

The Bahá'í Approach to Cosmopolitan Ideas in International Relations

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**The Bahá'í Approach to Cosmopolitan Ideas in International
Relations**

**A thesis submitted to the University of Limerick in candidacy for the Degree
of Doctor of Philosophy.**

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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this thesis is entirely my own work and that it has not been submitted as an exercise for a degree at any other University.

Nalinie N. Mooten

*For legal standards, political and economic theories are solely designed to safeguard
the interests of humanity as a whole...*

Shoghi Effendi

ABSTRACT

Cosmopolitanism embodies the desire to move beyond parochial and exclusionary concerns so as to be able to attain to ‘a world embracing vision’.¹ This tradition of thought bases its arguments on the premise that human beings, in all their diversity, constitute a single species, which is termed ‘the oneness of humankind’. This thesis will, firstly, examine Western cosmopolitan thought from its infancy to the present day, depicting it as a tradition of thought that has challenged divisiveness throughout the ages. Secondly, it will offer a Bahá’í cosmopolitan model to International Relations (IR), which reinforces ideas based on essential oneness. It will be shown that the Bahá’í model, which is sacred in nature and Eastern in origin, has significant connections with the Western cosmopolitan tradition (an aspect which demonstrates the universal nature of the cosmopolitan tradition). Consequently, Bahá’í cosmopolitanism can add to the growing cosmopolitan tradition in IR. Specifically, it represents a link to earlier Stoic ideas, and a return and rearticulation of a more ethical/spiritual cosmopolitanism (via its concept of the oneness of humankind) after the sharp materialist turn after the eighteenth century. Bahá’í thinking represents a good starting point for an attempt to reconcile ethical/spiritual cosmopolitanism with material cosmopolitanism. Thus, the Bahá’í cosmopolitan model can broaden the scope and diversity of IR cosmopolitanism, while offering a way of bridging the gap between the two main strands in the cosmopolitan tradition. To another extent, my study supports a growing body of IR that does not accept the state as a given and essentially challenges the claim that IR should be predominantly shaped along dichotomising paradigms – such as realism – which reject the Kantian and cosmopolitan concept of an ‘unbounded future.’²

¹ “Let your vision be world-embracing, rather than confined to your own self”. (Bahá’u’lláh, *Gleanings from the Writings of Bahá’u’lláh*, (Wilmette, IL: Bahá’í Publishing Trust, 1983), p. 94.

² Immanuel Kant, “The Contest of Faculties”, in Hans Reiss, ed., *Kant: Political Writings*, 2nd Ed., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 185.

DEDICATION

*To my husband, Patrick O'Halloran, and my parents, who have been a great support,
and have offered incessant encouragement in the last four years.*

I would also like to dedicate this work to the memory of Oliver Kiely, my 'Irish dad'.

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CHAPTER OUTLINE

Chapter One	- Introduction
Chapter Two	- Cosmopolitanism from Stoicism to the Enlightenment
Chapter Three	- Enlightenment Cosmopolitanism in the Thoughts of Rousseau and Kant
Chapter Four	- Twentieth Century Cosmopolitan Thinking: Functionalism, Cosmopolitan Democracy, and Postmodernism
Chapter Five	- The Bahá'í Faith as a Cosmopolitan Model
Chapter Six	- The Bahá'í Faith and the Cosmopolitan Tradition
Chapter Seven	- Conclusion

ABBREVIATIONS

AIDS	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
BIC	Bahá'í International Community
BCE	Before Current Era
CAMDUN	Campaign for A More Democratic United Nations
CE	Current Era
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
ECOSOC	United Nations Economic and Social Council
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agricultural Organisation
GA	General Assembly
GNP	Gross National Product
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICJ	International Court of Justice
IGO	International Governmental Organisation
ILO	International Labour Organisation
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INFUSA	International Network for a UN Second Assembly
IR	International Relations
MP	Member of Parliament
NGO	Non Governmental Organisation
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
UDHR	Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UN	United Nations

UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund

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Chapter One – Introduction

Part I: Aims, Objectives, and Structure

1.1 Introduction to IR and to the Theme of Cosmopolitanism

*There is no such thing as a perfect theory embodying the final truth, for the truth which it is supposed to embody is in fact a thousand truths which constantly grow and change.*³

Crawford shares the view that no intellectual field today suffers more “from the ambiguity of its subject matter, or the contestability of its theories” than International Relations.⁴ This ambiguity can be explained by “the age of transition”⁵ in which many claim we live in, or by the complex, and thus kinetic nature, of world politics in our times. Germane to this idea is that many processes working below or beyond the limited territory of the modern nation-state are challenging its ethos and so the very foundation of International Relations, thus contributing to a growing sense of ‘bewilderment’. This sense of bewilderment, which denotes a notion of change in international politics, refers to the weakening of the powers of the nation-state due to the introduction of extra-national forces, such as the question of human rights, the environment, increasing migration, and global economic interactions.⁶ This perplexity is, furthermore, linked to these global forces that destabilise the nation-state in its traditionally secure, self-sufficient, and unquestioned authority.⁷ Hence, scholars and politicians refer to the complexity of human

³ Anwar Hussein Syed, *Walter Lippman’s Philosophy of International Politics*, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1963), p. 18.

⁴ Robert Crawford, *Idealism and Realism in International Relations: Beyond the Discipline*, (London: Routledge, 2000), p. 1.

⁵ The concept of the “age of transition” has been expressed by diverse authors such as: Ervin Laszlo, *The Inner Limits of Mankind: Heretical Reflections on Today’s Values, Culture and Politics*, (London: Oneworld Publications, 1989); Stephen Toulmin, *Cosmopolis*, (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1970); David Held, *Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance*, (Cambridge: Polity, 1995); or James N. Rosenau, *The Study of Global Interdependence: Essays on Transnationalisation of World Affairs*, (London: Frances Pinter Publishers, 1980).

⁶ See the section on Cosmopolitan Democracy in Chapter Four where this argument is expanded.

⁷ See 1.1.1 The Nation-State as the Denial of the Oneness of Humankind.

interactions and relations, which foster a sentiment of confusion.⁸ As Paul and Hall claim, “World politics in the twenty first century is likely to be more complex than in previous eras”.⁹ In Rosenau’s eyes, such complexity has emerged from the increasing interdependence and interaction of societies, and, therefore, the transnationalisation of world affairs, which brings with it challenges for theorising IR.¹⁰

The existing sense of perplexity also arises from the fact that the diversity of political thought in the discipline¹¹ is sometimes prone to bring manifold contradictory assumptions (especially within traditional orthodox IR theory) about human and political behaviours, which are not easily reconciled. These contradictory views are found in the two mainstreams of thought in International Relations, one known as realism or the classical tradition, and the other as liberal internationalism. Some – may be too simply – would say that realism is a pessimistic view of IR, and others that liberal internationalism is the optimistic voice of the subject.¹² If we take the view that liberal internationalism is in strict opposition to realism, it is possible to describe liberalism as an optimistic and progressive viewpoint that considers human nature either as good or as having the potential to overcome its evil components. Liberal internationalism is, however, not the only possible channel through which one can find a voice to express the dissatisfaction with a static/sceptic worldview. Indeed, Persram notes that there is simplicity in the account that there are many theories ‘*but really only two*’ about the ‘world’.¹³ [Emphasis mine] Beyond ‘utopia’¹⁴ and reality we find critical theories, including cosmopolitan

⁸ “Conceivably we are so confused that even the fact of change perplexes us. Conceivably the forms of world politics have undergone alteration while the underlying structures continue essentially unmodified”. (James N. Rosenau, *The Study of Global Interdependence*, p. 12).

⁹ T.V. Paul & John Hall, *International Order and the Future of World Politics*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 11.

¹⁰ James N. Rosenau, *The Study of Global Interdependence*, p. 1.

¹¹ See Part IV for a Summary of IR theories or the State of IR.

¹² See Ian Clark, *The Hierarchy of States: Reform and Resistance in the International Order*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 49-66 and Robert Crawford, *Idealism and Realism*, p. 73.

¹³ Nalini Persram, “Coda, Sovereignty, Subjectivity, Strategy”, in: Jenny Edkins, Véronique Pin-Fat & Nalini Persram, (eds.), *Critical Perspectives on World Politics*, (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999), p. 165.

¹⁴ Since E.H. Carr’s *The Twenty Years’ Crisis* in 1939, a label has been put on liberal international writers as “utopian” or “idealists”. This body of thought has, thus, been denigrated since the inter-war period. “It is widely held that this critique had a devastating impact on the discipline”. (Peter Wilson, “The Twenty

democracy, critical international theory, or postmodernism, which offer ‘emancipatory’ views, and call for the reconceptualisation of a world centred upon the fixity of the nation-state.¹⁵ Since realism offers a myopic vision, which emphasises short-term interests and the inevitability of conflict,¹⁶ I choose to concentrate on the “optimistic” and “emancipatory” voices of IR, which assert that change in international affairs is possible.¹⁷ This relates to the idea that the realisation of the ‘good life’ is not to be locked up within bounded units¹⁸ and is a concern of the main approach scrutinised in this work: cosmopolitanism, or the cosmopolitan tradition. This tradition is used in two ways in the thesis: firstly, as a description of the world around us, in particular, the development of transnational processes, and secondly, as a prescriptive or normative view of ‘what the world should look like’.

Crucially, this thesis will focus on Bahá’í thinking¹⁹, as on the one hand, it represents a strong reinforcement of the cosmopolitan tradition of thought, underlining its validity and necessity, and on the other hand, because it centres on the concept of the ‘oneness of humanity’ in its belief-system, delineating a rearticulation of ethical cosmopolitan roots.²⁰ This principle reflects the sameness (which does not correspond to homogeneity, but instead draws on a commonality shared by humanity) of all human beings across the globe. In other words, it emphasises that

Years’ Crisis and the Category of Idealism in International Relations”, in: David Long & Peter Wilson, (eds.), *Thinkers of the Twenty Years’ Crisis: Inter-War Realism Reassessed*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), p. 1).

¹⁵ Critical international theory is included in Chapter Six, (Section 6.6 The Bahá’í Teachings, Critical International Theory and Postmodern Views). Cosmopolitan democracy is developed in Chapter Four, and Postmodernism is explored in Chapter Four (4.3 ‘Cosmopolitan’ Postmodern Perspectives in IR).

¹⁶ See 1.6.1 Realism, Human Nature and the Centrality of Territorially Organised Entities.

¹⁷ In this project, it will be implicitly contended that beliefs can shape and influence our conduct as much as the latter can shape and influence our beliefs (i.e. my belief in honesty can influence my conduct to be honest, or my deliberate violent behaviour can influence my belief that violence is part of human nature). In other words, in IR, the adoption of a positive and optimistic vision, and the belief that peoples and states are fully able to use the faculty of reflection (belief) enhance the chances of building a more just and equitable world order (conduct/behaviour).

¹⁸ Richard Devetak, “The Project of Modernity and International Relations Theory”, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 1995, Vol. 24 (No.1), p. 38.

¹⁹ See Chapters Five and Six.

²⁰ This implies the reiteration of the oneness of humankind and universal ethical values. The Stoics stressed the oneness of humankind and the unity of life, and “undermined the assumed natural political divisions between Greek and barbarian”. (Derek Heater, *World Citizenship and Government: Cosmopolitan Ideas in the History of Western Political Thought*, (New York: St Martin’s Press: 1996), p. 202).

humanity constitutes one race and a single people. To underline the non-homogenising effects of the oneness of humanity, Bahá'í writings always mention the latter “with its corollary of unity in diversity”.²¹ The Bahá'í model is not only based on the ethics of oneness, but also on a recommended scheme of global governance²² that gives practical expression to this principle. Accordingly, the Bahá'í cosmopolitan model supports the idea of moving away from an obsession with state sovereignty, and embraces the broader and more inclusive level of humanity that denounces unjustified division.²³ Bahá'í views add force to the argument that the nation-state, as the primary unit of IR, has had its day, and thereby highlight the need to include more flexible non-state actors. Robert Cox has expressed the same idea when he avers that the state is just one of the forces that shapes the present world, and admittedly not the most important one.²⁴ The oneness of mankind, thus, needs to be recognised as international politics have accepted the naturalness of political divisions, and a system based on the spatial nature of the world. This principle is useful in highlighting the artificiality of the concept of a closed, homogeneous, and ethically deficient, nation.²⁵

At this particular point, this chapter focuses, in its entirety, on: the ‘nation-state as a denial of the oneness of humankind’ and the aims of the thesis; the main concepts embedded in cosmopolitanism; the Bahá'í approach; and ‘the state of IR’, which are crucial to a wider exploration of the thesis. Firstly, Part I will examine the principle of the oneness of humankind in relation to the inadequacies of the nation-state, as it represents an important background for cosmopolitanism, and Bahá'í cosmopolitanism, specifically. Secondly, Part I will explore the hypothesis and aims of the thesis. In Part II, a definition of cosmopolitanism will be provided,

²¹ Bahá'í International Community, “Global Action Plan for Social Development”, Contribution to the first substantive session of the Preparatory Committee for the United Nations World Summit for Social Development, January-February 1994, downloaded 5 February 2003 <<http://www.bic-un.bahai.org/94-0121.htm>>

²² See Chapters Five and Six.

²³ See Chapter Six, (6.6 The Bahá'í Teachings, Critical International Theory and Postmodern Views).

²⁴ Robert Cox in: Richard Devetak, “Critical Theory”, in: S. Burchill, & A. Linklater, (eds.), *Theories of International Relations*, (2nd ed.), (Basingtoke: Palgrave, 2001), p.169 and see Cosmopolitan Democracy in Chapter Four.

²⁵ See 1.1.1 The Nation-State As the Denial of the Oneness of Humankind.

and will include the literature review of the primary material used in this work. Part III will introduce the Bahá'í approach, underline its links to cosmopolitanism, and cover the Bahá'í literature used in this thesis, and Part IV, or 'the state of IR', will highlight current developments in the discipline, and their effects on the expansion of cosmopolitanism.

1.1.1 The Nation-State as the Denial of the Oneness of Humankind

“Conceived of as an end in itself, the national state has come to be a denial of the oneness of mankind, the source of general disruption opposed to the true interests of its peoples...”²⁶

As humankind is a natural unit, cosmopolitanism questions the nation-state, a divisive unit, as the principle actor in IR. In this way, cosmopolitanism challenges the notion of the natural permanency of a world community structured around divided national communities with forever distinct and unvarying populations. In a teleological sense, the nation-state is, thus, problematic on the grounds that it divides the human race, whose 'reality' is one, and whose consequent aim is to reside in a world 'polity'. Benedict Anderson views the nation-state as an 'imagined' and 'limited' community as 'no nation imagines itself coterminous with mankind': "the nation is imagined as limited because even the largest of them, encompassing perhaps a billion living human beings, has finite, if elastic, boundaries, beyond which lie other nations".²⁷ Likewise, Eric Hobsbawm notes that nationalism, child of mother nation, represents an exclusive concept, "nationalism... excludes from its purview all who do not belong to its own nation, i.e. the vast majority of the human race".²⁸ Since the nation-state divides the human race, and oftentimes constructs aggressive and divisive borders, it cannot be the supreme or final expression of human relationships on the planet, as this would constitute a denial of our integral

²⁶ Bahá'í International Community, "A Bahá'í Declaration of Human Obligations and Rights", February 1947, downloaded 8 January 2003, <<http://www.bic-un.bahai.org/47-0200.htm>>

²⁷ Anderson Benedict, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, (London: Verso, 1991), p. 7.

²⁸ Hobsbawm in: Anthony D. Smith, *Nations and Nationalism in the Global Era*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), p. 9.

oneness. The nation-state embodies a citizen-alien relationship that excludes all those who do not reside within, whilst the cosmopolitan ideal ensures that all humans should have access to the same rights enshrined in a cosmopolitan law, which are not dependent on a spatial and limited unit for its application.

Indeed, how can humanity find its natural home in a unit that has given rise to xenophobia, genocide, or nationalism? The notion that the unit of the political state needs a homogeneous cultural nation has, as a consequence, led to excessive exclusivity and jingoistic intolerance. This idea has also encouraged the suppression of what is perceived as threats to a homogeneous community, and which ironically represents a completely illusory notion, a ‘myth’ or ‘artefact’²⁹ due to the increasing cultural heterogeneity of its population that is caused by migration, diaspora, or multiculturalism. In this regard, the Aristotelian notion of a good life locked within a *polis* can no longer serve its purpose, and must be transposed onto a more inclusive cosmopolis. Undeniably, the breakdown of the nation-state system entails new conceptions of equality in terms of gender and race, thereby confirming that the oneness of humankind, which works towards the inclusion of vulnerable groups and the recognition of a diversified and yet single human race, should be given greater attention in world affairs.

Here it is important to mention that feminist or postcolonial theories³⁰ that work toward ‘equal rights’ promote the idea of the deconstruction of dichotomies such as superior/inferior, male/female³¹ (with ‘female’ having here an inferior status). They mention the ‘political presence of newly empowered subjects’ underlining diversity, multiculturalism, and environmentalism.³² Azza Karam notes, “Emancipatory futures are inextricably linked to making the connections between local events and global ones, and doing so through resistance

²⁹ See Eric Hobsbawm, “Inventing Traditions”, in Eric Hobsbawm & T.Ranger, (eds.), *The Invention of Tradition*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

³⁰ These views are developed in Chapter Four, (4.3 ‘Cosmopolitan’ Postmodern Perspectives in IR), where the notion of a system of dichotomy and exclusion is developed.

³¹ Azza M. Karam, “Feminist Futures”, in: Jan Pieterse Nederveen, (ed.), *Global Futures: Shaping Globalization*, (New York: Zed Books, 2000), p. 184.

and accommodating difference, thus sharing in the kaleidoscope of power”.³³ These paradigms also contribute to refining the cosmopolitan project not as a ‘totalising’ universal project, but as one that seeks to unite and restore dignity,³⁴ while preserving an enriching diversity.³⁵ Booth referred to this revised cosmopolitanism as ‘sensitive universalism.’³⁶

Additionally, the nation-state represents a ‘problem’ in present day politics, as it is a confined unit that is given primary importance by IR through realist ideology, while its sphere of jurisdiction and influence have been rendered obsolete by more global processes. The nation-state, a particularistic unit, cannot solve problems which are increasingly global, and which likewise, demand global solutions. Indeed, there is enmeshment and interweaving of processes in terms of economics and culture³⁷ that cannot be locked within territorial confines. Globalisation³⁸, new technologies and the global and instant accessibility of information have transformed the way peoples interact with each other, thus, becoming more integrated and closer than was hitherto possible thereby challenging state sovereignty. The latter, as a case in point, asserts principles of non-intervention that weaken claims to humanitarian intervention, strengthening the dichotomy between us/them and inside/outside. Human solidarity cannot be created within solidified borders: it has to be diffused through porous borders and an inclusive attitude of mind, a *denkungsart* that is advocated by cosmopolites. Accordingly, the nation-state cannot be treated as the ultimate unit within IR theory. Hence, this thesis will scrutinise those thoughts on global cooperative measures that unite nation-states in matters of common concern

³² Braidotti, in: *Ibid.*, p. 177.

³³ Azza M. Karam, “Feminist Futures”, p. 185.

³⁴ “A local community with open boundaries, mutual responsibility...and no will to racial classification is the political key to human dignity, worth, and freedom”. (Kate Manzo, “Critical Humanism: Postcolonialism and Postmodern Ethics” in: David Campbell & Michael J. Shapiro, (eds.), *Moral Spaces: Rethinking Ethics and World Politics*, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), p. 177.

³⁵ These arguments are developed in Chapter Four, (4. 2. Introduction: Cosmopolitan Democracy: A System of Humane Governance/4.3 ‘Cosmopolitan’ Postmodern Perspectives in IR), Chapter Six (6.5 An Organic Representation of the World).

³⁶ Ken Booth, “Human Wrongs and International Relations”, *International Affairs*, 1995, Vol. 71 (No. 1), p. 119.

³⁷ With the movement of peoples across borders, culture is also carried across borders, which challenges the notion that culture can be kept ‘safe’ in a particular ‘home’.

thereby limiting their sovereignty and challenging the axiomatic supremacy of the socio-political unit. In parallel, this thesis also considers theories that seek to weaken the centrality of the nation-state as a political unit, and seek to render human community more harmonious and co-operative.

1.2 Aims and Objectives of the Thesis

*We have to find organisational means of solving the problems of human fellowship...In our own day human unity is generally seen as a practical problem.*³⁹

The hypothesis that I shall be exploring is that one cannot entirely dissociate Bahá'í cosmopolitanism, which is sacred and originates from the East, and the Western and more 'secular' cosmopolitan tradition. As a result, Bahá'í cosmopolitanism can contribute to the growing cosmopolitan tradition in IR. The thesis aims to show that Bahá'í thinking embodies a rearticulation of earlier Stoic ideas, and a return to a more ethical/spiritual cosmopolitanism (through its concept of the oneness of humankind) after the sharp materialist turn after the eighteenth century, and that it represents a valuable starting point for an attempt to merge ethical/spiritual cosmopolitanism with material cosmopolitanism.⁴⁰ Therefore, Bahá'í cosmopolitanism can broaden the scope and diversity of IR cosmopolitanism, while offering a way of bridging the gap between the two main strands in the cosmopolitan tradition.

This thesis shows, on the one hand, how Bahá'í views relate to, and therefore are not entirely dissociated from the 'mainstream' cosmopolitan tradition, and on the other hand, how the Bahá'í approach to world order can be utilised to develop a stronger cosmopolitan approach to

³⁸ Globalisation dilutes notions of territoriality and space in IR, and can also be defined as 'a process whereby power is located in global social formations...' (Thomas in: Ian Clark, *Globalization and International Relations Theory*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p.10.

³⁹ H.C. Baldry, *The Unity of Mankind in Greek Thought*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965), p. x.

⁴⁰ It is important to note that recent cosmopolitanism also denounces an ethically deficient cosmopolitanism, which in turn reinforces my hypothesis. See Chapter Six, (6.5 An Organic Representation of the World and the Notion of Global Interdependence).

IR. In brief, the Bahá'í model will be used to assist in reshaping IR along more inclusive parameters. It is important to note that the Bahá'í vision of world order is not an IR theory, but, as a religion, it contains views on IR that show the relevance of non-secular approaches. The thesis seeks to rediscover and re-imagine a persisting (cosmopolitan) tradition that has been left at the margins of IR, especially with the inception of the Cold War and the hegemony of the realist tradition.⁴¹ The cosmopolitan rationale highlights the fact that divisive political units might well be unnatural on the grounds that 'an indivisible people' should not be made to live in a 'divisible home'. To fulfil these aims, the thesis will narrate a set of Western cosmopolitan ideas developed throughout different epochs that have dealt with the possibility of the realisation of a cosmopolis. The Western cosmopolitan tradition is included as the global mainstream, and is used to show the relevance of the Bahá'í cosmopolitan model outside of the context of culturally specific beliefs. Hence, by presenting cosmopolitan thought, and its underlying claim that the nation-state must be displaced from its centrality through global cooperation schemes, I make a case for the validity of cosmopolitanism, and additionally explore the Bahá'í model as a means to reinforce IR. Furthermore, the thesis concentrates on showing a cosmopolitan trend that has been present throughout different times instead of adopting a strictly chronological approach.⁴²

This thesis raises the question of knowing whether the form of human unity enshrined in the principle of oneness could be and should be transposable to a political unity. The various chapters thereby depict various plans devised for political unity (underlining its possibility), and mostly justify such plans on the grounds of our common humanity, the unwarranted predominance of the nation-state, and the implications of a 'global era' (underlining its ethicality and its necessity). Cosmopolis can be imagined *qua* political community (world government/global governance) and *qua* human community (world citizenship). In this respect,

⁴¹ See Chapter One, (Part IV).

⁴² As a case in point, the nineteenth century is not included, as a link is made between Kantian Enlightenment notions of cosmopolitan law, and twentieth century adaptations of the concept through cosmopolitan democracy.

the Bahá'í approach to world order is a germane model of the links between our essential oneness (world citizenship), a political universal system (world government/global governance), and the pacification of international relations (world peace). These two themes are linked as a growing consciousness of a common humanity (world citizenship) oftentimes calls for a system of global organisation where existing boundaries become bridges rather than obstructions to unity, thus implying more global structural forms (world governance), and a less primordial place for the all-encompassing nation-state. This thesis endeavours to explore these themes by presenting cosmopolitan models that call for us to look beyond contained units of political organisation through various means of global cooperation.

In these respects, the Bahá'í cosmopolitan model is presented as a crucial alternative to insular forms of communities that foster prejudices and exclusion, and advocates cosmopolitan formulations of world politics in place of belligerent and competitive views that have helped to underpin realist IR. Furthermore, I contend that an ethical cosmopolitanism and a return to ancient principles of justice, community, and the oneness of humankind are necessary to generate a stronger cosmopolitanism. A material reality or global interdependence (or description) makes a spiritual unity (a prescription), not an ideal, but a clear necessity as shown in Chapter Six. This shows that the introduction of a more ethical cosmopolitanism, as an alternative to globalisation's overtly materialist turn is another reason for taking ethical cosmopolitanism more seriously. Indeed, the Bahá'í approach can be linked to cosmopolitan democracy in Chapter Four, and to additional cosmopolitanisms (a 'neo-cosmopolitanism')⁴³ that stress global justice and the need to dissipate notions of otherness.

⁴³ David Held and Richard Falk support this approach. See Chapter Six, (6.5. An Organic Representation of the World).

Part II: Cosmopolitanism: Definition and Location in IR

1.3 The Etymology and Concept of Cosmopolitanism

The etymological root of “cosmopolitanism” finds its origin in the word “cosmopolis” made up of the words “cosmos” (universe) and “polis” (city). The original Greek definition of “cosmopolis”, thus, refers to the universal city of humanity, which requires dwellers to give meaning and life to its existence. The universal city, henceforth, goes hand in hand with a notion of citizenship, and to be more precise, world citizenship. It is also possible to trace the etymological roots of cosmopolitanism to the word “cosmopolite” which means “citizen of the world”. This latter meaning is derived from the ancient Greek “kosmos” (world or universe) and “politês” (citizen). Thus, it is extremely relevant to correlate these two interpretations to the word “cosmopolitan”, one being a political and emotional habitat, or universal city, and the other being the more personal, and not yet legalised affiliation to that sense of belonging, or world citizenship. The Stoics, who conceived of the whole universe as a home for world citizens, conveyed this idea in their teachings. “After all the etymology of cosmopolitan points to the ancient Greek word of the *polis*, and its members the *politeis*”.⁴⁴

Cosmopolitanism highlights the limitedness of political communities (the *polis* was criticised by Stoicism), which now correlates to the inadequacy of ‘reasons of state’ or ‘reasons of political communities’, when their fates are entwined.⁴⁵ Cosmopolitanism developed from being merely ethical, to more political in the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, and present forms of cosmopolitanism make use of both ethical and political arguments, especially with regard to an

⁴⁴ Ulrich K. Preuss, “Citizenship in the European Union: a Paradigm for Transnational Democracy?”, in D Archibugi & D Held & M Köhler, (eds.), *Re-imagining Political Community: Studies in Cosmopolitan Democracy*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998), p. 145.

⁴⁵ David Held, “From Executive to Cosmopolitan Multilateralism”, in: David Held & Mathias Koenig-Archibugi, (Eds) *Taming Globalization: Frontiers of Governance*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003), (p. 168).

‘unequal globalisation’ which must be brought under control if all are to share in its benefits.⁴⁶ Cosmopolitanism has three main principles: individuals (not states) represent the basis of political communities; the equal moral worth of all human beings; and the importance of developing principles which can all be shared with respect to differences.⁴⁷ Held notes, “This larger, open-ended, moral perspective is a device for focusing our thought, and a basis for testing the intersubjective validity of our conceptions of the good. It offers a way of exploring principles, norms and rules that might reasonably command agreement”.⁴⁸

In other words, cosmopolitanism starts from a human perspective, rather than a state or a particular perspective, and positively asserts that as humans we share commonalities and the propensity to build peaceful societies. Various strands of the tradition can be found in Stoic cosmopolitanism, liberal cosmopolitanism (Enlightenment and modern cosmopolitanism), critical cosmopolitanism (a revised cosmopolitanism of the Enlightenment), and share important points of convergence. They are projects of universal emancipation, targeted firstly at the promotion of ‘universal community’ (ethical and/or political), the eradication of war, the protection of human rights and the environment, the alleviation of world poverty, and the safeguarding of cultural diversity. The project can be regarded as an attitude of mind (a feeling of belonging to a universal society of mankind, and not exclusively to one’s nation-state), and as the desire to create ‘world citizenship’ institutions such as a global parliament, or an assembly of world citizens at the UN. The history of these ideas is portrayed in Derek Heater’s *World Citizenship and Government: Cosmopolitan Ideas in the History of Western Political Thought*. Cosmopolitanism contains various strands such as a legal cosmopolitanism (the UDHR or the ICC), a political cosmopolitanism (a global parliament, world government, or global governance), and a moral cosmopolitanism, on which these two former notions are said to rest. As contended in this thesis, these three “cosmopolitanisms” are interdependent.

⁴⁶ See Chapter Six, (6.5. An Organic Representation of the World and the Notion of Global Interdependence) for a continuation of this discussion.

⁴⁷ David Held, “From Executive to Cosmopolitan Multilateralism”, p. 168.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

Throughout the thesis, different texts are utilised to depict a range of cosmopolitan ideas. In Chapter Two, for example, Marcus Aurelius's *Marcus Aurelius Antoninus to Himself* depicts the ideas of Stoic cosmopolitanism while Dante's *De Monarchia* describes a more politicised cosmopolitanism in the Middle Ages. In Chapters Two and Three, Renaissance cosmopolitan texts such as Erasmus' *Complaint of Peace* or Enlightenment perpetual peace projects such as Kant's *Perpetual Peace* are utilised. J. T. Schlereth's *The Cosmopolitan Ideal in Enlightenment Thought* serves as a useful guide for Enlightenment cosmopolitanism. In Chapter Four, the works of twentieth century cosmopolitans such as David Mitran's *A Working Peace System*, David Held, Daniele Archibugi, and Mathias Köhler's *Re-imagining Political Community: Studies in Cosmopolitan Democracy* are utilised. Critical texts such as Richard Devetak's "The Project of Modernity and International Relations Theory", or postmodern R.B.J Walker's *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory* are used to show a 'new' sensitive turn for cosmopolitanism.

It is also relevant to note that the term "cosmopolitan" is presently used to define the reduction of state sovereignty in cases where other institutions collide with the nation-state's powers to decide.⁴⁹ Indeed, Mary Kaldor, who speaks in favour of "cosmopolitan theory" and transnational democracy, does not envisage the occurrence of a world state or government, but rather the surpassing of state sovereignty in certain instances.⁵⁰ Cosmopolitans argue that the ever-increasing presence and participation of a global civil society, as manifested in the growing number of NGOs or IGOs, constitute the upcoming signs of a political cosmopolitan reality testifying to the moral and economic interdependence of humanity. Indeed, cosmopolitan political reality now comes from the grassroots rather than from the top, implying that the people, who consider themselves as world citizens should be the true decision-makers. "[World] citizenship operates both 'vertically' and 'horizontally'. For example, a world citizen may wish to concentrate on campaigning for the reform of the UN or supporting organisations devoted to

⁴⁹ Daniele Archibugi, "Principles of Cosmopolitan Democracy", in: D. Archibugi, D. Held & M. Köhler, *Re-imagining*, (eds.), p. 216.

relieving world poverty”.⁵¹ Numerous theories have been devised towards an international political system in the forms of federalism, functionalism, or cosmopolitan democracy, which although differing in their manifold aspects, reflect the need for a cosmopolitan political agenda.⁵² Thus, cosmopolitanism is not a sole theory; rather it encompasses all of the theories of International Relations that transcend the nation-state (with or without questioning its existence), a cosmopolitan tradition rather than a theory of IR.

Cosmopolitanism is also concerned with displacing the level of the state to a more humane level, and is a normative approach that seeks to displace the centrality of the state in IR. Indeed, relations between nations (internationalism) are surpassed and/or supplemented by other interrelationships occurring in the contemporary world suggesting that the world is not only organised along international lines, but increasingly along cosmopolitan lines. “International relations still exist, and will probably continue to mark the global scene for decades to come, but they now must be seen as embedded in a world comprised of nonnational as well as national entities”.⁵³ Cosmopolitanism can involve inter-state relations or internationalism as well as relations with any other agent of the international system. In this regard, cosmopolitanism can include internationalism without being necessarily based on state units, or solely on state units.⁵⁴ Donnelly says, “Instead of thinking of international relations (the relations between nation-states), a cosmopolitan thinks of a global political process in which individuals and other actors are important direct participants”.⁵⁵ He states,

A cosmopolitan model starts with individuals rather than states ...
Cosmopolitans see the state challenged both from below, by individuals and
NGOs, and from above, by the truly global community (not merely

⁵⁰ For a discussion on cosmopolitan democracy, see Chapter Four.

⁵¹ Derek Heater, *World Citizenship: Cosmopolitan Thinking and its Opponents*, (London: Continuum, 1992), p. 5.

⁵² See Chapter Four for a development of the concept of cosmopolitan democracy and Chapter Five for the federal model (5.2.1 Federalism or Commonwealth Models).

⁵³ James N. Rosenau, *The Study of Global Interdependence*, p. 2.

⁵⁴ Woolf asserted that a cosmopolitan institution was primarily a non-state organisation. (Peter Wilson, “Leonard Woolf and International Government”, in: David Long & Peter Wilson, *Thinkers*, p. 133).

⁵⁵ Jack Donnelly, *International Human Rights: Dilemmas in World Politics*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1998), p. 28.

international organisations and other groupings of states). ... The global political community (as opposed to the international society of states) is at best rudimentary. The cosmopolitan model, if more than a prescription about what is desirable, rests on predictions of the *direction of change* in world politics.⁵⁶ [Emphasis mine]

We need cosmopolitanism to engender a more just world (prescription), as well as to explain the functioning of the world (NGOs, civil society movements, human rights, etc.) Indeed, the transformation of the nature of world politics suggests that International Relations are turning into “Cosmopolitan Relations” whereby relations would not solely constitute relations between states, but also relations between a state and the people of a different state, and/or relations between an individual and an international organisation. Undeniably, relations and processes at work in the contemporary world are not merely of an inter-state nature. The concern of an individual, or a group of individuals, could be considered to be the concern of the whole body of humankind, and not solely that of a particular state or *polis*.⁵⁷ Refugees account for such a state of affairs: in the case where their state cannot provide for their security, a state other than their own can guarantee the protection of their rights, through the possible intervention of a NGO such as Amnesty International or through the UNHCR.⁵⁸

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 28-29.

⁵⁷ Even if some argue that transnational processes can be acknowledged, they still place the state at the centre of such processes. (See Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society- A Study of Order in World Politics*, (London: Macmillan Press, 1977.)) Bull envisages that there is an international society of states as opposed to a global political community.

⁵⁸ Peter Nyers and Mick Dillon spoke of the refugee as an individual occupying the ambiguous zone between citizen and human, as he or she is not a member of a proper political community, a notion that problematises the territorialising logic of the sovereign state. (Richard Devetak, “Postmodernism”, in: S. Burchill, & A. Linklater, (eds.), *Theories*, 2nd ed., pp. 199-200.)

Part III: The Bahá'í Faith and Cosmopolitanism

1.4 The Bahá'í Faith as a Cosmopolitan Worldview and IR Theory

*“The Bahá'í Faith, a new religion born in the middle of the nineteenth century, was the first religious system to set out a comprehensive... vision of global governance. The Bahá'í writings and teachings contain fresh normative values...no study of the literature of global governance can be complete without reference to the Bahá'í contributions”.*⁵⁹

Bahá'í literature is vast and has developed to take in various strands of thought such as women studies, theology, Bahá'í history, development studies, medicine, as well as other branches of study. In the field of International Relations, and cosmopolitanism, there is an extensive literature that goes back to the very inception of the Faith, developed by the main figures, the Universal House of Justice, and the Bahá'í International Community.⁶⁰ Many cosmopolitan texts can be retraced to the very roots of the Faith, in the writings of the Báb, Bahá'u'lláh, and 'Abdu'l'Bahá. These writings contain a strong ethical vision of a society based on unity and peace, as Bahá'u'lláh proclaimed the unity of humankind to be the basis of His revelation. In the *Gleanings of Bahá'u'lláh*, and the *Tablets to The Kings*, for example, the main tenets of Bahá'í cosmopolitanism are depicted, and the cosmopolitan theme continues with 'Abdu'l'Bahá, Who deplored various prejudices, and the separation of peoples into divided political units.⁶¹ 'Abdu'l'Bahá's recorded speeches and writings are taken from a series of talks given in Paris, London, the United States, and Canada in the early twentieth century, namely *'Abdu'l'Bahá in London, or Paris Talks*, and in treatises such as *The Secret of Divine*

⁵⁹ Foad Katirai, *Selected Reading in the Literature of Global Governance*, (Oxford: Publish2Day Oxford Ltd, 2002), p. 7.

⁶⁰ “The Bahá'í International Community is an NGO representing the Bahá'í Worldwide Community, and is an association of democratically elected national representative bodies called ‘National Spiritual Assemblies’”. See Chapter Five, (5.1.1. Origins of Bahá'í World Order Themes).

⁶¹ 'Abdu'l'Bahá notes that “imaginary boundaries” (in His words) have been given increasing importance, and have promoted conflicts. He writes, “If this conception of patriotism remains limited within a certain circle, it will be the primary cause of the world's destruction”. He continues, “Every limited area which we call our native country we regard as our motherland, whereas the terrestrial globe is the motherland of all, and not any restricted area”. ('Abdu'l'Bahá, *Selections from the Writings of 'Abdu'l'Bahá*, (Compiled

Civilization, or the Tablets of 'Abdu'l'Bahá. These works depict a moral cosmopolitanism, and also refer to global governance, or a more political cosmopolitanism.⁶²

Other Bahá'í texts on International Relations have been produced by individual Bahá'ís with special interest in the subject, such as Charles Lerche or Ulrich Gollmer, who base their works on the writings of the main figures, or institutions of the Faith, through articles such as *Bahá'í Political Thought*. Bahá'í beliefs can be linked to the cosmopolitan tradition. (More importantly, however, Bahá'ís contemplate Bahá'í beliefs as part of a revealed religion, rather than the product of secular thought). To retrace these important links, for example, the Stoics spoke of the essential oneness of humankind, and both Bahá'u'lláh and 'Abdu'l'Bahá praised Socrates, one of influences on this ancient Western school. Ancient Stoic thought, which emphasises the unity of the universe and a fellowship of man, bonds with the Bahá'í conception of the oneness of humankind (although Bahá'ís see it as more than an expression of emotion). Stoical ethical cosmopolitanism has been reworked by contemporary cosmopolitans, such as Martha Nussbaum, or critical theorists such as David Held, to give force to the argument of the limitedness of 'reasons of state' in view of our more entwined and interdependent communities.⁶³ In a Bahá'í context, Shoghi Effendi's *The World Order of Bahá'u'lláh*, the Universal House of Justice's *The Promise of World Peace*, and various statements made by the BIC, presented in Chapter Five, emphasise conditions of global interdependence that need to find more tolerant and cosmopolitan forms of communities. Bahá'í international thinking, like these normative approaches (what Brown has defined as the moral dimension of IR),⁶⁴ tends to move "beyond realism and neo-realism". Normative thinking has found its place in International Relations in different periods, the time of liberal internationalism in the aftermath of WWI, and in our present times, which claims the insufficiency of rational and scientific

by the Research Dept of the Universal House of Justice), (Southampton: Camelot Press Ltd., 1982), p. 300.

⁶² See Chapter Six, (The Bahá'í Faith and The Cosmopolitan Tradition).

⁶³ See Chapter Two for Stoicism, Chapter Four for Cosmopolitan Democracy, and Chapter Three and Six for the use of Stoic philosophy in the thoughts of Martha Nussbaum.

thinking, and the adoption of flexible and transversal approaches to international order and peace. Bahá'í international thinking, likewise, stands in parallel (but is not similar) to the recommendations of these normative models in IR.

'Abdu'l'Bahá's grandson, Shoghi Effendi, developed Bahá'í world order themes to a great extent, and clarified the writings and words of Bahá'u'lláh and 'Abdu'l'Bahá even further. Writing in the first half of the twentieth century, Shoghi Effendi's writings on Bahá'í theoretical and structural cosmopolitanism are found in a collection of letters, *The World Order of Bahá'u'lláh*, and also in other works such as *The Promised Day is Come*. In these works, Shoghi Effendi has greatly contributed to refining Bahá'í views on International Relations, a system of collective security, the importance of the development of international organisations, and a federal system based on the principle of the oneness of humankind. These principles can be depicted in the international order conceptualised after WWI, the inter-war years, and after WWII. Indeed, after WWI, Woodrow Wilson promoted the idea that a democratic international order must be constructed in order to avoid the brutality of war, and aspired to an association of nations, a 'League', functioning on the principle of collective security. The League of Nations is conceived in the literature of the Bahá'í Faith as the embryo of a peaceful world order. However, 'Abdu'l'Bahá and Shoghi Effendi regretted that the League had not been effective: they conceived it in terms of the birth and attempt at the realisation of the idea of global cooperative arrangements in International Relations.

