to be politically influential.” Second, taxpayers are reminded of the “burden” of property taxes through regular bills. By contrast, personal income taxation is generally collected and paid to the government by employers or firms rather than the individual taxpayer; and sales and value-added taxes, import and export taxes, and excise taxes disappear into the final selling price of goods and services. Third, property taxes are often collected by sub-national governments, which tend to be weaker than the central government—so “their

interests do not have high priority when revenue policy and administration are reformed,” such as to allocate skilled administrative staff and upgrade tax-collection technologies (Piracha and Moore 2016, 1785).

## 9. Distributional Implications of Government

The previous discussion of property taxation showed how policies that are ideal (efficient and equitable) from the urban physician’s perspective can negatively affect certain groups, so they require an urban politician to plan and ensure their effective implementation. Drawing on examples from Morocco and Nigeria, this section shows how bad laws can also have distributional implications. Transforming a bad law into a good law requires an urban politician who can engage with the politics of winners and losers.

### 9.1. Morocco: The “Museumification” of the Medina

According to French colonial officials in the early twentieth century, Moroccan cities and towns did not offer acceptable living conditions. French residents lived exclusively in the cities’ new neighborhoods while starting preservation projects in the medinas (historic districts often corresponding to an old walled city). This “museumification” process was a tool to control urban development and access to cities. Rabat and Casablanca expanded significantly during colonial times, while the historic capitals of Fez, Marrakesh, and Meknes stagnated, with rigid codes and building regulations freezing their appearance (Radoine 2003). By preventing modernization, the French also destroyed the social meanings of those spaces.

For example, the Jamaa el Fnaa plaza in Marrakesh is, in many ways, a French invention. A traditional center of trade and administration, the plaza had always held a vital significance in the city, but it never had clear geographical limitations separating it from the surrounding environment.


The location had historically been used for many temporary activities, making it look “empty” in the eyes of the French, who delimited its boundaries and announced the need to protect and preserve them. Since independence, other international entities, such as the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), became involved in architectural heritage programs in Morocco’s medinas, which continue to reflect an idea of preservation highly influenced by European culture. While it is true that these districts attract tourism across North Africa, little in the way of benefits or development tends to reach the poorer residents of the medina (Lamzah 2014).

### 9.2. Nigeria: Ban on *Okada* in Lagos

In Lagos, local authorities have acknowledged the need to resolve transportation issues in the rapidly growing city. To overhaul its transportation network, they enacted the Transport Sector Reform Law of 2018, a set of policies prohibiting certain types of vehicles and encouraging others. Perhaps the most controversial part of this legislation was the phased ban on *okada* (motorbike taxis) on certain highways and business corridors because they allegedly cause massive congestion. According to the Lagos State Government, motorcycles and tricycles were also responsible for 10,000 accidents and 600 deaths between 2016 and 2019 (Adinde 2020).



However, because *okada* are incredibly cheap and readily available across Lagos, they are the number-one form of transportation for low-income groups (Nzeadibe 2021). Despite widespread opposition, the state government decided to expand the ban across wider areas of the city in 2021. More than 800,000 private *okada* taxi drivers have found themselves unemployed as a result, and the ban has also crippled the developing ridesharing industry, which has pushed the idea of more properly formalizing *okadas* with proper permitting and registration. Meanwhile, *danfos* (minibuses) have increased their prices due to the influx of passengers, who often have to wait up to an hour in the hot sun to get a seat. Protests against the new law sometimes devolved into violent clashes between the police and *okada* drivers (Salaudeen 2020). However, the Lagos State Government seems to have no plans to change its approach.



### 9.3. Planning and (More) Politics: Discussion

The four big reports make scant mention of the politics of urban planning and what to do when a potential policy reform creates winners and losers. These papers' prescriptions are technocratic in nature and targeted to the urban physician. For example, UN-Habitat (2014) argues that government should seek to:

1. Inspire the urban populace: "A collective vision championed by leaders is the basis of impact planning and success stories show clearly that a vision has to drive the plan to reap real benefits for the city" (19).
2. Engage with stakeholders early in the reform process: "If stakeholders are on board from the beginning, it is less likely that proposals will be opposed later on. Broad support aligns a local agenda with that of other levels of government and also enlists the private sector" (23).
3. Provide leadership: "City leaders who see opportunities in urbanization need to rally all possible contributions toward developing them. A collectively held framework gives local leaders a road map to reach out to citizens, to energize departments, to mobilize partners so that they engage in realizing the vision, and to leverage synergies between stakeholders" (15).
4. Ensure good governance: "Implementation of plans requires monitoring capacity, credible institutions and low levels of corruption and impunity" (19).
5. Enact more good laws: "Many cities that have had major successes in planning also have progressive legislation that ensures that plans are legally binding documents and include sanctions for non-compliance by residents and developers" (19).