In the 1970s, J. Tyson wrote about the Bahá'í concept of global government in *World Peace and World Government*. This work has been completed by more timely approaches such as *Global Governance: Has A Paradigm Shift in World Government Theory Brought The Lesser Peace Closer* by Daniel Wheatley who clarifies Bahá'í views on federal world governance in Chapter Five. The BIC also published several texts such as *Who Is Writing The Future* to refine

⁶⁴ Chris Brown, *International Relations Theory: New Normative Approaches*, (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992), pp. 3-4.

the Bahá'í view of world order. Importantly, Bahá'í thinking rejects the impossibility of an alternative global order. IR, in its post-positivist era, can be reinforced by the relevance of the Bahá'í approach, which offers an alternative, a 'novelty' (even though Bahá'í thoughts on global security can be traced back to the mid-nineteenth century), and give to the field a value-laden and 'reflectivist' dimension. Cosmopolitan IR could be 'rounded out' by the addition of a more spiritual ethos to supplement the secular. Indeed, Bahá'í views can take IR beyond the limits of secular theories, while reinforcing them, and remaining true to their concerns and aspirations.

Part IV: The State of IR: Realism, Liberal Internationalism, and Critical Theory

1.5 IR Theory and Cosmopolitanism

In the following sections, I scrutinise realist IR, as it is the most 'anti-cosmopolitan' strand of IR theory. Indeed, the unbridgeable gulf between domestic and international politics is a central theme in realist thought, whereas cosmopolitans envisage a form of world political organisation (not necessarily a world government) with universal moral principles.⁶⁵ Cosmopolitanism, hence, comes as the antithesis or as a criticism of realist IR (the latter being one of the many theories of IR),⁶⁶ and therefore it is essential to review the characteristics of realism. Yet, before undertaking this task, it is important to clarify IR theory and the location of cosmopolitanism therein. This has been referred to previously in the introduction, and will be extended in the following discussions on liberal internationalism and critical theories.

In the last two decades or so, IR has taken on a new turn, a 'post-positivist' turn, no longer centred upon facts, scientific and explanatory methods, the methodology upon which realism

⁶⁵ Andrew Linklater "Rationalism", in: S. Burchill & A. Linklater, (eds.), *Theories of International Relations*, (London: Macmillan Press, 1996), p. 93.

⁶⁶ These include Liberal Internationalism, the English School, Feminism, Marxism, Critical Theory, Postmodernism, and Green Politics. Whenever they relate to cosmopolitanism, some of these theories are presented in this section.

mostly rests.⁶⁷ This has propelled IR theory into a ‘new’ perspective, and opened the way for alternative views that are no longer regarded as unfounded, but instead as an enrichment of IR. The rationale underlying theoretical inquiry is no longer solely problem-solving (safeguarding the status quo by legitimising power relations), but more critical (having the imaginative potential to anticipate alternative models of world order). The last two decades or so have seen a clear rejection of positivist assumptions and a return to the normative side of the discipline (how the world ought to be), founded after WWI upon liberal internationalism or ‘idealism’. It is held that the IR theorist can no longer be totally detached from the object of enquiry (feminists call this ‘embedded knowledge’), and that theory helps construct the world, and is not outside of it (constitutive theory). Robert Cox notes, in this context, that theory often ‘precedes and shapes reality’ indicating that theorists cannot stand outside the political and social world they examine.⁶⁸

Cosmopolitanism, as a normative approach, can be found in different forms in many theories in normative IR. It can be liberal, critical, feminist, green, or postmodern. However, what is certain is that it cannot be realist. Political liberalism is “a universalist doctrine and so is committed to some notion of a universal community of mankind which transcends identification with and membership of the nation-state community” it “has faith in the capacity of human beings to solve seemingly intractable problems through collective action”.⁶⁹ Cosmopolitanism is enshrined in contemporary liberalism as “liberals have offered a conception of community and identity which spans the entire planet”.⁷⁰ In brief, cosmopolitanism, as expanded upon in subsequent parts of the thesis, forms an integral part of the liberal international doctrine. Its normativity surpasses liberal internationalism, however. It can be found in critical theories, and in some aspects of postmodernism.

⁶⁷ It is important to clarify that not all realists were scientific in that sense (for example, Hedley Bull).

⁶⁸ Scott Burchill, “Introduction”, in: S. Burchill, & A. Linklater, (eds.), *Theories*, 1st ed., p. 2.

⁶⁹ Jill Steans & Lloyd Pettiford, *International Relations: Perspectives and Themes*, (Edinburgh: Pearson Education, 2001), p. 54.

Critical theory argues that counter-hegemonic forces challenge prevailing institutional and political arrangements. These counter-hegemonic values are transnational in nature and based on “an alternative set of values, concepts and concerns, coming from organisations like Amnesty International, Oxfam, and Greenpeace”.⁷¹ Postmodernists also reinvent International Relations along a new ethics with ‘others’. This postmodern cosmopolitanism, as I argue, is based on a new ‘solidarity with others’. “Postmodernists want to rethink the basis... for notions of morality and ethics, so that they are sensitive and responsive to differences”.⁷² The label ‘critical’ is sometimes referred to as feminist, postmodernist and critical international theories, and the term ‘critical’ shall be employed in this sense in the thesis, in other words, as a body of thought in IR which questions the fixity of the prevalent order. This body of thought, thus, intends to ‘denaturalise’ notions of strangeness and territoriality, which have become increasingly familiar. As Seyla Benhabib observes, “The dogmatism of knowledge is shown to be the dogmatism of a way of life”.⁷³ Critical theory also criticises liberalism, which fails to ‘do justice to difference’⁷⁴ and realism, which shall now be examined as it stands opposed to cosmopolitanism, its normative aspects, and its theoretical rationale.

1.6. An Exploration of Realist Theory

Realism – *realpolitik*, power politics – can be traced back to the Greek historian Thucydides in the fifth century BCE, or with Renaissance diplomat, historian and playwright Macchiavelli, and later with twentieth century figures such as Morgenthau or E. H. Carr, mostly influenced by the American critic and theologian Reinhold Niebuhr.⁷⁵ Several aspects of realist theory can be contrasted with the cosmopolitan tradition. More importantly, realists believe in the irreconcilability of the domestic and international spheres, whereas cosmopolitans envisage the

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

⁷¹ *Ibid.*

⁷² *Ibid.*, p. 147.

⁷³ Seyla Benhabib, in: Richard Devetak, “Critical Theory”, p. 161.

⁷⁴ Shapcott in: *Ibid.*, p. 167.

⁷⁵ Jack Donnelly, *Realism and International Relations*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 4.

pacifying of international relations through the promotion of the concept of ‘humanity’, thereby dismissing the relevance of a sound dichotomy between ‘domestic’ and ‘international’. Realists emphasise the anarchic nature of international politics, which is opposed to the sovereign and secure character of the state, the basic unit of analysis in realism. The absence of anarchy in the domestic realm provides for the possibility of progress and security. By contrast, the international is characterised by the “endless competition for power and security in the world of states”.⁷⁶ Hence, the international system is doomed to be controlled by power politics, which promotes little prospect for change and peace, and which, accordingly, impedes the imagining of a ‘post-sovereign’ system. In brief, cosmopolitans view international politics as a unified sphere in which the division between the domestic (internal) and international (external) should be reconciled. Indeed, for the cosmopolitan, the domestic and the international spheres are artificial divisions in the face of a common humanity, whereas the realist sees them as fixed in the realm of anarchy. For cosmopolitans, this flawed division prevents the fostering of the means by which a ‘post-sovereign’ world can be imagined, constructed, and improved upon, whereas for realists, this contention is fallacious as the world is divided along permanent and antagonistic boundaries.

Although the study of International Relations was born within ‘idealism’ after World War I, it “had been effectively refounded after World War II on realist premises, and has exerted its dominion as a paradigm in International Relations”.⁷⁷ With the liberal internationalists claiming that people had a genuine desire for peace, and the power of world opinion would sustain the Wilsonian League of Nations, it was then easy, with the examples of Mussolini and Hitler, to

⁷⁶ Andrew Linklater “Rationalism”, p. 93.

⁷⁷ Jack Donnelly, *Realism and International Relations*, p. 28. The origin of the dissimilarities between the two perspectives can be found in the ‘first great debate’ between the realists and the ‘idealists’, which was centred on the possibility of the pacification of international society through a sense of moral obligation to human beings in the world. (Andrew Linklater “Rationalism”, p. 93.) In this debate, cosmopolitan concepts such as collective security, the rule of law, and peace are contrasted with the realist terms ‘balance of power’, ‘anarchy’, and ‘sovereignty’. (At that time, cosmopolitan IR can be related to liberal internationalism.)

describe these ideas as simply wrong.⁷⁸ Liberal internationalism was held to have false perceptions about human nature, and was perceived as a flawed world outlook. In the 1930s, Reinhold Niebuhr reflected on these matters, and argued that liberals exaggerated “the capacities of collectivities of humans to behave in ways that were truly moral”.⁷⁹ This statement, thus, supports the realist view that morality is unattainable between collectivities, and stands opposed to the cosmopolitan belief that peaceful societies are attainable.

In the twentieth century, realism has had a great impact on International Relations as an academic subject, but has also influenced many American politicians (for example Kissinger), and can be said to have greatly shaped twentieth century world politics. Donnelly remarks, “Realism should not be ignored. But it should not be allowed to shape the study and practice of International Relations, as it has for so much of the past half-century”.⁸⁰ It was mostly E. H. Carr, with *The Twenty Years’ Crisis: an Introduction to the Study of International Relations*, who reshaped the discipline along more realist lines at the end of World War II, taking into account what he regarded as the ‘neglected’ factor of power. Carr stated that this work was “written with the deliberate aim of counteracting the glaring and dangerous effect of nearly all thinking, both academic and popular, about international politics in English-speaking countries from 1919 to 1939 – the almost total neglect of the factor of power”.⁸¹ To another extent, at that time, his aim was to discredit the other paradigm of International Relations, which he named utopianism.⁸² Carr criticised the normative character of liberal internationalism, and its neglect of ‘power’ as a crucial factor in IR. Liberal internationalists, on the contrary, stressed the concepts of morality and altruism in global politics.

⁷⁸ Chris Brown, *Understanding International Relations*, (Basingtoke: Palgrave, 2001), p. 27.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

⁸⁰ Jack Donnelly, *Realism and International Relations*, p. 5.

⁸¹ In: *Ibid.*, p. 27.

⁸² For Carr, “utopianism” refers to liberal internationalism. Peter Wilson, “The Twenty Years Crisis”, p. 2.

Realism, with the experience of the inter-war years, remained the main paradigm of International Relations, especially at the height of the Cold War and Super Power competition. However, realism did not go unchallenged, and was criticised in the seventies by proponents of the 'complex interdependence paradigm'.⁸³ As a response, this paradigm was discredited and opposed by the proponent of neo-realism, Kenneth Waltz, who claimed that the notions of interdependence were extravagant.⁸⁴ Kenneth Waltz's main claim is centred on the belief that states operate in a self-help system (or in an anarchical international system), where no higher form of authority prevails. Moreover, they are only preoccupied with their own welfare and security, and regard other states as potential threats. This self-help system forces them to adjust their power, and to be constantly aware of the power position of other states, which gives rise to a balance of power regulating world affairs in an anarchical system.⁸⁵ Whereas Morgenthau in 'traditional realism' (as Waltz named it) argues that power is rooted in human nature, "Waltz points to the anarchical condition of the international realm which he claims imposes the accumulation of power as a systemic requirement on states".⁸⁶ The latter treats the international system as a separate domain, whereas the former relies on reductionism. The main ideas of neo-realism are, thus, that anarchy and the distribution of power between states define the international system (as they shape state behaviour), and that states would not abandon egoism and self-interest for international order.

What is here relevant, especially in relation to cosmopolitanism, is that like realism, neo-realism still concentrates on the nation-state as the main unit. This state-centric view is in opposition to cosmopolitan views, which criticise the idea of the nation-state as a permanent and principal fixture of the international system, and which promote a normative international order where

⁸³ Chris Brown, *Understanding International Relations*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), p. 41. In the seventies, Keohane and Nye, who introduced the notion of 'complex interdependence' and the presence of multiple international factors, presented a substantive alternative to realism.

⁸⁴ Jack Donnelly, *Realism and International Relations*, p. 30.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 47.

⁸⁶ Scott Burchill, "Realism and Neo-Realism", p. 78. The systemic level relates to theories that conceive of causes operating on the international level, in addition to national and individual levels. Reductionist theories, for Waltz, only operate on the national and individual levels. (*Ibid.*, p. 92).

human values and acts of cooperation can prevail.⁸⁷ There has been, nonetheless, an attempt to render realism more ‘normative’. The English school of realists and rationalists has stressed the importance of international society or a world of states as opposed to universal categories such as humanity or sub-state entities.⁸⁸ Although the English school is often seen as part of realism and recognises conditions of anarchy,⁸⁹ it ‘acknowledges that the sense of belonging to the community of humankind has left its civilizing mark upon the state and international relations’.⁹⁰ This school of thought stresses the concept of international society: “the English school of International Relations shares with realist/neo-realist theorists the importance of anarchy, war, and balance of power, but only as ideas that shape political practice, rather than as laws of nature or unchanging phenomena deeply embedded in the international system”.⁹¹ International society can be depicted as sharing normative standards and rules, in the form, for example, of international law. International society, based on a system of states, can still share common aims, rules of conduct, and organisations – thus blending realist aspects with a more normative outlook.

1.6.1. Human Nature and the Centrality of Territorially Organised Entities

Realism, even if it acknowledges the potential for change, confirms that it occurs within the limits of the struggle for power enshrined in a static human nature. Gilpin notes that realism is distinguished by its “pessimism regarding moral progress and human possibilities”.⁹² Human nature is viewed as inherently pugnacious, is egoistic at its core, and leads to immorality and conflict in international affairs. Morgenthau, for example, observed, “the conflict-ridden

⁸⁷ “The idea of international society with common interests and values, rules and institutions, where conflict is mollified by mutually recognized requirements for co-existence undermines the neo-realist view that states are incapable of altruistic behaviour”. (*Ibid.*, p. 88).

⁸⁸ Jack Donnelly, *Realism and International Relations*, p. 52.

⁸⁹ Wight, in a very realist fashion, contended that the domain of international relations is “incompatible with progressivist theory”. Martin Wight, in: Linklater, A, “Rationalism”, p. 94.

⁹⁰ Andrew Linklater, *Ibid.*

⁹¹ James E. Dougherty & Robert L. Pfaltzgraff jr., *Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey* (New York: Longman, 2001), p. 168.

⁹² Gilpin in: Mastanduno, Michael, *Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies after the Cold War*, (New York: Chichester: Columbia University Press, 1999), p. 20.

international arena” is the consequence of “forces inherent in human nature” and that “*the animus dominandi*” or a natural will to power characterises human beings. Machiavelli expresses human nature as “insatiable, arrogant, crafty, and shifting, and above else malignant, iniquitous, violent, and savage”.⁹³ In the early twentieth century, Niebuhr in his *Moral Man and Immoral Society* (1932) has greatly influenced the realist movement and main realist writers, such as Morgenthau and E.H Carr. Niebuhr took the original sin as the explanation for an evil human nature. In his eyes, “the ultimate sources of social conflicts and injustice are to be found in the ignorance and selfishness of men”.⁹⁴

Change, from the realist perspective, can, thus, either be cyclical or stagnant, whereas from the liberal viewpoint, it follows a unilinear evolution towards progress, whether this is ethical or material.⁹⁵ Moreover, realists uphold that since relations between states are sustained by order, a balance aimed at preventing war between nations should prevail, whilst liberals see the necessity of a system of collective security in order to sustain peace. Realists rely, firstly, on clearly defined units represented by states, which are at the centre of their political theory, and secondly, on the notion of sovereignty, which “defines what the state is”.⁹⁶ With the emergence of new actors, realists recognise that the nation-state is not the only actor on the international scene, but nevertheless, hold that it is the most important one. Indeed, this view is found in the words of neo-realist, Stephen Krasner (1976): “In recent years, students of International Relations have multinationalized, transnationalized, bureaucratized and transgovernmentalized the state until it has virtually ceased to exist as an analytic construct. This perspective is at best profoundly misleading”.⁹⁷ Neo-realists such as Waltz regard states as the “unitary actors with a single motive – the wish to survive”.⁹⁸ This point is also stressed by Griffith “Realism conjures up a grim image of international politics. Within the territorial boundaries of the nation-state,

⁹³ Machiavelli in: Jack Donnelly, *Realism and International Relations*, p. 23.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 48.

⁹⁵ Lucian M. Ashworth, *Creating International Studies: Angell, Mitrany and the Liberal Tradition*, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999), p. 16.

⁹⁶ Barry Buzan, *Anticipating the Future*, (London: Simon & Chuster, 1998), p. 388.

⁹⁷ Stephen Krasner, in: Michael Mastanduno, *Unipolar Politics*, p. 21.

politics is an activity of potential moral progress ... Beyond the exclusionary borders of sovereign presence, politics is essentially the realm of survival rather than progress”⁹⁹ – a view that denies the cosmopolitan contention that the international realm does not have to be characterised by recurrence, fixity, conflict, and power politics.

It is often put forward that realists see the world as it is and ‘idealists’ as it should be. It can also be argued that realists only rely on the present, whilst ‘idealists’ wish to change the latter. In this way, realism seems to be ‘stuck’ with present events. Furthermore, with the demise of the Cold War, realism has lost its appeal. It is a theory functioning within defined limits: it is taken aback by the occurrence of sudden and unexpected events. Theory should, however, seek to predict and find solutions to the world’s problems, rather than lay down a set of negative facts about the reality of human nature, and the presumed ensuing impasse in which world politics finds itself. Indeed, if this were so, there would not be much point writing about International Relations theory as the only contemplation would be the image of a gloomy world doomed to remain static. Realism focuses on present facts, rather than on their development over time, as testified by its attachment to the nation-state system. Accordingly, it focuses on temporality, rather than evolution. Booth states, “the realist tendency to privilege the short term can lead to a kind of myopia in which broader problems are not detected until it is too late to do anything about them”.¹⁰⁰ Miller also shares the view that “it is wrong to assume that the only reality is that which presents itself for today or tomorrow. Angell’s interdependence is also reality...”¹⁰¹ Recently, cosmopolitanism underlines that the conservative nature of realism has neglected the logic of change, the existence of plural actors in world politics, and has been an obstacle to the creation of an alternative world order.¹⁰²

⁹⁸ Jack Donnelly, *Realism and International Relations*, p. 52.

⁹⁹ Martin Griffith, *Realism, Idealism, and International Politics: A Reinterpretation*, (London: New York: Routledge, 1992), p. ix.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

¹⁰² Scott Burchill, “Realism and Neo-Realism”, p. 90.

1.7 Synopsis of the Introduction

In the post-Cold War era, IR has dethroned a state-centric theory, namely that of realism, and allowed for the (re-) emergence of normative International Relations theory¹⁰³, which emphasises the potential transformation of the world through criticism of power politics. This ‘post-positivist’ trend, as it is termed, contends that there is no imposed reality, but that human beings can re-imagine and construct the world while weakening concepts such as power, which have justified the use of conflict, aggressiveness, and estrangement in international politics. Following this narrative, this work scrutinises the Western cosmopolitan tradition, which is used in a descriptive way (extra-territorial forces such as human rights, migration, and global economic relations weaken the nation-state, and, thus, underline the collapsing ground on which realism is founded), and as a prescription (the world can be improved by the solidarity of the human race, and more global co-operative strategies – thereby delineating an ethical prescription to a material global reality).

Accordingly, the Bahá’í cosmopolitan model, which centralises the ethical concept of the oneness of humankind in its beliefs, and delineates a rearticulation of the roots of Western cosmopolitanism (Stoicism), is included as a valuable contribution to cosmopolitan IR. The bio-ethical principle of the oneness of humankind underlines ‘species consciousness’, and also challenges the claims of the nation-state as the perfect model of political organisation. The Bahá’í model of world order can, thus, strengthen cosmopolitan IR, by reconciling a material cosmopolitanism with a more ethical form (global values, which stem from humanity’s ethical/spiritual reality are needed to counteract a material cosmopolitanism which contends that world order can be achieved solely through material means). This is relevant in the debate, as it shows, on the one hand, that a non-secular approach can be useful to cosmopolitan IR and, on the other hand, that world order can be ameliorated by merging material cosmopolitanism with more ethical aspects.

Moreover, the Bahá'í prescriptions are in line with contemporary cosmopolitans, such as Martha Nussbaum, or critical theorists such as David Held, who have reworked Stoical ethical cosmopolitanism, “to give force to the argument of the limitedness of ‘reasons of state’ in view of our more entwined and interdependent communities”.¹⁰⁴ As such, IR is now amenable to the inclusion of cosmopolitan ‘alternatives’, which had been obstructed by the ascendancy of realism during the Cold War era and Super Power competition. The post Cold War era has restored the relevance of cosmopolitanism as a sound description of the world, and is also propitious to including new voices to the debates in cosmopolitan IR, including the Bahá'í approach, which can make important contributions, and enrich a growing and diverse cosmopolitan tradition in IR. Indeed, the relevance of the cosmopolitan tradition has been addressed by texts in ancient times, the Renaissance, and the Enlightenment (by Marcus Aurelius, Erasmus, or Kant), and has been rediscovered and reworked, more recently, by contemporary cosmopolitan authors such as Martha Nussbaum or David Held.

In order to start our cosmopolitan narrative, cosmopolitanism shall now be examined from ancient times to the Enlightenment so as to trace its origins. This period, especially Stoic times, laid the foundations for cosmopolitan conceptions of oneness, crucial to a more emergent political cosmopolitanism in the Renaissance, and the Enlightenment.

¹⁰³ Liberal Internationalism, which lies at the foundation of IR, is a normative approach.

¹⁰⁴ See 1.4 The Bahá'í Faith as a Cosmopolitan Worldview and IR theory.

Chapter Two – Cosmopolitanism from Stoicism to the Enlightenment

Part I- Stoicism to Medieval Cosmopolitan Thought

2.1 Introduction

The ideas depicted in the present chapter are central to our theme as they testify to the rise of the ‘emotive’ and brotherly principle of the oneness of mankind, which is believed to contain the elements necessary to sustain the establishment of a politically minded cosmopolitan world order. These ideas question the divisiveness of political communities, and thereby contribute to laying the foundations for the realisation of a cosmopolis on the grounds of our oneness. Although only Western schools of thought (Cynicism and Stoicism)¹⁰⁵ are presented in this chapter as examples of ‘ancient cosmopolitanism’, it will be shown, later in the thesis, how the implications of their advocacies to move beyond Western concerns are still utilised by contemporary cosmopolitan approaches.¹⁰⁶ As a case in point, contemporary cosmopolitan author, Martha Nussbaum, utilises Stoic thinking to assert that cosmopolitanism allows us to think ‘from the standpoint of anyone else¹⁰⁷, – Western or non-Western.

The present chapter rests on an investigation of Stoic, medieval, Renaissance, and Enlightenment cosmopolitan ideas. It is significant that early Stoicism was more concerned with forming a community of mankind along ethical and emotive lines rather than changing the structures of world order. Stoic ideas, like earlier cosmopolitan doctrines, were focused on establishing an ethical universal community rather than devising a political scheme, which relate to a concept of World Citizenship, and consciousness that one’s soul belonged to the

¹⁰⁵ Cynicism is only mentioned as way of introduction to Stoicism.

¹⁰⁶ See Chapter Six, (6.5 An Organic Representation of the World).

¹⁰⁷ Martha Nussbaum, “Kant and Cosmopolitanism”, in Bohman, James, & Lutz-Bahmann, Matthias, (eds.), *Perpetual Peace: Essays on Kant’s Cosmopolitan Ideal*, (Cambridge: London: MIT Press, 1997), p. 15.

whole Cosmos.¹⁰⁸ They did, however, in Roman times, become somewhat more politicised as we can see from the ideas of Seneca. The teachers of Stoicism, who were guided by a universal system of nature, proclaimed the novel concept of a world commonwealth where all of the world's peoples are citizens, an idea that subsequently endured in a new medieval and Christian form.¹⁰⁹ In the fourth century CE, Constantine the Great built an Empire which had the pretensions of the former pagan Roman Empire, but which rested on a firm Christian basis, and later, Dante, who wrote about a world government, based his work upon the idea of a renewal of "a Catholic and Roman Imperium inspired by a universal *civitas humani generis*".¹¹⁰ The vision of a universal Christian empire found its parallel in another religious cosmopolitan model that ushered monotheistic universalism, Islam. Religious universalism was, nonetheless, attenuated during the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, when in the West, the cosmopolitan theme was sustained by an elite, a 'republic of letters' detached from the destiny of the Roman Empire, and concerned with secular humanitarianism. This elitist aspect is underlined in Chapter Six, and linked to Bahá'í views. By this stage, cosmopolitan issues were, thus, more secular in tone, while still focused on ethical concerns. Yet, it is clear that religious ideas, which had a clear cosmopolitan intent, constituted a basis for the humanitarianism delineated in the eighteenth century, namely the concern for the betterment of humanity through philanthropic concern. As a way of introducing cosmopolitan ideas that are developed in the present chapter, Schlereth notes:

The dream of an integrated world order... has been an ideal that, like most ideas, began as a speculative suggestion in the minds of a few men. In this case, the ideal began with a philosophic elite known in western intellectual history as the Stoics. Their conception of the universality of mankind quietly energized the minds of certain Romans like Cicero and Marcus Aurelius; it had a similar effect upon humanists like de Montaigne and Erasmus in the Renaissance. Enlightenment cosmopolites, as intellectual heirs to the thought of both

¹⁰⁸ Rendall, G. H, *Marcus Aurelius Antoninus to Himself- with an introductory Chapter on Stoicism and the last of the Stoics*, (London: Macmillan & Co, 1898), pp. xiv-xciii. In reference to Stoic ideas, it is important to note that the Cosmos alluded to the whole universe: the world was considered just as one of the components of this system.

¹⁰⁹ J.V Bryce, *The Holy Roman Empire*, (London: Macmillan, 1941), p. 6.

¹¹⁰ Thomas Schlereth, *The Cosmopolitan Ideal in Enlightenment Thought*, (London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977), p. xxi.

antiquity and the Renaissance, adopted the ideal and endowed it with additional persuasion and force.¹¹¹

The philosophy of these epochs, as it is contended in the hypothesis, contained strong ethical components, and became the basis of the cosmopolitan political theme. Specifically, the ethical themes of the oneness of humanity, world citizenship, and the development of human virtues are rediscovered in Chapter Five and Six through Bahá'í lenses with the contention that ethical values must be taken more seriously in world order – thereby confirming the universality of the cosmopolitan tradition. As underlined in the hypothesis, ethical values also reflect the need to transcend parochialism in order to adopt a more inclusive vision by going beyond particular and exclusive political units. This is found, specifically, in the political themes of the Enlightenment through its perpetual peace projects.

2.2 Stoicism: Political Implications

2.2.1 Origins and Impact of Stoicism

Mainstream western cosmopolitan thought can be accredited to the Stoic school founded by Zeno in Athens in 315 BCE. The career of Alexander the Great ended before Zeno made his way to Athens and became one of the disciples of Crates the Cynic,¹¹² a distinguished follower of Diogenes the Cynic, believed to have coined the term ‘citizen of the world’.¹¹³ Heater notes,

He (Diogenes) and his followers were called ‘Cynics’, a word deriving from the Greek word for Dog. Even so, this lifestyle¹¹⁴ was itself a deliberate proclamation of his world citizenship – challenging by shock tactics the narrow conventions of the *polis*. He rejected the status of a *polites*, a citizen, in favour of that of a kosmopolites, a citizen of the ‘cosmos’, the universe. Man, he was proclaiming, is not, as his contemporary Aristotle asserted, a political animal; he is, as species, a multicultural animal.... One authority has summed up

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 135.

¹¹² Gerard H. Rendall, *Marcus Aurelius*, p. xiv.

¹¹³ Derek Heater, *World Citizenship: Cosmopolitan Thinking*, p. 27.

¹¹⁴ Diogenes lived “in a capacious jar in the market place, execrating in public and behaving, it was said, like a dog”. (*Ibid.*)

Diogenes' significance as follows: Diogenes' unique achievement of cosmopolitanism, whereby the whole world was his country, found expression both in his concern for his fellow men and in his submission to God.¹¹⁵

In contrast to the Cynics, however, the Stoics did not believe that one had to forsake one's affiliation and citizenship to the *polis* to attain a true sense of world citizenship.¹¹⁶ Furthermore, that the *polis* was no longer – ethically and socially – the unit of political and moral perfection testifies to a clear shift of attitude in the Hellenistic world after the conquests of Alexander the Great. Indeed, the political and civic changes demanded an alteration of philosophy in favour of the superseding of the venerated *polis*. The changes of formula were, thus, post-Alexandrian rather than post-Aristotelian (Aristotle noted that the *polis* was the perfect unit of political organisation), and on that account the role that Alexander has had on the Stoic school as a philosophy, and the Roman Empire as a political organisation, is considerable.¹¹⁷ When Stoic ideas matured, they likewise exerted an admirable influence on the overall policy of the Roman Empire: it can indeed be asserted that the Stoic philosophical doctrine sustained the physical achievements of the long-lasting Roman Empire.

Born of the World Empire of Alexander, Stoicism experienced a renewal in Italy, when Rome - the City- became Rome -the Empire-. In the words of Rendall, “In the accomplishment of this [the making of the Roman Empire], Stoicism was no unimportant factor. It was the one philosophy, which in its conceptions of social obligations, of world citizenship, and of solidarity and brotherhood of man, contained the germs of a great political order”.¹¹⁸ Rendall goes on to state, “The strength of Rome, the secret of her Empire, lay in character, in an operative code of honour, domestic, civic and (more at least than other states) international”.¹¹⁹ Besides, the Stoic doctrine laid great emphasis on virtues and right conduct, and this boosted Roman virtues and

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 31.

¹¹⁷ According to Hatch, Stoical and Roman are the basis of Christian society. (Gerard H. Rendall *Marcus Aurelius*, p. xv).

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. lxxxviii.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. xciii.

acts of courage in the commonwealth.¹²⁰ It is interesting to note that in that sense cosmopolitan behaviour is strongly linked to the adoption of moral conduct in that the recognition of the fellowship of man acts as one of the twin principles of cosmopolitanism- with the other being ethical behaviour. With regard to the latter, Stoicism has been regarded more as a religion than a speculative philosophical system: “More religious in character than any other Greek philosophy, it brought a new moral force into the world”.¹²¹

2.2.2 Early Principles of Stoicism

The origins of Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus could well have had an influence on Stoicism: Cleanthes came to Athens from Asia Minor, Chrysippus from Tarsus in Cilicia, while Zeno may have been from Phoenician or mixed decent. Zeno is thought to have been bilingual, and due to the rarity of this aspect at the time, both eastern associations and the probable mixed descent of Zeno might have enlarged the concepts of his school.¹²² The tradition that had began before Stoicism, which emphasised the faculty of *Logos* as a common human attribute, was certainly adopted by the school. The unity of mankind is, thus, regarded as a constant outlook of the Stoic doctrine as it emphasises the rational principle [*Logos*] that governs the whole cosmos. As some have attributed the idea of the unity of mankind to Alexander, so others have given Zeno the credit for this idea. Bury states:

One of the things which Zeno’s philosophy did was to overcome the distinction of Greek and barbarian. He introduced the idea of cosmopolitanism, transcending patriotism; of the whole world, the oecumene, as a man’s true fatherland; of a community embracing all rational beings, without regard to the distinction of Greek and barbarian, or a freeman and slave. According to this doctrine the philosopher feels himself citizen of a state to which all mankind belongs, a state whose boundaries are measured by the sun. In the ideal state of Zeno all human beings are citizens.¹²³

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. xciii.

¹²¹ C.R. Haines, *The Communings with Himself of Marcus Aurelius Antoninus, Emperor of Rome: together with his Speeches and Saying*, (London: William Heinemann, 1916), p. xxi.

¹²² H.C. Baldry, *The Unity of Mankind*, p. 152.

Yet, it is doubtful that a single man was capable of changing the Hellenistic outlook in one swift move. Zeno was in favour of a classless Utopia, devoid of marriage, and actually viewed the institution of the family as dangerous. He advocated a community of wives, which Baldry translates as ‘freedom of intercourse between the sexes’.¹²⁴ Zeno, in truth, advocated uniformity and an elitist society: men and women, in his utopia, are to wear the same outfit to promote what he contemplates as unity. Moreover, only the wise are able to build a society based on concord and unity.¹²⁵ Hence, in contrast to the teachings of Aristotle, the early Stoics thought that the good life could not be achieved within the limits of the *polis*, and that only the wise (as opposed to the foolish) could have an experience of universal harmony.¹²⁶ A question is raised: can there be universal claims with the practice of exclusion or an attitude of intellectual superiority? This is where cosmopolitanism raises a sensitive issue: can it claim exclusion or assimilation? It is clear that in the cosmopolitan conceptions of Zeno, mankind as a general term only referred to a section of humanity, the one that emphasised the ‘wise’ elite. Although he believed in a community of mankind, the latter was to bear allegiance only to the ‘better’ and wiser people or what we may call an ‘early meritocracy’.

Early Stoic writers regarded this distinction as far more important than the common *Logos* of mankind. Plutarch attributed the concept of a World State to Zeno, which is regarded as a grave distortion. Zeno envisaged a community of wise and good men and women, and not a World State. Chrysippus enlarged the view of Zeno by rejecting the idea of noble birth and by supporting the idea of a single human community sustained by the universality of law. Haines states that, “Reason is law to all rational creatures, and so we are all citizens of the World-State. In this cosmopolitanism the Stoics approached the Christian view, ethics being ... made of universal application”.¹²⁷ However, it is in the Middle and Late Stoa that the idea of the unity of mankind clearly finds its full expression. “Ces idées amènent naturellement, semble t-il, à celle

¹²³ Bury, in: *Ibid.*, p. 153.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.* p. 155.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*

¹²⁶ Derek Heater, *World Citizenship and Government*, p. 14.

d'une humanité universelle ...Pourtant ne concluons pas trop vite; ce seront là les fruits qui mûriront à l'époque romaine, dans le moyen Stoïcisme..."¹²⁸

2.2.3 Principles of the Middle and Late Stoa

Although in later stages Stoicism encountered changes – the earlier distinction between the foolish and the wise had been undermined – its main unifying element remained its idea of human unity, brotherhood or fellowship. Thus, if the Stoics did start a cosmopolitan doctrine, it is usually held that the latter had few if no political implications whatsoever. Human brotherhood was to the Stoics a question of human relationships more than a politically unifying concern, but surely, without this starting point, cosmopolitan political thinking could not have possibly emerged. As a case in point, the brotherhood of man has been rendered somewhat more political with the Roman Stoics. Cicero and Seneca, for instance, “combined both Greek and Roman thought into the most mature cosmopolitanism developed in antiquity”.¹²⁹

The theme of human reason and the respect for natural law is also an important constituent of this early cosmopolitan doctrine. “Reason is as law to all rational creatures, and so we are all citizens of a World State”.¹³⁰ One of the paramount tenets of the Stoics is the belief that the universe is governed by a divine intelligence, impacting on all of its different parts, and following an endless cyclical scheme of decay and renewal. The thought of a world-soul, *sui generi*, antecedent to all forms of human life, is the condition and motivating force behind every form of being.¹³¹ “Mankind is a universal brotherhood, for whose benefit the whole world was made, inhabiting a world community (*cosmopolis*), and recognising a universal law”.¹³² In the

¹²⁷ C. R. Haines, *The Communings with Himself*, p. xxiv.

¹²⁸ “It seems that these ideas naturally lead to the concept of universal humanity... However, let us not conclude too hastily; they will find their full expression in the Roman period, in the middle Stoa”. (Brehier, in: H.C. Baldry, *the Unity of Mankind*, p. 166).

¹²⁹ Thomas Schlereth, *The Cosmopolitan Ideal*, p. xix, See Seneca below.

¹³⁰ C.R. Haines, *The Communings with Himself*, p. xxiii.

¹³¹ Bell, in: Gerard H. Rendall, *Marcus Aurelius*, p. 4.

¹³² *Ibid.*, p. 8.

same way, cosmopolis meant “viewing the whole universe and its inhabitants as if they were a social entity”.¹³³ The cosmopolis took shape in the minds of men and aspirations to enhance the unity of mankind became apparent: the World City is clearly reminiscent of Stoic thought as citizenship is to envelop the surface of the wide world. “The ethical ideal becomes internal and as the city widens to the world, transcends limitations of status or franchise- and belongs to man as a man, the common seal of humanity”.¹³⁴

As we shall see, the status of slave or alien was altered as they would not to be seen as mere subjects under the yoke of a Greek master. Stoic ideas not only engendered ideas of world citizenship and a world state, but also inspired the Roman Empire and its thrust for world dominion. The modified form of Stoicism, which undermined the distinction between the foolish and the wise, boosted the notion of the cosmopolis and greatly influenced the shape of the Roman Empire. Inspired by Stoicism, the Roman lawyer Seneca, the slave Epictetus,¹³⁵ and the Roman emperor Marcus Aurelius reiterated the concepts of human brotherhood, a community of mankind, and the ideal of belonging to the whole rather than the part. More interestingly, it implied that greater advantages would be gained if emphasis were placed on universality rather than particularity. In the words of Marcus Aurelius, “...For what is advantageous to the whole can in no wise be injurious to the part”.¹³⁶

Stoic ideas had an impact on the legal and institutionalised life of the epoch and in the Roman Empire, and as we argue, still have an impact on contemporary thought. As such, Stoic ideas did not remain fruitless ideas that started and died in the minds of men. The principle of the oneness of mankind influenced how Stoic writers like Seneca viewed the issue of slavery, and more importantly, led to a change in the legal situation for slaves. Truly, natural law, which sustained Seneca’s ideas of a single human race, regardless of race, gender, or class, constituted the germ

¹³³ Derek Heater, *World Citizenship and Government*, p. 181.

¹³⁴ C.R. Haines, *The Communings with Himself*, p. lxxxvi.

¹³⁵ The life of Epictetus shows how Stoic ideas laid hold of the conscience of the slave and the freeman, as well as the high-born and the cultured. (Gerard H. Rendall, *Marcus Aurelius*, p. xcvi).

of what is now called cosmopolitan law.¹³⁷ Seneca in letter XLVII stated “How about reflecting that the person you call your slave traces his origin back to the same stock as yourself, has the same good sky above him, breathes as you do, lives as you do, dies as you do? It is as easy for you to see in him a free-born man as for him to see a slave in you”.¹³⁸ In the Roman Empire, Stoic ideas influenced legislation, especially in regard to improving the status of women and slave, and thus reiterated the oneness of humankind by attempting to include both the feminine gender and slaves (the marginalised).¹³⁹

Such rights have been reiterated in the twentieth century, namely, Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) notes that everyone is entitled to rights and freedom set in the Declaration regardless of sex, and Article 4 underlines that, “...Slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms”.¹⁴⁰ This theme is also at the heart of Kant’s notion of cosmopolitan law that has been linked to the Stoic idea of natural law.¹⁴¹ “More significantly, in his *Grundlegung*, Kant follows Cicero (in *De Officiis*, III) in linking respect for humanity with living in accordance with a universal natural law. Kant’s concept of *ius cosmopolitanum* (cosmopolitan law) bears a close resemblance to the Stoics’ *ius naturae*. (natural law)”.¹⁴² Kant’s *ius cosmopolitanum* has in turn been developed and transposed to the notion that violations of human rights would no longer be sheltered by sovereign states. In our times, the consciousness of world citizenship descending from natural law has taken the form of rights and duties, with the individual at the centre, and not the state.¹⁴³ The UDHR and the Rome Statute of the ICC might well mark the beginnings of the development of a legalised world citizenship.

¹³⁶ Derek Heater, *World Citizenship and Government*, p. 20.

¹³⁷ As we will see in Chapter Three, Kant’s notion of ‘cosmopolitan law’ has been influenced by the Stoics’ notion of natural law.

¹³⁸ Seneca, in: Robin Campbell, *Epistulae morales. Letters from a Stoic: Epistulae morales ad Lucilium /by Seneca*, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1969), p. 93.

¹³⁹ Bertrand Russell, *History of Western Philosophy*, (London: Routledge, 2000), p. 276.

¹⁴⁰ Geoffrey Robertson, *Crimes Against Humanity: The Struggle for Global Justice*, (London: Penguin Books, 2002), p. 575.

¹⁴¹ See Chapter Three, (3.4.7 Kant and the Idea of Cosmopolitan Right/Law).

¹⁴² Derek Heater, *World Citizenship: Cosmopolitan Thinking*, p. 35.

¹⁴³ See Chapter Four and Cosmopolitan Democracy.

Although this remains a moot point, it is undeniable that crimes against humanity can no longer pass unnoticed anywhere on earth, and are called to be punishable before the law.¹⁴⁴

However, what interests us at present is the origin of these cosmopolitan trends. The Stoic doctrine, in short, encompasses the ideas of the Cosmos as a single entity, and the human race as its inhabitants. Natural law enjoins people to be equal, and from this natural equality stems the brotherhood of mankind, and the ‘natural’ universal community. These ethical ideas represent a key theme in cosmopolitan thought, and are a strong component of my hypothesis. More interestingly, Stoicism began to shape the contemporary interrogations of cosmopolitanism in terms of loyalty. Even if one recognises the unity of the human race and the whole world as its home, which entity should be preponderant: the city, the country or the whole world? This is one of the main topics of controversy in cosmopolitan theory i.e. the value of patriotism. Is it not a serious issue to let go of the attachment to one’s city or country? Stoicism, in placing emphasis on the whole world, could have suggested that ties to one’s home were insignificant if not non-existent.¹⁴⁵ However, this special trait of Stoicism, which is believed to be unresolved, has influenced the western tradition that often wrongly conceptualises cosmopolitanism as a theory that seeks to replace, rather than complement, particular identities with a universal one. More importantly, the main difference between the Cynic and the Stoic is that, “The Stoic, in contrast to the Cynic, did not renounce his citizenship, even though the *polis* structure was decaying and was being superseded in the late fourth century B.C.”¹⁴⁶

¹⁴⁴ Article 6 of the UDHR states: “Everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law”. (Geoffrey Robertson, *Crimes Against Humanity*, p. 576).

¹⁴⁵ This question of allegiances does not seem to have bothered Seneca or the Emperor Marcus Aurelius. According to them, man as a rational being could pledge allegiance to both entities without any problem of loyalty. It was a question of personal taste.

¹⁴⁶ Derek Heater, *World Citizenship: Cosmopolitan Thinking*, p. 31.

2.2.4 Marcus Aurelius Antoninus: Cosmopolitan Writer and Emperor

Marcus Aurelius exemplified a true cosmopolitan leader. In *The Communings with himself of Marcus Aurelius Antoninus- Emperor of Rome*, he demonstrated the naturalness of cooperation and harmony in human relationships, and went as far as to state that the purpose of humanity was to co-operate with one another. In his eyes, humanity is like a chain, which falls into pieces if one link is dysfunctional. Likewise, in Book II, he used the analogy of the different parts of the body to show that if they did not work together in a proper fashion, they would endanger the existence of the human being. He supported this by describing nature as the generator of harmony in all existing phenomena, and consequently drew the conclusion that feelings of aversion and resentment would be contrary to natural law.

Rationality has, like all Stoic dogmas, a central place in his philosophy: only those who bear allegiance to rational principles are in accordance with the laws of nature, and only those acting according to the laws of nature are standing above the mass of humanity. Although elitist features are not explicit in his writings, a trace of elitism still persists. “...All that is rational is akin, and that is in man’s nature to care for all men, and that we should not embrace the opinion of all, but of those alone who live in conscious agreement in nature”.¹⁴⁷ The Stoic Roman Emperor linked the intellectual and rational faculties common to all beings in the first place to the communality of law, and secondly to the bond which unites beings in a social fellowship. If human beings are linked in universal brotherhood, it is as the result of their intellectual and rational faculties. “But men have reason therefore treat them as fellow creatures”.¹⁴⁸ The reality that our common humanity justifies the naturalness of the universe as a single polity – and in this case as a state- stands as one of the models of cosmopolitan political theory. The need for a single polity devised on the grounds of the existence of a single human race is indeed the point

¹⁴⁷ Marcus Aurelius, *The Communings with Himself*, (Book III), C.R. Haines, (ed.), p. 53.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, (Book VI), p. 148 His contemporary and friend in thought Seneca, who believed that reason can be only controlled if preserved from passions, expressed a note of caution in the idealisation of reason.

of contention in current cosmopolitan political theory. What do the writings of the later Stoics, and more precisely of Marcus Aurelius, have to offer to the improvement of present cosmopolitan theories? Stoics surpassed the city-state system by proposing a universal paradigm, but respected grassroots values. They acknowledged the oneness of mankind, and hence spoke of the oneness of a polity or common political habitation, but as we already have seen, they did not reject smaller political units.

Marcus Aurelius posed the most central and rhetorical interrogation underlining the necessity of a cosmopolis: “for of what other single polity can the whole race of mankind be said to be fellow members?”¹⁴⁹ If humanity is one, and all of its inhabitants are imbued with common human characteristics (more importantly the faculty of reason and intelligence), then the only possible common habitation is the World-City. More importantly, Marcus Aurelius considered the world to be simply one of the components of the universe, and so was alluding to the world’s insignificance in the infinity of material existence. Likewise, when he referred to the single polity, he did not denote the world, but the universe as a whole. The theme of the unity of mankind is so strong in the mind of the Roman Emperor that he clearly expressed cosmopolitan beliefs in a pure and unquestionable form. “Cease not to think of the Universe as one living Being, possessed of a single Substance and a single Soul; and how it does all things by a single impulse; and how all existing things are joint causes of all things that come into existence; and how intertwined in the fabric is the thread and how closely woven the web”.¹⁵⁰ For Marcus Aurelius, the place of the individual is crucial in helping humanity to progress. Each individual, like the link on the chain, is an important element in the construction of the cosmopolis, and in caring for the ‘good of mankind’.¹⁵¹

Seneca wrote, “...Reason herself, to whom the reigns of power have been entrusted, remains mistress only so long as she is kept apart from passions...” (*Ibid.*, (book I), p. 125).

¹⁴⁹ This question is posed again by Heater in the twentieth century: “Is it therefore desirable – is it possible– that the state should be coterminous with the whole planet, and its citizenship therefore comprise its entire population? (Derek Heater, *World Citizenship and Government*, p. ix).

¹⁵⁰ Marcus Aurelius, *The Communings with Himself*, Book IV, C.R. Haines (ed.), p. 91.

Although the Stoic cosmopolitan doctrine encompasses all that exists in the Universe, Marcus Aurelius showed awareness of the diversity inherent in the complexity of matter by inviting us to concentrate on the same origin of things rather than on their derivatives.¹⁵² The diversity, which resides in the single nature of things, is an illusion (appearance) that blurs the oneness of humanity. In his own words:

There is one light of the Sun, even though its continuity be broken by walls, mountains, and countless other things. There is one common Substance, even though it be broken up into countless bodies individually characterised. There is one Soul, though it be broken up among countless natures and by individual limitations. There is one intelligent Soul, though it seems to be divided...But the mind is peculiarly impelled towards what is akin to it, and countless with it, and there is no break in the feeling of social fellowship.¹⁵³

Likewise, there is one human race, though it may be diversified. Seneca also testified to unity in diversity, but nevertheless contended with regret that diversity had become a means of contention. In contemporary terms, Baldry likewise acknowledges, “the crucial issue as we see it, is the gap between theory and practice: the paradox of a human race acknowledged in theory to be a single family, yet split by divisions of creed and colour which threaten its destruction”.¹⁵⁴ This is the most challenging and thought provoking point in Stoic cosmopolitan thinking: though oneness is the most important feature of human and material relationships, and though it is natural to abide by universal principles, oneness is not anchored in uniformity. It is rather the expression of diverse elements coming together to form a coherent single whole, while unity governs the wholeness of human interactions.

Marcus Aurelius was not a conservative: change is viewed in a positive light, and there is a constant evolution occurring in the natural state of things, since: “That which comes after always has a close relationship to what has gone before.”¹⁵⁵ Likewise, evolution is a result of the

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*, (Book IV), p. 75.

¹⁵² Marcus Aurelius stated, “All things come from one source...Look not on these as alien to that which thou dost reverence, but turn thy thoughts to the one source of all things”. (*Ibid.*, (Book VI), p. 151).

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*, (book XII), p. 307.

¹⁵⁴ H.C. Baldry, *The Unity of Mankind*, p. 28.

¹⁵⁵ Marcus Aurelius, *The Communings with Himself*, Book VI, C.R. Haines, (ed.), p. 91.

harmonious relationship of nature: succession is the sign of the interconnectedness and interdependence of all existing things. Interdependence engenders a liking for one another, and creates a motion, which finally brings unity. As we shall see, Marcus Aurelius, like other devoted cosmopolitan writers, believed in work to achieve the purpose for which humanity was brought into being. The building up of an orderly universe requires work, one of the features of the natural state of creation, and does not occur by a single unexpected event.¹⁵⁶

The need for a single polity embracing the whole of mankind, the centrality of the individual in devising this polity, and henceforth the adoption of World Citizenship, through an evolutionary process, are themes raised by Marcus Aurelius. More importantly, he challenged the assumptions, like those still made by contemporary writers such as Berger and Lukmann, that to 'be a cosmopolitan is to be rootless.'¹⁵⁷ In his own words, reminiscent of those of Socrates, he asserts "...my city and country, as Antoninus, is Rome; as a man the world".¹⁵⁸ The value of patriotism is not undermined, and neither is that of world citizenship in the World City. They are twinned and complementary loyalties, which do not necessarily contradict each other. Change is a state of transformation rather than decay. Marcus Aurelius stated, "The parts of the whole – all that nature has comprised in the Universe – must inevitably "perish", to mean, "be changed". If one follows the thoughts of the philosopher, it can be argued that parts of the whole – such as the nation-state system – must be transformed and changed rather than eradicated, for it is only natural that it be so. The writings and philosophy of Marcus Aurelius and of the later Stoics, in general, have much to offer to present cosmopolitan thinking, which is still striving to find its place in IR. The heritage of the Stoic tradition was subsequently revised during the Middle Ages, an age to which we now turn.

¹⁵⁶ In the words of Marcus Aurelius, "Consider each little plant, each tiny bird, the ant, the spider, the bee, how they go about their own work and do each his part for the building up of an orderly universe". (*Ibid.*, (Book V), p. 99).

¹⁵⁷ In: Daniel Deudney, "Ground identity: Nature, Place, and Space in Nationalism", in Yosef Lapid, & Friedrich Kratochwil, (eds.), *The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory*, (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996), p. 133.

2.3 The Transition from the Ancient to the Medieval World

The ethos behind medieval politics was, indeed, greatly influenced by that of the ancient world; it can be said that the ancient world spurred the spirit of the medieval world in the same way that the latter placed its marks on the modern age.¹⁵⁹ If the medieval world had inventions of its own -for example feudalism- it is contended, however, that, “the political ideas of the ancient world largely conditioned the development of those of the Middle Ages... This process was, however, a highly complex one involving reinterpretation and innovation as these ideas were applied in the context of medieval conditions radically different from those which prevailed in ancient Greece, Rome or Israel”.¹⁶⁰ Specific aspects of ancient thought were, thus, absorbed and recreated in the new conditions of medieval context. More specifically, the notion that the world should be united under one sovereign rule, and that all of the various kingdoms and republics should be made politically subordinate to it, is a medieval trait that was influenced by Stoic philosophy. As Bigongiari remarks, “This is the old cosmopolitanism of the Stoics revisited to suit Christian needs and fitted into an Aristotelian system”.¹⁶¹ Bryce, similarly, notes that the great ideas which antiquity bequeathed to the ages that followed were those of a World Religion and a World Monarchy.¹⁶² As such, the cosmopolitan ideal is never completely detached from its earlier expressions. “Ideas, especially collective ones like cosmopolitanism”, Schlereth notes, “rarely originate as unique novelties; rather they possess a historical paternity”.¹⁶³

2.3.1 Christianity, the Oneness of God and Humanity

The Athenians had initially believed that the concept of diversity of the races justified the dichotomy between “races that rule” and “races that serve”, thereby making of slavery a natural

¹⁵⁸ Marcus Aurelius, *The Communings with Himself*, Book VI, C.R. Haines, (ed.), p. 155.

¹⁵⁹ Walter Ullman, *Medieval Political Thought*, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1975), p. 7.

¹⁶⁰ Joseph Canning, *A History of Medieval Political Thought: 300-1450*, (London: Routledge, 1996), p. 1.

¹⁶¹ Dino Bigongiari, (ed. and introduction), *The Political Ideas of St. Thomas Aquinas*, (New York: The Free Press, 1952), p. 1.

¹⁶² J.V. Bryce, *The Holy Roman Empire*, p. 90.

institution. The religious beliefs that appeared to be a local and national matter with the plethora of Gods had, likewise, nourished the belief in the divisive nature of humanity: it is only logical, therefore, that a multiplicity of Gods be in accord with a multiplicity of human races.¹⁶⁴ Christianity, for which Stoicism seemed to have prepared the way, marked a change of attitude towards those beliefs by proclaiming the oneness of God and humanity, and in so doing, stressed the continuation of the cosmopolitan ethical theme. The unity of God strengthened the unity of man, who had been created in His image, and therefore mankind, like God, was thought to be one. As Bryce explains,

Before the great movement towards assimilation which began with the Hellenization of the East and was completed by the Western and Northern as well as the Eastern conquests of Rome, men, with little knowledge of each other, had held differences of race to be natural and irremovable barriers... Christianity more effectively banished it ... by subsisting for the variety of pantheons the belief in one God, before whom all men are equal.¹⁶⁵

The monotheistic concept, as we shall see, is also embodied in an Islamic cosmopolitan vision of empire. The transition between the ancient world and the Middle Ages began with the reign of Constantine the Great and lasted until the coronation of Charlemagne in 800 C.E, which marked the start of the Western or Medieval Empire. In 323 C.E. Constantine the Great became sole Emperor and the new Rome was transferred to Constantinople, capital of the Byzantine Empire. Constantine established an Empire that was “the continuation in Christian form of the Roman Empire”¹⁶⁶, and which carried with it the universal pretensions of its ‘pagan’ predecessor. Christianity was soon to become coterminous with the Roman Empire, which had been fed by Stoic doctrine that propagated the feeling of a single Roman people throughout the world.¹⁶⁷ Roman and Christian concepts fused, and came to be understood as the same concept, both promoting universality and expansion. Bryce explains that from the days of Constantine until far down to the Middle Ages, the Empire conjointly with the papacy was the heart of

¹⁶³ Thomas Schlereth, *The Cosmopolitan Ideal*, p. xvii.

¹⁶⁴ J.V. Bryce, *The Holy Roman Empire*, p. 91.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 92.

¹⁶⁶ Donald M. Nicol, *The End of The Byzantine Empire*, (London: Edward Arnold, 1979), p. 7.

Western Christendom.¹⁶⁸ If Christianity had raised the awareness of the domain of heaven, the present world was to present a problem to ecclesiastical people, who had to find a way to make it the terrestrial representation of the divine. In response to this problem, the person of the Emperor and the Empire provided appropriate and timely answers.

In the same way that Constantine strove to achieve imperial universal dominion based upon his belief in Christ, so too did the Western Emperors. From 800 C.E to 1300 C.E the idea of the renewal of the Roman Empire was irrevocably linked to the idea of the universal nature and destiny of Christianity, being made evident by Christ's birth and life in the Roman Empire.¹⁶⁹ Indeed, medieval theoretical politics held that unity was a constitutive principle of the universe and that the one and only body of mankind was made up of two dimensions, the temporal and the spiritual. The work of St. Thomas of Aquinas clearly embodies this thought: there is a severance of temporal and spiritual power, but the spiritual one is prevalent, and the Pope has both spiritual and secular powers. The clerical power would eventually ensure that sovereignty rested in the spiritual hand or the papacy, and that the temporal power remained in service of the spiritual. Western medieval cosmopolitan ideas are, therefore, linked to the supremacy of the Church where "the Church is the true Cosmopolis" with the Pope as its earthly head.¹⁷⁰ ¹⁷¹ From this principle, the necessity and divine origin of the world state and the *imperium mundi* of the Romano-German emperor were deduced.¹⁷² However, it was not only Christendom which made claims to universalism: another universalism, Islam, would also present a universal alternative to its Christian counterparts.

¹⁶⁷ J.V. Bryce, *The Holy Roman Empire*, p. 12.

¹⁶⁸ J.V. Bryce, in: Geoffrey Barraclough, *The Medieval Empire: Idea and Reality*, London: Historical Association, 1959, p. 5.

¹⁶⁹ Derek Heater, *World Citizenship and Government*, p. 29.

¹⁷⁰ Otto Gierke, (Trans. and Intro by Maitland, William, Frederic) *Political Theories of the Middle Age*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. xlvi.

¹⁷¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁷² *Ibid.*, p. xlix.

2.4 Islam as Universal Monotheism

The very idea that there is a single truth for humankind and that it is a duty to share it with others was a trait of Christianity that reappeared with Islam.¹⁷³ Islam can indeed be said to be part of a ‘late antiquity dynamic’ that sought to reconcile imperialism with religion, or more precisely, monotheism.¹⁷⁴ Ironically, both Christians and Muslims characterised each other as ‘infidel’, a notion that revealed their essential similarity.¹⁷⁵ From the onset, Islam expressed its ‘cosmopolitanism’: half a century after the passing of the prophet Muhammad, Islam had become a world religion, claiming to supersede Christianity and all other faiths, and intending to reach out to the whole of mankind.¹⁷⁶ “Almost from the beginning, Islam was a world empire and a world civilization extending over three continents, inhabited by many different races, including within itself the seats of the ancient civilization of Egypt and the Fertile Crescent, to which soon were added Iran and northern India”.¹⁷⁷

Muslim jurists laid down from an early date the concepts of Dar Al-Islam (Muslim realm or ‘House of Islam’) and Dar Al-Harb (Realm of war or ‘House of War’). The state of warfare or ‘Jihad’ was to continue until all of mankind embraced Islam (a world-wide Dar Al-Islam), or submitted to the authority of the Muslim state. Until this happened, there could be no peace.¹⁷⁸ In the Jihad, there were, however, two kinds of infidels, the polytheists (who were totally in the wrong and should be subjected *ipso facto* to Muslim law) and the Jews or Christians (‘the People of the Book’, whose monotheism was tolerated on the condition of the payment of a tax ‘jizya’). The similarities between Islam and Christianity at this time can be linked to the policies of Constantine, who was dedicated to the promotion of ‘missionary monotheism’, and to the expansion of the dominions he had conquered. He also aspired for the marriage between

¹⁷³ Bernard Lewis, *Islam and The West*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 4.

¹⁷⁴ Garth Fowden, *Empire to Commonwealth: Consequences of Monotheism in Late Antiquity*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 5.

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

Christianity and Rome, and could be distinguished for his greater toleration of Jews in comparison to polytheists. This vision is indeed found in the claimed successors of Muhammad, the institution of the Caliphate. Abu Bakr and Umar, the first two successors of Muhammad, conquered Mesopotamia, Syria, Palestine, and Egypt. At the death of Uthman, Muhammad's third successor, Muslim control extended from Mesopotamia to the Iranian plateau.¹⁷⁹

By 715, the Islamic Empire comprised of all the lands from the Pyrenees, through Spain and North Africa, to the Indus Valley in the East.¹⁸⁰ In the eighth century, it constituted the largest empire the world had ever seen.¹⁸¹ The Byzantine Empire was crippled by this time, even though Byzantium had not been destroyed. When the Umayyad dynasty fell, and the Abbasids came to power, they replaced the then Islamic capital Damascus with Baghdad, a truly cosmopolitan city in what historians call 'the Golden Age of Islam' – an age when Dar Al-Islam was still expanding and excelling in all the arts of civilisation.¹⁸² Pointing notes, "It (Baghdad) rapidly became the largest city in the world outside China, with a highly cosmopolitan population drawn from all over the Islamic world and grew to almost 900 000 people within a century of its foundation".¹⁸³ Balyuzi highlights Islam's cosmopolitan traits:

The civilization of Islam was neither Arab, nor Persian, nor Syriac. It had all those elements within its fold, and many more: Egypto-Coptic, Indian, Greek, Spaniard, Berber and Turkish. Jews, Christians, Muslims, Mazdeans, Sabeans, even Pagans, were equally proud to bear its burden and rear its structure. Never before in the experience of mankind had monotheistic thought and pagan speculation found a congenial home in which to exist side by side, neither infringing on the other, neither sanctioning the other, neither assimilating the other.¹⁸⁴

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 141.

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁸¹ Clive Pointing, *World History: A New Perspective*, (London, Pimlico, 2001), p. 306.

¹⁸² "Arab scholars were studying Aristotle," writes Professor Philip Hitti, "when Charlemagne and his lords were learning to write their names. Scientists in Cordova, with their seventeen great libraries, one alone of which included more than 400,000 volumes, enjoyed luxurious baths at a time when washing the body was considered a dangerous custom at the University of Oxford". (H.M. Balyuzi, *Muhammad and the Course of Islam*, (Oxford: Ronald, 1976), p. 286).

¹⁸³ Clive Pointing, *World History*, p. 335.

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 288.

The Golden Age of Abbasid Baghdad could indeed be said to embody the formula ‘One God, One Empire, One Emperor’.¹⁸⁵ Yaqubi, an Arab geographer, described Baghdad as “the crossroads of the universe” as to its population, all the peoples of the world contributed, and to its markets, products from all over the world were displayed.¹⁸⁶ In the first centuries of the Islamic dispensation, the Caliphate constituted the amalgamation of religious and political authority, which can be likened to Constantine’s integration of religious and political authority.¹⁸⁷ Within early Islam, universalism was connected to the twin concepts of religion and empire that reinforced each other within the early Caliphate. After the decline of the Abbasids¹⁸⁸, the Caliphate was interpreted solely as a political institution, when the ulama came to represent religious authority. An ensuing political fragmentation was due to begin as a result of the vastness of the territory under Islamic rule and the consequent impossibility of governing it within a unified central power. In 1200, Islam became more politically divided than ever before, but however continued to exercise political and cultural influence. One erudite of Western medieval thought, St. Thomas of Aquinas, constructed his philosophy through the colossal contribution of Islamic heritage to the West: the gift of the transmission of classical, and in particular, Aristotelian, knowledge.¹⁸⁹

2.5 Thomas of Aquinas: Concept of a Single Divine Being

Aquinas can be distinguished from other contemporaries by his interest in the works of Moses Maimonides (1135-1204), a Jew, and Ibn Sina (Avicenna) (980-1037), a Muslim. His cosmopolitanism can be shown in his interest in the work of not only Christian, but also Jewish and Muslim writers, and in a sense, it led him to examine the arguments of the writers, rather

¹⁸⁵ Garth Fowden, *Empire*, p. 160.

¹⁸⁶ Clive Ponting, *World History*, p. 151.

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁸ When in 1055 Baghdad fell to the Turks, the power of the Abbasids decreased significantly and the Islamic commonwealth was left with no centre of political reference, ‘no secular equivalent to Mecca’. (Garth Fowden, *Empire*, p. 166).

¹⁸⁹ It is thanks to Islamic philosophers that classical philosophy, including Aristotelian works, was translated into Latin, and made available to the West in the thirteenth century.

than their faith.¹⁹⁰ St Thomas was the first to attempt a combination of Christian and classical knowledge within his philosophy. He believed that truth was ultimately one, because it had its source in one God, and thus was not dependent on one's denomination. He, thus, 'trusted in the image of the creator in us all to search out traces of the divine handiwork...'¹⁹¹ In *De ente et essentia*, Aquinas explicated a universe created by one sovereign God.¹⁹² St. Thomas borrowed from Muslim philosophers when he underlined the distinction between essence and existence outside of God, and that everything depends on an exterior cause for its existence.¹⁹³ In this regard, Avicenna influenced Aquinas to recognise the existence of the universe by 'the one God'¹⁹⁴, once more underlining the similarities between Christian and Islamic monotheism. One of the most interesting traits bequeathed by Aquinas was that there should not necessarily be a contradiction between the principles of faith and reason, and religious and human values.¹⁹⁵ Building on this point, he gave a positive interpretation of secular life and the life of the state in general, not rooted in sin, but in an Aristotelian fashion, in the nature of man. Blending Aristotelianism with Christianity, he ensured that political life, and the sphere of human and ethical values founded in natural law, was not obliterated by divine justice, but was rather in the service of divine justice. "Thus the action and value of the state, as part of the natural order, must be considered in the general frame of the divine direction of the world, and is entirely subservient to that direction".¹⁹⁶

Since the life of the state and political institutions belonged to the natural sphere, independently of religion, St. Thomas, unlike Augustine, accepted the rule of a non-Christian or pagan state, although in the end the Church must have the last word.¹⁹⁷ Natural law, being a part of the

¹⁹⁰ Norman Kretzman & Eleonore Stump, (eds.), *The Cambridge Companion To Aquinas*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 61.

¹⁹¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁹² *Ibid.*

¹⁹³ Kenny Joseph, "Thomas Aquinas, Islam, and the Arab Philosophers", downloaded 22 June 2003, <<http://www.op.org/nigeriaop/kenny/ThoArabs.htm>>

¹⁹⁴ Kretzman Norman & Stump Eleonore, (eds), *The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas*, p. 63.

¹⁹⁵ A.P. D'Entrèves, *The Medieval Contribution To Political Thought*, (New York: The Humanities Press, 1959), p. 20.

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

¹⁹⁷ See *Summa Theologica, Ibid.*, p. 24.

eternal law of God, is not concerned with the natural rights of the individual: we make our start not from the individual but from the cosmos, from a well graded world in which law finds its highest expression – natural law representing ‘a bridge that separates man from his divine creator’.¹⁹⁸ Moreover, it “expresses the dignity and power of man, who alone from created beings is called upon to participate intellectually and actively in the rational order of the universe”.¹⁹⁹

This breakthrough in medieval thought, blending elements of faith (revelation) and reason (order) propounds that ‘grace’ does not abolish nature, for the existence of the state is justified in the very nature of man. It is, hence, relevant that Aquinas describes (universal) man as being subject to a threefold order of divine law, reason, and political authority.²⁰⁰ Interestingly, the state is important for the fulfilment of human nature, but the former remains in service to a higher type of perfection, to a divine direction. Here, however, we come to a break with the cosmopolitan tradition as is found, for example, in the writings of Dante, as Aquinas never mentioned the concept of universal empire but relied on the state, like Aristotle, as the perfect political organisation – a concept that made him somehow more credible than the so called ‘utopianism’ of Dante.²⁰¹ “Thus the revival of the classical conception of the state helped to destroy the medieval idea of a universal community or *imperium mundi*, and it prepared the way for the modern idea of the particular and sovereign state”.²⁰² If St Thomas remained silent on a medieval theme such as that of universal empire, he, nevertheless, believed in the concept of the fundamental unity of human life that is to be found in his philosophy of law ‘with its assertion of the unity and universal value of the supreme principles of justice... Thus behind or above the

¹⁹⁸ A.P. D’Entrèves (Introduction), *Aquinas*, p. xiv. The ‘Great Chain of Being’ (a hierarchical order from God through the angels to man and beneath man to animals, plants, and other created beings) could be said to embody this conception. (Paul Sigmund, *St. Thomas of Aquinas on Politics and Ethics*, New York: Princeton University, 1988, p. xx) This order, however, led Aquinas to believe in the inferiority of women and their due obedience to men, and in the institution of slavery. (*Ibid.*, p. xxvii).

¹⁹⁹ A.P. D’Entrèves, (Introduction), *Aquinas*, p. xiv.

²⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, p. xiii.

²⁰¹ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

²⁰² A.P. D’Entrèves, *The Medieval*, p. 36.

manifold human types of life and political experience there is a fundamental oneness...²⁰³ As

D'Entrèves goes on to state:

No doubt the idea of the general idea of the fundamental unity of mankind is preserved in the general outlines of St. Thomas's conception of politics. It survives in the very notion of natural law, common to all men, from which the several systems of positive laws derive their substance and value. It survives in the conception of the *unus polulus Christianus*, which embraces all countries and nations...But in the particular sphere of practical politics, it is the particular State which carries the day.²⁰⁴

The theme of the political unity of the world, to which we now turn, is better characterised by the writings of Dante, who like St Thomas favoured monarchy as one of the best forms of government. "The chief concern of the ruler of a multitude ...is to procure the unity of peace... Now it is manifest that what is itself one can more efficaciously bring about unity than the rule of many".²⁰⁵

2.6 Dante or a Paradigm of Medieval Cosmopolitan Thought

In spite of the supposed universal medieval outlook found in the sayings and writings of medieval heritage, Carlyle affirms that even though a great mass of political writings of the eleventh and twelfth centuries were preserved, it is only in a few incidents that we can find allusions to the political unity of the world.²⁰⁶ He, then, goes on to say that it is only in the latter part of the thirteenth century, or rather the fourteenth century, that the concept of the universal empire began to take an important configuration in political theory.²⁰⁷ It is indeed no coincidence that such a revival of universalism was constructed at that time. The second half of the thirteenth century was a gloomy age for Europe, and the desire for restored authority and the

²⁰³ *Ibid.*

²⁰⁴ A.P. D'Entrèves, *Aquinas*, p. xxv. St Thomas writes, "Mankind is considered like one body, which is called the mystic body, whose head is Christ both as to soul and as to body. Christ has one vicar, the Pope, and the Pope is the "head of the republic of Christ". St. Thomas, Dino Bigongiari (Ed. and Introduction), *The Political Ideas of St. Thomas Aquinas*, (New York: The Free Press, 1952), p. xxxv.

²⁰⁵ In: *Ibid.*, p. xxvii.

²⁰⁶ A.J. Carlyle & R.W. Carlyle, *A History of Medieval Political Theory in the West*, (Edinburgh: William Blackwood & Sons, 1936), p. 179.

dream of universal empire was revived. This conception is clearly found in the writings of Dante. In fact, an Italian answer to the problems of the empire came from the poet, who presented a “philosophy of politics” which was cosmopolitan in many respects. Dante was a fervent opponent of the temporal claims of the papacy, and so he favoured the re-establishment of a Roman Empire sustained by a strong temporal monarchical power.²⁰⁸ His political ideas found in his treatise *De Monarchia* addresses the “fundamental question” of what form of political organisation best suits the reality of human nature, or how people can best live together, and is, therefore, a matter of great interest to our theme.²⁰⁹

Dante’s universal concerns can be said to be very contemporary, as he raised aspects of human nature combined with political concerns that are still highly relevant to the nature of our own times, namely the exclusive character of state sovereignty and the unified aspect of human nature.²¹⁰ Indeed, Dante’s political theory was preoccupied with the medieval conception of the political unity of the world, a conception crucial in the theory of the structure of medieval society.²¹¹ As part his global ethical vision, he emphasised the idea of human fellowship as the basis of peace.

Dante’s *De Monarchia* advanced three main points: firstly, he spoke in favour of a sovereign rule under which various kingdoms and republics would be placed; secondly, a universal empire, which would be capable of ensuring justice and liberty; and finally the establishment of a supranational authority, which would avoid warfare and strife.²¹² The latter idea is derived from the Stoic argument for the unity of mankind that can be realised through the rational

²⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 150

²⁰⁹ Prue Shaw, (ed. and introduction), *Dante, Monarchia.*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. i.

²¹⁰ Ullman states that, “Dante’s concept of world monarchy had some semblance with the papal monarchy, as it was originally conceived, and yet in other ways it was an early and premature attempt to nip the incipient concept of national sovereignty in the bud”. (Walter Ullman, *Medieval Political Thought*, p. 191).

²¹¹ A.J. Carlyle & R.W. Carlyle, *A History of Medieval*, p. 170.

²¹² Dino Bigongiari, (introduction), *On World Government (De Monarchia)*, Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Educational Publishing, 1957, p. xi.

faculty, or the *intellectus possibilis* of the totality of the earth's population.²¹³ Dante was influenced by the Averroist contention that there is just one intellect for the whole of humankind.²¹⁴ In his eyes, there should only be one goal for human civilisation, which must be "one and the same" for all civilisations of the world. For Dante, this goal can only be accomplished by a temporal government or universal empire.²¹⁵ If mankind is one, it is indeed irrefutable that there must be a single goal for all civilisations of the world. "Now it would be foolish to admit that one civilisation may have one goal, and another, another, and not to admit one goal for all".²¹⁶ Each single part of creation has a special function like the different parts of the body, and therefore it is only logical that the whole of mankind has a specific function too. Likewise, the bodily organs are also representatives of unity, a principle that is at the root of all social order.²¹⁷

Unlike physics or mathematics, politics is in the realm of human control and can be dealt with on a practical scale. Dante, thus, maintained that, "Since our present concern is with politics ... and since all political matters are in our control, it is clear that our present concern is not primarily at thought but at action".²¹⁸ This universal goal cherished by Dante is nothing less than the realisation of "man's ability to grow in intelligence", or the practical realisation of the rational faculties of mankind. As Shaw explains, "mankind considered as a totality has its own function or purpose, a purpose which cannot be fulfilled by any individual, however brilliant, or by any single group or race, however gifted, but only by the whole of humanity considered precisely as a whole. That purpose is to realise human potential, *sinul* (all at once) and *semper* (all the time)".²¹⁹ If one thinks of universal peace as the goal of human civilisation, Dante perceived the latter as a condition that must be established before humankind's goal is realised,

²¹³ *Ibid.* Furthermore, following the Stoic doctrine, Dante underlines the fact that the part is a sample of the whole. (*Ibid.*, p. 7).

²¹⁴ Joseph Canning, *A History of Medieval*, p. 150.

²¹⁵ Dante, *On World Government*, Dino Bigongiari (ed.), p. 3.

²¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

²¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

²¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p.4.

²¹⁹ Prue Shaw, *Dante, Monarchia*, p. xvi.

that is, as a prerequisite for the achievement of man's rational faculties. Likewise, Dante argued that each created thing exists not for its own sake, but for the function which it alone can fulfil; in this case mankind is the only entity that can realise its own purpose, and it can only do so if it is protected from inherent division.²²⁰ That universal peace is a necessary condition for the fulfilment of mankind's purpose is confirmed by the fact that "individual men find that they grow in prudence and wisdom when they can sit quietly", and likewise mankind can fulfil its purpose in the tranquillity of peace.²²¹ In this state, man, who is God's almost divine work, and who is endowed with a unique hybrid status ("Thou hast made him a little lower than the angels")²²² will fulfil its purpose when he is most happy, that is, when universal peace is achieved.²²³

If universal peace is a necessary state that is required for mankind to fulfil its purpose – the development and achievement of rational faculties – then universal peace necessitates the development and establishment of a single world government. In brief, universal peace realised through the establishment of a single world government would bring tranquillity to the world, a condition necessary for the purpose of humankind, or the attainment of rational faculties. For Dante, this single temporal world government took the form of the Empire or Monarchy,²²⁴ and was justified in a Roman form that was predetermined by divine providence. Peace and world government resemble God and are proper forms of human governance insofar as they represent a reflection of the divine will. "Things are at their best when they go according to the intention of their original mover, who is God... Therefore, mankind exists at its best when it resembles God as much as it can. ... Therefore mankind in submitting to a single government most resembles God and most nearly exists according to the divine intention..."²²⁵ Furthermore, since plurality corresponds to disorder, a plurality of authority results in disorder, therefore "authority

²²⁰ Dante, *On World Government*, Dino Bigongiari (ed.), p. 6.

²²¹ *Ibid.*

²²² Hence the duality of man's character, his unique hybrid status (not quite divine, not quite animal) defines humanity's purpose to be achieved collectively. (Prue Shaw, *Dante, Monarchia*, p. xvi).

²²³ *Ibid.*

²²⁴ Dante, *On World Government*, Dino Bigongiari (ed.), p. 9.

is single”, and only a single world government (the single authority) can ensure that justice is preserved.²²⁶

For Dante, representatives or kings did not exist for their own sake – a reminder that each thing has been created for a specific purpose, thereby serving a defined function – but existed for the sake of their citizens and people.²²⁷ Dante, thereafter, drew the conclusion that the world governor is necessary for the well-being of mankind: he serves justice and freedom, establishes peace, and having no other territories to conquer, he has annihilated all traces of greed and ambition. A note of caution should, however, be expressed: if a world governor is the most perfect establishment of rule on earth, it does not imply that smaller units should be under his control. Thus, Dante promoted the principle of federalism, providing kingdoms and cities with the right to internal rule. The world government is not in the position of governing the whole of the world, for diversity dwells in each single organism in nature. Canning also reiterates Dante’s advocacy of federalism, in that although Dante conceived of a universal monarch to be directed by common law and peace, he also believed that nations, kingdoms, and cities should have different laws according to their internal conditions.²²⁸ “World government... must be understood in the sense that it governs mankind on the basis of what all have in common and that ...leads all toward peace”.²²⁹ Humanity is a whole, made up of smaller parts (kingdoms, cities, communities, families, and individuals), and since each part requires a leader, the whole is not exempt from this attribute. Moreover, if we consider humanity as part of a larger whole, the cosmos, we find that the single principle of unity operates in its constituent parts, of which the human race is one. If humanity follows this order, it will mostly resemble God, who is the perfect example of oneness and unity.²³⁰ All order consists of the subordination of plurality to

²²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

²²⁶ *Ibid.*

²²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 17.

²²⁸ Joseph Canning, *A History of Medieval*, p. 150.

²²⁹ Dante, *On World Government*, Dino Bigongiari (ed.), p. 20.

²³⁰ Prue Shaw, *Dante, Monarchia*, p. xvii.

unity (*ordinatio ad unum*), and ‘many’ should always be subordinated to ‘one’.²³¹ Indeed, “It is better that what can be done by one should be done by one, not by many”.²³²

One point, however, underlines flaws in Dante’s belief in the equality of cultural and racial norms, and hence in the oneness of mankind. Dante believed in the superior nobility of the Roman people, whom he thought fit to govern the whole world, and like most of his contemporaries, including Aquinas, believed in the natural inferiority of women.²³³ However, Dante is recognised as having first conceived of the modern concept of humanity and of the human race.²³⁴ If Dante’s thought on international government was the reflection of medieval thinking, and thus did not introduce anything new, the one concept which broke away from political thought in the medieval ages was this idea of *human civilitas*, or that of a single human race.²³⁵ In the words of Heater, “Dante’s idea of the human race (*genus humanum*) has been the more significant. This notion is, in the words of one authority, “the first known expression of the modern idea of humanity”.²³⁶ Dante did not conceive of humanity made up exclusively of Christians, but also of Jews, Muslims, and Pagans. “It was this body which he termed ‘the human race’, or simply humanity (*humanitas*), or perhaps most significantly the human state, the *humana civilitas*”.²³⁷ Thus, it does not come as a surprise that Dante was devising and contemplating the idea of a world government: in his eyes, a single human race needed to find its expression in a single world polity. Despite Dante’s ingenuity, it is difficult to imagine that a single person would be in the position of governing the whole surface of the world. If that was the case, was it indeed worthwhile employing a cosmopolitan idea at all?²³⁸ Dante, however,

²³¹ Otto Gierke, *Political Theories*, p. 9.

²³² Dante, *On World Government*, Dino Bigongiari (ed.), p. 19.

²³³ In *De Vulgari Eloquentia*, Dante states that although it is in the scriptures that a woman spoke first (Eve), it is unreasonable to think that it was so. If one uses the faculty of reason, God could only have granted such a noble action to a man (Adam). (Dante, in: Marianne Shapiro, *Dante in De Vulgari Eloquentia: Dante’s Book of Exile*, (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1990), p. 50).

²³⁴ Derek Heater, *World Citizenship and Government*, p. 41.

²³⁵ See A. P. D’Entrèves, *Dante as a Political Thinker*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952).

²³⁶ Derek Heater, *World Citizenship and Government*, p. 58.

²³⁷ Walter Ullman, *Medieval Political Thought*, p. 194.

²³⁸ Derek Heater, *World Citizenship and Government*, p. 58.

placed his hopes in a single world ruler, an idea subsequently challenged by Renaissance and Enlightenment cosmopolites.

2.7 The Breakup of Universal Pretensions and the Introduction of Territorial Sovereignty

From the thirteenth century onwards, a different answer to the problems of empire came into being, representing a sharp departure from Dante's vision. This answer came in the form of state sovereignty, an outcome that the legal reality of the time had set into motion.²³⁹ In the thirteenth century, the idea of 'national' sovereignty appeared in France, when it was proclaimed that 'the king was emperor in his realm'.²⁴⁰ In Sicily, the same trend occurred, which strongly emphasised the sovereignty of the king. No one, even the emperor, could interfere with the affairs of his territorial confines, which undermined the medieval idea of universality and introduced the individual sovereign kings of lords.²⁴¹ "The ideological and legal development of the concept of state sovereignty marked the beginning of the state's exclusive competence to do what 'it pleases to do'.²⁴² Carlyle notes that, "Europe was broken up into disconnected bodies, and the cherished scheme of a united Christian state appeared less likely than ever to be realised".²⁴³

A process of disintegration occurred inside the medieval doctrine to give way to the antique/modern concept of the state unit as an 'absolute and exclusive concentration of all group life'.²⁴⁴ The beginning of 'antique-modern' ideas corresponded to the social disintegration of the Middle Ages and the construction of the theories of the state.²⁴⁵ That the State came as a result of God's will was a shared opinion: a state of nature prevailed at the beginning, slowly

²³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 195.

²⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 196.

²⁴¹ *Ibid.* See the first legal expression of territorial sovereignty in Pope Clement V's decree, in which the universality of the emperor's rule was denied. (*Ibid.*, p. 197).

²⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 199.

²⁴³ A.J. Carlyle & R.W. Carlyle, *A History of Medieval*, p. 179.

²⁴⁴ Otto Gierke, *Political Theories*, p. 21.

²⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

giving way to a compulsory motive for the foundation of the State, that justified the idea of a union of men in a political bond, a community with defined boundaries.²⁴⁶ This very idea of the state was weakened by medieval theories that first took shape and favoured a universal empire. The concept of the concentration at a single point of the whole life of the community was at odds with the medieval doctrine of a harmoniously articulated medieval community of a federalistic kind.²⁴⁷ But this concept of the state clearly won over, and deterred the practical ideas of its universal predecessor. With the confusion of knowing whether the empire or the state was the right form of human organisation, the antique Aristotelian conception of the state triumphed as the highest and all-encompassing self-sufficient community. The theory of the state was victorious, claiming that there was no room for a world state above the state, and below it, there was only room for communes, thereby destroying the *imperium mundi*.²⁴⁸ In relation to the latter, Carr contends that the modern history of International Relations can be deciphered in three periods, the first of which is “the gradual dissolution of the medieval unity of empire and church and the establishment of the national state and the national church”.²⁴⁹ The creation of a territorial state might have personified the feeling of oppression that came from the people, who had no decision-making power, and felt overwhelmed by the ecclesiastical and monarchical orders, which most probably led to the French revolution. Despite the birth of the concept of state sovereignty from the medieval framework, cosmopolitanism continued to flourish, especially in the Renaissance and the Enlightenment. By this time, cosmopolitanism had become more secular, and detached from the emphasis on the destiny of the Roman Empire.

Even if the rise of states and state-based politics appear to be at odds with a rise in cosmopolitan political thought, and whilst it seems ironic that the cosmopolitan spirit emerges whenever it feels threatened, it is relevant to note that cosmopolitanism was a strong reaction to parochial

²⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 89.

²⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 95.

²⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 97.

²⁴⁹ E.H. Carr, *Nationalism and After*, (London: Macmillan, 1968), p. 2.

politics and state-building (as in antiquity, during which cosmopolitanism can be regarded as a reaction to the *polis*). Indeed, Enlightenment cosmopolitan writers viewed the state as a ‘necessary evil’ that had to be constrained in favour of a spirit of universal brotherhood. Today, the success of international institutions have replaced this ‘thought’ with more practical studies of a more tangible cosmopolitanism, like Mitrany’s specialised agencies, or as seen by the emergence of a more efficient human rights regime like the ICC.

Part II: Renaissance to the Enlightenment: A Continuation of the Stoic Ideal

2.8 Renaissance to Enlightenment Cosmopolitan Authors: Visionaries or mere Dreamers?

The cosmopolitanism of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment was not a continuation of medieval Christianity, which developed divisive tendencies despite its universalist implications, but rather a revival of the Stoic ideal which is part of ethical cosmopolitanism:

Neither Renaissance cosmopolites (even Catholic ones) nor their eighteenth-century descendants referred to the Middle Ages and its Christian hegemony for their cosmopolitan heroes or precedents. While medieval Christianity theoretically transcended all governmental boundaries, racial and geographical divisions, the schism between western and eastern Catholicism, confessional antagonisms towards the heathen, Jew, and Mohammedan, and finally the rupture of the Reformation were factors that seriously restrained the growth of any widespread cosmopolitan spirit.²⁵⁰

Within the Enlightenment, cosmopolitanism was influenced by two main Renaissance figures: the French sceptic Michel de Montaigne,²⁵¹ and Dutch classicist Desiderius Erasmus. As Montaigne asserted, “not because Socrates said it, but because it is really by feeling, and perhaps excessively so, I consider all men my compatriots, and embrace a Pole as I do a Frenchman, setting this national bond after the universal and common one”.²⁵² Similarly,

²⁵⁰ Thomas Schlereth, *The Cosmopolitan Ideal*, p. xxi.

²⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. xxii.

²⁵² *Ibid.*

Erasmus “refused to be a violent partisan in the stormy controversies of the Reformation ... (and) continually advocated a world republic of scholars imbued with the spirit of the *tranquillitas orbis Christiani*”.²⁵³ Referring to sovereigns, Erasmus noted that, “Among themselves their alliances must be based...on sincere friendship that shares in efforts toward the common good of all”.²⁵⁴ Like the *philosophes* of the Enlightenment,

The humanists organized their friendships for the sake of a common mission, read one another’s books and manuscripts and established international academies of study. They began to develop a philosophical style that taught that despite disagreements they would strive for universal solidarity, tolerate diversity of opinion, and cooperate in a common search for truth in a republic of letters... it flourished in the secular urban cosmopolis of intelligent aristocrats, worldly merchants, and cultivated ecclesiastics.²⁵⁵

In this Republic, class counted for less than talent, and represented a movement that went beyond local circles. This contradiction in terms – cosmopolite yet exclusivist or elitist – was to endure in the Enlightenment form,²⁵⁶ a heritage that could have been bequeathed by the early Stoic dichotomy between the wise and the foolish. In the seventeenth century, faith in a single world monarch at the head of a world government was slowly declining, if not completely vanishing. Prior to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, authors such as Pierre Dubois or Erasmus could not conceive of a perfectly selfless and merciful sovereign. Erasmus hence stated, “Most of us dread the name of World Empire.... There is no doubt that a unified Empire would be best if we could have a sovereign made in the image of God, but, men being what they are, there is more safety among kingdoms of moderate power united in a Christian league”.²⁵⁷ As for the French Publicist Dubois, the possibility of one man reigning over the whole world could not be envisaged as a sane idea.²⁵⁸ If the prospective idea of a single world emperor was disappearing, it was to give way to a more dispersed system of governance, shared by several

²⁵³ *Ibid.*

²⁵⁴ Erasmus, “The Complaint of Peace”, pp. 193-194.

²⁵⁵ Thomas Schlereth, *The Cosmopolitan Ideal*, p. xxiii.

²⁵⁶ In his definition of Enlightenment cosmopolitanism, Schlereth persists that the ideal “became a social aspiration of the elite intellectual class”. (*Ibid.*, p. xii) ‘World citizen’ became the denomination of a ‘small minority of eighteenth century intellectuals’. (*Ibid.*)

²⁵⁷ Erasmus: in Derek Heater, *World Citizenship and Government*, p. 60.

sovereigns, or system of transnational organisation enshrined in the well-known “perpetual peace projects” of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

As opposed to those who believed that conflict was a natural feature of International Relations, and that balance of power policies provided the means of regulating relations among states, proponents of systems of universal peace relied on a more peaceful resolution of conflicts propelled by rulers and governments.²⁵⁹ The context prevalent in International Relations in the eighteenth century became known as “the Westphalian model of world order”.²⁶⁰ The Treaties of Münster and Osnabrück, which constituted the Treaties of Westphalia and ended the Thirty Years War in 1648, did away with papal influence and hierarchical and imperial structure within the Empire. The peace treaties transformed a ‘traditional imperial vertical model’ into a ‘modern horizontal interstate model’, and gave legitimacy to state sovereignty, and the presence of an international anarchical system.²⁶¹ With the concept of sovereignty, core concepts such as territorial integrity, the right to go to war, and non-intervention became prominent. In the words of Holsti, “War was regarded as a fact of life and as a useful instrument of diplomacy, not as a problem”.²⁶² As a direct response to the rise of the state, the middle of the eighteenth century produced a boom in peace projects, as exemplified by those of the Abbé de Saint Pierre and Rousseau.²⁶³

Although still thought to embody strong touches of utopianism, these projects ‘realistically’ contain in embryonic form contemporary international organisations from the League of Nations to the United Nations, and from the European Parliament to the International Court of Justice. As Archibugi notes, this intellectual tradition has been more influential than recognised

²⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁵⁹ Evan Luard, *Basic Texts in International Relations: The Evolution of Ideas About International Society*, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1992), p. 400.

²⁶⁰ Georg Cavallar, *Kant and The Critique of International Right*, (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1999), p. 44.

²⁶¹ *Ibid.*

²⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 46.

²⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 48.

and has paved the way not only for contemporary international institutions, but also for the development of international and global thinking – even if their authors are barely counted among founders of internationalist theory.²⁶⁴ Such schemes were mostly drafted for Europe – only few of them embodied a global perspective – but, nonetheless, represented a noticeable attempt to create a cosmopolitan constitution. In fact, the idea of a unified regional entity backed up by a federation of nations is consistent with more global schemes of socio-political cohesion inasmuch as they are designed to move beyond sole national sovereign units. As contended in the hypothesis, a transnational and peaceful system of governance (a more ‘tangible’ cosmopolitanism) is based on the theme of human fellowship emphasised and developed by the Stoics, which represents a strong aspect of ethical cosmopolitanism.

2.8.1 Emeric Crucé & Comenius: Enlightened Proponents of Cosmopolitanism?

The work of the monk Emeric Crucé is among the schemes that advocate a more precise organisational system.²⁶⁵ His work, which represents a true innovation, has been named as one of the first schemes of international organisation, not restrained by universal monarchy, the sole religion of Christendom, and free of the limits of a mere continent. Crucé’s plea is that of the settlement of international disputes by means of arbitration, the advocacy of free trade, and the condemnation of war on rational rather than religious grounds.²⁶⁶ As Tel Meulen writes, “Mit seinem *Nouveau Cynée* begründete Emeric Crucé den modernen Pazifismus... So war Crucé der erste, der ein wirklich universelles Friedenssystem verfasste”. In the same way, his colleague Christian Lange calls Crucé ‘le premier internationaliste véritable’.²⁶⁷ Additionally and more

²⁶⁴ Daniele Archibugi, “Models of International Organisation in Perpetual peace projects”, *Review of International Studies*, October 1992, Vol.18 (No.4), p. 295.

²⁶⁵ Crucé was a Catholic priest or monk. (Elizabeth V. Souleyman, *The Vision of World Peace in Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century France*, (Port Washington: London: Kennikat Press, 1972), p. 14).

²⁶⁶ Peter van den Dungen, *The Hidden History of A Peace ‘Classic’: Emeric Crucé’s Le Nouveau Cynée*, (London: Housmans, 1980), p. 27.

²⁶⁷ *Ibid.* With his *Nouveau Cynée* Emeric Crucé founded modern pacifism... Henceforth Crucé was the first to draft a true universal peace system”. (Meulen, in: *Ibid.*) Lange calls Crucé “the first genuine internationalist”.

recently, Hinsley writes that Crucé's book was "in the records of modern history, the first proposal for an international organisation that was also a proposal for maintaining peace".²⁶⁸

An important facet of the originality of this work is that contrary to most of his contemporaries, Crucé does not solely have Christian sovereigns in mind, but the whole world inclusive of Turks, Persians, Chinese, Jews, and Muslims. For Archibugi, this shows that Crucé had moved beyond the religious and cultural prejudices of his times "as to deny the European nations any privileged role".²⁶⁹ It is also the contribution of an innovative idea, namely, that of the equal dignity of each state of the international community.²⁷⁰ In *Le Nouveau Cynée*,²⁷¹ the true cosmopolitan nature of Crucé's writings can be captured in his conception of the whole human race "formed in the same mould and by the same workman".²⁷² Souleyman notes, with a close resemblance to Stoic teachings, that Crucé "regards all the peoples of the world as one body, the different members of which are in such close interdependence that the happiness or misery of one affects the whole".²⁷³ Indeed, Crucé had a strong inclination toward Roman Stoics, and conceived of the world as a common dwelling of the human race that led him to consider the separation of peoples into different provinces foolish.²⁷⁴ The cause of the enmity prevalent among the peoples of the world results from the fact that they belong to different political bodies, to "inveterate tradition", and not to the warlike inclination of humanity. Crucé wrote, "Inveterate tradition alone is responsible for the fact that man often sees in his fellow man a stranger".²⁷⁵ Crucé also suggested looking beyond differences of religion, which at their core contained the same belief of the acknowledgement and worship of God. Furthermore, he favoured the practice of tolerance since he believed that differences of religion were often used

²⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁶⁹ Daniele Archibugi, "Models of International Organisation", p. 298.

²⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

²⁷¹ The full title of his work is *The New Cyneas of Political Discourse Expounding the Opportunities and Means for Establishing General Peace and Freedom of Trade Throughout the World. To the Monarchs and Sovereign Princes of Our Time.* (Derek Heater, *World Citizenship and Government*, p. 65).

²⁷² Crucé, *Le Nouveau Cynée*, (Introduction and Translation T. H. Bach), Philadelphia: Allen, Lane and Scott, 1909, p. 93.

²⁷³ Elizabeth V. Souleyman, *The Vision of World Peace*, p. 10.

²⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁷⁵ Crucé, *Le Nouveau Cynée*, p. 85.

as an excuse for bloodshed.²⁷⁶ These ethical and world-minded traits were to serve a wider purpose, and represent one of the most important contributions made by the writer.

In conceiving an international organisation of the world that would usher in the establishment of permanent peace, Crucé identified five main causes that led to war: differences of race and nationality, differences of religion, the desire for profit, and the reparation of a wrong. He held none of them to be excusable or admissible. Besides, he found it unacceptable to enlarge one's territory for the mere sake of aggrandisement "Let every prince be satisfied with the territory he possesses and not go beyond its frontiers under any pretext".²⁷⁷ In this context, he writes, "Quel plaisir seroit-ce de voir les hommes aller de part & d'autre librement, & communiquer ensemble sans aucun scrupule de pays, de ceremonies, our d'autres diuersitez semblables, comme si la terre estoit, ainsi qu'elle est véritablement, vne cité commune à tous?"²⁷⁸ Along with this reiteration of the need for a cosmopolis, and the importance of encouraging close relations between people, Crucé advocated free trade by suggesting that it would facilitate international relations, and hence the promotion of universal peace. While van den Dungen observes that this advocacy was not to prevail in subsequent centuries, Heater thinks of him as a man ahead of his times.²⁷⁹ He contemplated the construction of roads, bridges, and designs to unite the seas, proposed the introduction of one currency in Europe, and one system of weights and measures.²⁸⁰ As Peter van den Dungen remarks,

A similar form of proposition emanated from this metropolis more than two centuries ago. Its author has no works on international law to consult. Neither Grotius, nor Pufendorf, nor Vattel had published anything upon the subject. The great tribunal which he proposed was a perpetual court of equity, composed of a representative from every recognised kingdom or government in the world.²⁸¹

²⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 87.

²⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 39.

²⁷⁸ Crucé: in Peter van den Dungen, *The Hidden History*, p. 28. "What a pleasure to see men go here and there freely, and communicate together without obstacles of countries, ceremonies, or other such like differences, as if the earth was, as it truly is, a city common to all?"

²⁷⁹ Derek Heater, *World Citizenship and Government*, p. 65.

²⁸⁰ Peter van den Dungen, *The Hidden History*, p. 28.

²⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

His thoughts that free trade would lead to the coming together of the nations was upheld a century and a half later by Adam Smith, and his principle of political economy in *The Wealth of Nations*.²⁸² In order to establish his plan for the establishment of perpetual peace, he envisaged calling together the representatives of all sovereigns, regardless of denominations such as race, or creed, and by doing so included India, China, Persia, Ethiopia, Morocco, and other countries.²⁸³ As treaties cannot ensure peace, he proclaimed the necessity of having an international court of arbitration where the final decision would be based on the majority of votes. His system belongs to a pyramidal model of international organisation, shared by authors such as Duc de Sully, the Abbé de Saint-Pierre, and William Ladd, and constitutes the skeleton of the Holy Alliance or that of the League of Nations or the General Assembly of the United Nations.²⁸⁴ The latter model functions on arbitration by the international union –members of which are sovereigns and not subjects – one vote per state, the principle that sovereignties decide on their internal constitution, and the possibility of using a joint force of the Union to suppress possible rebellions within member-states.²⁸⁵ This model does not guarantee that friction between states disappears, but rather that conflicts between them are eased and regulated by a supranational institution endowed with arbitration powers.

Furthermore, there is no reason why workable domestic institutions could not be replicated on the international level for the purpose of eliminating war.²⁸⁶ Archibugi holds that a strong version of this model has been devised by the Abbé de Saint-Pierre and Crucé, in which the union could have an international army, made up of coercive powers supplied by each member.²⁸⁷ The principle of ‘one state, one vote’ is laid down in a very similar fashion in the charter of the United Nations, which claims the sovereign equality of all its members although the permanent members of the Security Council are granted more power, and are thus “more

²⁸² *Ibid.*

²⁸³ Elizabeth V. Souleyman, *The Vision of World Peace*, p. 17.

²⁸⁴ Daniele Archibugi, “Models of International Organisation”, p. 296.

²⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 297

²⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

equal than others”.²⁸⁸ Concern for the democratic nature of this model is somewhat controversial since people are subjects of their sovereign, and cannot be defended in the international community. In this international system, individuals are excluded from civil society if they are not represented by their sovereigns. Furthermore, in such a model, peace is dependent on harmony between states more than in a stable internal constitution.²⁸⁹

Another noteworthy cosmopolitan figure is John Ahmos Komesky, a Moravian theologian better known by his Latin name Comenius, who placed his faith in the power of education along the universalist claims of Christianity. Those who have assessed the xenophobic inclinations of adults have reviewed his ideas in the twentieth century, and found that if universal education can remedy deep impregnated xenophobia, and promote world peace, then his idea is undoubtedly worth considering.²⁹⁰ Comenius was the first great educationist to give pronounced attention to the development of this concept.²⁹¹ In *Pampaedia or Universal Education*, Comenius conceived of providing education to the entire human race, regardless of age, class, sex, and nationality as they share the common trait of humanity.²⁹² Rusk shares the viewpoint that the arguments brought forward by *Pampaedia* are supported by texts from the scriptures that all should be educated, irrespective of class, creed, sex or age.²⁹³ His belief in the oneness of mankind was sustained by his Christian convictions that God has created men without discrimination, and, thus, mankind cannot change his will. In this vein, he wrote that, “...when God has not discriminated, man should not seek to appear wiser than God by disposing nature otherwise than God himself did”.²⁹⁴ All men have the common fate of birth and death, share the same inner and outer structure (human nature and bodily structure), and are endowed with an

²⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁸⁹ But even if for Saint-Pierre, or Crucé, the prerequisite for the achievement of peace was concerned with reforming relations between states, they did not intend to undermine reform within states.

²⁹⁰ Derek Heater, *World Citizenship and Government*, p. 61.

²⁹¹ *Ibid.*

²⁹² Jan Amos Komensky, *Comenius's Pampaedia or Universal Education*, (introduction and trans., A.M.O. Dobbie), (Dover: Buckland, 1986), p. 6.

²⁹³ Robert R. Rusk, *The Doctrines of the Great Educators*, (5th Edition) (Melbourne: London: Macmillan, 1979), pp. 72-73.

²⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 25.

active nature that only worldwide education can nurture.²⁹⁵ More importantly, Rusk goes on to say that Comenius was “a prophet of the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) through his advocacy of universal education as an agent of peace and harmony”.²⁹⁶ As regards Spinka, he links the oneness of vision of Comenius to the premise of one world society and thus, poses the following question, “Why cannot men form an all-inclusive world society by reason of common knowledge, common law, and common religion?”

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Comenius underlined the vision of this one world society in *Panegersia* (Universal Awakening) in which he viewed men as world citizens, and thus cannot comprehend why mankind has not yet achieved a common republic with common laws. In this book, he gave some insight into how the world should be governed on a worldwide basis, condemning the solution of a world monarch, and favouring the creation of consultation through various local assemblies, which would report to a general universal assembly (Panegersia). The members would come from local and continental regions and would make up ‘a Senate of the World’, supporting universal law for the whole human race. “Universal law must be established to serve the whole human race in all cases”.²⁹⁸ Comenius also advocated a universal language as part of a universal education, and a means to achieve world peace: “Education will not be complete without a universal grammar book and a lexicon of the new universal language”.²⁹⁹ This would ensure the invaluable possibility of communicating in a common tongue, which bears a great resemblance to the advocacy of Esperanto and world federalism in the twentieth century.³⁰⁰ Comenius’s advocacy was, thus, universal education for the entire human race since “... the whole world is a school for the entire human race...” within framework of the Christian church and precepts.³⁰¹

²⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

²⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 77.

²⁹⁷ Jan Amos Komensky, *Comenius's Pampaedia*, p. 9.

²⁹⁸ Comenius, in: Derek Heater, *World Citizenship and Government*, p. 64.

²⁹⁹ Jan Amos Komensky, *Comenius's Pampaedia*, p. 11.

³⁰⁰ Derek Heater, *World Citizenship and Government*, p. 63.

2.8.2 The European System of the Abbé de Saint-Pierre: Model for Later Cosmopolitan

Schemes

Crucé and Comenius could be depicted as innovators who envisaged a cosmopolitan order that went beyond Christianity, and inclusive of all the peoples of the world. Nonetheless, the schemes, which made a first reference to a European Union, could be of great interest to our theme. As a case in point, St Pierre's project has served as a model for more elaborated and complete world programs. Indeed, the Abbé's project can be counted among one of the most famous projects for perpetual peace, which successively influenced the international nature of the political writings of Rousseau and Kant. St. Pierre's project was the outcome of the mode of thinking that prevailed at the beginning of the eighteenth century, in which violence was abhorred, and schemes of perpetual peace flourished:³⁰² "The whole of the eighteenth century may be found in Abbé de Saint-Pierre's ideas, beliefs, hopes, illusions. Sincere love of mankind, faith that good will prevail and progress be enjoyed, that was the basis of his philosophy".³⁰³ "The famous Abbé with his hobby of perpetual peace" -as people called him- was expelled from the French Academy for not addressing the King as Louis the Great (Louis XIV), as he adopted a system of taxation, in the Abbé's eyes, which was one of the main causes of the poverty of the masses.³⁰⁴ His moral code was not based on a Christian precept, but more on the golden rule: "Do unto others as you would that they should do unto you".³⁰⁵

In a few words, the spirit of his moral system could be enshrined in a word of his own invention, namely, 'bienfaisance' (beneficence).³⁰⁶ Although the Abbé thought that man was constantly progressing and encouraged progress in all human fields, he claimed that not a great

³⁰¹ Jan Amos Komensky, *Comenius's Pampaedia*, p. 58.

³⁰² Perpetual peace projects can be regarded as a reflection of the development of free thought.

³⁰³ Goumy: in Derek Heater, *The Idea of European Unity*, (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1992), p. 70.

³⁰⁴ Elizabeth V. Souleyman, *The Vision of Peace*, p. 92.

³⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

deal had been achieved as regards the betterment of the relations between members of the human race.³⁰⁷ As with the authors mentioned before him, it is said that the Abbé was ahead of his age for dealing with the issues of better forms of government, the abolition of privileges and hereditary titles, and reforms in educational methods.³⁰⁸ He emphasised the fact that his scheme was not utopian using the examples of already existing confederations whose model could be transferred unto a larger scale. “The author would not permit any one to say that the establishment of the Federal States of Europe which he was proposing was nothing but a figment of his imagination; the Confederations of German and of Helvetic States, the Corps of the United Provinces, by their very existence, testified to the contrary”.³⁰⁹

His system of perpetual peace, like that of Crucé’s, can be said to take the pyramidal form, in which states are sovereigns and cannot interfere in other states’ internal affairs (Article II, fundamental article), and in which one state has one vote and arbitration is ensured by the international union.³¹⁰ In his project and as in Crucé’s, the Abbé viewed the relations between states as those between equal members of a European Union. The Abbé, however, restricted his project to the mere continent of Europe, and exclusively to the Christian religion.³¹¹ As with other Enlightenment thinkers, the Abbé stressed the futility of holding a lasting peace by the means of a balance of power. Furthermore, he was against the idea of expanding another state by conquest, donation, sale or other ways. (Art. IV, fundamental articles.) “Each sovereign shall be contented, he and his Successors, with the Territory he actually possesses, or which he is to possess by the Treaty hereunto joyned”.³¹² This statement reminds us of Crucé’s advocacy of not changing states borders, and preserving the status quo. As regards the balance of power, the

³⁰⁶ *Ibid.* The appointment of high officers in government should be attributed to their virtues “Appointments to high positions in Government should be made on the basis of merit, moral dignity, aptitude for work, and knowledge of political science...” (Useful Articles, Art. 3, *Ibid.*, p. 88).

³⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 77.

³⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 80.

³¹⁰ Daniele Archibugi, “Models of International Organisation”, p. 298.

³¹¹ *Ibid.*

³¹² Evan Luard, *Basic Texts*, p. 412.

Abbé made it clear that, “Neither the Balance of Power nor Treaties are sufficient to maintain peace, the only way is by a European Union”.³¹³

In his “permanent and perpetual Union”, composed of sovereigns from all Christian states, (Art.1 Fundamental Articles), the senate made up of twenty-four senators (Art. IX) was designed to ensure that hostilities between various dominions would be settled, and that contributions to the Union would be made proportional to the income of each member. (Art. X) Although the Union was restricted to the Christian states, the Abbé solicited non-European sovereigns to ally themselves with the Union, since in so doing, the possibility of insurrection against the Union would be reduced.³¹⁴ In the second discourse, the Abbé invited sovereigns to delegate representatives to meet in one of the free cities of Europe, and to declare the establishment of a Permanent league of European states, wherein compulsory membership of the League would be required.³¹⁵ It was also stipulated that the language used in the Senate would be that most commonly used in Europe, and, furthermore, that colonies should be abandoned on the grounds that they are too costly and burden the mother country.³¹⁶

In addition to the twelve fundamental articles, the Abbé added eight “important articles” based on a system of punishment and reward granted according to the degree of loyalty of individuals to the European Union, not leaving much room for individual freedom.³¹⁷ This system would ensure that the Federation is reinforced. In his “useful articles”, he points to the possibility of a worldwide, and not only European, vision when he envisages the same kind of union in Asia. “The European Union shall endeavour to establish in Asia a permanent Society like that of

³¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 414.

³¹⁴ Elizabeth V. Souleyman, *The Vision of Peace*, p. 82.

³¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 79 & 85.

³¹⁶ Evan Luard, *Basic Texts*, p. 414.

³¹⁷ For example, the Abbé writes “After the Congress shall have declared war against a Sovereign, those of his subjects who side with him against the Common Country shall be punished with death or imprisonment for life, while great rewards await those who will support the Union”. (“Important Articles”, Art. 4 in Elizabeth V. Souleyman, *The Vision of Peace*, p. 87).

Europe that peace may be maintained there also”.³¹⁸ It can be argued that the Abbé, thus, adopted an incremental approach to world governance: he could have well conceived on account of his advocacy for Asia, of peaceful regional entities, which would have harmonious relations with each other. Souleyman underlines the following points as a summary of the Abbé’s project “...The juridical organisation of a League of Nations, 2) The contribution to be made by the Allied nations for the maintenance of the Union, 3) The establishment of a permanent World Tribunal to which all differences between nations should be referred, 4) The creation of an international army which would be at the disposal of the League to support the decisions of the Tribunal, 5) The amendment of the twelve fundamental articles through unanimous vote of the Assembly and of the articles of secondary importance through a majority of votes”.³¹⁹ Like Kant after him, the Abbé viewed peace treaties as a temporary cessation of war, thereby believing in their insufficiency to ensure perpetual peace.

The Abbé’s project, if not considered utopian by its author, has been the subject of criticisms from two famous figures of the Enlightenment, Voltaire and Rousseau. Voltaire, who was inspired by Marcus Aurelius, viewed war as a result of the policies of the powerful. Not only was an international organisation impractical, but sovereigns could not bring about peace for the simple reason that they were the cause of wars.³²⁰ Voltaire disagreed with the Abbé’s idea that princes would work toward peace once they recognised that there would be more benefits in peace than war. As regards Rousseau, the plan of a European Union was a more attractive idea, and his criticisms were more carefully calculated. For him, such a Union should not be in opposition to other powers, but rather should exist because its peoples share similar historical and cultural traditions. As we shall see, the Abbé’s writings had a colossal impact on the formulation of Rousseau’s ideas, which will be portrayed in the subsequent chapter.

³¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 90

³¹⁹ *Ibid.*

³²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 301.

2.8.3 Jeremy Bentham's Idea of Peace

Between 1786 and 1789, Jeremy Bentham wrote an essay called *A Plan for an Universal and Perpetual Peace*. Like the Abbé, Bentham's plan (even though the name of his essay reveals universalism) was confined to the mere continent of Europe.³²¹ According to Bentham, the idea of peace must be grounded on 'a line of common utility between peoples, instead of trying to touch their hearts.'³²² The Abbé de Saint-Pierre prepared the way for Benthamite principles of utilitarianism, especially as his writings provided for the greatest happiness of the greatest number, and the questioning of institutions and practices that did not work toward this aim.³²³ This is a reflection of a more material cosmopolitanism: Bentham, while caring for a future of peace, advocated the pursuit of individual self-interest (or 'utility') with the view that it would be materially beneficial to all. Materialism becomes an end in itself, rather than the means towards an ethical end. Bentham's plan for 'universal and perpetual peace' was grounded on two propositions, the first being 'the reduction and fixation of the forces of the several nations that compose the European system', and the second being 'the emancipation of the colonial dependencies of each state.'³²⁴

Similar to Norman Angell in the twentieth century, Bentham viewed colonies as a financial burden on the mother country that could only be remedied by their surrender, and considered it to be pure illusion that they could increase the mother country's wealth.³²⁵ In the words of Waltz, "The expenses of conquering and holding cannot be balanced by advantages in trade, for the same advantages can be had, without expense, under a policy of free trade".³²⁶ Waltz

³²¹ Although Bentham's title denotes universality, he conceived of such a plan to reduce the tensed relations between Britain and France. (Derek Heater, *World Citizenship and Government*, (p. 82)). It might be said that his plan was more European than international.

³²² Elizabeth V. Souleyman, *The Vision of Peace*, p. 200.

³²³ Derek Heater, *The Idea of European Unity*, p. 68.

³²⁴ In: Evan Luard, *Basic Texts*, p. 415.

³²⁵ John H. Burton, (Ed.), *Benthamania: Or, Select Extracts From the Works of Jeremy Bentham With An Outline Of His Opinions On The Principle Subjects Discussed in His Works*, (Edinburgh: William Tait, 1843), p. 400.

³²⁶ K. Waltz, *Man, the State and War*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), p. 99.

somewhat ironically refers to this principle as the ‘war-does-not-pay argument’, an argument that he says dates back to Emeric Crucé in the early seventeenth century, was used by Bentham, and ‘brought to its apogee’ by Norman Angell.³²⁷ More interestingly, however, Bentham still thought that ‘savage’ tribes should be civilised; he merely wanted to abolish colonisation on the grounds of the costliness of the dependent countries. “Colonization may be the means of spreading the blessings of civilization among savage tribes: here there is a palpable advantage to those tribes themselves, and to the world at large; but it is obtained at a sacrifice on the part of the mother country”.³²⁸

In order to realise the goal of perpetual peace, Bentham found it necessary to establish a Common Court of Judicature, devoid of coercive powers, in the event of differences between nations. He also established a distinction between international laws and laws calculated for an internal government. He wrote that, “An international code ... ought to regulate the conduct of nations in their mutual intercourse”.³²⁹ Moreover, he regarded it as fallacious that laws were provided for internal disputes and not for international ones. Such findings represented a new insight for the age in which he lived, and some even claimed that international law had not been given a proper name before Bentham introduced his discovery of the dichotomy between internal and international law.³³⁰ Bentham considered that the absence of an international authority did not allow just precedents to be applied in cases of international disputes, as was the case on an internal level. When disputes between nations arise, the stronger party wins, and this erroneous precedent serves as an example for future cases, thus allowing for a situation of international injustice.³³¹ More importantly, he also noted that the absence of an international tribunal represented the opportunity for two nations to wage war in case they did not find an

³²⁷ *Ibid.*

³²⁸ John H. Burton, *Benthamania*, p. 401.

³²⁹ Bentham: in Evan Luard, *Basic Texts*, p. 415.

³³⁰ “All that Bentham wrote on the subject (International Law), is comprised within a comparatively small compass; but it would be unpardonable to omit all mention of a science which he was the means of revolutionizing, and which, previously to his taking it in hand, had not even received a proper name”. (John H. Burton, *Benthamania*, p. 396).

³³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 397.

agreement to their differences. He wrote, “Wherever there is any difference of opinion between the negotiators of the two nations, war is to be the consequence. While there is no common tribunal, something might be said for this. Concession to notorious injustice invites fresh injustice”.³³² For Bentham, an international tribunal would, thus, foster the realisation of international justice, and the avoidance of war between nations. Moreover, he conceived that each Power, which would make up the European Diet, would send two deputies to its meetings, and would ensure that secrecy would be avoided at all costs. He, thus, encouraged the liberty of the press in constituent states.³³³

Bentham, like the Abbé de Saint-Pierre, refused to consider his thoughts utopian, because he held an international tribunal to be in the interest of the parties concerned. Moreover, and again like the Abbé, he demonstrated the validity of his claims by providing examples of the existing Conventions such as the German Diet and the Swiss League that had proven to be able to avoid conflict within their realm. Their existence could provide a framework within which a wider European Union could come into being. Bentham states, “Why should not the European fraternity subsist as well as the German Diet or the Swiss league?”³³⁴ It can be argued that Bentham’s vision has been realised in the twentieth century, especially as regards the European Union and the absence of war between nations within its borders.

With regard to the location of sovereignty, he remarked, “In the United Provinces, in the Helvetic, or even in the Germanic body, where is that one assembly in which an absolute power over the whole world resides? Where was there in the Roman Commonwealth?”³³⁵ For Parekh, even though Bentham does not clarify this point, he may have expressed the thought that within a federal state, each unit is sovereign in areas of its own jurisdiction, and that sovereignty is shared in areas of common jurisdiction. This international tribunal was to take care of matters

³³² Bentham: in Evan Luard, *Basic Texts*, p. 416.

³³³ *Ibid.*, p. 417.

³³⁴ *Ibid.*

common to all nations and not interfere in the internal affairs of states. The latter could be a good pattern for worldwide jurisdiction, which would interfere in matters only common to all sovereigns and not disturb their internal arrangements. In order to demonstrate this point, Bentham indicated the possibility of a political society with a plurality of sovereigns, as was the case in the Roman Commonwealth.³³⁶ Although Bentham viewed the establishment of an international tribunal as primordial, he believed that present nations might not wish, or were, at this stage of their development, incapable of bringing such a project to life. Thus, he envisaged an international subordinate impartial authority, although he remained doubtful "...whether the community of civilised nations, may hereafter be able to establish such a tribunal".³³⁷ Bentham's solutions were, thus, very practical: if the nations of the world were not capable of arriving at the establishment of an impartial international authority, then the power of an international public opinion could. More significantly, Bentham favoured the establishment of such a tribunal, but since it seemed impossible to establish it at once, he temporarily renounced the idea for the choice of the public opinion.³³⁸

The answer is, that though there be no distinct official authority capable of enforcing right principles of International Law, there is a power bearing with more or less influence on the conduct of all nations, as of all individuals, however transcendently potent they may be – this is the power of public opinion; and it is to the end of disputing this power rightly, that rules of international law should be framed.³³⁹

Moreover, as briefly mentioned above, he believed that the principles of freedom of the press, and the disclosure of the government's proceedings to the public, have an important role to play in the shaping of public opinion, and thus of peace. Bentham's cosmopolitan insight is closely

³³⁵ Bentham, in: Bhikku Parek, *Bentham's Political Thought*, (New York: Barnes & Noble Books, 1973), p. 24.

³³⁶ *Ibid.*

³³⁷ John H. Burton, *Benthamania.*, p. 397.

³³⁸ Burton defines public opinion as "... a system of law, emanating from the body of the people". (*Ibid.*, pp. 24-25).

³³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 397.

related to his views on “the Greatest-happiness principle”, free trade, and political economy.³⁴⁰ The greatest amount of happiness to the whole of the human race he called “the Greatest-happiness principle”, which later served to define utilitarianism. For Bentham, free trade would encourage common interests, attract the “blessings of peace”, and ease the tensions between nations.³⁴¹ Bentham was only concerned with the well being of the whole of mankind, and strove to find the means and principles capable of governing a peaceful cosmopolitan society. Although he was opposed to war (he describes war as ‘not only an evil but the complication of all other evils’), he foresaw cases where it could be justified, namely in their promotion of peace and security. In the *Principles of International Law*, he gave a justification for recourse to war, and compared it to individuals resorting to courts in order to right a wrong.³⁴² He called these ‘just wars’, and defined them as wars that would have the potential of liberating the destitute from servitude and oppression, or a weak nation from the yoke of a powerful one. The guiding principle of such wars would be to strike at a government, and not at people: striking against people would be contrary to the ‘Greatest happiness principle’, and would trigger off a considerable amount of misery, while striking at a government would reduce the propensity for unhappiness.³⁴³ He, thus, stated, “The fifth object of an International Code would be to make such arrangement that the least possible evil may be produced by war consistently with the acquisition of the good which is sought for”.³⁴⁴ While Bentham encouraged commercial relations between different nations of the world, he did not consider that a political undertaking in the form of a community of nations would be advantageous. On the contrary, he feared that this might lead to despotism caused by the alliances of monarchs. Thus, Bentham envisaged an international judicial tribunal and international commercial transactions. However, he considered it dangerous to set up a political community of nations, which could end up in tyranny.

³⁴⁰ “Political Economy, if it were to be looked upon as an art, he conceived to be the art of supplying mankind at large with the greatest possible quantity of the produce of industry, and of distributing it in the manner most conducive to the well being of humanity”. (J. H. Burton, *Benthamania*, p. 399).

³⁴¹ *Ibid.*

³⁴² Kenneth Waltz, *Man, the State, and War*, pp. 96-97.

³⁴³ John H. Burton, *Benthamania*, p. 398.

This point links in with Kant's thoughts on the matter, as shown in Chapter Three.³⁴⁵

2.9 Conclusion

The present chapter has highlighted the origins of cosmopolitan thought as a reaction to particularism, in Ancient Times, the Middle Ages, the Renaissance, and the Enlightenment, that helped refine the cosmopolitan ideal in the twentieth century. The Stoics contributed crucial ideas in the development of cosmopolitan thinking, which have endured until the present day. They taught that it is virtuous to extend one's loyalty beyond one's state (the *polis*), that world citizenship does not exclude local affiliations or interest in local affairs (a notion of 'grassroots involvement'), and that all peoples are endowed with Logos (the gift of speech and reason) that governs the whole cosmos. Early Stoicism, however, regarded the distinction between wise and foolish as being more important than Logos, which denotes an elitist aspect of the early doctrine. In brief, Stoic principles amount to the idea that mankind is a universal brotherhood, that this unity is reflected in the gift of one world community (cosmopolis), and that ethics are of universal application. The Stoic idea of an ethical universal commonwealth, wherein citizens are citizens of the cosmos endured in the Middle Ages through the image of a world monarchy, and a world monarch – an aspect that had more to do with the form of world state or world government, rather than world citizenship. This period is linked to Christianity in the Middle Ages, which tended towards universalism.

The Middle Ages highlighted the need for universal structures based on the Christian belief in the oneness of God and humanity, and also criticised, as with Dante, the divisiveness of small and contained political units that are today enshrined in the body of the nation-state. Dante, thus, abandoned the restrictions of a *polis* in favour of a more open cosmopolis. These medieval cosmopolitan ideas also contributed to equating an ethical cosmopolitanism with the oneness of

³⁴⁴ Bentham: in Evan Luard, *Basic Texts*, p. 415.

³⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

humanity, and the unboundedness of cosmopolis. The Medieval cosmopolitan dialectic, as is mostly found in the writings of Dante, was thus centred on the notion of an essential unity of the human race, and its corollary of one empire and emperor. The individual, however, did not have many rights in this configuration. “The emphasis is thus on the individual being governed, not morally responding to an understanding of universal natural law. The Christian duty was one of submissive obedience to both prince and God”.³⁴⁶

The ‘negative aspects’ of the cosmopolitan ideal in this age assist in highlighting the importance of a more democratic system, whereby the individual is not only submissive to governance, but has a central voice in shaping his destiny (world citizenship), and secondly underline that the cosmopolis can no longer be defined against an ‘infidel’. As Anthony Smith notes, “Neither the Chinese, nor the Roman, nor the Buddhist, nor the Islamic civilizations could ever pretend to that universality; there were always other empires, and contrasting cultures, at their *limes*”.³⁴⁷ Furthermore, cosmopolis can no longer sustain the ideas of a single world empire, and forceful expansion devoid of consent. The ‘positive aspects’ of these times emphasise the soundness of a community wherein the absence of rigid boundaries promotes a non-territorial and non-ethnic sense of belonging, and where a universal system of organisation represents the corollary of oneness³⁴⁸.

Thomas of Aquinas, during this time, underlined that the universe was created by one God, but nonetheless, and as opposed to Dante, justified the existence of the emerging state in the nature of man. It was the latter idea that would gain ascendancy. Indeed, the introduction of the state destroyed medieval universal pretensions, and gave way to a more secular cosmopolitanism. The state became a sovereign and territorial political entity demarcated by solidified boundaries,

³⁴⁶ Derek Heater, *World Citizenship and Government*, p. 58.

³⁴⁷ Anthony D. Smith, *Nations and Nationalism*, p. 20.

³⁴⁸ The cosmos is regulated by the principle of unity in which ‘all Manyness has its origin in Oneness and to Oneness it returns’. (Otto Gierke, *Political Theories*, p. 8). It is important to clarify that ‘world empire’ was rarely conceived of outside Christian lands. (Derek Heater, *World Citizenship and Government*, p. 182).

a ‘Westphalian’ system that saw the emergence of ‘international relations’. In the Enlightenment, the idea of world citizenship was sustained by an élite ‘republic of letters’, who considered themselves to be world citizens, where common ideas and attitudes counted more than national affiliations. This secular humanitarianism was concerned with the betterment of society through perpetual peace plans, and the advocacy of world citizenship.