From this perspective, urban planning is entirely the responsibility of the urban physician, who is tasked with making bad laws better through a top-down process of learning about the “correct” solution, explaining it to the wider populace, and then implementing the technical solution. The fact that this approach ignores the politics of policy reform and the necessary role of the urban politician is surprising, given the extensive mainstream discussion of this issue over the past few decades by actors from across the ideological spectrum. Once its sociopolitical context is understood properly, bad policy often cannot be considered “bad” but rather as a deliberate imposition by the state to support a politically influential class or interest group. For example, restrictions (such as the Nigerian ban on *okada*) give rise to rents (extra profits for bus firms), and firms and individuals compete for those rents, both legally (raising bus fares) and illegally through bribery, smuggling, and black markets (Krueger 1974). Whenever a government policy has a clear beneficiary or victim, groups will tend to organize in support or opposition, lobbying to either increase the value of the gains or reduce the cost (Krueger 1990).

The political right has incorporated this view of policymaking into the narrative of the New Political Economy, which is based on the assumptions of neo-classical microeconomic analysis and individual rational choice. On the political left, interest groups more often take the form of exploitative elites who leverage state policy to create benefits for themselves at the expense of marginal or subordinated classes (Toye 1993, 135). The implication of both paradigms is that transforming bad laws into good laws is difficult because of “the system of incentives which, when once distorted, produces a polity which then defends and protects the distorted incentives that have created it” (160).

For example, in Kampala, Uganda, developers are required to go through clearly specified steps, from acquiring ownership to getting approval to build from the Kampala City Council (KCC). The laws are good enough, so their failure relates to implementation. For instance, in 2005 the wife of a city councilor was given a ten-year remit by KCC “to plant trees and preserve the environmental ecosystem” in

Centenary Park. However, “in marked contrast to the approved plans, [she] fenced off the park and proceeded to construct permanent buildings.” An attempt by KCC to sue the developers was halted by presidential intervention, and the park was transformed into “a complex of restaurants and bars.” The same happened to wetland areas and the city’s only children’s playground (Goodfellow 2013, 9). Even buildings that have obtained approval systematically flout “other basic regulations such as those concerning height, distance from the road, connection to drainage, provision of parking, fire escapes, and disability access.” This failure is not due to bad laws, a weak legal framework, or the lack of able urban physicians, but to urban politicians intervening to allow developers to ignore those regulations (Goodfellow, 2013, 10). Sometimes, this intervention is on behalf of small groups of elites, but also sometimes just to attract large groups of voters—such as the 300 residents of “a dilapidated Kampala housing estate” who lobbied local politicians to prevent the site being redeveloped (Goodfellow 2013, 12).

By contrast, legislation such as the Kigali Conceptual Master Plan of 2007 and the Rwanda Building Control Regulations of 2009 have effectively reduced illegal construction in Rwanda’s capital, Kigali. Upon discovery, developers of unpermitted buildings routinely face fines, which if not paid are followed by a demolition order (Goodfellow, 2013, 13). Good

policy has been sustained, is not structured around periodic crackdowns, and encompasses wealthy investors (Goodfellow 2013, 15). This is partly because the ruling Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), which is “perceived as being led by a small minority of foreign-born returnees within the already minority Tutsi ethnic group,” had to derive legitimacy from somewhere else besides the local Rwandan population. To attract supporters, the RPF promised to ensure law and order, reduce corruption, and promote rapid economic development, as visually evident in the transformation of Kigali. Unlike in Kampala, where an opposition party ruled, the RPF faced little political pressure in Kigali, allowing it to impose short-term costs to promote a long-term vision for urbanization (Goodfellow 2013, 17). Here, the urban politician empowered the urban physician to implement long-term developmental policies.

Even the successful implementation of good laws can have transition costs, defined as “the collective social costs of creating new rights or altering or destroying existing rights.” These include “the costs of organizing negotiated transitions” regarding compensation or a purchase price for an asset, often land for redevelopment. In addition, there are political “contestation costs” when various groups mobilize to gain a better deal or to prevent a policy reform from taking place (such as with the violent protests by *okada* drivers in Nigeria); these costs vary depending on the group’s political influence and degree of organization (Khan 2010, 52).

In some cases, a ruling coalition may be able to force through reforms despite the presence of high transition costs. In 1980s England, for example, the Thatcher government faced a year-long strike by coal miners who opposed plans to privatize the industry, which would result in the closure of less-profitable mines. The government accepted this transition cost because it viewed a victory against the politically influential miner’s union as a vital step in revitalizing the economy and dissuading opposition to reforms in other areas (Pruitt 2020). More often, political opposition from influential and/or well-organized groups “forces some changes to be abandoned. Growth in many developing countries is often of this type: driven by gradual, ad-hoc, interventions in rights that are

often blocked or reversed” (Khan 2010, 56).

In choosing which bad laws to turn into good laws, we need an urban physician who can prioritize laws according to a methodology such as growth diagnostics (see Section 3.4). We also need an urban politician who can look for—and actively manage—those reforms that achieve “the greatest growth effect at the lowest social cost” (Khan 2010, 57). In Bangladesh, for example, building the Jamuna bridge required first acquiring 2,860 hectares (6,622 acres) of land, which happened over the span of a decade from 1988 to 1997. The “very generous” compensation was “based on market prices... plus a 50 per cent premium. A total of around 16,000 landowners were recognized for compensation.... There were additional payments for resettlement.” The project enjoyed cross-party commitment, and although land purchases were compulsory, the high compensation meant the process did not ignite any political division between winners and losers. The very expensive project was also funded by soft loans, so required close engagement with foreign donors (Khan 2010, 75–76).

## 10. Customary and Statutory Land Ownership

The big policy papers highlight the importance of property rights, frequently repeating the mantra that well-functioning land markets require

“clear and secure” property titles (Lall, Henderson, and Venables 2017, 136). These calls to implement good policy often acknowledge—but do not dwell on—the conflict between statutory and customary ownership or control of land. Statutory ownership is based on written and codified law passed by a legislative authority such as a national parliament. Under customary ownership, land is often allocated to households by a tribal chief or headman. The household control of land after it has been allocated for as long as that household continues to farm the land and retains an active presence in the community, African countries face very different current constraints regarding customary land. In Tanzania, Mozambique, and Ethiopia, customary land ownership was abolished, and land ownership was vested in the state. In Kenya and Malawi, customary land ownership was eliminated and replaced with private land ownership. In Zambia, Sudan, and Uganda, there is an overlapping pattern of customary, private, and state land ownership (Kalabamu 2000, 305). This section gives examples of bad laws from Sierra Leone and Ghana and discusses whether an urban physician is enough to make these bad laws better.



## 10.1. Sierra Leone: Weak Local Councils

After the end of Sierra Leone’s civil war in 2002, the central government passed the Local Government Act establishing 19 new local councils comprised of 13 district councils and 6 city councils. The act intended to streamline the delivery of public services, improve democratic functioning, and decentralize more authority over permits and approval processes (Rigon, Koroma, and Walker 2018). Significant efforts were made to increase spending on primary services, especially education, healthcare, and agriculture. Although the act was met with widespread approval and support in its early years, its effectiveness and public legitimacy have since waned. One major issue is the conflict between the local councils and the chieftaincy system. Under the still active Protectorate Land Ordinance of 1927, all land in Sierra Leone’s provinces is vested in tribal authorities comprised of familial chiefs and their councilors, who manage the land on behalf of the native communities (Colonial Government of Sierra Leone 1927). When investors seek to develop rural land for non-agricultural purposes, they face a complex system in which they have to obtain approval from both the tribal authorities and the government—and are often rejected (Johnson 2011). The system also leaves local authorities with insufficient funding because unclear laws mean the chiefs or central agencies sometimes collect taxes intended for local councils (Kargbo 2009, 26).

## 10.2. Ghana: Customary Land Disputes

Land acquisition in Ghana is governed by both customary and statutory principles. Customary lands—comprising 80 percent of Ghanaian territory—are managed in accordance with local practices, while statutory lands are governed based on statutes, laws, and acts of parliament (Fiadzibey 2006). As a result, the country is fraught with challenges such as the double sale of land, numerous unofficial fees, and fraudulent transactions (Ameyaw and de Vries 2021). The most significant effect of this legal division is that large swathes of land have become unavailable for development due to land-title cases being contested in court—indeed, an estimated 57 percent of all pending court cases in Ghana are related to land disputes, which can take 10–20 years on average to reach a resolution (Mintah et al. 2021). Not infrequently, people and firms instead rely on violence and political connections to resolve their land-related disputes.