We have indeed seen that through the Stoics, the spirit of Dante, and Enlightenment thinkers such as the Abbé de Saint-Pierre, Crucé, and Bentham, a more universal system of institutional organisation was envisaged to go beyond war and the state. The schemes of Dante, Crucé and Comenius were somehow more universal than those of the Abbé, but all sought to move beyond the warlike inclinations of the state. Whereas Dante conceived of a world monarch, Enlightenment writers such as Crucé and Comenius were more concerned with fostering pacifying relationships existing between states and peoples. There is an evolution in cosmopolitanism from world monarchy (Dante) to a confederation of nations (Crucé), a system of international law (Bentham), or cosmopolitan education (Comenius). The democratisation of cosmopolitanism and the interplay of ideas of world citizenship and world government (in the form of a confederation of nations) came together during the Enlightenment. Although still imbued with the idea of the state as permanent, cosmopolites saw it more as a necessary evil and artificial construction, and did not envisage its disappearance – a criticism often targeted at the cosmopolitan Enlightenment. Nonetheless, they reacted to its claims of supremacy, by proposing peace projects schemes, as will be now scrutinised through the ideas of Kant, and Rousseau’s criticisms of cosmopolitanism.

The various themes presented in this chapter will be re-explored through Bahá’í lenses in Chapter Six. The notion of world citizenship, the importance of values and ethics, and the characteristics of Stoical cosmopolitanism, which are respectful of lesser loyalties (i.e., the question of loyalty), as opposed to the excessive cosmopolitanism of Diogenes, will be examined. Furthermore, the idea that the ‘true’ nature of man does not correlate to warlike

inclinations will be underlined in Chapter Six, through the ideas of Marcus Aurelius, Dante, Erasmus, and Crucé. The idea that the state of war is contrary to reason is addressed through the rejection of the need for the preservation of a balance of power in the perpetual peace projects of the Enlightenment. This idea is also correlated to the importance of devising an international organisation, or international law for peace, an aspect found in the ideas of Crucé, the Abbé de Saint Pierre, and Bentham. Chapter Six will also link the ideas of Comenius to Bahá'í views, with specific emphasis on Comenius' vision of world citizenship education and consultation.

Chapter Three – Enlightenment Cosmopolitanism in the Thoughts of Rousseau and Kant

3.1 Introduction: Enlightenment Cosmopolitanism

The Enlightenment fostered a new attitude of mind. However, this attitude was reserved to the *philosophes*, and ultimately failed to heal the bifurcation between state and inter-state. Enlightenment cosmopolitanism, therefore, never really “escaped the haughty intellectual snobbism that the Cynics first associated with the ideal”³⁴⁹ – an aspect linked with Chapter Six. The belief in the ‘abstract fundamental unity of mankind’, nevertheless, contributed to some of the humanitarian reforms of the eighteenth century, which became ‘the social aspirations of the elite intellectual class’, described by Voltaire as the world’s ‘*petit troupeau des philosophes*’.³⁵⁰ Here the idea of cosmopolitanism, or the brotherhood of man, is again linked to the notion of ethics, as it is the will to be moral that sustains the desire to launch philanthropic projects concerned with the involvement in the affairs of fellow-human beings.³⁵¹ An example of these philanthropic projects can be captured in the Abbé de St Pierre’s project to devise a scheme for world government, supported by measures such as alleviating poverty, and eradicating serfdom and torture, which were transformed into a kind of activism.³⁵² Furthermore, the Enlightenment protested against slavery and the slave trade.

Schlereth noted that this humanitarian activism represented the “secular version of the Christian ideal of service to all mankind”,³⁵³ an aspect underlined in Chapter Six. However, the Enlightenment *philosophes* remained attached, to a certain extent, to state rhetoric. “The Enlightenment failed to deliver a proper solution to the conundrum of current politics...it was a

³⁴⁹ Thomas Schlereth, *The Cosmopolitan Ideal*, p. 14.

³⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. xii.

³⁵¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 57 & 90.

³⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 90 and see Chapter Two, (2.8.2 The European System of Abbé de Saint-Pierre: Model for Later Cosmopolitan Schemes).

³⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 91.

failure in its goal of providing a universal science of politics...³⁵⁴ The good life was still thought to be possible ‘inside’ (the state realm) and not ‘outside’ (the international realm). Two Enlightenment figures, however, remained important in attempting to heal the bifurcation between intra- and inter- state politics. Rousseau and Kant ‘deserve honourable mentions’³⁵⁵ in providing noteworthy examples of Enlightenment cosmopolitanism. Even though Kant’s writings remained state-centric, he expounded the notion of ‘cosmopolitan law’ that was complementary to state and interstate relations, and that has been taken up by twentieth century advocates of cosmopolitan democracy.³⁵⁶ The Kantian findings are essential to demonstrate that cosmopolitanism surpasses international relations, and that it revolves around the human being as the central unit, diminishing the importance of the state in IR.³⁵⁷

As part of the hypothesis, Chapter Two and the present chapter show how ideas in ancient times, in the Middle Ages, in the Renaissance, and in the Enlightenment sought to create a universal, and in some cases, a regional system based on the fellowship of the human race, and on a political system that sought to move beyond the parochial concerns of limited communities. Their wish to move beyond particularism stems from an ethical vision of an unbounded community of mankind, unified through the common bond of humanity, oneness, and yearning for peace, and it is indeed these themes, which are developed in twentieth century cosmopolitanism.³⁵⁸

The cosmopolitan tradition that was bequeathed to the Enlightenment owes its existence to the Stoics. “... Some openly expressed their intellectual debt to the ancient Stoics – we may instance the influence of Cicero and Seneca on Franklin and Marcus Aurelius on Voltaire. But these were no more than attitudes of mind, all paling in comparison with Kant’s intellectual

³⁵⁴ Lucian M. Ashworth, “The Limits of the Enlightenment”, p. 1.

³⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

³⁵⁶ See Chapter Four for the project of Cosmopolitan Democracy.

³⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁵⁸ See Chapter Four.

commitment to the cosmopolitan ideal...³⁵⁹ Here we can note the links between Stoicism, the Enlightenment, and twentieth century projects such as cosmopolitan democracy, which is reviewed in Chapter Four. Rousseau, influenced by the perpetual peace project of the Abbé de Saint Pierre, attempted to discover the conundrum associated with patriotism and cosmopolitanism, and pondered over the possibility of creating a cosmopolitan society, which he eventually held to be impossible. Yet, the constant interplay of cosmopolitan and patriotic ideas in his thoughts raises an interesting debate as to the possibility of a cosmopolitan loyalty and political organisation.³⁶⁰

3.2 Jean Jacques Rousseau: A Follower of Abbé de Saint Pierre?

According to Souleyman, Rousseau gave the ideas of the eighteenth century ‘a tremendous dynamic force’.³⁶¹ Rousseau, on the recommendation of Mme Dupin, among others, disseminated the ideas of Abbé de Saint Pierre, who had often been ridiculed and mocked for his naïveté.³⁶² Although Rousseau valued the Abbé’s ideas on perpetual peace, he doubted that their immediate realisation would come to fruition.³⁶³ Moreover, he did not hold the Abbé’s scheme to be devoid of reason and presence of mind “...c’est un livre solide et sensé, et il est très important qu’il existe”³⁶⁴, but considered the Abbé’s plans for its accomplishment rather childish and simplistic.³⁶⁵ “Ainsi, quoique le projet fût très sage, les moyens de l’exécuter se sentaient de la simplicité de l’auteur. Il s’imaginait bonnement qu’il ne fallait qu’assembler un

³⁵⁹ Derek Heater, *World Citizenship: Cosmopolitan Thinking*, p. 28. Nussbaum notes Stoic impact on Kant’s philosophy. “In general, we may say that Kant’s conception of a world politics in which moral norms of respect for humanity work to contain aggression and to promote solidarity is a close adaptation of Cicero’s Stoic ideas to the practical problems of his own era”. (*Ibid.*, p. 35)

³⁶⁰ See also Chapter Six (6.4 The Question of Loyalty).

³⁶¹ Elizabeth V. Souleyman, *The Vision of World Peace*, p. 138.

³⁶² Souleyman argues that the abbé’s ideas had become known throughout the world thanks to Rousseau’s criticisms. (*Ibid.*, p. 139)

³⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 139.

³⁶⁴ “It is a reasonable and sensitive book, and so it is important that it exists”.

³⁶⁵ Rousseau, “Jugement Sur La Paix Perpétuelle”, C.E. Vaughan, (ed.), *The Political Writings of Jean Jacques Rousseau, (Vol. I)*, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1962), p. 388.

Congrès, y proposer ses Articles, qu'on les allait signer, et que tout serait fait".³⁶⁶ He found the Abbé's project "beautiful, constructive, sound" from the theoretical point of view, but not practical as Rousseau believed men to be senseless, and, first and foremost, guided by their personal interests when not in the state of nature. So, although Rousseau was inclined to believe that a Union of European States would be a germane plan, he modified Saint Pierre's project in order to make it less visionary and more achievable.³⁶⁷

Rousseau held the view that the Abbé had been wrong in believing that man's intelligence played a greater role than their passions in human affairs. Moreover, like Voltaire, he found the Abbé's faith in the sovereigns and rulers of the world rather foolish: "Ministers are in perpetual need of war... Is it not obvious that there is nothing impractical about it [the plan] its adoption by these men? What then will they do to oppose it? What they have always done: they will turn it into ridicule".³⁶⁸ For Rousseau, kings were keen on accomplishing merely two ends, namely expanding their dominion, and strengthening their rule within their borders.³⁶⁹ Rousseau found the Abbé's assumption that sovereigns would readily abandon power for the sake of instilling peace to be quite naive. Consequently, though a firm admirer of the Abbé's ideas, Rousseau asserted that the sovereign peoples and the power of democracies should be given a strong voice in designing perpetual peace. The internal constitution of states should be based on democracy and the sovereignty of the peoples, and not on monarchical power. As a consequence, the European Union would require changes in the internal political organisation of each state, and peace and security would become a result of such transformations, rather than their premise.³⁷⁰ Another argument set forth by Rousseau was that the European Union would not justify its existence because of its opposition towards other states or regions, but rather because of its

³⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 392. "Although the project is very wise, the means to realise it are oversimplified by the author. He thought, rather naively, that perpetual peace would be established just by convening a Congress, and by signing his proposed articles".

³⁶⁷ Elizabeth V. Souleyman, *The Vision of World Peace*, p. 140.

³⁶⁸ Rousseau, "Jugement Sur La Paix Perpétuelle", C.E. Vaughan, (ed.), *The Political Writings*, p. 389.

³⁶⁹ "The whole life of kings is devoted solely to two objects: to extend their rule beyond their frontiers and to make it more absolute within them". (Rousseau, in: Kenneth Waltz, *Man, The State, and War*, p. 181).

historical, cultural, and religious homogeneity.³⁷¹ “It is to Rousseau that we owe the belief that, if ever a political union were brought into being, it would exist in a continent which already enjoyed a cultural homogeneity of sound organic growth”.³⁷² If Rousseau found failures in the Abbé’s plan, the latter had come to play a major role in the development of his ideas and own writings. As Stelling-Michaud writes:

By analysing and refuting the theories of the old utopian, Jean-Jacques was led to make comparisons which enabled him to give greater precision to his own thought... All that Rousseau wrote about the foundations of the social order, political sovereignty and the nature of government, on inter-state relations, the problem of war and peace must be related to his posthumous and fond dialogue with the author of the *Project for Perpetual Peace*.³⁷³

Moreover, Rousseau considered perpetual peace to be a worthwhile project as he considered war between nations “the worst state of all” for humanity.³⁷⁴ Although Rousseau was greatly influenced by Abbé de Saint Pierre, he has sometimes been described as a forerunner of realism or as a pessimist.³⁷⁵ Yet, it has been argued that because of this very affiliation, he could also be described as a utopian pacifist.³⁷⁶ Some have claimed that it would be more correct to describe him as a realist (hence pessimist) in International Relations.³⁷⁷ It can be contended that Rousseau was pessimistic about the immediate future, and optimistic as regards the affairs of a future civilisation. His writings can be depicted as a ‘paradox’: Rousseau found it difficult to design a consistent political philosophical system, and thus his writings can be said to enshrine several trends. Rousseau demonstrated both the ability to opt for a cosmopolitan world outlook, and also for its national antithesis. Like many other writers, Rousseau’s works cannot be

³⁷⁰ Daniele Archibugi, “Models of International Organisation”, p. 301.

³⁷¹ *Ibid.*

³⁷² Derek Heater, *The Idea of European Unity*, p. 90.

³⁷³ Stelling-Michau: in *Ibid.*, p. 77.

³⁷⁴ Stanley Hoffman & David Fidler, (eds.), *Rousseau on International Relations*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), (p. xviii).

³⁷⁵ Pierre Hassner, “Rousseau and the Theory and Practice of International Relations”, in: Clifford Orwin & Nathan Tarcov, (eds.), *The Legacy of Rousseau*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), p. 200.

³⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 205. Voltaire, Kant, and more recently Waltz have described him as a utopian pacifist. They “have failed to separate Rousseau’s ideas from those of Saint-Pierre, thus distorting Rousseau’s insights into international politics”. (Stanley Hoffman & David Fidler, *Rousseau on International Relations*, p. xxiii).

³⁷⁷ Pierre Hassner, “Rousseau and the Theory”, p. 200.

described to being consistent throughout his life, and it might be true to say that he found both social order and life as a whole quite paradoxical.³⁷⁸ Prior to 1760, he was more attracted to cosmopolitan ideals, but in later works such as *The Social Contract* and *Émile*, he clearly broke with the cosmopolitan attitude.³⁷⁹ Nonetheless, throughout his life, it can be said that the issue of supra-state institutions, and the idea of a union of states, epitomised the core of his interests.³⁸⁰

3.2.1 Good Nature of Man and Evil Nature of Society

The most prominent idea given to the world by Rousseau was his belief in the candour and purity of man's nature before he would enter into a civil union with his other companions – an idea not congruent with that of original sin. The first phrase in *Émile* accordingly read, “God makes all things good, man meddles with them and they become evil”.³⁸¹ Rousseau, hence, insinuated that war is not in the nature of man, but rather in the nature of society: “...the human species has not been created solely in order to engage in war and destruction. It remains to consider war of an accidental and exceptional nature which can arise between two or more individuals”.³⁸² If man needs the social bond to develop his capacities, the latter makes him lose his goodness, and leads him to aggressiveness and malevolence. “Man is naturally peaceful and timid”, Rousseau stated, “at the least danger, his first action is to flee; he only fights through the force of habit and experience...It is only when he has entered into society with other men that he decides to attack another, and he only becomes a soldier after he has become a citizen”.³⁸³ This is the first dilemma that Rousseau found intrinsic in international relations, and which justified Rousseau's belief, like Kant, that no perfect solution could be found.

³⁷⁸ Derek Heater, *The Idea of European Unity*, pp. 78-79.

³⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

³⁸¹ Jean Jacques Rousseau, *Émile*, (London: Dent & Sons, 1966), p. 6.

³⁸² Rousseau, “The State of War”, Victor Gourevitch, (ed.), *The Social Contract and Other Later Political Writings*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 166.

Such a problem exists because different wills (or desires) characterise the nature of a society. If I have the will to have a certain possession, or do a certain thing, my neighbour might wish for something else. Since it is impossible to live with so many conflicting wills, Rousseau used the term 'general will' to describe the will of the 'best interests of the group considered as a whole'.³⁸⁴ For Rousseau, freedom was more about the freedom from one's own inclinations than freedom to act according to one's own desires, a view similar to that expounded by Kant, i.e. I am free to smoke, but I would be freer if I was freed from my inclination to smoke.³⁸⁵ Hence, the famous phrase that has been seen as contradictory "whoever refuses to obey the general will... shall be forced to be free".³⁸⁶ It is, therefore, by obeying the general will that man can attain true freedom and morality. For Rousseau, morality was crucial to domestic and international politics. Peace and international order are purely moral objectives, and as such morality cannot be detached from Rousseau's policies.³⁸⁷ This idea can be connected to the Stoic belief in one's belonging to the whole, and the interconnection of all members of society. Rousseau said, "As soon as the multitude is united in one body, one cannot injure one of the members without attacking the body, and still less can one injure the body without the members being affected".³⁸⁸ If timidity and virtue give way to aggressiveness through different stages of social conditions (such as family, tribes, and state), the remedy for such a condition is to be found in the social contract through the application of the general will. The idea is that each member willingly wants to submit to the general will because of the protection that he can benefit from it.³⁸⁹ However the general will, which is the controlling force for domestic politics, and represents the guiding force for legitimate or popular government, the source of law, and the safeguard of patriotism and virtue³⁹⁰, cannot be applied to international politics.³⁹¹ The will

³⁸³ *Ibid.*, p. 45.

³⁸⁴ Derek Matravers, (Introduction): in Rousseau, *The Social Contract*, (London: Wordsworth Editions Ltd, 1998), p. xi.

³⁸⁵ See also 3.4.4 Kant's views on freedom and morality.

³⁸⁶ Rousseau, *The Social Contract*, Victor Gourevitch, (ed.), *The Social Contract and Other*, p. 53.

³⁸⁷ Stanley Hoffman & David Fidler, *Rousseau on International Relations*, (p. xix).

³⁸⁸ Rousseau, *The Social Contract*, Victor Gourevitch, (ed.), *The Social Contract and Other*, p. 52.

³⁸⁹ Elizabeth V. Souleyman, *The Vision of Peace*, p. 143.

³⁹⁰ Virtue, in Rousseau's eyes, can be achieved when the private will of the citizen conforms to the general will and this is most effectively achieved through patriotism, 'the union of the individual with the national interest'. (Stanley Hoffman & David Fidler, *Rousseau on International Relations*, p. xiv).

of the state cannot be imposed on other states and becomes an individual will, thus breaking up the general will on the international arena.³⁹² The lack of general will between states provokes the fragility of the relations between them.

If man has succeeded in overcoming the state of nature in the State through the social contract, the same is not true on the international scene where several nations still live in the state of nature. In the words of Waltz, “The social contract theorist...compares the behaviour of states in the world to that of men in the state of nature”.³⁹³ As there are so many of us in the state of nature, we can only “co-operate or die”, and by choosing cooperation conflict becomes inevitable. Waltz explains, “He [Rousseau] imagines how men must have behaved as they began to depend on one another to meet their daily needs. As long as each provided for his own wants, there could be no conflict; whenever the combination of natural obstacles and growth in population made cooperation necessary, conflict arose”.³⁹⁴ The state being an artificial creation, or the action of man as opposed to the creation of God, it can only be belligerent. Likewise, Rousseau contended that war was a relation between state and state, rather than between man and man.³⁹⁵ In this light, Rousseau found that the existing laws of the right of nations (today known as International Law) are nothing but a chimera as conventions and agreements between states have not succeeded in transcending the state of nature.³⁹⁶ War is not in the nature of man, but rather a result of the lack of social order, therefore it can be avoided. For Rousseau, both republican and tyrannical states could wage unjust wars since there was no general will to appease the inherent tensions between nations, or no superior authority.³⁹⁷ Although a republican government has an internally ‘sound’ constitution and is governed on the rule of law and justice, the state of nature emerges when this internally perfect state has to deal with

³⁹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. xiv & xv

³⁹² *Ibid.*

³⁹³ Kenneth Waltz, *Man, The State, and War*, pp. 172-173.

³⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 168.

³⁹⁵ “It is the relation of things and not of men which constitutes war... There is no war between men; there is war only between states...” (Rousseau, “The State of War”, Gourevitch Victor, (ed.) *The Social Contract and Other*, p. 168).

³⁹⁶ Victor Gourevitch, (ed.), *The Social Contract and Other*, p. xxvii.

external bodies. Rousseau considered that the lack of general will on the international level made virtue and cosmopolitanism impossible, whilst he conceived patriotic virtue to be achievable within the state.³⁹⁸ Here, Rousseau moved from the general Enlightenment contention that despotism and absolutism were the main cause of war: a republic could also wage an unjust war.³⁹⁹ For Waltz, the fact that Rousseau depicted the international system as the cause of war renders him ‘a third image’ writer.⁴⁰⁰

3.2.2 The Idea of a Federation of States: An Impossible Ideal?

For Rousseau, there is an inherent contradiction prevalent in international politics. By creating the state to protect individuals from private wars, a state of war between nations is created which ‘kindle[s] national wars a thousand times more terrible...’⁴⁰¹ The solution to such a dilemma is, thus, to create a federal government placed under the authority of law, which will unite nations in the same way that it unites individual members within the state.⁴⁰² The path towards the abolition of war is, thus, similar to that followed by individuals in the primitive state when they formed a civilisation. There is a parallel with Rousseau’s conception of the relationship of the individual to the state, and the relationship of the state to a confederative system of states.⁴⁰³ Nations in the state of nature should take the next step and establish through a union of peoples an international contract “which would defend and protect with all its force the person and property of every member, and by means of which every one ...may... remain... as free as before”.⁴⁰⁴ According to Rousseau, the evolution of civil society was incomplete if it was only men who had renounced the state of nature, and not states vis-à-vis each other. “Each one of us is in the civil state as regards our fellow citizens, but in the state of nature as regards

³⁹⁷ Stanley Hoffman & David Fidler, *Rousseau on International Relations*, p. xvi.

³⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰¹ *Ibid.*, p. xxiv.

⁴⁰² *Ibid.*

⁴⁰³ In *Émile* Rousseau notes that it is important to leave each state as ‘its own master’ ... ‘without destroying the right of sovereignty.’ (Rousseau, *Émile*, p. 430).

the rest of the world'; a form of federal Government as shall unite nations... combines the advantages of the small and the large states".⁴⁰⁵ Rousseau initially conceived of a kind of government, which resembled a tight federation model, rather than a loose type of confederation. Rousseau originally considered a federation of states in which the law of the federation would be enforced on its members. Such a coercive measure would be taken as the self-interest of sovereigns would not desire peace, and also due to the conflicting nature of relations between states. Rousseau stated,

The Federation [that is to replace the "free and voluntary association which now unites the States of Europe"] must embrace all the important Powers in its membership; it must have a Legislative Body, with powers to pass laws and ordinances binding upon all its members; it must have a coercive force capable of compelling every State to obey its common resolves whether in the way of command or of prohibition; finally, it must be strong and firm enough to make it impossible for any member to withdraw at his own pleasure the moment he conceives his private interest to clash with that of the whole body.⁴⁰⁶

The member states of such a federation would have enough defensive forces to prevent foreign attack, and yet not enough offensive to undertake conquest.⁴⁰⁷ In the international organisation, the individual will of the state would be dependent on the will of the Congress of Nations (in the same way as the individual will is subjected to the general will in the state), and the practise of positive international law. A precondition for such an order would be the downfall of monarchies, which would encourage democracy and the sovereignty of the peoples.⁴⁰⁸ Rousseau gave the example of Europe, where similar religions, customs, and commercial interests would enable the realisation of a federal arrangement; however, he saw these mutual similarities and bonds as a potential for conflict, which sustained his belief that a coercive organisation would

⁴⁰⁴ Rousseau, "The Social Contract", Vaughan, C.E., (ed), *The Political Writings*, p. 32.

⁴⁰⁵ Rousseau, in Derek Heater, *The Idea of European Unity*, p. 81.

⁴⁰⁶ Rousseau, *A Lasting Peace through the Federation of Europe and the State of War*, (trans. C.E. Vaughan), (London: Constable & Co, 1917), pp. 38-39. In Rousseau's eyes, the federation requires (I) important powers as members, (II) a legislative body, (III), an executive power to compel obedience to the laws of the federation, (IV) the prohibition that states withdraw from the federation (which stands in contrast to Kant's voluntary federation). (Stanley Hoffman & David Fidler, *Rousseau on International Relations*, p. xxv).

⁴⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 207.

⁴⁰⁸ Elizabeth V. Souleyman, *The Vision of Peace*, p. 150.

be needed.⁴⁰⁹ These bonds can only be transformed into a peaceful force if they are organised in accordance with the rule of law, and along the lines of what Abbé de Saint Pierre proposed, “the guarantee of existing borders and of arbitration of high council”.⁴¹⁰

However, Rousseau regarded this solution as utopian, and, hence, it would not be achievable. He proposed to establish peace through law, with a federal government, but he immediately questioned its realisation. “Even part from this, such a government seems to carry the day over all others; because it combines the advantages of small and large states, because it is powerful enough to hold its neighbours in awe, because it upholds the supremacy of the law, because it is the only force capable of holding the subject, the ruler, the foreigner equally in check”.⁴¹¹ Moreover, due to the coercion that must be exercised, such a solution might do more harm than it could ever prevent. However, in Rousseau’s eyes, even the realisation of such a project was doubtful, and more than doubtful, it was not desirable. Indeed, Rousseau’s hesitation as regards the possibility of such an organisation was stronger than his firm belief in its realisation, albeit in the near future. “It is not said that if his system [Saint-Pierre’s] has not been adopted it is because it was not a good one; what should be said is that it was too good to be adopted...One never sees federal leagues established except by revolutions: and, according to this principle, who among us would dare say whether this European league is desirable or to be feared?”⁴¹² To secure princes against the rebellion of their subjects would undermine democracy at its core, as people would have no right of revolt; moreover, they would not be guaranteed protection against the tyranny of the princes. Thus, in brief, the *sin qua non condition* of subjects forsaking rebellion would be that sovereigns abandon tyranny. How would this be feasible? It is this very question that Rousseau failed to provide an answer for. Souleyman remarks “He [Rousseau] does not believe in the divine right of anointed heads; he does not see in them the proprietors of their states; he wonders how the Congress planned by the Abbé could be given the right to

⁴⁰⁹ Pierre Hassner, “Rousseau and the Theory”, p. 205.

⁴¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 206.

⁴¹¹ Rousseau, in: Pierre Hassner, “Rousseau and the Theory”, p. 205.

guarantee the sovereigns against the revolt of their subjects without assuming the duty of guaranteeing the subjects against the tyranny of the Princes”.⁴¹³ Truly, Rousseau could not have envisaged that the European Union might be used as a tool for undermining principles of democracy by overthrowing the rights of individuals to rebellion. But, in doing so, he also failed to provide a constitution that would respect the rights of individuals and peoples in an international organisation.⁴¹⁴

If the large scale universal union was utopian, Rousseau found absolution in the idea of a variety of small republics “as means of creating islands of peace within the state of war”, that is a second best alternative.⁴¹⁵ With these small and self-contained islands of peace reminiscent of the Greek Platonic ideal, the world would not be composed of cosmopolitans or world citizens, but instead it would be comprised of good and virtuous citizens.⁴¹⁶ In this sense, Rousseau’s answer was the establishment of ideal states all over the world, which would create the necessary conditions for peace.⁴¹⁷ Yet, he was aware that such a solution was doubtful due to the meagre possibility that the islands of peace would remain untouched by others, a condition that is familiar in our contemporary world. So, this ideal was also utopian.

It can be argued that Saint-Pierre was a forerunner of international organisation, but Rousseau like Kant, stood midway between world government and state sovereignty.⁴¹⁸ Although Rousseau thought the absence of a superior above states to be the cause of war, he did not prescribe an international government. He was neither the advocate of a world government, nor the advocate of nationalism. For Rousseau, a universal state was impossible in the world as it

⁴¹² Rousseau, “Jugement sur le Projet de Paix Perpétuelle”, C.E Vaughan (ed.), *The Political Writings*, p. 389.

⁴¹³ Elizabeth V. Souleyman, *The Vision of Peace*, p. 142.

⁴¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 301. Cavallar holds that there can be many interpretations of Rousseau’s writings since he developed different concepts in various writings. (Georg Cavallar, *Kant and the Critique*, p. 49).

⁴¹⁵ Pierre Hassner, “Rousseau and the Theory”, p. 205.

⁴¹⁶ Stanley Hoffman & David Fidler, *Rousseau on International Relations*, p. lxii.

⁴¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. xiii.

⁴¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. liv.

was, and in an ideal world, it was neither necessary nor desirable.⁴¹⁹ Furthermore, Rousseau's constant sarcasms about cosmopolitans remind us that he did not find it necessary to create a world government or world confederation.⁴²⁰ A note of caution should be expressed, however, because even if Rousseau were an advocate of patriotism,⁴²¹ in the sense of civic virtue and autarky, he would not have sympathised with nationalism as it is conceived today.⁴²² "The whole emphasis of Rousseau's patriotism is insular and defensive, not expansive and offensive...Rousseau's patriotism aims at civic virtue not at national power..."⁴²³ Nonetheless, Rousseau clearly envisaged the possibility of perpetual peace in a distant future, which accounts for his optimism for future generations. In *Jugement*, he wrote, "Without a doubt, the prospect of perpetual peace is presently absurd, but with another Henry VI and another Sully, the perpetual peace project will become once again sensible".⁴²⁴ Though it may seem that he falls back on the goodness of sovereigns like St Pierre, Rousseau thought that the perpetual peace project was not for his own times, but rather for the future.

3.3 Tensions in Rousseau's Thought

3.3.1 Cosmopolitan Inclinations

Rousseau displayed a cosmopolitan outlook in his conception that duties and loyalties do not necessarily have to be bound with the fatherland. In the first discourse or *On the Sciences and the Arts*, Rousseau criticised those philosophers who were "subjugated by the opinions of their century, their country, their society," and spoke highly of Descartes, Bacon, and Newton as "the

⁴¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. lvii.

⁴²⁰ *Ibid.* p. lx.

⁴²¹ "Patriotism is not only the source of individual virtue but also is a deterrent force against ambitious foreign rulers". (*Ibid.*, p. xxi).

⁴²² *Ibid.*, p. lx.

⁴²³ *Ibid.*, p. lxi and lxii.

⁴²⁴ Rousseau wrote, "La paix perpétuelle redeviendra un projet raisonnable". (Rousseau, "Jugement Sur La Paix Perpétuelle", C. E. Vaughan (ed), *The Political Writings*, p. 396.)

preceptors of the human race”.⁴²⁵ In the second *Discourse on Inequality*, Rousseau described himself as a philosopher who used “a language that suits all nations” and alluded to “a few great cosmopolitan souls who surmount the imaginary barriers that separate peoples, and who, following the example of the sovereign Being who created them, include the whole human race in their benevolence”.⁴²⁶ He continued by stating the ills engendered by the division of humanity into separate peoples:

The body politic, thus remaining in the state of nature with relation to each other, soon experienced the inconveniences that had forced individuals to leave it; and among these great bodies that state became even more fatal than it had previously been among the individuals of whom they were composed. Hence arose the national wars, battles, murders, and reprisals which make nature tremble and shock reason, and all those horrible prejudices which rank the honour of shredding human blood among the virtues. The most decent men learned to consider it one of their duties to murder their fellow men; at length men were seen to massacre each other by the thousands without knowing why; more murders were committed in the state of nature during whole centuries over the entire face of the earth. Such are the first effects one glimpses of the division of the human race into different societies.⁴²⁷

Finally, in the discourse of political economy, Rousseau referred to “the great city of the world” (la grande ville du monde) as the “body politic of which the law of nature is always the general will, and diverse states and peoples are only individual members”.⁴²⁸

3.3.2 Patriotic Inclinations

In *Poland*, Rousseau believed that “[c]osmopolitanism has destroyed the roots of patriotic ardour.”⁴²⁹ However, Rousseau’s political teachings were to focus on the greatest attachment of the citizens to their fatherland. As opposed to Diderot’s and Pufendorf’s conception of a natural

⁴²⁵ Rousseau, “First Discourse”, *The First and Second Discourses*, Roger D. Masters & Judith R. Masters (eds.), (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1964), p. 36.

⁴²⁶ Rousseau, “Second Discourse”, *The First and Second Discourses*, Roger D. Masters & Judith R. Masters (eds.), (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1964), p. 161.

⁴²⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴²⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴²⁹ Cobden, in: Victor Gourevitch, (ed.), *The Social Contract and Other*, p. xxxiv.

society of mankind, Rousseau conveyed the idea that there was no evidence of a natural society of mankind in the early draft of *The Social Contract* known as *The Geneva Manuscript*.⁴³⁰ For Rousseau, Grotius was wrong to consider the state of war as a characteristic of the human species, and not as a consequence of sociability. If there was a universal sociability, the latter would prove to be very delicate because most souls are not capacious enough to extend their loyalties to the whole world, and hence to build a political community of mankind.⁴³¹ Likewise, in *Émile*, Rousseau stated, “Distrust those cosmopolitans who search out remote duties in their books and neglect those who lie nearest”.⁴³² From “a few great cosmopolitan souls who surmount the imaginary barriers that separate peoples...”,⁴³³ Rousseau went on to distrust cosmopolitans whose remote duties could be of greater importance than “those who lie nearest”. More interestingly, in *Émile*, Rousseau found it even normal that hate prevailed towards foreigners, and praised patriotism. “Every patriot hates foreigners; they are only men and nothing to him...The great thing is to be kind to our neighbours. Among strangers, the Spartan was selfish, grasping, and unjust, but unselfishness, justice, and harmony ruled his home”.⁴³⁴

In the first version of the *Social Contract*, Rousseau defined cosmopolitans as those to whom love of fatherland was a natural consequence of their love for the human race, but given the nature of this hazy loyalty, they were incapable of loving anyone. Rousseau spoke of “...those supposed cosmopolites who, justifying their love of fatherland by their love of mankind, boast of loving everyone so that they might have the right to love no one”.⁴³⁵ Rousseau argued in *Discourse on Political Economy* that if Socrates held the whole world to be his fatherland, it meant a weak attachment to the nation. “Do we want people to be virtuous? Let us begin by making them love their fatherland: but how will they love it if their fatherland is nothing more

⁴³⁰ Gourevitch, in: *Ibid.*, p. xii.

⁴³¹ *Ibid.*, pp. xii & xiv.

⁴³² Rousseau, *Émile*, p. 7.

⁴³³ See previous page.

⁴³⁴ Rousseau, *Émile*, p. 7.

⁴³⁵ Rousseau, “Geneva Manuscript”, Victor Gourevitch (ed.), *The Social Contract and Other*, p. 158.

to them than it is to foreigners, and grants them only what it cannot refuse to anyone?”⁴³⁶ The strongest feeling belongs to our nearest loyalties, and they dissipate and weaken as they distance themselves to our spatial location. Rousseau noted, “It would seem that the sentiment of humanity dissipates and weakens as it spreads to the whole earth, and that we cannot be touched by the calamities of Tartary or Japan, as we are by those of a European people”.⁴³⁷

The love for the *patrie* is justified in a Platonic way. For Rousseau, a good political order could only exist in a rather small and isolated political entity. This is what he recommended to the Poles and Corsicans. Appropriate governance can be found in a small compass, where people know and interact with one another, and where they can be convoked by the state in a periodic assembly.⁴³⁸ Small republics are encouraged since they can be virtuous.⁴³⁹ Furthermore, he encouraged what we would today describe as isolationism. “No one who depends on others, and lacks resources of his own, can ever be free. Alliances, treaties, gentlemen’s agreements, such things may bind the weak to the strong...”⁴⁴⁰ Rousseau did not think much of colonisation, and the aggrandisement of one’s territory. In addition to the unnecessary costs they engendered, Rousseau held the view that there was nothing “as downtrodden and miserable than conquering peoples...”⁴⁴¹ For Rousseau, conquest was nothing more than the law of the strongest.⁴⁴² Similarly, he condemned slavery because of its illegitimacy (i.e., the illegitimate law of the strongest), and also because of its absurdity and meaninglessness.⁴⁴³ He also denounced any form of militarism, and the upkeep of standing armies. As we shall see in following sections, these notions are very similar to Kant’s thoughts on the subject.

⁴³⁶ Rousseau, “Discourse on Political Economy”, Victor Gourevitch (ed), *The Social Contract and Other*, p. 16.

⁴³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 29.

⁴³⁸ Marc F. Plattner, “Rousseau and the Origins of Nationalism”, in Orwin, Clifford, & Tarcov, Nathan, (eds.), *The Legacy of Rousseau*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), p. 189.

⁴³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 207.

⁴⁴⁰ Rousseau, “Constitutional Project for Corsica”, Victor Gourevitch (ed), *The Social Contract and Other*, p. 200.

⁴⁴¹ Rousseau, “Discourse on Political Economy”, Victor Gourevitch (ed), *The Social Contract and Other*, p. 28. In the eyes of Rousseau, aggrandizement and conquest had been the cause of the ruin of the Roman Empire.

⁴⁴² Rousseau, “Social Contract”, Victor Gourevitch (ed), *The Social Contract and Other*, p. 47.

⁴⁴³ *Ibid.*

3.3.3 The Pitfall of a Single Loyalty

Rousseau did not seem to have envisaged that man could love his fatherland, and let this feeling grow to embrace mankind as a whole. For him, the love for one's fatherland could only weaken as it went beyond its realms. In his eyes, "any bond of sentiment attaching us to the human race as a whole is only an extrapolation, and a weak one, from the solidarity that flourishes within certain particular societies, primarily small republics".⁴⁴⁴ In reply to Rousseau's argument, it could be argued that there should be a balance between love of humanity as a whole, and love of the motherland. It is impossible to love everybody for the simple reason that we do not know everybody, however, it is possible to love the whole creation of God/Nature, whether we know it or not, for it is a part of nature. (In this sense it is impossible to know all of our compatriots, or all the inhabitants of the earth, but it is possible to decide not to dislike those we have not met yet). Love of humankind as a whole is then not possible if we describe it as the love of each single individual on the planet – whom we cannot possibly all know – but conceivable if we regard mankind as a greater whole of which we are part. The failings of the Enlightenment can be excused on the grounds that such extensive processes of intermingling between the different peoples of the world, as witnessed today, had not yet taken place at this time.

Rousseau had clear difficulties in finding a happy medium between patriotism, nationalism, and cosmopolitanism. He found the Aristotelian preference for domestic politics over foreign relations appealing, and at the same time was slow to reject a kind of universal order. Ultimately, he rejected a universal monarchy, or any kind of worldwide political order, to favour the idea of a "general society of the human race" that he considered to be an abstraction of *philosophes*.⁴⁴⁵ The tension between natural right and political right, on the one hand, and cosmopolitanism and patriotism, on the other, led Rousseau to conclude that there was no single

⁴⁴⁴ Pierre Hassner, "Rousseau and the Theory", p. 202.

⁴⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 202

solution to the human problem.⁴⁴⁶ Rousseau eventually opted for the fact that we are firstly citizens of our fatherland, and secondly, to a lesser degree, citizens of the world.⁴⁴⁷ He did not accept the possibility of two or multiple loyalties as they could only be competing with each other. It is impossible to love two objects since it is against nature (we can only have one and not multiple passions), and this incompatibility is irrevocable. In the words of Gourevitch, “Entire peoples simply cannot wholeheartedly devote their best energies both to the greatest good of their own countries and to the greatest good of mankind as a whole”.⁴⁴⁸ Rousseau could not have possibly imagined that loyalties could be other than spatial. “The assumption that loyalties have to be spatial, rather than temporal, familial, cultural or ideological, locks Enlightenment thought into the conservative logic that the state is the vehicle for the achievement of its citizen’s interests”.⁴⁴⁹ Ashworth also puts forward another ‘error’ made by twentieth century liberals, namely, the belief that cosmopolitanism “requires a single (and impossible) all-encompassing loyalty to all humanity by the peoples of the earth”.⁴⁵⁰ Rousseau, like other Enlightenment thinkers did not envisage that, firstly, there could be loyalties beyond spatial ones, and secondly that they could be multiple and interlocking. If loyalty to all the peoples of the earth is impossible because of spatial and numerical factors (as with love for all of the citizens in a state), it can be argued that it is, however, not impossible (ideologically or on a humane level) to pledge allegiance to the whole of mankind. There is no possible limit to the quantitative potential of one’s allegiances, even if the physical requirements speak against such an extending sphere of loyalty. The multiple and interlocking processes also take place in the spatiality of the world as a whole.

⁴⁴⁶ Victor Gourevitch, *The Social Contract and Other*, p. xxviii.

⁴⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. xxix

⁴⁴⁹ Lucian M. Ashworth, “The Limits of The Enlightenment”, p. 21.