## 10.3. Customary and Private Land Ownership: Discussion

In British-controlled Africa, colonial officials perpetuated the distinction between customary and statutory land, while French colonies made a more conscious effort to reform the system to resemble the one prevailing in France. (Njoh 2004). After independence, some states pursued customary land-ownership reform, with varying degrees of success.

In Ethiopia, the distinction between customary and statutory land was abolished in 1975, when all land was nationalized under the Soviet-backed Provisional Military Administrative Council (also known as the “Derg”).

In Rwanda, the government tried and failed to harmonize the dual systems of customary and statutory tenure in 1967, 1978, 1991, and again in 1997 (Manirakiza et al. 2019). Yet only about 1 percent of land in Rwanda was registered by 2010, with the rest held under customary or local tenure. In 2003, the government initiated a lengthy set of consultations regarding land tenure:

“That revealed broad support for land tenure reform and led to the drafting of the National Land Policy (2004) and the enactment of the Organic Land Law (OLL) in 2005.... This was followed in 2007 by field trials that tested formal tenure regularisation procedures and processes that would lead to simple registration of land. These procedures were implemented by locally appointed committees and technicians” (Payne 2011, 21–22).

After trials proved successful, the government rolled out land-tenure regularizations nationwide. In addition, a new Land Law was enacted in June 2013 stipulating that “all landholders should formally register their land and transactions” and recognizing the state as “the sole authority to grant rights of occupation and use of land” (Manirakiza et al. 2019).

Uganda demonstrates that a revolutionary ascent to power (as in Rwanda) is not enough to grant the state the capacity to make bad laws better. A decade after Museveni came to power in 1986, the NRM government passed the 1998 Land Act, aiming to clarify customary rights over land and land markets and to gradually transition from communal to statutory private ownership (Coldham 2000). However, the act was “undercut by lack of both consultation and foresight in anticipating responses to new legal provisions and by a lack of adequate resourcing of the reform process.” The burdensome process of acquiring a certificate of customary ownership meant that not a single one was issued in the first year (Hunt 2004).



In Botswana, the 1966 Constitution grants the country's traditional chiefs a formal role in government. However, the national House of Chiefs—which includes eight Tswana chiefs, four representatives of smaller ethnic groups, and three selected members—gives these figures a lot of voice but little influence. Soon after independence, the ruling Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) enacted the Tribal Land Act of 1968, which gave the president the ability to remove chiefs and led to the creation of statutory Land Boards that stripped the chiefs of any powers to allocate land (Manatsha 2020). Investors have since found it easier to acquire property and experienced more certainty in their subsequent use of land (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001).

The case of Shenzhen in China offers an instructive example of how to implement good laws in the absence of private, individual property rights. What became the city of Shenzhen was a network of 300 villages in the 1970s. Construction was made possible by villagers agreeing to pool collective land, starting with the Caiwuwei Grand Hotel in the village of the same name, which rapidly built additional factories producing “electronics, furniture, toys, and many other consumer goods” (Du 2020 216). Between 1980 (when the area was designated an SEZ) and 2008, Shenzhen's GDP rose from \$4 million to \$114.47 billion; its population grew from 300,000 in 1979 to 12.6 million in 2021; and per capita income increased from \$122.43 to around \$30,000 over the same years (Yuan et al. 2010, 58). By 2007, high-tech industries were producing \$111 billion worth of goods, of which \$80 billion was exported (Yuan et al., 2010 62). Construction in Shenzhen was based on villagers agreeing to pool collective land. In November 1984, the Caiwuwei Grand Hotel was built on village collective land (Du, 2020, 216). Over the next few years, more than thirty factories were built in the same village, producing electronics, furniture, toys, and other consumer goods. Elsewhere, “twenty-four production teams collectively formed Huanggang Industry Limited and received forty million yuan from the Shenzhen government as compensation for village land requisition,” using this money to establish the Shapuwei Industrial Zone and the Jilong Industrial Zone, which together “attracted tens of thousands of workers from all over China” (Du 2020, 245).