⁴⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

Time	Rousseau/Enlightenment	Today
Nature of Loyalties	Spatial/Single/Exclusive	Ideological/Interlocking/Multiple/ Worldwide

Table 1: Belief in the Nature of Loyalties in the Enlightenment and Today

Although Rousseau's preference chose patriotism, he knew that modern conditions had made virtue and isolation impossible. Accordingly, he saw the need to focus on these parts of the world embroiled with tyranny and war. So, whilst it is possible to be satisfied with one's own happiness, it is not virtuous to leave others in a state of conflict and violence. The eradication of war and oppression must be complete, rather than partial, in other words, it must be world encompassing. It is, thus, impossible to ignore the plurality of states, which to him is arranged in an imperfect fashion and is the cause tyranny and war.⁴⁵¹ In *Émile* Rousseau stated:

We shall ask ourselves whether... the submission of the individual to the authority of the Law and of other men, while at the same time the several communities remain as regards each other in the state of nature, does not leave him expose to all the evils of both conditions without the advantages of either...Is it not this partial and incomplete association which is the cause of tyranny and war?⁴⁵²

While Rousseau favoured patriotism, he was at pains to overcome the tensions between several possible loyalties, and the very contradictions this could entail. Locke and Montesquieu maintained that commercial society constituted a partial solution to the problem of strife, but Rousseau reversed the latter, stating that mutual dependence created strife. Kant, Hegel, and Marx counteracted the reversal of Rousseau, and argued that this state of war would eventually lead to the unification of the planet and to peaceful political regimes.⁴⁵³ Rousseau's works are still of relevance today, especially as he shed light on the problem of violence in certain parts of the world, and believed that such a state was unacceptable. No one can be isolated and

⁴⁵¹ Pierre Hassner, "Rousseau and the Theory", p. 204.

⁴⁵² Rousseau, *Émile*, p. 430.

⁴⁵³ Pierre Hassner, "Rousseau and the Theory", p. 214.

contented with his/her own sense of spatial security without acknowledging that extreme violence prevails in other spatial surroundings.

3.3.4 The Divine Sanction of Patriotism

For Rousseau, patriotism was given divine approbation, and hence it was made legitimate. Initially, “all polities were theocracies, all religions national, and so to speak, citizen religions: patriotism ennobled and hallowed by divine sanction”.⁴⁵⁴ However, this leads us to believe that, as Rousseau claimed, God never legitimately approved of loyalties beyond those of the fatherland. A change occurred with Christianity, which Rousseau regarded as a genuine religion, where men are children of the same God, and “all recognize one another as brothers”.⁴⁵⁵ In the *Letter to Usteri*, he wrote, “The great Society, human society in general, is founded on humanity, on universal beneficence, I say and have always said that Christianity is favourable to this Society”.⁴⁵⁶ However, Christianity “supposedly, otherworldly kingdom” became “the most violent despotism in the world”.⁴⁵⁷ In the *Social Contract*, where Rousseau mentioned Christianity as the religion of man, he endorsed the idea that the realm of Christianity was not earthly, but heavenly. He, thus, stated, “Christianity is a wholly spiritual religion, exclusively concerned with the things of Heaven, the Christian’s fatherland is not of this world...”⁴⁵⁸ Did Kant hold more optimistic views as to the possibilities of cosmopolitanism?

⁴⁵⁴ Victor Gourevitch, (ed.), *The Social Contract and Other*, p. xxiii.

⁴⁵⁵ Rousseau, “The Social Contract”, Victor Gourevitch, (ed.), *The Social Contract and Other*, p. 147.

⁴⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, “Letter to Usteri”, p. 266.

⁴⁵⁷ *Ibid.* “The Social Contract”, p. 147.

⁴⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 148.

3.4 Immanuel Kant: Cosmopolitan and Yet...

A famous answer to the international problematique sprung from the writings of the Prussian political philosopher, Immanuel Kant, who was inspired by Rousseau.⁴⁵⁹ Kant sought to construct a system in which the nation-state would be restrained by a supra-national institution, a pacific union of states and individuals. The distinctiveness of the author is reflected in Brown's critique of Kant's pamphlet *Perpetual Peace* of 1795 as the 'first genuine masterpiece of international political theory', Doyle's view that Kant is the 'greatest of all liberal philosophers', and similarly, in Booth's thought that Kant is 'the greatest of all theorists of International Relations.'⁴⁶⁰ To this Lutz-Bachman adds that the pamphlet *Perpetual Peace* contains a philosophy of international politics whose potential has not been exhausted to this day.⁴⁶¹ Kant has not always been viewed in such a favourable manner, and Carr describes him as a dreamer who wished to base 'a political system on morality alone'.⁴⁶² Yet, to characterise the nature of Kant's writings Cavallar uses the term 'anticipatory', rather than utopian, and claims that, "international relations of a sort different from our present ones are a real possibility and a proper goal of human endeavour".⁴⁶³ Where did Kant find his inspiration, and to what extent is his work still relevant to present cosmopolitan thinking?

According to Nussbaum, Kant, who made frequent references to the term 'cosmopolitan', is greatly indebted to the Greco-Roman world. Nussbaum holds that Kant's pamphlet *Perpetual Peace* is a profound defence of cosmopolitan values, and although it is part of the eighteenth

⁴⁵⁹ The international problematique can be defined as follows: international anarchy is a source of discord and war so how can it be transformed into domestic order? For example, one of the solutions considered is the replacement of international anarchy with a world government, and another solution is the strengthening of international institutions. Jens Bartelson, "The Trial of Judgement: A Note on Kant and The Paradoxes of Internationalism", *International Studies Quarterly*, June 1995, Vol. 39 (No. 2), p. 256.

⁴⁶⁰ Chris Brown, *Understanding International Relations*, 1st ed., p. 236, and Georg Cavallar, *Kant and The Critique*, p. 44.

⁴⁶¹ Matthias Lutz-Bahman, "Kant's Idea of Peace and The Philosophical Conception of a World Republic", in: James Bohman & Matthias Lutz-Bahmann, (eds.), *Perpetual Peace*, p. 59.

⁴⁶² E. H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919-1939: An Introduction To The Study of International Relations*, (London: Macmillan, 1946), p. 97.

⁴⁶³ Georg Cavallar, *Kant and The Critique*, p. 153.

century tradition, it has emerged from the ancient Greek, and especially Roman Stoic world.⁴⁶⁴ It is indeed mainly with Roman Stoicism that the first development of *kosmou polites* (world citizen) emerged, a term which would prove to be widely used by Kant, and which testifies to the continuation of cosmopolitan ethics.⁴⁶⁵ Kant has also been influenced, like Rousseau, by the Abbé de Saint-Pierre, and admired both of their writings, though he did not blindly embrace all of their convictions.⁴⁶⁶ Like Rousseau, and unlike Saint-Pierre, Kant emphasised the importance of domestic policy for international relations, and was anti-despotic: one man could not possibly represent “the united power of all”.⁴⁶⁷ In addition, Kant differed from Rousseau mainly because he thought that the state of nature was not a state of innocence. Political society had civilised man and not corrupted him, as opposed to Rousseau’s belief that political society corrupted man’s innocent state of nature.⁴⁶⁸

The title of Kant’s essay *Perpetual Peace* bears a close resemblance to that of the Abbé’s *Projet Pour Rendre la Paix Perpetuelle en Europe*, and so does its form, with the articles and clauses that characterise the sketch. It resembles Rousseau as it addresses sovereign peoples rather than kings. Like the Abbé, Kant believed the balance of power to be an illusory method for achieving peace, as it could not overcome the state of nature, and hence, it was too fragile a basis on which to establish a lasting peace.⁴⁶⁹ However, unlike the Abbé, who wished to set up a permanent congress of the states of Europe, Kant, like Crucé, widened the geographical scope of a mere continent by including all of the peoples of the world in a cosmopolitan peace. More importantly, Kant differed from both the Abbé de Saint-Pierre and Crucé, when he addressed his proposal not to the sovereigns, but rather to the ‘enlightened’ citizens of the world, whom he thought incapable of giving their consent for war.⁴⁷⁰ As Ernst-Otto Czempel points out, Kant

⁴⁶⁴ Martha C. Nussbaum, “Kant and Cosmopolitanism”, p. 28.

⁴⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶⁶ Georg Cavallar, *Kant and The Critique*, p. 49.

⁴⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 27.

⁴⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 45.

⁴⁷⁰ James Bohman & Matthias Lutz-Bachman, “Kant’s Cosmopolitan Ideal”, in “Toward Perpetual Peace: Historical Reconstructions”, in: James Bohman & Matthias Lutz-Bachman, (eds.), *Perpetual Peace*, p. 2.

insisted that it is those who suffer the consequences of war (physically or financially) who should decide upon them, and citizens would, therefore, prefer peace to war, as they are the first ones to suffer from their miseries.⁴⁷¹ Kant, by endowing citizens with decision-making power, predicted the emergence of a transnational civil society.

3.4.1 The Duality in Kant's Writings

Kant's essay *Toward Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch*, a work that best addresses the problem of war, can be interpreted in two ways. The essay begins with an ironical remark about the title that bears either an optimistic or pessimistic touch.⁴⁷² Mankind can find perpetual peace "in a vast grave where all the horrors of violence and those responsible for them would be buried".⁴⁷³ Or, more optimistically, perpetual peace can be found when the nations of the world are able to surpass the state of nature between them and form a cosmopolitan federation free from the scourge of war and violence.⁴⁷⁴ These dual optimistic and pessimistic traits depict the nature of his writings. Kant was at pains to find a perfect solution, and like Rousseau, opted for the second best choice. "...A perfect solution is impossible, nothing straight can be constructed from such warped woods from which man is made of..."⁴⁷⁵ Perfection is just the approximation of an ideal, and thus the solution finds itself in the second possible choice. Indeed, Kant's views that there is 'no perfect solution', and that everything revolves around approximation are reflected in his political advocacy.

One of the main contradictions encountered in his political advocacy, and reminiscent of the duality of his thought, was his belief in the wickedness of human nature, and yet his conviction that man could surpass the state of nature both in a civil and cosmopolitan union. Human nature,

⁴⁷¹ Georg Cavallar, *Kant and The Critique*, p. 152.

⁴⁷² James Bohman & Matthias Lutz-Bahman, "Kant's Cosmopolitan Ideal", p. 1.

⁴⁷³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷⁵ Kant, "Idea For A Universal History With A Cosmopolitan Purpose", Hans Reiss, (ed.), *Kant: Political Writings*, p. 46.

without reason, is evil, and so, for Kant, war was only a natural consequence of the wickedness of human nature. “War does not require any particular kind of motivation, for it seems to be ingrained in human nature”.⁴⁷⁶ In order to eradicate war and appease a dormant pugnacious human nature, a civil constitution must be instituted. Kant’s writings are, thus, two-sided: man is considered warlike, but despite this irrefutable fact, he can still escape the state of nature. For these reasons, it can be said that Kant was neither a complete ‘utopian’, nor a pessimist/realist. In the words of Reiss, “Kant was not a blinkered visionary, nor was he even an unpractical utopian dreamer”.⁴⁷⁷ Kant himself wrote, “Be ye wise as serpents, and harmless as doves”.⁴⁷⁸ Thus, Kant was both a cosmopolitan and a statist, believing that mankind can improve, but exclusively within certain limits. So while Kant believed in the state system, he yet believed in something more than the state system.⁴⁷⁹ Kant’s ideas also helped to draw the subtle distinction between realism and liberal internationalism. For Kant, wars constituted an impetus towards perpetual peace whereas for Waltz they reflect the perpetual state of conflict between nations.⁴⁸⁰ It is this very distinction that accounts for Kant’s optimism and for the tradition of the Enlightenment, which can be considered the starting point of liberal internationalism. Bartelson explains “...the distinction between realism and idealism as we know it⁴⁸¹ would scarcely have made sense to Kant, even if the distinction as we know it today is reminiscent of Kantian thought. As he himself [Kant] reminds us, “the world is” ought to be understood as “the world as we have made it”.⁴⁸² For Kant, reality was, thus, our own creation, and changing reality was not impossible. The world ‘as it ought to be’ signifies a change that can occur if we decide to intervene positively.

⁴⁷⁶ Kant, “Perpetual Peace”, Hans Reiss, (ed.), *Kant: Political Writings*, p. 111.

⁴⁷⁷ Hans Reiss, (Introduction), *Kant: Political Writings*, p. 39.

⁴⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷⁹ Andrew Hurrell, “Kant and the Kantian Paradigm”, p. 185.

⁴⁸⁰ Wade L. Huntley, “Kant’s Third Image: Systemic Sources of the Liberal Peace, *International Studies Quarterly*, Blackwell Publishers, March 1996, Vol. 40 (No.1), p. 50.

⁴⁸¹ We give prevalence to the *is* instead of the *ought*.

⁴⁸² Jens Bartelson, “The Trial of Judgement”, p. 256.

The transformation of negative elements (warlike inclinations of men)⁴⁸³ into a positive result (a peaceful society) is explained as follows: the negative traits of man force him to go through processes of maturation and reason to form a non-warlike society. In this way, the civil and the cosmopolitan constitutions are a mirror of one another, as they both require ‘the unsocial sociability’ of men to form peaceful societies.⁴⁸⁴ The very asocial qualities of man stimulate him to go towards a more peaceful and law-governed society, which accounts for his view on progress. The antagonism between states is similar to the situation prevalent among individuals before a civil constitution has been established.⁴⁸⁵ In *Idea For A Universal History With A Cosmopolitan Purpose*, Kant wrote in the fourth proposition, “The means which nature employs to bring about the development of innate capacities is that of antagonism within society, insofar as this antagonism becomes in the long run the cause of a law-governed social order”.⁴⁸⁶ Thus, Kant built on a pugnacious human nature to arrive at a pacific cosmopolitan society. Likewise, on the international level, and central to his ideas, was the view that war and aggression constitute a driving force for a peaceful framework of international relations. Helped by morality and the fear of annihilation, the destructive forces in man give way to a legal and peaceful system. Just as man in the state of nature needs laws to regulate his civil life, so the international life, which is devoid of laws, must emerge as an international civil society.

Furthermore, in Kant’s writings, the nature/reason dichotomy and man’s finite intelligence constituted an impetus towards the realisation of a more rational, and hence more peaceful society. Since the state of nature exists, it is difficult for mankind to exercise a complete and perfect reason. Kant saw two main impediments to the full exercise of reason. The first one was that “men live as much under the laws of nature in the natural world as they do under the laws of reason in the intelligible world. Reason, therefore, has to compete with non-rational animal

⁴⁸³ In his appreciation of the state of nature, Kant like Hobbes, presents a bleak picture of insecurity. (Andrew Hurrell, “Kant and the Kantian Paradigm in International Relations, *Review of International Studies*, Cambridge University Press, July 1990, Vol.16 (No.3), p. 186).

⁴⁸⁴ Georg Cavallar, *Kant and the Critique*, p. 114.

⁴⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 113.

impulses”.⁴⁸⁷ This led Kant to believe that a perfect rationality cannot be realised, and therefore, humans are of finite intelligence. Any decision made by humans is, thus, influenced by their particular background, and impedes a perfect rational decision.⁴⁸⁸ Thus, “because of these impediments to the effective use of reason in humans, Kant despaired of creating a better world by reason alone, and instead argued that human selfishness, and the natural desires that fuelled it, would eventually push humans towards a more rational society”.⁴⁸⁹

3.4.2 Kant and the Hidden Plan of Nature

What formed Kant’s view of ethical and political thinking was his belief that an ‘invisible hand’ directed Nature in all of its undertakings, and helped it find its purpose. “Individual men and even entire nations little imagine that, while they are pursuing their own ends, each in his own way and often in opposition to others, they are unwittingly guided in their advance along a course intended by nature. They are unconsciously promoting an end which, even if they knew what it was, would scarcely arouse their interest”.⁴⁹⁰ The question that might be of interest is whether or not this unconsciously pursued end is a cosmopolitan end. Kant, by the nature of his writings, seemed to have gone in that direction. There is an end in human nature that man is unaware of, a purpose in nature followed by the whole of mankind regardless of “the senseless course of human events”.⁴⁹¹ Regardless of the nature of events occurring in the world (and even if they seem contrary to reason), Kant seemed to have believed that they, nonetheless, led to a cosmopolitan union for mankind. The highest purpose with which Nature must work is the establishment of a civil society capable of delivering international justice. Kant described this

⁴⁸⁶ Kant, “Idea For A Universal History With A Cosmopolitan Purpose”, Hans Reiss, (ed.), *Kant: Political Writings*, p. 44.

⁴⁸⁷ Lucian M. Ashworth, *Creating International Studies*, p. 57.

⁴⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁹⁰ Kant, “Idea For A Universal History With A Cosmopolitan Purpose”, Hans Reiss, (ed.), *Kant: Political Writings*, p. 44.

⁴⁹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 42.

end as “the greatest problem for the human species”.⁴⁹² It is both the most difficult problem and the least to be given consideration by the human race.⁴⁹³ Kant summarised this idea by stating that, “the history of the human race as a whole can be regarded as the realisation of a hidden plan of nature to bring about an internally – and for this purpose also externally – perfect political constitution as the only possible state within which all natural capacities of mankind can be developed completely”.⁴⁹⁴ This perfect political constitution is now only an idea that will prove to be real in the future, and this reality, the highest purpose of nature will be that of “a universal cosmopolitan existence”.⁴⁹⁵ This highest purpose of nature constitutes the matrix within which all the capacities of the human race are able to develop.⁴⁹⁶

3.4.3 Kant and the Enlightenment

If Kant thought of the future as being guided by Providence⁴⁹⁷, he also believed in the capacity of man to develop a mature guideline that would help establish a cosmopolitan foundation for mankind. The latter is found in his approach and understanding of what constitutes a real ‘Enlightenment’. For him, the Enlightenment could be depicted as ‘man’s emergence from his self-imposed immaturity.’ In addition, the Enlightenment signified the freedom to use one’s reason in order to move toward higher stages of maturity. A note of caution should be expressed in relation to his views on freedom, which he linked to the application of moral laws. According to Kant, freedom cannot exist without established laws on a collective level. (It can individually, if we are rational, we are free, and we legislate for ourselves). Freedom, morality, and the withering away of the state of war are thoroughly interconnected.

⁴⁹² *Ibid.*, p. 45.

⁴⁹³ *Ibid.*, p. 46.

⁴⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 50.

⁴⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 51.

⁴⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁹⁷ “Perpetual peace is guaranteed by no less an authority than the great artist *Nature* herself (*natura daedala rerum*)... This design, if we regard it as compelling cause whose laws of operation are unknown to us, is called *fate*...showing the way towards the objective goal of the human race and predetermining the world’s evolution, we call it *providence*. (Kant, “Perpetual Peace”, Hans Reiss, (ed.), *Kant: Political Writings*, p. 108).

For Kant, man tended to utilise and rely on other people's understanding without developing the faculty of free and unguided thought. Once he slowly made use of the freeing impact of reason by learning how to reform his thought process, he removed the veils of immaturity and could consequently improve both himself and government rule. According to the political philosopher, man's true nature lies in progress and an ever-growing sense of maturity, which in turn leads mankind towards superior forms of government. "Reason", in the words of Kant, "condemns war", and sets the achievement of peace as "an immediate duty".⁴⁹⁸

Although man's corrupt habits may take over his true nature, the latter could undoubtedly be freed. One has to bear in mind that the maturing process is slow rather than instantaneous, arduous rather than smooth: as 'it is so easy to be immature', the path to maturity requires effort. In Kant's words, "...it is difficult for any individual man to work himself out of the immaturity that has all but become his nature..."⁴⁹⁹ In the same way, Kant made the same analogy with the state of peace and war. Since war is the natural state of men living together, the state of peace requires effort, thorough thought, and work, which are achieved through the use of reason. "...Reason does not work itself instinctively, for it requires trial, practice and instruction to enable it to progress gradually from one stage of insight to the next".⁵⁰⁰ Kant considered peace to be a quasi-moral duty, as, in his own words, perpetual peace 'must be formally instituted.'⁵⁰¹ His fervent desire for perpetual peace and cosmopolitan views can be related to his belief in the common moral improvement of what he calls 'the human species.' In addition to reason, human freedom and morality are to be achieved if the hidden plan of nature is to fulfil its purpose.⁵⁰² Kant's foremost goal was, thus, the development of the faculties of

⁴⁹⁸ James Bohman & Matthias Lutz-Bahman, "Kant's Cosmopolitan Ideal", p. 1.

⁴⁹⁹ Kant, "An Answer To The Question: 'What is the Enlightenment'", Hans Reiss, (ed.), *Kant: Political Writings*, p. 54.

⁵⁰⁰ Kant, "Idea For A Universal History With A Cosmopolitan Purpose", in: *Ibid.* p. 42.

⁵⁰¹ Kant, "Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch", in *Ibid.*, p. 98.

⁵⁰² For the political philosopher of the eighteenth century, whose main concern was human freedom, human nature is inherently bad, and freedom can be experienced only in a civil constitution and civil law. (Hans Reiss, (Introduction) *Kant: Political Writings*, p. 28).

mankind, and the mechanisms, through which this could occur, are part of his ethical and political recommendations.

3.4.4 Kant's views on Freedom and Morality

Freedom is important to understand Kant's universalist inclination. All men are free, but this freedom can entail conflicts and chaos when different individuals meet. Therefore, the freedom of one individual has to be regulated in a universally binding way. In short, the political freedom of the individual can only be obtained with legal arrangements, which would lead to the freedom of all. At the state level, the same process would take place between different states and, thus, a system of international right/law ought to prevail.⁵⁰³ The individual is at the basis of Kant's political theory, and the impulse of progress towards perpetual peace depends on him. His faith in progress concerning the individual finds its roots in the ability of the latter to learn from experience. His pietism could also account for the place of the individual in his theory.⁵⁰⁴ The reason why Kant laid so much emphasis on the morality of the individual can be explained by the fact that individuals constitute the state. Progress towards perpetual peace is dependent on their moral improvement, and can only be brought about in favourable political conditions. Thinking that the improvement of the individual can be linked to the gradual moral improvement of all peoples, he believed in the moral unity of mankind, and in the existence of a global ethical commonwealth. "Men are compelled to reinforce this law (law of equilibrium between states) by introducing a system of united power, hence a cosmopolitan system of general political security".⁵⁰⁵ Although he was against rebellion, Kant agreed with the aims of the French and American revolutions, but went further by advocating perpetual peace.⁵⁰⁶ International right was a crucial principle, and could be jeopardised by war or by its

⁵⁰³ Andrew Hurrell, "Kant and the Kantian Paradigm", p. 197.

⁵⁰⁴ Hans Reiss, (Introduction), *Kant: Political Writings*, pp. 1 & 8.

⁵⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 49.

⁵⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

preparation.⁵⁰⁷ Moreover, war is not compatible with morality. It is ‘the source of all evils and moral corruption’.⁵⁰⁸ “We regard this as barbarism, coarseness and brutish debasement of all humanity’.⁵⁰⁹ His pamphlet *Perpetual Peace* is concerned with the very relationship between different states, and the system, which should be adopted to prevent war. It represents, in contrast to war, the ‘supreme political good.’⁵¹⁰

3.4.5 Kant and Perpetual Peace

In the first section of his work ‘perpetual peace’, Kant provided some prohibitive laws, seen as necessary to abolish war. Peace is only valid if it contains no secret reservation for future wars. According to Kant, as was the case for the Abbé de Saint-Pierre, this would then only mean a mere ‘suspension of hostilities’,⁵¹¹ and not lead to real peace as such. He also suggested the gradual abolition of standing armies, which represented a constant threat of war. War machines should be abolished as their very existence made wars more likely.⁵¹² There is an exception to this prohibitive law, which could be interpreted as self-defence. “It is quite different matter if the citizens undertake voluntary military training in order to secure themselves and their fatherland against attacks from outside’.⁵¹³ The power of money constituted a threat to peace. In the eyes of the writer, no national debt (national debts, in Kant’s time, were used to finance war) should be contracted for external affairs since it could well become a cause of war. Thus, Kant prohibited national debts, which could be used by creditors as cause of aggression.

Even if Kant agreed that the balance of power could be an appropriate cause of peace, he thought that neither the balance of power nor international law could be a sufficient base on which perpetual peace could be established. There should, moreover, be recognition of the

⁵⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 34.

⁵⁰⁸ Kant, “The Contest of Faculties”, Hans Reiss, (ed.), *Kant: Political Writings*, p. 183.

⁵⁰⁹ Kant, “Perpetual Peace”, in: *Ibid.*, p. 103.

⁵¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 175.

⁵¹¹ Kant, “Perpetual Peace”, Hans Reiss, (ed.), *Kant: Political Writings*, p. 93.

⁵¹² *Ibid.*, p. 94.

sovereignty of the state leading to the principle of non-intervention. “No state shall forcibly interfere in the constitution and in the government of another state”.⁵¹⁴ This law has led some authors to question the universalist aspects of Kant’s views. In the words of Hurrell, this view “...emphasises the value that Kant places on the autonomy of states and his insistence on the importance of non-intervention”.⁵¹⁵

Kant believed that perpetual peace must be ‘formally instituted’ as the state of nature is a state of war, and international anarchy ought to be superseded. Indeed, Kant could not be satisfied with the moral improvement of the moral society: only when international anarchy is reformed through a formal agreement between states can progress towards peace be achieved.⁵¹⁶ The institution of perpetual peace is to be regulated by a republican constitution. This constitution would be based on three principles: the principle of freedom to all members of society, the principle of uniform legislation and legal equality. From Kant’s perspective, republics are less likely to go to war because of the refusal of citizens to participate.⁵¹⁷ The republican government is the only framework within which moral progress is possible.⁵¹⁸ Late twentieth century theorists of the ‘democratic peace’ have repeated this argument, which claims that even if democracies are as war prone as other states, they do not go to war with each other. Thus, a world full of democracies would be a more peaceful one.⁵¹⁹

Kant’s faith in world peace is stronger than destructive forces such as war. The invisible hand, or the providential aid, to which he referred and believed to be guiding human affairs, would eventually unite the peoples of the earth. The trends described by Kant as providential can today

⁵¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 95.

⁵¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 96.

⁵¹⁵ Andrew Hurrell, “Kant and the Kantian Paradigm”, p. 183.

⁵¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 199.

⁵¹⁷ Hans Reiss, *Kant: Political Writings*, p. 99.

⁵¹⁸ Andrew Hurrell, “Kant and the Kantian Paradigm”, p. 196.

⁵¹⁹ Chris Brown, *Understanding International Relations*, 1st ed, p. 224. Michael Doyle calls it a ‘separate peace’; democracies will not fight each other, but will be just as aggressive against non-democratic countries.

be transposed as dialectical.⁵²⁰ “Despite, and indeed, because of, human inclinations to aggressiveness and acquisitiveness, the spread and interconnection of peoples across the face of the earth will create the conditions of peace”.⁵²¹ For the political philosopher, “progress towards international peace is based on both moral improvement, self-interest and a combination of factors working at the level of the individual, domestic society, and the international system”.⁵²² The international and the domestic state of affairs are, according to him, dependent on each other. If international anarchy reigns, political liberty at the domestic level is not attainable. “The problem of solving a perfect civil constitution is subordinate to the problem of a law-governed external relationship with other states, and cannot be solved until the latter is also solved”.⁵²³

We shall now attempt to examine whether Kant’s perpetual peace was only an ideal, to which he aspired, as this is of great interest to the thesis. As he held the view that mankind could never achieve perfection, and considering that perpetual peace is a perfect state, did Kant really have faith in its fulfilment? His stress on ‘ought’, and thus on morality is continuously reiterated in his works, henceforth rendering perpetual peace a moral obligation and an aspiration, rather than an oncoming reality. He contemplated perpetual peace as an ideal, but nevertheless believed that his theory was the only one that could claim validity if peace among nations was to be established.⁵²⁴

3.4.6 Kant and the Dream of a World State

Even if Kant was among the first to use the term ‘cosmopolitanism’, which dates back to ancient times (he did not invent the concept but was among the first to use the term), his definition did not imply a world state. Kant, though strongly influenced by the ethics of the

⁵²⁰ James Bohman & Matthias Lutz-Bahman, “Kant’s Cosmopolitan Ideal”, p. 3.

⁵²¹ *Ibid.*

⁵²² Andrew Hurrell, “Kant and the Kantian Paradigm”, p. 199.

⁵²³ Kant, “Idea For A Universal History With A Cosmopolitan Purpose”, in: *Ibid.*, p. 199.

Stoics, was sceptical of a perfect society, and upheld that mankind always moved towards ‘excellence’ or ‘ideal’: following this line of argument, he maintained that perfection or excellence were unattainable. Scholars doubt whether Kant would have advocated a world government, if he had had complete rather than partial faith in mankind. In some of his works, Kant spoke of the necessity of creating an international state, but he eventually rejected the idea. He will finally fall back on the second best choice, or renounce the better idea to the best idea.⁵²⁵ Thus, since cosmopolitanism has extremely positive connotations⁵²⁶, in that it is inclusive rather than exclusive, Kant had doubts about its complete realisation. Thus, he favoured a confederation or federation of nations (the ‘negative substitute’ for a world state) rather than a perfect, and, according to him, impossible, world government. “If all is not to be lost”, he wrote, “this can at best find a negative substitute in the shape of an enduring and gradually expanding federation likely to prevent war”.⁵²⁷ Even the scholar Hedley Bull has misread Kant’s cosmopolitan views. He writes, “The Kantian or universalist view of international morality is that ...there are moral imperatives... (that) enjoin no co-existence and co-operation among states but rather the overthrow of the system of states and its replacement by a cosmopolitan society”.⁵²⁸ Kant had no intention of eradicating the state-system, rather he desired that relations between them be facilitated, improved, and harmonised. He asserted that the most perfect scheme could not be a state consisting of nations.⁵²⁹ For relations between states to be eased, he recommended the spread of republican constituted states i.e. a league of nations, or what he called a ‘pacific federation’, which would naturally and almost contagiously federate and forsake war. In this manner, an international and legally constituted federation would replace the state of nature predominant on the international scene. The internal republican reform of states could foster peace within the state’s borders, but not beyond it. Kant advocated a pacific federation or a league of nations, functioning on the principle of the ‘law of

⁵²⁴ *Ibid.* Kant, “Perpetual Peace”, Hans Reiss, (ed.), *Kant: Political Writings*, p. 106.

⁵²⁵ He will renounce the idea of a world state for that of a federation of states.

⁵²⁶ Here cosmopolitanism means the possibility of a world state.

⁵²⁷ Kant, “Perpetual Peace”, Hans Reiss, (ed.), *Kant: Political Writings*, p. 105.

⁵²⁸ Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, p. 25.

⁵²⁹ Kant, “Perpetual Peace”, Hans Reiss, (ed.), *Kant: Political Writings*, p. 102.

nations', what today might be termed 'international law'. World peace is necessary for the development of human capacities, and, thus it serves an exclusively ethical purpose.⁵³⁰

Thus, if Kant's logical solution to the problem of anarchy is to be found in an international state, it is not a realistic solution, since it relates to his idea that there is no perfect solution.⁵³¹

Moreover, this international state would not reflect the will of the peoples. Instead of the international state, Kant called for a federation of states, which he deemed to be a more appropriate solution. "Each nation, for the sake of its own security, can and ought to demand of the others that they should enter along with it into a constitution, similar to the civil one, within which the rights of each could be secured. This would mean establishing a federation of peoples. But a federation of this sort would not be the same thing as an international state".⁵³²

The aim of the federation is to abolish war, which would respect the autonomy of states, and the principle of non-intervention and have limited powers. "...Thus a kind of league, which we might call a pacific federation is required. It would differ from a peace treaty, in that the latter terminates one war, whereas the other would seek to end all wars for good... This federation does not aim to acquire any power like that of the state, but merely to preserve and secure the freedom of each state itself".⁵³³ For some, his rejection of a world republic reveals a failure to live up to his moral and political principles.⁵³⁴

For Kant, the idea of an international state contradicts itself since a number of nations forming one state would constitute a single nation, which does not match the assumption of the right of nations in relation to one another. In addition, the larger the universal state becomes the more

⁵³⁰ According to Kant, it is morally illogical to wish for one's neighbour what one does not wish for oneself, thus, war is an illogical undertaking. (Lucian M. Ashworth, *Creating International Studies*, p. 57).

⁵³¹ "...Kant speaks in Perpetual Peace of an idea of 'infinite process of gradual approximation'". (Andrew Hurrell, "Kant and the Kantian Paradigm", p. 192).

⁵³² Kant, "Perpetual Peace", Hans Reiss, (ed.), *Kant: Political Writings*, p. 102.

⁵³³ *Ibid.*, p. 104.

⁵³⁴ Kenneth Baynes, "Communitarian and Cosmopolitan Challenges To Kant's Conception of World Peace", in: James Bohman & Matthias Lutz-Bahmann, (eds.), *Perpetual Peace*, p. 225.

‘counter-productive’ it tends to be, and is, thus, doomed to fail.⁵³⁵ As regards the prospect of a universal monarchy, Kant drawing on the writings of Rousseau and Gibbon’s study on *the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, believed such an idea to be erroneous: such an institution is bound to break up into smaller states.⁵³⁶ For Kant, furthermore, states would not wish to abandon their sovereignty. “...It is not the will of the nations according to their present conception of international right”.⁵³⁷ Some argue that Kant considered the idea of an international state not to be impossible, but rather not timely.⁵³⁸ Such an achievement could indeed prove possible in the future. Since “such a solution [international state] is not the will of the nations according to their present conception of international right”, it could a possible achievement with their future conception of international right. But this argument goes against Kant’s view on the progress of humankind and his philosophy of history, namely the view that an international state cannot exist because differences of language and religion prevent state from intermingling, and the fear of losing freedom. In *Perpetual Peace*, he wrote, “For the laws progressively lose their impact as the government increases its range and a soulless despotism, after crushing the last germs of goodness, will finally lapse into anarchy”.⁵³⁹ In *The Metaphysics of Morals*, Kant once again pointed to the disastrous consequence that an international state would bring about, namely it would achieve the opposite result for which it was initially conceived. “But if such an international state of this kind extends over too wide an area of land, it will eventually become impossible to govern and thence to protect each of its members and the multitude of corporations this would require must again lead to a state of war”.⁵⁴⁰ In *Theory and Practice*, Kant rejected the idea of an international state, or more precisely ‘a cosmopolitan commonwealth under a single head’, on the grounds that it might cause ‘the most fearful

⁵³⁵ Georg Cavallar, *Kant and the Critique*, p. 116.

⁵³⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵³⁷ Kant, “Perpetual Peace”, Hans Reiss, (ed.), *Kant: Political Writings*, p.105.

⁵³⁸ See Cavallar, Georg, *Kant and the Critique*, p. 130.

⁵³⁹ Kant, “Perpetual Peace”, Hans Reiss, (ed.), *Kant: Political Writings*, p. 113.

⁵⁴⁰ Kant, “The Metaphysics of Morals”, in: *Ibid*, p. 171.

despotism.’⁵⁴¹ Henceforth the advocacy of a federation of states, rather than an international state or world government constituted a more ‘prudential choice’.⁵⁴²

Other aspects of Kant’s thoughts reject an international state. The emergence of an international state would, in the words of Kant, not constitute a ‘lawful arrangement’.⁵⁴³ Cavallar explains, “In contrast to individuals in the state of nature, most states cannot be regarded as juridical vacuums. They have already acquired a rightful or legitimate internal constitution. Hence, no state has a right to force others into a civil state, that is, into an international organisation. It is the absence of a right, not the impossibility of sufficient power”.⁵⁴⁴ Consequently, the permanent congress of states would be in the incapacity to force states to join the federation, and Kant added that the latter could be ‘dissolved at any time’.⁵⁴⁵ Thus, Kant made the distinction between a confederal structure, which is ‘a voluntary gathering of various states which can be dissolved at any time’ (and which he advocates), and a federal structure, like that of the United States, which is indissoluble and based on a political constitution.⁵⁴⁶

Kant used the term ‘international state’, rather than ‘cosmopolitan state’, probably because what he had in mind was, in some aspects, more of a statist nature than of a cosmopolitan one. For him, a cosmopolitan state could have possibly meant the abandonment of states in favour of a non-structured worldwide gathering of peoples. Kant, however, was more inclined towards organisation, and the preservation of states, rather than the abolition of state structures, which would have probably amounted to mere folly i.e. the surrender of reason.

⁵⁴¹ Kant, “Theory and Practice”, in: *Ibid*, p. 90.

⁵⁴² Georg Cavallar, *Kant and the Critique*, p. 116.

⁵⁴³ Kant, “Perpetual Peace”, Hans Reiss, (ed.), *Kant: Political Writings*, p. 129.

⁵⁴⁴ Georg Cavallar, *Kant and the Critique*, p. 119.

⁵⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 120. Kant writes that the permanent congress of states is a ‘voluntary gathering of various states’ and not a Union, for which he gives the example of the indissoluble constitution of the American States. (Kant, “The Metaphysics of Morals”, Hans Reiss, (ed.), *Kant: Political Writings*, p. 171).

⁵⁴⁶ David Held, “Cosmopolitan Democracy and the Global Order: A New Agenda”, in: James Bohman & Matthias Lutz-Bachmann, (eds.), *Perpetual Peace*, p. 250.

3.4.7 Kant and the Idea of Cosmopolitan Right/Law

In Kant's *Metaphysics of Morals*, the distinction between a law of nations (or international right (*ius gentium*), and cosmopolitan right (*ius cosmopoliticum*) is explored. Whereas the former deals with the conduct of states vis-à-vis one another,⁵⁴⁷ the latter relates to “the rational idea... of a peaceful (if not amicable) *international community* of all those of the *earth's peoples* who can enter into *active relations* with one another”.⁵⁴⁸ [Emphasis mine] As far as international right is concerned, it hints at a ‘Congress of States’ which can be dissolved at any time, and which settle its disputes “in a civilised manner”⁵⁴⁹, that is through lawful arrangements, and not through “barbaric acts”, or warlike inclinations. The concern of international right/law is, thus, to remedy the state of nature between states through the establishment of a confederation of nations (which Kant defined as a dissoluble partnership or alliance).⁵⁵⁰ Further, it aims to ensure that in this way, constant warfare will be avoided, and the advancement towards perpetual peace realised. International right/law, thus, relates to the establishment of a “universal union of states” that can produce the conditions for progressing towards perpetual peace, the ultimate, and not necessarily realisable, purpose of pure reason.⁵⁵¹

In addition to international right, Kant noted that cosmopolitan right implied an international community of peoples (which can be substituted for the term ‘world community’ as Kant’s notion is here based on peoples and not states), who regularly interacted (through commerce, visit, or hospitality) with each other. Indeed, cosmopolitan right propounds that, “all nations are originally members of the community of land”, which here importantly does not refer to a “legal community of possession”, but to a “reciprocal action (*commercium*)”, in which “each member

⁵⁴⁷ Kant defines international right or “the right of nations” as “the right of states in relation to one another”. (Kant, “The Metaphysics of Morals”, Hans Reiss, (ed.), *Kant: Political Writings*, p. 164).

⁵⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 172.

⁵⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 171.

⁵⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 165.

⁵⁵¹ Kant insists the even though perpetual peace is an ‘approximation’, working towards it is as if it were an attainable end-result, constitutes a requirement of reason. (Kant, “The Metaphysics of Morals”, Hans Reiss, (ed.), *Kant: Political Writings*, pp. 174-175).

has constant relations with all the others”.⁵⁵² These relations allude to a spirit of commerce, and a cosmopolitan right limited to the right of hospitality. The spirit of commerce, or economic cooperation, can help countries develop mutually beneficial ties of trade, investment, and other economic relations, which strengthens the bonds of peace between them. However, the idea of commerce replacing war, for Kant, substitutes a more benign selfishness for a malign form, which does not mean that he saw commerce as essentially moral, but as a possible material vehicle for the attainment of global peace.⁵⁵³

The fact that Kant advocates cosmopolitan right as the right of people to exchange ideas and goods did not go as far as including the right of citizenship.⁵⁵⁴ This version of cosmopolitan right is, in this case, a limited description of ‘world citizenship’, as Kant defined it merely as the creation of universal laws that regulate various cross-border relations between peoples. Therefore, although the peoples of the world may originally ‘possess’ the totality of the earth, the latter cannot be considered a ‘world-state’ for ‘world citizens’. The earth is partitioned into limited areas, which are the legal possession of a certain number of peoples only, and cosmopolitan right sees to it that the citizens of these different plots of land can partake in peaceful and active relations with one another. For Kant, this version of cosmopolitan right thus limits itself to commerce, the exchange of ideas, or the right not to be treated with hostility on somebody’s else territory, but it does not amount to the right of settling anywhere in the world according to one’s wishes. Indeed, the right of a world citizen, in the context of cosmopolitan right, is “to attempt to enter into a *community* with everyone else and to *visit* all regions of the earth with this intention”,⁵⁵⁵ without having the right of ‘permanent residence’. [Emphasis mine] Furthermore, this restricted notion of world community does not refer to a legal right to

⁵⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 172.

⁵⁵³ “As early as 1623 Emeric Crucé was proposing that more commerce would help promote peace, while Kant a hundred and seventy years later saw commerce as a peace-promoting outlet for selfishness that was superior to war”. (Lucian M. Ashworth, *Creating International Studies*, p. 26).

⁵⁵⁴ David Held, “Cosmopolitan Democracy and the Global Order”, p. 250.

⁵⁵⁵ Kant, “The Metaphysics of Morals”, Hans Reiss, (ed.), *Kant: Political Writings*, p. 172.

world citizenship, which would permit any human being to settle anywhere in the world by virtue of a common humanity and common possession of the earth.

As regards hospitality, Kant stated that it is ‘the right of a stranger not to be treated with hostility when he arrives on someone else’s territory.’⁵⁵⁶ According to Brown, this would mean that we are under no obligation to allow foreigners to settle and work, but that they would be permitted to enter the country if they were fleeing persecution⁵⁵⁷ – a definition that could be similar to the situation of refugees in our times. Such a restrictive view, Brown believes, is taken because of the different conditions under which Kant lived. The “modern problems posed by refugees and migrant workers simply did not exist... Temporary refuge for the occasional Enlightenment intellectual fleeing persecution was all that was required”.⁵⁵⁸

However, it is noteworthy to underline that Kant gave both a restricted and an expanded meaning to his notion of cosmopolitan right, and it is useful here to examine his broader version which can be found in his tract *Perpetual Peace*. The restricted sense being that of cosmopolitan right limited to universal hospitality can have a wider consensus “... all men are entitled to present themselves in the society of others by virtue of *their right to communal possession of the earth’s surface*”.⁵⁵⁹ [Emphasis mine] Kant noted that, “...no-one originally has any greater right than anyone else to occupy any particular portion of the earth”, and went on to underline “that *right of the earth’s surface* which the human race shares in common”.⁵⁶⁰ [Reiss’ emphasis] What the human race shares in common is the right of the earth’s surface, not only in the sense of an original possession which has been subsequently partitioned, but as a habitable land for the world’s peoples. “Only under this condition (a universal right of humanity) can we flatter ourselves that we are continually advancing towards perpetual peace”.⁵⁶¹ This wider notion

⁵⁵⁶ Kant, “Perpetual Peace”, in: *Ibid.*, p.105.

⁵⁵⁷ Chris Brown, *Understanding International Relations*, 1st ed., p. 236.

⁵⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵⁹ Kant, “Perpetual Peace”, Hans Reiss, (ed.), *Kant: Political Writings*, p. 106.

⁵⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

⁵⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p.108.

diffuses the idea that Kant interestingly linked the universal entitlement of the earth's surface to establishing world citizenship.⁵⁶² World citizenship, as recognised by Kant, is further demonstrated in this passage, which delineates a concern for the defence of universal human rights:

The peoples of the earth have thus entered in varying degrees into a universal community, and it has developed to the point where a violation of rights in one part of the world is felt everywhere. The idea of a cosmopolitan right is not fantastic and overstrained; it is a necessary complement to the unwritten code of political and international right, transforming it into a universal right of humanity.⁵⁶³

Kant's cosmopolitan right has been regarded as one of his most distinguished and innovative ideas.⁵⁶⁴ Indeed, cosmopolitan right significantly holds individuals, and not states, to be the primary juridical units.⁵⁶⁵ It is the law that deals with peoples as world citizens irrespective of the law between nations (international law) or within nations (national law).⁵⁶⁶ For Archibugi, Kant "had the merit of founding a law independent of, both the juridical relations within individual states and those existing between one state and another".⁵⁶⁷ Archibugi also underlines the interesting links between Kant's triad of laws, world citizenship, and peace. He mentions that Kant's idea of cosmopolitan right amounts to a necessary prerequisite for 'advancing towards perpetual peace'...that is, to found peace on respect of individuals as citizens of the world".⁵⁶⁸ Indeed, Kant was keen on establishing a world community, sustained by the law of world citizenship and human rights, and abhorred conquest and imperialism.⁵⁶⁹ Cosmopolitan law defines colonialism as "the inhospitable conduct of civilised states of our continent, especially the commercial states and the injustice they display in visiting foreign countries and

⁵⁶² Derek Heater, *World Citizenship: Cosmopolitan Thinking*, p. 101.

⁵⁶³ Kant, "Perpetual Peace", Hans Reiss, (ed.), *Kant: Political Writings*, pp. 107-108.

⁵⁶⁴ Kant follows closely in the footsteps of Cicero and Marcus Aurelius by stating that cosmopolitan right or law is "a necessary complement to the unwritten code of political and international law". (Martha C. Nussbaum, "Kant and Cosmopolitanism", p. 37.)

⁵⁶⁵ Georg Cavallar, *Kant and the Critique*, p. 144.

⁵⁶⁶ See Chapter Four and Cosmopolitan Democracy.

⁵⁶⁷ Daniele Archibugi, "Models of International Organisation", p. 312.

⁵⁶⁸ Derek Heater, *World Citizenship: Cosmopolitan Thinking*, p. 101.

peoples”.⁵⁷⁰ Likewise, Kant showed a great antagonism towards the question of slavery. If freedom was the principal right of a citizen, according to Kant, then it is clear that equality followed closely behind. Therefore, Kant argued that all men are equal before the law, and rules out any inferior status for the citizen such as slavery.⁵⁷¹ The basis of his ethical and political thought, thus, can be said to rely on the principle of the unity of mankind.

3.4.8 Kant and the Unity of Mankind

In his extensive study of anthropology, Kant upheld the unity of mankind, which constitutes the basis of his ethical and political thought.⁵⁷² Vlachos writes,

Kant ne se limite pas à étudier seulement en marge la géographie physique ou de la morale, les questions intéressant la nature de l’homme; ...il passe aussitôt à ... l’étude comparée de l’homme selon sa constitution naturelle et sa couleur. Cette dernière recherche relative aux “races” et “aux variétés”, élargie ... par une géographie politique, par une psychologie comparée des peuples – ...amènera progressivement le philosophe à dresser le plan de ses *Leçons d’Anthropologie*, inaugurées en 1972, et qui jettent tant de lumières sur le fond de sa pensée politique.⁵⁷³

Vlachos goes on to state, “L’on voit, dès lors, que l’anthropologie...semble avoir eu comme but principal de fournir le soubassement théorique nécessaire à l’étude métaphysique de la moralité, de la justice et des institutions politiques”.⁵⁷⁴ Based on the unity of mankind, Kant drew on further cosmopolitan principles, upon which his political policies are based. While making several distinctions with regard to love towards others, he believed that we can possibly love

⁵⁶⁹ Wade, L, Huntley, “Kant’s Third Image”, p. 49.

⁵⁷⁰ Kant, “Perpetual Peace”, Hans Reiss, (ed.), *Kant: Political Writings*, p. 106.

⁵⁷¹ Hans Reiss, *Kant: Political Writings*, p. 26.

⁵⁷² *Ibid.*, p. 36.

⁵⁷³ Georges Vlachos, *La Pensée Politique de Kant*, Bibliothèque de la Science Politique, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris VI, 1962, p. 22. “Kant does not limit himself to a minor study of physical geography or morality, or to questions prevailing to the nature of man ... he also studies man in his natural constitution and his ‘colour’. This latter research related to ‘races’ and ‘diversity’, enlarged by a political geography, by a psychology of various peoples... will gradually lead the philosopher to draft the plan of his ‘Anthropological Lessons’ introduced in 1972, which shed great light on the depth of his political thought”.

any other person, certain kinds of people, or all of humankind.⁵⁷⁵ Nussbaum states that Kant “more influentially than any other enlightenment thinker defended a politics based on reason rather than patriotism or group sentiment, politics that was truly universal rather than communitarian...”⁵⁷⁶ Furthermore, Kant did not contend that cosmopolitanism constituted the opposite of constitutional patriotism, or the love for one’s country. Indeed, the true cosmopolitan “in his affection for his country, must have the inclination to promote the welfare of the world”.⁵⁷⁷

Kant, thus, showed that affection for one’s country must be subordinate to a ‘general love for humanity.’ In Kantian thinking there is a reordering of priorities whereby the cosmopolitan overcomes the prejudices and affections of his own country for a more tolerant and enlarged viewpoint based on reason.⁵⁷⁸ Indeed, he used the term ‘cosmopolitan’ in several ways (for example the juridical or political sense), one of which is concerned with a way of thinking or mentality (*Denkungsart*). His views can be compared to Benjamin Ferencz’ famous adage “think globally – act locally”.⁵⁷⁹ Moreover, when Kant advocated republicanism, he also established the principle of the limits of tolerance. “This principle amounts to saying that all views must be tolerated provided that they are views which involve the toleration of the views of others”.⁵⁸⁰ This is similar to the view of Nussbaum who asserts that cosmopolitanism allows us to “think from the standpoint of everyone else”.⁵⁸¹

In addition to the oneness of man, another aspect of Kant’s cosmopolitanism is his belief in the oneness of religion. Kant did not believe in several religions, but upheld that there was only one

⁵⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 24. “We see, from then on, that anthropology... seems to principally provide the necessary theoretical background that permits to delve into the metaphysical study of morality, justice, and political institutions”.

⁵⁷⁵ Georg Cavallar, *Kant and the Critique*, p. 143.

⁵⁷⁶ Martha C. Nussbaum, “Kant and Cosmopolitanism”, p. 26.

⁵⁷⁷ Georg Cavallar, *Kant and the Critique*, p. 143.

⁵⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 144.

⁵⁸⁰ Hans Reiss, *Kant: Political Writings*, p. 32.

⁵⁸¹ Martha C. Nussbaum, “Kant and Cosmopolitanism”, p. 15.

religion for all. For Kant, the concept of a single religion was not opposed to different creeds, and religious books such as the Zend-Avesta, the Vedas, the Koran, and others. Beliefs are different on the grounds that they change with time, but are part of a single and permanent religion. Rousseau, who in *Émile* (a book that made Kant sometimes miss his daily walk) advocated the oneness of truth and the practice of tolerance, might have influenced Kant on this point.⁵⁸² “What, thought I, is not truth one? Can that which is true for me be false for you? ... Their choice is the result of chance, it is unjust to hold them responsible for it, to reward or punish them for being born in one country or another”.⁵⁸³

The claim that there are different religions amounts to saying that there are different moralities, which, for Kant, was an absurd idea, as morality was thought to be a product of universal reason. In this context, Kant wrote, “*Religious differences*-an odd expression! As if we were to speak of different *moralities*. ... And there may be just as many different religious books (The Zend-Avesta, The Vedas, The Koran, etc..). But there can only be one religion which is valid for all men and at all times...”⁵⁸⁴ It is easy to see that Kant would have agreed with the universality of human rights, and not conceive of various religions or cultures as constituting an obstacle to their application.

3.4.9 Assessment of Kant’s Contribution to IR Theory

Kant did not write for his own times but rather for the future “what we are seeking to know is not a history of the past... but a history of the future”.⁵⁸⁵ Indeed, after more than two centuries, Kant’s writings seem to deal with issues that are still relevant to the beginning of the twenty first century. One of the aspects of the relevance of Kant’s *Perpetual Peace* is that, at the start of the twenty first century, the rise of political violence, and the state of nature among states

⁵⁸² “Let us ... seek honestly after truth; let us yield nothing to the claims of birth, to the authority of parents and pastors...” (Rousseau, *Émile*, p. 261).

⁵⁸³ *Ibid.*, p. 250.

⁵⁸⁴ Kant, “Perpetual Peace”, Hans Reiss, (ed.), *Kant: Political Writings*, p. 114.

have not yet been resolved.⁵⁸⁶ The conditions of international peace, ultimately attributable to the eighteenth century writer, emphasise the conflict-reducing effects of representative democracy, economic interdependence, international law and organisation. Indeed, for Kant human beings can only enjoy freedom in an organised society regulated by law. Besides the pacifist role played by democracy and interdependence, inter-governmental organisations have made a significant contribution to lowering the outbreak of militarised disputes. In this regard, Kant's views can be said to be prophetic: the European Union, as an aggregation of similar liberal democratic constituted states, bears the practical traces of his writings. His theory of a liberal peace among such states has also been reaffirmed by Huntley.⁵⁸⁷

The United Nations, whose aim is to promote peace, can be compared to the federation of states that Kant had advocated two centuries ago. This is an organisation of sovereign nations. Its six main organs, the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Trusteeship Council, the International Court of Justice, and the Secretariat, which were established by the UN Charter, work with other agencies and other international organisations to provide an increasingly cohesive, yet diverse, programme of action in the fields of peace and security, humanitarian assistance, human rights, and economic and social development. In relation to Kant, this very organisation and its different organs have a similar shape to that of the 'federation of States'. Furthermore, they seem to respond to the universalist demands of the political philosopher, for whom human rights, collective security, and a 'spirit of commerce' were crucial. Strikingly, the very spirit of the Charter coincides with Kant's vision. The first article of the Charter stresses the importance of maintaining peace and security, and the resolution of conflicts in accordance with the principles of justice and international law. The article reads:

To maintain peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and

⁵⁸⁵ Kant, "The Contest of Faculties", Hans Reiss, (ed.), *Kant: Political Writings*, p. 177.

⁵⁸⁶ James Bohman & Matthias Lutz-Bahman, "Kant's Cosmopolitan Ideal", p. 2.

⁵⁸⁷ Wade L. Huntley, "Kant's Third Image", p. 45.

law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of peace.⁵⁸⁸

This international institution focuses on the importance of self-determination and the sovereignty of States, which are also a reflection of Kant's ideas. "Nothing in the present Charter shall authorise the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the jurisdiction of any state".⁵⁸⁹ Human rights were also a matter of concern for the political thinker. "The peoples of the earth have entered in varying degrees into a universal community, and it has developed to the point, where a violation of rights in one part of the world, is felt everywhere".⁵⁹⁰ The declaration of human rights, proclaimed and adopted in 1948 by the General Assembly of the United Nations, is also linked to the cosmopolitan views of Kant. Its preamble makes use of the terms 'the equal and inalienable rights of the human family' or 'friendly relations among nations' as a basis for freedom and peace in the world. It also underlines the importance of the rule of law to protect human rights. Article 1 reads, "All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in spirit of brotherhood."⁵⁹¹ Human rights demand the application of international law, as does the very idea of Kant's perpetual peace whose main objective revolves around the necessity of 'Right.' To that end, the International Court of Justice (also known as the World Court), the only judicial organ of the United Nations, and the war crimes court have been established. The ICJ describes itself as an organ of international law, and deals with the problems of the international community by promoting the rule of law.⁵⁹² Moreover, the Court assists the operations of international organisations by giving them its opinions on legal questions, emphasising the role of international law in international relations. With regard to the ICJ, it remains to be known whether Kant would have approved of such a state-centric view of justice.

⁵⁸⁸ In Geoffrey Robertson, *Crimes Against Humanity*, (Excerpts from the UN Charter), p. 598.

⁵⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁹⁰ Kant, "Perpetual Peace", Hans Reiss, (ed.), *Kant: Political Writings*, pp. 107-108.

⁵⁹¹ In Geoffrey Robertson, *Crimes Against Humanity*, (Universal Declaration of Human Rights), p. 575.

⁵⁹² Evan Luard, *The United Nations: How It Works and What It does*, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1994), pp. 88-89.

Kant's ideas are, however, not reflected in all aspects of the organisational structure of the United Nations, namely the Security Council. Even if the Security Council's main aim is to maintain peace and security, the veto of its five permanent members is not in accordance with the proposals of the eighteenth century, including Kant's perpetual peace. In fact, the 'veto power' (as it is commonly called) is more a tradition of the Concert of Europe, where the Great Powers would decide on policies of common issues. According to Brown, the common interest was weighed towards the interests of the Great Powers themselves. "The Security Council has been expected to enforce the norms of collective security and universalism, while, in its very nature, it represents the alternative, Concert, tradition".⁵⁹³ Institutional reforms have been called on, and could possibly be seen as the continuation of the Enlightenment process, which was dynamic rather than stagnant from Kant's perspective.

Kant's vision seems to have been realised in several ways. The United Nations, although they have very little power of coercion, can sanction states in international relations to a certain degree. There is also a case for arguing that human rights have made a positive intrusion in public law, and this has often been accomplished by NGOs through the channel of public opinion. Archibugi writes, "The role of answering the constitutions and political practice of states -albeit solely with the aim of informing public opinion- has been mainly performed by non governmental organisations such as Amnesty International rather than by a supranational organisation with some claim to being the expression of the inhabitants of the planet".⁵⁹⁴ Furthermore, even though some states refuse to recognise them, violations of human rights can be denounced, but it is far more difficult to denounce the flaws in the practice of democracy, such as free elections, since they are claimed not to be universally valid.⁵⁹⁵ The model of cosmopolitan right that Kant has in mind is partially but not fully achieved. There is no organisation in the international community that has been founded to represent the citizens of the world, rather than their states. So whilst the United Nations has been achieved, there has not

⁵⁹³ Chris Brown, *Understanding International Relations*, 1st ed., p. 140.

⁵⁹⁴ Daniele Archibugi, "Models of Political Organisation", p. 314.

been as yet a ‘United Peoples of the World’ organisation. Such an organisation would imply that citizens could be represented in an assembly other than their own states.⁵⁹⁶

3.5 Further Contemporary Implications

The role of the nation-state in international relations has today become more complex as forces working independently of its realm affect local, national, regional, and international spheres due to the closer economic, political, cultural, and humane interactions. The implications of Kant’s cosmopolitan law for contemporary International Relations are striking. Kant spoke for the creation of new institutions of cosmopolitan law that would transcend civil law, and thus the nation-state.⁵⁹⁷ Indeed, it is possible for states to be internally peaceful, but yet they can also be externally bellicose. Consequently, institutions of cosmopolitan law are required.⁵⁹⁸ His belief in cosmopolitan law comes as a result of his pluralist vision of global order, and his positive cosmopolitan views. Cosmopolitan law partly rests on the need for an enlightened global society, or world citizens, that include the rights of individuals against the nation-state.⁵⁹⁹ For Habermas, the forces that are currently unleashed by globalisation can only be peaceful if the *sine qua non* condition of Kant’s cosmopolitan law is fulfilled i.e. if the human rights of world citizens acquire power over and against the nation-states, of which they are citizens and/or residents.⁶⁰⁰ Arendt argues that, today, human rights cannot only be enforceable by nation-states, which sometimes use their power to abuse human rights for “political, religious, or nationalist goals”.⁶⁰¹ Kant, like many of his contemporaries, upheld the principle of the

⁵⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵⁹⁷ Cavallar underlines the fact that ‘cosmopolitan’ is at the heart of Kantian thinking on the international level, in that it goes beyond the scope of the Westphalian model of sovereign states”. (*Ibid.*, p. 144).

⁵⁹⁸ James Bohman & Matthias Lutz-Bahman, “Kant’s Cosmopolitan Ideal”, p. 5.

⁵⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

⁶⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

⁶⁰¹ *Ibid.*, p. 18.

sovereignty of states, which, nonetheless, can stand in the way of cosmopolitan law and the practice of human rights.⁶⁰²

More than two hundred years have passed since Kant's perpetual peace. The contemporary relevance of his writings demonstrates the validity of his thoughts. Kant's project was visionary, and two centuries seem to be insufficient to confirm the accuracy of his vision. His idea of progressive history contradicts his claim that states would ever be willing to give up their sovereignty, a word that could include the right to wage a war or kill in the name of the nation. Possibly mankind is not mature enough to be thinking seriously about the idea of universal perpetual peace. As Kant wrote, "We are cultivated to a high degree by art and science. We are civilised to the point of excess in all kinds of social courtesies and properties. But we are still a long way from the point, where we could consider ourselves morally mature".⁶⁰³

3.6 Conclusion

The fact that cosmopolitan epochs were followed by nationalistic ones (such is the case with the Enlightenment, which was followed in the nineteenth century by an age of extreme nationalism as conceived by the German romantics) can constitute an argument for cosmopolitanism's failure to triumph in International Relations. However, counter-arguments can be put forward: the age of the Enlightenment was not armed to deal with the concrete possibility of a global community. "The unification of the world – the world wider than the trans-Atlantic community – into a true "cosmopolis" was not yet possible, for in the eighteenth century the technical and organisational conditions were not yet existent".⁶⁰⁴ The Enlightenment was a worthwhile attempt at cosmopolitanism, first of all by succeeding to keep the ideal alive; nonetheless, its failures are quite clear. For all the debates on the 'unity of mankind', the latter was reserved to

⁶⁰² *Ibid.*

⁶⁰³ Kant, "Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose", Hans Reiss, (ed.), *Kant: Political Writings*, p. 49.

⁶⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 124.

an élite, to the urban intellectual white man that fostered a certain sense of uniformity. Furthermore, "... it is clear that his vision [Kant's] of a 'great political body of the future' would demand a certain level of uniformity around the world".⁶⁰⁵ Nonetheless, such a case is not 'universal' throughout the Enlightenment.

Montesquieu, in his *Persian Letters*, exceptionally denied that one's own perceptions and conventions were superior to others. He wrote, 'the Negroes paint the devil sparkling white, and their Gods as black as coal...' In relation to the latter, Devetak notes, "the journey of self-discovery must begin with a departure towards the other. Only in this way will knowledge approach universality and escape ethnocentrism".⁶⁰⁶ There is, to another extent, in this Enlightenment tradition of thought, a concern to balance diversity with universal principles. More importantly, despite the diversity of nations, some universal principles such as justice (as opposed to despotism) and tolerance apply.⁶⁰⁷ Notwithstanding these successes and failures, one element remained unresolved in the Enlightenment, and it has been bequeathed to our own age. This relates to the nature of the relationship between state and inter-state. "The Enlightenment regarded the nation as mainly a civic, legal conception; it was composed of individuals bound together not necessarily because they had the same language, history of culture but because they had the same rights and liberties".⁶⁰⁸ Kant, who of course, can be criticised for the above reasons, nonetheless, attempted to heal this inter-state and state divide. His *jus cosmopolitanum* was the notion that helped reconcile the two spheres – the state and the international with a broader conception of a cosmopolitan law. "The ideas of international organisations, of global federalism, of functional integration and transnational pluralism represented direct, but belated, attempts by the liberal Enlightenment to reincorporate inter-state practice into the mainstream of

⁶⁰⁵ Richard Devetak, "The Project of Modernity", p. 32.

⁶⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 34.

⁶⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

⁶⁰⁸ Thomas Schlereth, *The Cosmopolitan Ideal*, p. 109.

modernity”.⁶⁰⁹ As underlined in Chapter One, the Enlightenment was a reaction to the creation of the state, and sought to solve the warlike inter-state sphere through perpetual peace projects. It is this more positive aspect of cosmopolitanism that has been underlined in Chapters Two and Three, representing a reactionary movement against parochial politics.

Rousseau’s ideas are important for the argument of this thesis, as he pondered over the possibility of cosmopolitanism and of a cosmopolitan loyalty, which is linked to the Bahá’í vision in Chapter Six. His counter-arguments are important for discussing the feasibility of a cosmopolitan loyalty. He was one of the first to underline the importance of peoples, and not only sovereigns in plans of perpetual peace, thus, anticipating the value of a global civil society. Rousseau’s ideas are also central in bringing forward the problematic nature of the inter-state, that cannot possibly remain warlike, if the state of nature between states, and not only within states is to vanish. International relations, thus, remain in an imperfect state if the state of nature has not been resolved on the inter-state level. Rousseau valued the pacification of international relations for the main reason that he believed that war created degradation and misery, and that humanity’s purpose was to live in peace, a point which is stressed in Chapter Six. However, Rousseau, who considered many ways to remedy the state of nature between states, chose ‘pessimism’, and renounced cosmopolitanism for patriotism. His choice is fascinating, as he thought of the implications of cosmopolitanism in only spatial terms, a point that can be deemed outdated in a global and increasingly non-territorial age, an aspect which is discussed in Chapter Four.⁶¹⁰ Moreover, Rousseau did not escape elitism: the general society of mankind represented *the philosophes*, which is a restrictive and elitist trait of the cosmopolitan Enlightenment.

Kant’s ideas are essential to the cosmopolitan project. Whether criticised or not, Kant remains a central figure in cosmopolitanism. His *Perpetual Peace*, *Metaphysics of Morals*, or *Idea for A*

⁶⁰⁹ Lucian M. Ashworth, “The Great Detour: Toxic Modernity and the Emergence of International Relations”, Paper presented at the 23rd conference of the British International Studies Association, University of Sussex, 14-16 December 1998, p. 24.

⁶¹⁰ See the functional, cosmopolitan democracy, and post-positivist approaches in Chapter Four.

Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Intent, clearly depict a politics of the future, unrestrained by war, and committed to an ideal of world citizenship. He is a clear descendant of Stoicism, holding valid the idea of an ethical global commonwealth. Kant did not envisage a world state, but a confederation of nations, more suited to the reality of the idea of imperfection in international life. His spirit of criticism, essential to cosmopolitanism, highlights the need to think for oneself, freed from traditional beliefs, which is a trait of the Enlightenment tradition of thought. Kant, nonetheless, can be highly criticised for holding non-intervention as a valid principle, especially with the centrality that he gave to human rights. With his principle of non-intervention, he did not entirely live up to his cosmopolitan ideal. Moreover, he is forever doubtful, which denotes the concept of ‘approximation’, or the impossibility of reaching perfection. Kant remained an optimistic at heart, who did not want to appear idealist: his optimism is balanced with the interplay of negative aspects, which would, in the long run, be obliterated. His negative views of human nature are counterbalanced by his positive views on a perpetual peace system. This makes Kant unique in the Enlightenment cosmopolitan tradition, as he challenged the irreversibility of conflict: for him, conflict, through the hand of Nature, would give way to a universal peaceful political system, in which the human race would be able to fulfil all its latent moral capacities. Kant’s cosmopolitan philosophy has contemporary implications. As Martha Nussbaum asserts:

Between the fate of Western democracies and the fates of all other political communities resulting from such dangers as global warming and new forms of violence, it is clear that living up to democratic ideals of political and economic justice (democratic self-determination and freedom from destitution, abject suffering, hunger, and environmental catastrophe) is now truly and unavoidably a cosmopolitan project.⁶¹¹

David Held and the proponents of cosmopolitan democracy have undertaken to apply Kant’s idea of cosmopolitan law to twentieth century conditions. Kant, along with the third layer of his cosmopolitan law, *ius cosmopolitanicum*, has influenced David Held’s ‘cosmopolitan democracy’. Indeed, Held acknowledges that his use of the term ‘cosmopolitan’ has been influenced by

⁶¹¹ Martha C. Nussbaum, “Kant and Cosmopolitanism”, p. 20.

Kant.⁶¹² Held notes, "... it could be said, adapting Kant, that the individuals who composed the states and societies whose constitutions were formed in accordance with cosmopolitan law might be regarded as citizens, not just of their national communities or regions, but of a universal system of 'cosmo-political' governance".⁶¹³ The proponents of cosmopolitan democracy believe that democracy should be developed on several layers, locally, nationally, regionally, and globally in order to manage the democratic deficit on the global level. Democratic public law is praiseworthy, as it gives autonomy to the individual on the local or national level, but it is no longer sufficient, as the individual and the national community are faced with events beyond their restricted communities. Thus, law should be expanded unto the global level to become a 'cosmopolitan democratic law.'⁶¹⁴ Unlike Kant's restrictive use of the phrase 'cosmopolitan law' that was reserved to notions of universal hospitality, Held and his colleagues have widened the use of the term in consonance with twentieth century conditions. "No matter where individuals live in the world, all must be able to participate, agree, and consent".⁶¹⁵

This thesis will not concentrate on the nineteenth century, as it principally follows a thematic line⁶¹⁶ – linking Stoicism, the Enlightenment, and twentieth century cosmopolitanism (Kant's ideas, especially, represent a useful connection to cosmopolitan democracy which is reviewed in the following chapter). Kant and Rousseau's contributions to cosmopolitanism will be linked to Bahá'í views in Chapter Six. I will underline the idea of a cosmopolitan loyalty, more explicitly found in the writings of Rousseau, and the theme of a global civil society or world citizenship, that have been advocated for the creation of a peaceful society. I will also expand upon Kant's ideas of world citizenship, his extended notion of a cosmopolitan law, and the concept of antagonism within society, which he moulded in order to realise peace.

⁶¹² Derek Heater, *World Citizenship: Cosmopolitan Thinking*, p. 102.

⁶¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 103.

⁶¹⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶¹⁵ *Ibid.*

Chapter Four – Twentieth Century Cosmopolitan Thinking: Functionalism, Cosmopolitan Democracy, and Postmodernism

4.1 Introduction: The Functional Approach

In the present chapter, the functional approach, cosmopolitan democracy, and post-positivist theories will be reviewed in light of their cosmopolitan traits, namely their sense of transnationalism and non-territoriality, and the extent to which they undermine the primordial place of the nation-state, a point correlating to one of the objectives of the thesis. This chapter, which deals with twentieth century thought, lays the basis for further discussion of twentieth century cosmopolitan thinking, and Bahá'í views in Chapter Six. More specifically, the aspects of non-territoriality emphasised in the functional approach, cosmopolitan democracy, and Mitrany's social view of peace will be underlined. As part of the hypothesis, Kantian ethical cosmopolitanism is here linked to a form of neo-cosmopolitanism, or 'cosmopolitan democracy', which is a descendant of Kantian conceptions of a universal community founded on human rights. The ethical theme can be encapsulated as the rediscovery of a set of values, including the oneness of mankind, which posit the artificiality of a world of divided and bounded political units (like the nation-state). Moreover, the material aspects of globalisation, the need for institutional reform and multiple citizenships, and the importance of cross-cultural dialogue advocated by the cosmopolitan democracy approach provide a useful basis for the discussion connected to Bahá'í views in Chapter Six. The question of universalism and diversity and the nature of post-positivist thought underlined in the last section of this chapter will also be utilised in Chapter Six.

The functional approach will be examined in this present chapter as a starting point for our analysis. Indeed, where does functionalism, or more correctly 'the functional approach', situate

⁶¹⁶ It is also not included because of the more practical reason of space.

itself within International Relations theory, and to what extent is this approach cosmopolitan? Functionalism is frequently and wrongly (wrongly because Mitrany only used the term 'functional approach' to depict his ideas) used to refer to David Mitrany who is believed to be its main mentor. Hawkesworth and Kogan describe Mitrany as a 'towering figure in functionalist scholarship',⁶¹⁷ and Harrison as 'its principal exponent',⁶¹⁸. All the same, David Long suggests that such a view leads to 'a politics of forgetting' in that placing Mitrany at the centre of functionalist ideas has blocked the development of previous functionalist thinking that could have led the functional approach to take another direction.⁶¹⁹ In spite of its various predecessors, it is Mitrany, who gave a clear global flavour to the main ideas enshrined in what he called 'the functional approach', influenced its descendants, and fully detached the functional approach from its main theoretical alternative world federalism. For instance, according to Laski, the problem of international organisation had to be tackled from the point of view of a function, and not from the sovereign state. However, he greatly differs from Mitrany in his belief in a world government and federalism as the most appropriate forms of world structure, which is regarded by Long as a 'serious error'.⁶²⁰

Like other theories of international organisation, the functional approach can be said to have its origins in the Enlightenment with its precepts of reason and science as a means of freeing society from superstition, but nonetheless its originators are figures such as Jeremy Bentham, James Mill, Saint Simon and Comte in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.⁶²¹ The intellectual forebearers of 'functionalism' can be counted amongst Guild Socialism, Marxism, pragmatism, and utilitarian liberalism, and is also influenced by the socio-economic reformist

⁶¹⁷ Mary Hawkesworth & Maurice Kogan, *Encyclopedia of Government and Politics*, Vol. 2, (London: Routledge, 1992), p. 880.

⁶¹⁸ Reginald J. Harrison, *Europe in Question: Theories of Regional International Integration*, (London: George Allen and Unwind, 1974), p. 27.

⁶¹⁹ Long includes R.H Tawney, G.D.H. Cole, and Harold Laski among the predecessors whose ideas have been either distorted or not fully incorporated in Mitrany's arguments, especially the ideological elements (socialist and democratic elements). (David Long, "International Functionalism and The Politics of Forgetting", *International Journal*, Spring 1993, Vol. 48 (No. 2), p. 378).

⁶²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 373.

⁶²¹ Mary Hawkesworth & Maurice Kogan, *Encyclopedia of Government*, p. 879.

spirit of British Fabianism.⁶²² Cooper highlights the fact that Mitrany's functional ideas are drawn from the tradition of the 'pacification of international relations' initiated by Kant and modified by Saint Simon and Comte, a testimony of the liberal tenets prevalent in the functional approach.⁶²³ The latter statements have given way to the idea that Mitrany understood functional ideas to provide a means through which the modern and enlightened life can be experienced, and where functionalism is thought of as 'a mature and final statement of Enlightenment politics'.⁶²⁴ It is significant that Mitrany quotes Kant in *The Progress of International Government* when he refers to the "notion of a historical process of pacification which operates independently of the human will".⁶²⁵ In the same way, he explains that Kant's moral (noumenal) realm is accompanied by the natural (phenomenal) one. The noumenal duty to pursue peace goes hand in hand with the phenomenal reality of the growing commercial interactions between states.⁶²⁶ Mitrany extends this definition of commercial relations to scientific and technological reality, testifying to a more material cosmopolitanism, as underlined in the hypothesis. His emphasis is on material needs as a means of achieving an ethical peace. Moreover, he introduces the idea that with the shift to social and economic activities, governments will be forced to change their institutional arrangements.⁶²⁷

In the same way, St Simon and Comte view history as progressing toward an age of increasing peace, and St Simon particularly endorses the idea that we have moved through theological and metaphysical ages to a scientific age.⁶²⁸ Mitrany, thus, promotes a shift from ethics to matter. Though this material cosmopolitanism is acknowledged in the hypothesis of this thesis, it will be demonstrated in Chapter Six that it is an insufficient form of cosmopolitanism. Mitrany

⁶²² Charles Pentland, "Functionalism and Theories", p. 16.

⁶²³ Justin D. Cooper, "Organizing for Peace: Science, Politics and Conflict in The Functional Approach", in: Lucian M. Ashworth & David Long, (eds.), *New Perspectives on International Functionalism*, Great Britain: Macmillan Press, 1999, p. 27. For Saint Simon and Comte technological innovation would cause the reform of political institutions, "outflank the state and provide a new type of leadership". (*Ibid.*, p. 30).

⁶²⁴ John H. Eastby, "Functionalism and Modernity", pp. 49 & 51.

⁶²⁵ David Mitrany, "The Progress of International Government", in *The Functional Theory of Politics*, (London: London School of Economics & Political Science: Robertson, 1975), p. 91.

⁶²⁶ Justin D. Cooper, "Organizing for Peace", p. 29.

⁶²⁷ *Ibid.*

supports this particular view in light of his understanding that science and technology have transformed the very nature of politics. New organisational problems are created by the growing interdependence of the world, caused by the progress of science and technology. In the words of Cooper, Mitrany assigns a formative role “to science and technology as the principal dynamic which is reorganising social life in an international direction”.⁶²⁹ Like Saint Simon and Comte, he foresees the replacement of politicians by an expert administration over administrative institutions as each type of activity requires specific expertise.⁶³⁰ In brief, science and technology are instruments of the historical process that are used to achieve pacific relations.⁶³¹ However, Pentland maintains that functionalism draws more on the traditions of numerous international organisations in the early twentieth century, such as the Universal Postal Union, the International Telegraphic Union, and the International Labour Organisation, and on the experience of Allied cooperation during World War I and the ‘non-controversial’ activities of the League of Nations, of a technical and economic nature.⁶³² Furthermore, Mitrany had observed the way the Great Depression and the New Deal in America were handled, and noted that the federal constitution and the states were powerless to respond to the social needs of the times. Thus, he keenly observed how the concrete actions of administrative organs such as the Tennessee Valley Authority went across state boundaries.⁶³³ Indeed, the functional approach is one of the first modern theories of International Relations that does not focus primarily on high politics.⁶³⁴ The focus shifts from diplomatic relations to a broader inclusion of non-state actors.⁶³⁵

⁶²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 30.

⁶²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 29.

⁶³⁰ *Ibid.*

⁶³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 31.

⁶³² Charles Pentland, “Functionalism and Theories”, p. 16.

⁶³³ Joachim J. Hesse & Vincent Wright, (eds.), *Federalizing Europe?: the Costs, Benefits and Preconditions of Federal Political Systems*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 30.

⁶³⁴ Lucian M. Ashworth & David Long, *New Perspectives*, p. 19.

⁶³⁵ *Ibid.*

Rainey explains that the 1943 essay *A Working Peace System* endowed Mitrany with the title of ‘the father of functionalism’.⁶³⁶ Following the idea that Mitrany has been the main ‘influential’ inventor of the functional approach, Dorothy Anderson remarks, “David Mitrany was one of the originators, almost the founding father, of the functional approach to world government...”⁶³⁷ Nonetheless, in this light, it is significant that Mitrany’s ideas constitute perhaps more a ‘functional approach to global governance’ as, for him, a world government would just be another common mistake: the transfer of the duties and obligations of the nation-state to a much bigger but still flawed territorial entity. Long notes that, like Laski, Mitrany recognised the fact that interdependence requires an international organisation, but parts with Laski in his contention that such interdependence would be the precursor to a world government.⁶³⁸ This point highlights an innovative approach to global governance and world politics, which by refusing territorial, ideological, or geographical politics, revolutionises the traditional way we think about politics. In this way, Mitrany establishes a whole new concept of political pragmatism, the very means by which peaceful relations could be established.⁶³⁹

Mitrany expresses the novelty of the functional approach in his essay *A Working Peace System*, where he points out that we have to “try some new way” to attain the goal of an effective international system.⁶⁴⁰ He also distinctively contributed to International Relations via the functional alternative, which was aimed at reducing state power “without falling into the grandiose ideals of a new world order”.⁶⁴¹ Rainey goes on to state, “it is not often that a prophet can see his utterances come to pass...while the record is not yet complete, functionalism has

⁶³⁶ Rainey: in David Mitrany, “Retrospect and Prospect”, in *The Functional Theory of Politics*, p. 240.

⁶³⁷ Anderson, Dorothy, “David Mitrany: An Appreciation of His Life and Work”, *Review of International Studies*, October 1998, Vol. 24 (No. 4), p. 577. Anderson notes that Mitrany contributed to functional ideas by clearly advocating a cosmopolitan world order. (*Ibid.*)

⁶³⁸ David Long, “International Functionalism and The Politics of Forgetting”, p. 373.

⁶³⁹ The task is now one of practicality: “The purpose of any new international system...is a task of practical government, not of political baptism.” (David Mitrany, *A Working Peace System: An Argument for the Functional Development of International Organisation*, (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1943), p. 14).

⁶⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

⁶⁴¹ Justin D. Cooper, “Organizing for Peace”, p. 27.

proved to be a useful concept in nudging sovereign national states towards unity...⁶⁴² Indeed, according to Mitrany, the end of history, as contrasted with Fukuyama's, is not the victory of the predominance of the liberal democratic state, but the devaluation of the state in its ideological and divisive nature.⁶⁴³ Like other approaches to global governance, the functional approach wishes to overcome the struggle between the global dimension of social, economic, and material issues and the stubborn particularism of political units. This tension needs to be reconciled through greater 'global political integration'.⁶⁴⁴

More significantly, Mitrany had actually used the term 'functional approach' to depict his thinking: he considered the '-ism' implied in functionalism to be a sign of inflexibility, rigidity, and unhealthy resistance to change.⁶⁴⁵ The refusal to accept dogmatism⁶⁴⁶ and constricted thinking is crucial in understanding Mitrany's approach, which is characterised by flexibility and adaptability, and by pragmatism and gradualism. Inis Claude has, thus, rightly pointed out that 'functionalism' was an approach rather than a theory.⁶⁴⁷ Depicting the spirit of the approach, Anderson added, "Functionalism is an approach rather than a theory, and it is one of compassion and tolerance".⁶⁴⁸ With his belief in the inconsistency of international life, and with a great dislike for rigidity, Mitrany, had he still been alive, would most probably have adapted

⁶⁴² Rainey, in: David Mitrany, "Retrospect and Prospect", *The Functional Theory of Politics*, p. 240.

⁶⁴³ John H. Eastby, "Functionalism and Modernity", p. 58.

⁶⁴⁴ Charles Pentland, "Functionalism and Theories of International Political Integration", in: Paul Taylor & A.J.R. Groom, (eds.), *Functionalism: Theory and Practice in International Relations*, (London: University of London Press, 1975), p. 16.

⁶⁴⁵ It is Haas, founding father of 'Neo-functionalism' that described Mitrany's ideas as 'functionalism'. Mitrany used the term 'functionalism' in his reply to Haas. (It is only in this context that Mitrany used 'functionalism'.) Later, Mitrany updated his approach to the 'Functional Theory of Politics'. (Lucian M. Ashworth & David Long, (eds.), "Working for Peace: The Functional Approach, Functionalism and Beyond", p. 3) However, it has become common practice to describe Mitrany's ideas as 'functionalism'.

⁶⁴⁶ In 1925, Mitrany wrote to his friend Felix Frankfurter, "But I have never suffered from dogmatism. My interest is to see some development in the organisation of peace, and I care little how it is done and by whom it is done as long as it takes us towards that end". (Dorothy Anderson, "David Mitrany", p. 578). Mitrany did not want to be associated with any political party although he was a member of the Labour Party Advisory Committee on International Questions from 1918 to 1931. He would also refuse to participate in any organisation that had a nationalistic ethos. (*Ibid.*)

⁶⁴⁷ Paul Taylor, "Introduction", in: Paul Taylor & A.J.R. Groom, (eds.), *Functionalism*, p. xix.