Developing these SEZs did not require purchasing land and displacing the original inhabitants. Locals collectively agreed to lease land to investors, and “villagers became rent-collecting landlords instead of working in the factories,” often remaining in situ in newly constructed apartment blocks (245).

## 11. Conclusion

The recent pivot toward urban policy among globally influential organizations is clearly reflected in reports written by the World Bank, UN-Habitat, and the OECD, which aim to bring attention to cities in developing countries and to influence urban policy, providing a checklist of the interventions needed to make bad laws better. These papers are a part of an enduring “anti-politics machine,” a term initially used by James Ferguson (1990) to describe how donor projects in Lesotho sought to make political decisions about the allocation of resources despite presenting themselves as technical solutions to technical problems.

The big policy papers provide theory and empirical data to highlight the potential for cities to serve as engines of economic growth and poverty reduction (*inspiration*); the current dysfunctionality of cities in failing to do so (*education*); and a checklist of policy reforms needed to realize that potential and make those bad laws better (*technical solutions*). This combination of inspiration, education,

and technical solutions represents the urban physician—i.e., the urban incarnation of the anti-politics machine. The task of the urban physician is to provide top-down leadership, to translate outside technical advice into a local context that will be readily explicable to the urban population, and to bring local stakeholders on board.

This paper reviews an extensive set of case study evidence on laws we judged to be “bad.” In some cases, there is a clear role for the urban physician, for example in adjusting or more carefully drafting laws to fit the socioeconomic context of the country or city to which they apply. In many more cases, to just characterize laws as being “bad” misses a lot: We also need to think carefully about why those bad laws exist, who benefits from their implementation, and what political strategies would be needed to improve them. Notably, building “white elephants” in urban infrastructure is not merely a symptom of poor planning in 1950s and 1960s Africa; rather, it remains a pervasive syndrome of all urban infrastructure building across the world. Better planning skills, more democracy, and less corruption can all help (the “democratic urban physician”?) but are not enough. For example, when skyscrapers are built to confer political prestige, not just make production more profitable, they become a matter of politics.

One set of bad laws are those inherited from the colonial era. Their continued existence has hindered the process of urban development from Kenya to Ghana to Algeria. Such colonial laws created economic “winners” invested in their preservation, for example elites who profit from weak property-rights protection among the poor. Yet the direct political influence of the colonizer has declined significantly across Africa; the decision over which laws to reform or implement is now more clearly a domestic political question, as the brief comparison of Zambia and Zimbabwe demonstrated.

This paper also found that decentralization has often been subverted by politically jealous central governments and undermined by the weak capacity of local governments. In addition, property taxes are efficient (appealing to the

urban physician) but difficult to collect (requiring the skills of the urban politician), and there is no easy way to compel politically influential property owners to pay them.

Many bad laws have profound distributional impacts or are caught in the friction between customary and statutory laws. In both cases, making bad laws better requires a carefully crafted political strategy that recognizes the historical features behind the political settlement and the resulting transition costs. Such a strategy calls for someone with the hardnosed political skills to build a coalition for reform (sometimes offering inducements to ensure the active support of groups who could otherwise stymie reform through indifference or active opposition), to identify and compensate those losing out (requiring forecasting the social and economic implications), and to subdue any opposition that mobilizes against the reforms, whether in parliament, council chambers, the media, or the street. This is a project for the urban politician, who can guide reform through the twin demands and opportunities of street-level and high-level politics.

The big policy papers of some of the world’s most influential policy organizations (the OECD, the World Bank, and UN-Habitat) occasionally get their advice spot-on. There are some bad laws that need to be rewritten such that they both avoid complexity and excessive length, and

also recognize the local context in which they will be applied. Even here, the perspective of the big policy papers is limited. They acknowledge that governments often lack capacity but fail to recognize the complexity of building capacity or acknowledge its multi-faceted nature. Similarly, they offer reforms but tend to produce overwhelming lists without any means for policymakers to prioritize these recommendations or engage with the transition costs of reform. Despite their length, distinguished authorship, and claims to be a blueprint for all policymakers, these big policy papers usually have a very limited focus.

This paper has shown that a greater understanding of why bad laws exist and endure is vital to devising a strategy to reform them. The urban physician is central to any reform element but very often needs to work closely with the urban politician. Big policy papers should incorporate both urban characters in order to devise a strategy to reform dysfunctional urbanization in Africa.



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