⁶⁴⁸ Dorothy Anderson, "David Mitrany", p. 352. Interestingly, Anderson describes Mitrany's approach as one of 'compassion and tolerance'. (*Ibid.*) This is a statement that many would find controversial. Some have thought Mitrany's approach to be inhumane and amoral. (See Justin D. Cooper, "Organizing for Peace", p. 5).

his normative approach to late twentieth and early twenty-first century conditions. Although the theory (Mitrany updated his approach to ‘a functional theory of politics’) has received a certain backlash, it cannot be disregarded from any account or understanding of international organisation. As a case in point, many specialised agencies that exist within and outside of the United Nations system today are but a practical reflection of how a functional system should work – although Mitrany would have been disappointed in the way in which they are still greatly influenced by states.⁶⁴⁹

The relevance of the functional approach has not been undermined. Taylor points out that, “Professor’s Mitrany’s approach has won a large number of friends and is surely one of the major original contributions to the study of International Relations”.⁶⁵⁰ And according to Eastby, Mitrany foresees twentieth century developments in a way that is unsurpassed by any other recent IR theory.⁶⁵¹ Functionalist thinking, whether criticised or enthusiastically adopted, undoubtedly offers an original perspective that provokes intellectual debate, and a new vision of global governance. It should also be noted that even though “functionalism is now linked to a great degree to the developments of the European Union or the specialized agencies of the United Nations, its initial form in the thirties and forties stressed the broader picture of an organisational approach to world politics.”⁶⁵² Moreover, the functional approach has survived many developments in the theoretical framework of the social sciences, such as ‘the behavioural revolution’, and the advocacy of a ‘scientific method’.⁶⁵³ As well as surviving the second debate in IR, Mitrany has managed to ensure that his approach is ‘inescapable’ in any account of international organisation. In particular, with the end of the Cold War, an adapted version of the functional approach might seem more plausible than before.

⁶⁴⁹ Lucian M. Ashworth & David Long, “Working for Peace”, p. 7.

⁶⁵⁰ Paul Taylor, “Introduction”, p. xxv.

⁶⁵¹ John H. Eastby, “Functionalism and Modernity”, p. ix.

⁶⁵² Lucian M. Ashworth & David Long, “Working for Peace”, pp. 1 & 3.

⁶⁵³ Paul Taylor, “Introduction”, p. x.

4.1.1 A Pragmatic Approach to Global Governance

This [functional] approach to peaceful change, as Mitrany called it, which tries ‘to make changes of frontiers unnecessary by making frontiers meaningless’,⁶⁵⁴ criticises constitutionalism and permanent rules – which can also explain Mitrany’s dislike of federalism (and –isms in general), which he held to be fixed and rigid. Mitrany and Carr were especially apprehensive about the prospect of federalism, which based on geography or ideology, would only exacerbate political friction in the long term. The solution lay in strengthened functional arrangements based on social and economic concerns. Along with Carr, who advocated a functional approach to a European union in *Conditions of Peace*, Leonard Woolf thought it essential that social and economic factors formed the basis of any international political organisation.⁶⁵⁵ These aspects were also transformed in practical terms: on the eve of the Second World War, the League of Nations produced the Bruce Report, which placed great emphasis on improving its economic and social aspects. It came to form the bedrock of the socio-economic elements of the United Nations in the post-war period, as well as the creation of specialised agencies such as the World Health Organisation, which still flourishes today.⁶⁵⁶ During the course of the Second World War, and in its aftermath, there was a general trend reinforcing the belief that functional rather than political cooperation would be more successful.⁶⁵⁷

Sir John Boyd Orr, director general of the Food and Agricultural Organisation of the United Nations, tirelessly drew attention to the benefits of functional organisations in order to sustain a world of peace, a world of justice, and a world of plenty. He conceived that such a plan was possible due to the numerous advancements of mankind in achieving the annihilation of time

⁶⁵⁴ David Mitrany, *A Working Peace System: An Argument*, p. 26.

⁶⁵⁵ Dorothy Anderson, “David Mitrany”, p. 580.

⁶⁵⁶ Evan Luard, *Basic Texts*, p. 498 and Paul Taylor, “Introduction”, p. xii.

⁶⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

and space and the technical collapse of boundaries.⁶⁵⁸ However, such an idea was in line with a federal world government, a point that would differentiate him from Mitrany. For Boyd Orr, functional organisations could not work by themselves; they needed to be aligned with a federal world government. However, he made it clear that he did not place his hopes in the Assembly, but rather in the specialised agencies of the United Nations.⁶⁵⁹ Boyd Orr's concern, however, can be directly linked to Mitrany's. Indeed, for Boyd Orr, world unity had already happened in the physical world, and it is, thus, not appropriate to dream of it. The problem that mankind faced, and the question that would preoccupy Mitrany, was the practical issue of 'how to make that unity work'. A core aspect of functional thinking is, as Mitrany expresses in *A Working Peace System*, the concept of actively bringing people together, rather than keeping peacefully apart.⁶⁶⁰ Science and learning have helped transform the nature of the world, and have induced its transition to a new era, characterised by problems which can only be dealt with by a functional organisation imbued with a spirit of collaboration.⁶⁶¹ It actually made clear sense to Mitrany, as it did Boyd Orr, that peace could not possibly be achieved without economic prosperity. Science and technology have put politics in a new situation, whereby it could never operate in an old constitutional fashion. New 'organisational problems' are created by science and technology, and politics is, thus, faced with a new and daunting challenge, namely, that of constant change.

4.1.2 Moving away from Power Politics and Territoriality

Mitrany certainly did not think that we are trapped in an atomistic view of the world, in which power remains the principal determinant of our actions. The world is a bit more complex than a

⁶⁵⁸ Sir John Boyd Orr, *Food: The Foundation of World Unity*, (Series: Towards World Government No.1), (London: National Peace Council, 1948), p. 3.

⁶⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 8

⁶⁶⁰ David Mitrany, *A Working Peace System: An Argument*, p. 5. As a means to a positive peace, Mitrany advocates police cooperation rather than mere military competition. Cooper mentions that for Mitrany 'the police function is his preferred mode, and he mentions surveillance by an international police force.' (Justin D. Cooper, "Organizing for Peace", p. 37).

⁶⁶¹ Sir John Boyd Orr, *Food*, p. 4.

statist and realist view where states are our main locus of loyalty and responsible for the satisfaction of our needs. The functional approach is anything but a billiard-ball model arrangement of International Relations; rather in its cobweb form, it is characterised by a multiplicity of forms and transactions, which do not necessarily imply a world institution in the form of a world government at the world level.⁶⁶² In this way, the functional approach has become a strong alternative to the power political approach of world politics, as well as to the concept of territorial and political integration.⁶⁶³ Indeed, the functionalist approach has been recognised as one of the main intellectual precursors of this new vision of world society, where the competitive elements of the billiard-ball model are replaced by the cobweb image of “interdependencies and cross-national contacts among states”.⁶⁶⁴ It offers an alternative to the assumption that the world is made up of a number of nation-states, which would continue to compete for issues such as national military security.⁶⁶⁵ Moreover, the world has a functional nature. Hence, it is necessary that an organisational form should reflect the reality of a functional world.⁶⁶⁶ The technological and social problems of the times are of an ever-changing nature and cannot be confined to the old constitutional and fixed ways.⁶⁶⁷ All inventions and discovery will engender problems of a global and functional nature, and hence will require global, functional solutions.⁶⁶⁸

In this regard, the functional alternative breaks away from the concept of national sovereignty, which is now regarded as a recent invention that has slowly come to be seen as a natural social construction. Mitrany underlines the exclusiveness of the functional approach in undertaking such a task. The functional approach is...“the only path that breaks away from the long advance

⁶⁶² A.J.R. Groom, “Functionalism and World Society”, in: Paul Taylor & A.J.R. Groom, (eds.), *Functionalism*, p. 94.

⁶⁶³ Paul Taylor, “Introduction”, p. xvii.

⁶⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. xi

⁶⁶⁶ A.J.R. Groom, “Functionalism and World Society”, p. 94.

⁶⁶⁷ One of the main propositions of the functional approach underlines that constitutional advocacy is not relevant to the problems of the modern world and cannot meet its challenges. (Paul Taylor, “Introduction”, p. xxiv). “The modern, no-nonsense, down-to-earth, technical, activist, and programmatic approach to politics here finds its full expression, and starkly confronts the ‘old-fashioned’ constitutional approach”. (Joachim J. Hesse & Vincent Wright, (eds.), *Federalizing Europe*, p. 29).

to the dogma of territorial sovereignty, and so allows social organisation to follow its own natural bent and range”.⁶⁶⁹ It is clear, however, that with developments such as nuclear power, satellites, and space travel, national sovereignty has lost long-held claim of exclusivity.⁶⁷⁰ It is here that Mitrany introduces his technical self-determination thesis: if nations can no longer claim sovereignty on an issue such as space travel, technical issues can each claim self-determination, and can be looked at separately.⁶⁷¹ Thus, the issue that is being considered determines the geographical scope, and other factors such as the organisational structure.⁶⁷² The organisations are dependent on the form that the functional needs take, when they arise, decline, and change, underlining the principle of ‘form’ following ‘function’.⁶⁷³ In Mitrany’s words, the organisational principle based on sectoral activity and autonomy, can be described as follows: “The essential principle is that activities should be selected specifically and organized separately”.⁶⁷⁴ Pentland clarifies the whole ethos of ‘functionalism’ by stating that the whole *raison d’être* of the approach relies on “the flexible creation and adaptation of institutions to social and economic needs as they arise, change and die out”.⁶⁷⁵

4.1.3. From National to Global Loyalties

Whereas economic interdependence was a reality –a statement, which did not need much convincing for Mitrany–,⁶⁷⁶ it is highly relevant that this same interdependence might endanger peaceful relations between states and not necessarily lead to peace. Hence, Mitrany recognised the necessity of planning, the obsolescence of the nation-state incapable of dealing with economic interdependence, and the fallacy of free market. A basis of universal human welfare

⁶⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 30.

⁶⁶⁹ David Mitrany, “Retrospect and Prospect”, *The Functional Theory of Politics*, p. 264.

⁶⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 32.

⁶⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p. 30.

⁶⁷² Lucian M. Ashworth & David Long, “Working for Peace”, p. 5.

⁶⁷³ Charles Pentland, “Functionalism and Theories”, p. 15.

⁶⁷⁴ Justin D. Cooper, “Organizing for Peace”, p. 34.

⁶⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p.15.

⁶⁷⁶ In a *Working Peace System*, he writes, “...powerful centres of social life have developed also in the other continents, and that has led not to segregation but to an ever greater and varied economic and social

had be constructed to eradicate what Angell called ‘the unilateral illusion’ of nationalism.⁶⁷⁷ Reform and international planning were needed to tackle the issue of human needs that other theories imperfectly left aside. “For single-functioned international organisations to work, Mitrany held that people’s loyalties would naturally shift from national to international structures. This main innovation in Mitrany’s ideas –one that received criticism– was that the traditional loyalty towards the nation-state would wane, if not disappear, in the face of growing international interactions and transactions. Loyalties would naturally shift to international organisations since they would respond to most of our needs and wants, and thus demonstrate the incapacity of the nation-state to do so. Fruitful international cooperation has the ability to tear away man’s loyalty to his cherished nation-state. Taylor notes “Individuals and groups could begin to learn the benefits of co-operation and would be increasingly involved in an international co-operative ethos, creating interdependence, pushing for further integration undermining the most important base of the nation-state”.⁶⁷⁸ The naturalness of the nation-state was being challenged as well as its claim to eternal life.⁶⁷⁹

For Mitrany, functional organisations responded to the problems and issues of internationalisation. Single function international organisations were a ‘compromise’ between the state and inter-state relations representing international society. In addition, functionalism provided an answer to cultural issues, since by emphasising needs, cultural differences became minor as they are put aside.⁶⁸⁰ In Mitrany’s opinion, institutions created ideas, hence, international institutions would bring about internationalised minds.⁶⁸¹ In this way, international institutions would create international attitudes. The functional approach, therefore, seeks to bypass the territorial state, which by its very divisive nature, cuts off worldwide common interests and activities and reinforces the dichotomy ‘them and us’. While people within a

interdependence of all peoples and lands”. (David Mitrany, *A Working Peace System: An Argument*, p. 13).

⁶⁷⁷ Reginald J. Harrison, *Europe in Question*, p. 27.

⁶⁷⁸ Paul Taylor, “Introduction”, p. x.

⁶⁷⁹ Lucian M. Ashworth, *Creating International Studies*, p. 71.

⁶⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 95

territorial union may not all enjoy the same interests, functional organisations would link their commonality by moving above frontiers, linking people instead of nationalities. Going beyond territoriality signifies going beyond closure: nationality or any extreme and unhealthy feeling of group belonging only exacerbates hatred for others, while working and sharing same interests above frontiers render nationality a matter of the past, and allows peace to become an active working system. This would lead to a gradual recognition of feeling part of humanity as opposed to a mere territorial union. As international activities increase, an ‘international outlook and opinion’ is developed,⁶⁸² and in this way, the quest for international peace can be advanced.

4.1.4 From a Time of Power to a Time of Service

Not only does the functional approach undermine power politics, but it also brings a new element to cosmopolitan thinking. The functional approach fosters the shift from the traditional link between ‘authority based on territory and ideology’ to the functional link of ‘authority based on activity’. It moves beyond territorialism through the construction of a world where borders become meaningless. “Thus the primacy in organisation is given to transactions and not to constitutions, and boundaries are functionally determined and not state determined”.⁶⁸³ Service is a characteristic of present times (Mitrany’s times), as opposed to power, and it ensues that this will no longer depend on rights but on services. The government’s role cannot be confined to protecting individual rights within a constitution, but should be organised in such a way as to provide social services.⁶⁸⁴ Mitrany notes, “We cannot do that till we break away from the stranglehold of territorial sovereign ideas and organisation; out of its jungle of power politics into the greener pastures of the politics of service and common welfare”.⁶⁸⁵ The real

⁶⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 96

⁶⁸² David Mitrany, *A Working Peace System: An Argument*, p. 40.

⁶⁸³ A.J.R Groom, “Functionalism and World Society”, p. 94.

⁶⁸⁴ Lucian M. Ashworth & David Long, “Working for Peace”, p. 4.

⁶⁸⁵ David Mitrany, “Retrospect and Prospect”, *The Functional Theory of Politics*, p. 266. As a case in point, Luard foresees that the vacuum left by national governments in the provision of welfare will make the latter a global issue like the environment. (Christien van den Anker, “Global Justice: The Moral

shift comes in the move from governmental constitutional rigidity to a flexible and extensive social service state.⁶⁸⁶ Whereas the nineteenth century relied on a rigid constitutionalism, the demand is now leaning towards social reform. The nineteenth century trend of written pacts and declarations of rights, as in the form of the Covenant of the League, which was concerned with fixing precise relations between members, and whose social and economic aspects were only secondary, cannot prevail. Such formulised rules cannot restore order by any means. A written pact cannot hope to grasp the problems of the times and restore change as needs are now at the heart of international society. In Mitrany's words:

The Covenant ... was still of that species essentially, with the characteristic predominance of rules of 'thou shalt not kind'. The function of our time is rather to develop and co-ordinate the social scope of authority, and that cannot be so defined or divided. Internationally it is no longer a question of defining relations between states but of merging them -the workaday sense of the vague talk about the need to surrender some part of sovereignty. ...The community itself will acquire a living body not through an act of faith but through active organic development.⁶⁸⁷

Whereas federalists are concerned with the constitutional basis of the state, functionalists following the trend of times, focus on the organisation of the world in its 'active working relations.'⁶⁸⁸ It is, thus, irrelevant to concentrate on the parochial politics of member-states and their constitutionality; it is now time to deal with the politics of the global life of humanity. Mitrany believed that giving too much attention to security and political issues such as national sovereignty could only exacerbate 'emotional opposition.'⁶⁸⁹ Thus, he follows a policy that

Implications of Globalization", in M. Shaw (ed.), *Politics and Globalisation. Knowledge, Ethics and Agency*, Routledge, 1999, p. 132).

⁶⁸⁶ David Long, "International Functionalism and The Politics of Forgetting", p. 372. Mitrany, like the Fabians, saw that the state had to fulfil the welfare needs of its individuals, an idea which appeared before the First World War, but refused to see this development in the light of a socialism stuck in the state. In this way, he also collapsed the distinction between domestic and foreign policy that realists take for granted. For Mitrany the welfare state, through international cooperation, would help collapse the distinction between internal and international matters. (Lucian M. Ashworth & David Long, "Working for Peace", p. 6).

⁶⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

⁶⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

⁶⁸⁹ Ronald J. Glossop, *Confronting War: An Examination of Humanity's most Pressing Problem*, (London: McFarland, 2001), p. 276.

seeks to remove the material and psychological underpinnings of conflict.⁶⁹⁰ There is a danger here of looking at Mitrany's guidelines and taking it for granted that his approach has nothing to do with politics. By avoiding controversial issues, Mitrany managed to make politics look invisible. However, his approach can also be seen as one that revolutionises and 'pragmatise' politics. Here Cooper defines the functional as 'practical, technical, and non ideological'.⁶⁹¹ Socio-economic development projects, and the activities and functioning of the United Nations are all within the non-controversial matters that can act as a test for the functionalist thesis.⁶⁹²

4.1.5 Regional Organisations and the Pragmatic Approach to World Unity

As briefly commented upon above, the use of the term functionalism and its attribution to Mitrany, already constitutes a misreading of his complex, and yet 'simple and pragmatic' approach (in the words of Anderson) if viewed through empirical lenses.⁶⁹³ However, as it is argued, the functional approach is apparently pragmatic and logical, but it can also be considered to be 'normative'. Mitrany's approach is targeted at the eradication of war⁶⁹⁴ and a global peace system, but it is not an approach to regional integration, as his neo-functionalist descendants claim. Here Heater describes as 'ironical' the fact that Mitrany's descendants were to adopt a regional approach, an approach that Mitrany thought harmful to the development of peaceful relations between states.⁶⁹⁵ Due to the influence of its neo-functionalist descendants, it is still largely taken for granted that 'functionalism' is related to regional integration. With regard to the latter Harrison writes, "The functionalist thesis was not originally related to the

⁶⁹⁰ Charles Pentland, *International Theory and European Integration*, (London: Faber and Faber, 1973), p. 15.

⁶⁹¹ Justin D. Cooper, "Organizing for Peace", p. 34.

⁶⁹² *Ibid.*, p. 16.

⁶⁹³ Mitrany maintains that if one follows specific steps to arrive at world peace, there should be no impediments to its realisation.

⁶⁹⁴ Here Cooper notes that the elimination of war is more associated with a 'decrease in its incidence and scope', rather than its total eradication. (*Ibid.*, p. 38)

⁶⁹⁵ Derek Heater, *World Citizenship and Government*, p. 111.

question of international regional integration. Its principal exponent, David Mitrany makes this explicit in *A Working Peace System*".⁶⁹⁶

Mitrany's understanding of the use of international technological and functional development was to attain world unification, and in this way, although he praised the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community, it is noteworthy that he never upheld the idea of a regional functional organisation, which to him would mean a super nation-state. With regard to regional organisations, Mitrany says, "There is little promise of peace in the mere change from the rivalry of whole continents, tightly organized and capable of achieving a high degree of, if not actual, self-sufficiency. Continental unions would have a more real chance than individual states to practice the autarky that makes for division".⁶⁹⁷ Regionalism for Mitrany was a defective remedy, as it would transpose the flaws of the nation-state to a higher level.⁶⁹⁸ It is, however, important to consider that the aim of the functional approach is to bring about, like its theoretical alternative federalism, the unification of mankind. Due to the challenging philosophical potential of the functional approach, and the plain scientific rigor with which neo-functionalism came to be identified, the latter was seen as having failed to pursue the broader aspects of Mitrany's functional approach.⁶⁹⁹ Yet, this failure of the neo-functional approach did not trigger the waning of the broader cosmopolitan and pluralist side of the functionalists.⁷⁰⁰ Hesse and Wright note, "Mitrany was a true cosmopolitan, who sought via functionalism to transcend all territorial frontiers, rather than to create new ones."⁷⁰¹

⁶⁹⁶ Reginald J. Harrison, *Europe in Question*, p. 27.

⁶⁹⁷ David Mitrany, in: *Ibid.*, p. 27.

⁶⁹⁸ Lucian M. Ashworth, *Creating International Studies*, p. 86.

⁶⁹⁹ Paul Taylor, "Introduction", p. xix.

⁷⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

⁷⁰¹ Joachim J. Hesse & Vincent Wright, "*Federalizing Europe*", p. 29.

4.1.6 A New Kind of Liberal Internationalist

However strongly Mitrany felt about pragmatism (and this can explain why he gained the respect of realists such as Morgenthau)⁷⁰², and although his means towards peace were conceived in material terms, his aim was a highly moral and ethical one. For this reason, many consider him to be an idealist and follower of the tradition of liberal internationalism. Franciszek Golembki states, "...without doubt functionalism may be considered as a general theory of social affairs, based on philosophical principles linked with the tradition of liberal thought."⁷⁰³ The concept of change and flexibility is most probably another term for progress, the fact that human beings can be made to comprehend functional organisations and shift their national allegiance to international organisations could correspond to reason, and the suggestion that we can arrive at a working peace system could denote a sign of our freedom. Harrison observes, "Pessimistic, in the realist tradition, about the prospects for resolution of political differences through constitutional arrangement which surrender sovereignty, he is in marked contrast, optimistic about the potential of functionalism for 'the voluntary and progressive evolution of world society'".⁷⁰⁴ Nonetheless, Mitrany is a new kind of liberal internationalist: he does no longer solely rely on ideas and reason, and he places great emphasis on activity. In *A Working Peace System*, he hence says, "The functional way is action itself".⁷⁰⁵ The liberal notion that a world organisation sustained by enlightened world citizens, or a 'more internationalised system of economic relations', can lead to world peace has been transposed to the idea that instead sectoral international authorities can do so.⁷⁰⁶ Moreover, Mitrany recognised that society cannot be 'reformed' at once with a miraculous potion. The task is to build up gradually and understand that making mistakes is an integral part of this process. "We

⁷⁰² Morgenthau believed the functional approach to be impractical in international politics, but nonetheless he held the view that it was still an improvement on other alternatives. (Paul Taylor, "Introduction", p. xii).

⁷⁰³ *Ibid.*, p. xix.

⁷⁰⁴ Reginald J. Harrison, *Europe in Question*, p. 34.

⁷⁰⁵ David Mitrany, *A Working Peace System: An Argument*, p. 55.

⁷⁰⁶ Justin D. Cooper, "Organizing for Peace", p. 29.

cannot start from an ideal plane, but must be prepared to make many attempts, from many points, and build and mend things as we go along”.⁷⁰⁷

4.1.7 A Materialist Approach to an Ethical End

Mitrany worked for world peace through functional and practical means. Ashworth notes that, “The functional theory was meant to use the lure of economic well-being and efficient management to bring about a pacific international order”.⁷⁰⁸ In this way, he perhaps achieved a merger between the apparent dichotomy between materialism and ethics. Yet, his concept, laid out in the hypothesis, was that material means could provide the main means through which peace could be achieved. Mitrany aimed at a peaceful world, where ignorance and poverty would give way to cooperation and world economic prosperity.⁷⁰⁹ Material well-being is a *sine qua non* condition for a prosperous and peaceful world. Thus, it is argued that the functional approach relies on the rational aspects of conflict settlement, as it revolves around the satisfaction of material needs.⁷¹⁰ Nonetheless, it is not tied to nationalism: as material well-being increases and becomes universal, the state loses control over decisions of an economic nature.⁷¹¹ This pragmatic way of approaching the issue of world peace is a crucial element of his thought. Indeed, vague phrases and a high religious or ethical sense are no longer necessary to engender peace. Rather, the ‘historical problem of our time’, as he called it, ‘the chief trait of which is the baffling division between the peoples of the world must be remedied in a functional way.’⁷¹² “All the great religions, as well as the lay creed of humanism, have preached world unity, in the sense of a common humanity, yet after centuries of such teaching we find ourselves

⁷⁰⁷ David Mitrany, *A Working Peace System: An Argument*, p.52.

⁷⁰⁸ Lucian M. Ashworth, *Creating International Studies*, p. 78.

⁷⁰⁹ Poverty or the unequal and unjust distribution of wealth in the world were attributed to capitalism and the market. ‘Functionalism’ emerged as the approach that could offer a solution to the extremes of wealth and poverty. (Lucian M. Ashworth & David Long, “Working for Peace”, p. 2).

⁷¹⁰ *Ibid.* p. 18.

⁷¹¹ John H. Eastby, “Organizing for Peace”, p. 58.

⁷¹² David Mitrany, “A Working Peace System”, in *The Functional Theory of Politics*, p. 123.

with little sense of such unity left in our outlook and our actions”.⁷¹³ It is perhaps this conclusion that led Mitrany to distrust hazy hopes, and adopt a more practical approach to the ethical goal of world unification. Moreover, scientific and technological times had rendered such a project not merely desirable, but necessary.⁷¹⁴

Like Boyd Orr, Mitrany shares the view that unity has not yet happened in the political world, but is a reality in material and social life. Both aspects must be reconciled.⁷¹⁵ This is clearly not a simple task, which requires that the diversity of social life should be brought together. “It is in the light of this task, of how to achieve unity in diversity...that we must look at the various ideas for international organization”.⁷¹⁶ For Mitrany, another challenge of his times and very much valid in our own, was the difficult question of how to reconcile different aspects of each individual through the common interests of all humankind. Far from wanting to homogenise the world, the question of finding a true way to preserve diversity became critical. “The very end of political organisation is to make it possible that people with differing views and divergent sentiments should yet work peacefully for common ends”.⁷¹⁷ By bringing common interests together, he sought to bypass cultural and other such divisive issues (or what he saw as divisive) through the use of international planning in order to arrive at a greater understanding of each other in the world. Bringing people together by means of what unites them as opposed to what divides them, was described by Rousseau as the ‘incentive common good’.⁷¹⁸ As Taylor remarks, “the functionalist proposition that what we do together affects what we think of each other, and that favourable experience create favourable attitudes, seems to have the merit of common sense”.⁷¹⁹ However, this sense of common contact, as Mitrany claims, can be as much a cause of conflict as of cooperation. Conflict will emerge if contacts stem from ‘every

⁷¹³ *Ibid.* Heater notes that Mitrany is here confronted with a ‘baffling’ paradox. (Derek Heater, *World Citizenship and Government*, p. 101) The outcome of which is most probably his functional approach.

⁷¹⁴ David Mitrany, “A Political Theory for the New Society”, in: Paul Taylor & A.J.R. Groom, (eds.), *Functionalism*, p. 26.

⁷¹⁵ *Ibid.*

⁷¹⁶ David Mitrany, “A Working Peace System”, *The Functional Theory of Politics*, p. 125.

⁷¹⁷ *Ibid.*

⁷¹⁸ David Mitrany, “Retrospect and Prospect”, *The Functional Theory of Politics*, p. 263.

direction'. Hence, there is the need to separate interests through function. Mitrany notes, "People ... must be built up in friendship for common case".⁷²⁰ In a cosmopolitan way, Mitrany does not see a functional alternative through a union of states, but of people concerned with performing a special function.

4.1.8 Synopsis of the Functional Approach

As with Laski before him, Mitrany believed that the nation-state had outlived its usefulness for mankind has "... reached a point where the material forces at our disposal threaten to escape our control and to warp the very civilization which they were meant to embrace".⁷²¹ It goes without saying that the nation-state cannot be looked at as the ultimate political creation, and that the seat of sovereignty no longer resides within it. The nature of society cannot be comprehended within the state or any regional or universal territorial union; it is the social nature of society that is now at the forefront of any consideration for international reform.⁷²² Ashworth and Long note that Mitrany's approach is portrayed as "a global vision of states and international organisations working towards a peaceful and constructive world order through cooperative relationships across borders to satisfy human needs".⁷²³ In fact, Mitrany places human needs at the core of his theory. Human reason is not the sole motor of international affairs as needs and emotions are also central elements. Both have to be taken into account if a proper scheme of international organisation is to function.⁷²⁴ The very root of violence is to be found in the socio-economic conditions of people: provide them with even a moderate portion of their wants, and in this way, peace, to a certain extent, can be secured.⁷²⁵ Based on a problem-to-problem basis, functional agencies would solely concentrate on the issues for which they had been created.⁷²⁶

⁷¹⁹ Paul Taylor, "Introduction", p. xxii.

⁷²⁰ David Mitrany, *A Working Peace System: An Argument*, p. 44.

⁷²¹ David Mitrany, in: John H. Eastby, "Organizing for Peace", p. 51.

⁷²² David Mitrany, "A Political Theory for the New Society", p. 26.

⁷²³ Lucian M. Ashworth & David Long, "Working for Peace", p. vii.

⁷²⁴ Lucian M. Ashworth, *Creating International Studies*, p. 82.

⁷²⁵ Paul Taylor, "Introduction", p. xi.

⁷²⁶ Ronald J. Glossop, *Confronting War*, p. 276.

The real enemies were no longer political units such as nation-states, but the social problems of mankind. Hunger, illiteracy, communications, transportation or pollution should belong to the realm of international agencies which would circumvent political issues, and, thus, bring a prosperity that nation-states, due to their political and territorial essence, could not ever dream of achieving.

The inability to address social problems was the real cause of war, and hence dealing with such problems would naturally directly attack the causes of war, although it remains clear that Mitrany 'sought to resolve the problems of nationalism and sovereignty by circumventing them'.⁷²⁷ Additionally, while diverse people are co-operating on these non-controversial issues, they would naturally be brought closer together, and gradually come to regard each other as friends.⁷²⁸ Dorothy Anderson notes:

In its essence 'Mitranean theory' is simple and pragmatic: to work with and for people; to co-operate on the issues and matters that unite and not divide; to look for solutions by function not form; to consider people's common interests whatever their country, nationality or religion, to work on what can be done practically, step by step, in preference to rigid solutions which require legality and constitutions on political agreements.

However, Mitrany does not propose any new institution or principles on how to reform the international system. The very mechanism of change is already in place in nation-states in the form of technical and social arrangements. This technical-administrative arrangement is unjustifiably locked in the nation-state system and needs to be exported to more international spheres.⁷²⁹ The real shift had to be from governmental constitutional rigidity to a flexible and extensive social service state.⁷³⁰ The reinvention of a new order is to be made through existent parameters that need to be exploited, and not through the creation of another territorial, fixed and rigid regional or universal organisation. This fresh and original spirit could simply not pass unnoticed. When the functional approach is referred to, it is usually Mitrany who first comes to

⁷²⁷ A.J.R. Groom, "Functionalism and World Society", p. 100.

⁷²⁸ *Ibid.*

⁷²⁹ John H. Eastby, "Functionalism and Modernity", p. 57.

mind: the ‘functional approach’ has become associated primarily with a ‘Mitranean view.’ Instead, it is necessary to focus on common activities and common administrative agencies to foster a culture of active, and living, peace. Peace does not take on the old strategic view of quiet and undisturbed relations between states, but rather an active collaboration in which nation-states will actively participate, a working ‘social’ peace system.⁷³¹ Mitrany adds another dimension to peace in that it is no longer enough to have a sense of non-threatening relations; it is a social view of peace, no longer a static view of it.⁷³² More interestingly, the very immediate aim of ‘functionalism’ is the realisation of a society composed of pluralistic nation-states whose sovereign power has been reduced through functional linkages. In a more extreme way, it takes the form of a world where nation-states have completely disappeared, and have been replaced by a ‘global administrative system’ conditioned by a functional ethos.⁷³³

4.1.9 Criticisms

Despite the contemporary nature and attractiveness the functional idea of world order, it is not, as with any other theory or viewpoint, immune to criticism. Some are based on a misunderstanding of the functional approach,⁷³⁴ but others, based on more accurate analysis, challenge the validity of Mitrany’s propositions. McLaren, in a very radical manner, goes as far as to state that the functional approach should never have had its long existence, and that indeed the approach was ‘doomed from the start’.⁷³⁵ Indeed to McLaren, ‘functionalism’ has no connection with reality: “For functionalists to assume that a higher, political level is not required in any international functional agency is to fabricate a world without any

⁷³⁰ David Long, “International Functionalism and The Politics of Forgetting”, p. 372.

⁷³¹ David Mitrany, *A Working Peace System: An Argument*, p. 51.

⁷³² *Ibid.*

⁷³³ Charles Pentland, “Functionalism and Theories”, p. 15.

⁷³⁴ Ashworth and Long show that a good number of criticisms made by Claude and Haas are based on a misconception of ‘functionalism’, misconceptions that Claude and Haas proceed to criticise. (Lucian M. Ashworth & David Long, “Working for Peace”, p. 11).

⁷³⁵ In: Ronald J. Glossop, *Confronting War*, p. 140.

correspondence to reality.⁷³⁶ It can be argued, in line with Imber, that McLaren might have gone a bit too far in his suggestions that functionalism has no relevance whatsoever with reality, as the approach has been considered as one of the most in tune with its time.⁷³⁷ Imber responds by stating that, “McLaren suggests that functionalism should ‘never have been allowed’ its 50 year life; which begs the question as to why has it maintained such a vigorous intellectual existence. I would hope it is because enough people believe and act on the proposition that functionalism is possible”.⁷³⁸ Other arguments against Mitrany have been expressed, and certainly functionalism can be viewed as an easy target for criticism, but this vice can also be turned into a virtue. Functionalism triggers off thoughts about its possibility, discussions and other alternatives, and hence in an adapted form, it enriches prospects on global governance. Among the critics, Haas considered Mitrany to be exceedingly optimistic in his belief in the simplicity of the operations and running of functional organisations.⁷³⁹ Having observed functional organisations, Luard notes, for example, that in the post war period, they often became the subject of political disputes as much as pure political bodies.⁷⁴⁰ In his words, “... nearly all the UN’s specialised agencies experienced serious disputes on membership, programmes, and above all on budgets”.⁷⁴¹ Therefore, functional organisations could not escape the world of political disputes and arrangements. Indeed, with discussion and debate, political disputes are likely to arise – even in technological organisations.

There is also much controversy regarding the apolitical side of Mitrany’s approach.⁷⁴² In this regard, Haas has argued that Mitrany was mistaken in believing that “... international functional

⁷³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 146.

⁷³⁷ Eastby, as we saw earlier, notes that the functional approach foresees twentieth century developments better than any other recent IR theory. (John H. Eastby, “Functionalism and Modernity”, p. ix)

⁷³⁸ Imber, in: Robert I. McLaren, “Mitranyan Functionalism: Possible or Impossible?”, *Review of International Studies*, April 1985, Vol. 11 (No.2), p. 155.

⁷³⁹ Lucian M. Ashworth & David Long, “Working for Peace”, p. 22.

⁷⁴⁰ Evan Luard, *Basic Texts*, p. 499.

⁷⁴¹ *Ibid.*

⁷⁴² Harrison notes, “The functionalist approach is essentially non-political. It avoids situations of conflict to concentrate upon ‘common needs that are evident’ and upon ‘making frontiers meaningless through the continuous development of common activities and interests across them.’ (Reginald J. Harrison, *Europe in Question*, p. 28, Harrison is partly quoting Mitrany in *A Working Peace System: An Argument*, p. 62).

agencies could operate without reference to the political context.”⁷⁴³ Indeed, many believe that he wished to abolish politics altogether by living in a merely functional world, however, this is not the case. Mitrany used a very subtle way of conducting politics. He suggested inducing an active peace by leaving the cultural (and national divisive issues) aside. He wanted to bring technical and political realms together at a later stage,⁷⁴⁴ but it is true that for that he eschews some political implications: even though it can be argued that his functional approach provided a way to combine the political and technical spheres, Mitrany perceives functional agencies as being free from political – ideological – disputes. They are technologically functioning bodies in which all contentiousness, and hence political issues are overlooked. In this regard, Claude poses a pertinent question: “Is it in fact possible to segregate a group of problems and subject them to treatment in an international workshop where the nations shed their conflicts at the door and busy themselves only with the co-operative use of tools of mutual interest?”⁷⁴⁵

In addition, for Mitrany, the problem of the differing sizes and power in economic and political structures is taken as being unproblematic in a functional world.⁷⁴⁶ He takes it for granted that small states will readily accept the decisions of big states, as functional organisations would be limited in scope and purpose.⁷⁴⁷ The limited function would “neither trespass upon fundamental principles nor offend sentiments of national dignity.... As in national affairs, the willingness to grant a measure of power for the sake of good service is likely to temper claims to authority for the sake of prestige”.⁷⁴⁸ Here Mitrany assumes that small states are ready to concede their power to bigger states for the sake of prestige. He goes on to state, “A formal and comprehensive scheme would imply so much dislocation on the one side and so much adjustment on the other that the difficulties would be almost insuperable... But the functional

⁷⁴³ Ronald J. Glossop, *Confronting War*, p. 277.

⁷⁴⁴ Hawkesworth and Kogan remark, “He wished to separate power from welfare in order to reunite them later in a higher, more fruitful synthesis”. (Mary Hawkesworth & Maurice Kogan, *Encyclopedia of Government*, p. 880).

⁷⁴⁵ Claude: in Reginald J. Harrison, *Europe in Question*, p. 32.

⁷⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 32.

⁷⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

⁷⁴⁸ In Reginald J. Harrison, *Ibid.*

arrangements could take things as they are”.⁷⁴⁹ In this context, Harrison, like Luard, states that the solution appears to be too simplistic: where there is cooperation, there is bound to be some political decision-making, and such decision-making bodies cannot fail to reflect the problems of inequality and dissimilarity.⁷⁵⁰ The need for an international, formal, institutionalised framework for debate, and the legitimisation of decisions on, for example, aid is, consequently, accepted in principle. This represents an instance of the somewhat paradoxical positive relationship between conflict and consensus which functionalist theory fails to recognise.⁷⁵¹

In the same way, Hawkesworth and Kogan point out that the recognition and identification of a common problem might not be straightforward: “... the theory assumes that policy makers share a common set of values which enables them not only to identify a common problem, but also to agree upon an internationally co-ordinated strategy for dealing with the matter”.⁷⁵² Hence, they assume that experts, whether scientists or industrialists, might prefer a national solution that could be simpler and more productive.⁷⁵³ In this regard, McLaren notes that it is assumed that all problem-solvers would have the same values, would like to pursue the same goals, and have a same worldview.⁷⁵⁴ He then goes on to criticise the fact that ‘function’ is actually a very vague term. Whether function is defined as a task, as in the work of Haas, or as a problem, or a set of related problems, there may be many other subsections of functions within a defined function. Reflecting upon this issue, Haas questions:

Is food, for example, a function in itself, or is it part of the function of health, or the function of energy, or the function of renewable resources, or the function of labour and employment, or the function of international trade, or the function

⁷⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

⁷⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

⁷⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 33.

⁷⁵² Mary Hawkesworth & Maurice Kogan, *Encyclopedia of Government*, p. 1151.

⁷⁵³ *Ibid.*

⁷⁵⁴ Robert I. McLaren, “Mitranean Functionalism”, p. 147. Mitrany further assumes that functional organisations based on Western secular values are going to appeal to everyone. “If the values of the secular western modernity are the preconditions within which functional solutions work best, then the functional approach itself is historically or culturally bounded just like other political views that Mitrany criticizes”. (Lucian M. Ashworth, “Bringing the Nation Back In? Mitrany and the Enjoyment of Nationalism”, in: Lucian M. Ashworth, & David Long, (eds.), *New Perspectives*, p. 39).

of international development? Within one country, food may be seen as an aspect of several of those functions.

He, thus, concludes, “functions cannot be unambiguously defined and therefore cannot be treated in isolation”.⁷⁵⁵ If for Mc Laren functions cannot be treated in isolation, for some federalists, such as Guy Héraud, reducing reality exclusively to a materialist dimension is not possible in the face of the complexity of the conflict of interests in society. To Héraud, consideration of different levels of power, and different economic, social, and cultural interests at many levels cannot be ignored. For the federalist, interests which are irreconcilable at one level could be concilable at a superior level.⁷⁵⁶ Furthermore, Mitrany dislikes regional organisations,⁷⁵⁷ and assumes that functional organisations will necessarily be global bodies. In this regard, van den Anker questions the assumption that the reduction of the powers of the nation-state will necessarily be replaced by global institutions. She points out, “it remains to be seen to what extent the space created by the diminishing powers of the nation-state will be occupied by transnational or global institutions. It may well be that regional institutions are going to play a more important role than global ones in the near future”.⁷⁵⁸ Recent developments, such as the European Union, show that such an entity is not necessarily belligerent, and that it is, indeed, successful in building cooperation.

Other commentators, such as Deustch and his colleagues, challenge the very thesis of the functional approach. Through their study on integration, they concluded that administrative, technical, or political bodies could not trigger off a peaceful society in the same way as the more subjective trends of “mutual sympathy and loyalty”, the existence of “we-feeling, trust and mutual consideration” and the “partial identification in terms of self-images and interests”.⁷⁵⁹ International bodies are, thus, not the cause of changing attitudes; rather, changing

⁷⁵⁵ Robert I. McLaren, “Mitranean Functionalism”, pp. 142 & 148.

⁷⁵⁶ Reginald J. Harrison, *Europe in Question*, pp. 44 & 46.

⁷⁵⁷ “Continental unions would have a more real chance than individual states to practice the autarky that makes for division”. (David Mitrany, *A Working Peace System: An Argument*, p. 27).

⁷⁵⁸ Christien van den Anker, “Global Justice”, p. 131.

⁷⁵⁹ Evan Luard, *Basic Texts*, p. 500.

attitudes encourage the creation of peace-promoting administrative or political organisations.⁷⁶⁰ Taylor, similarly, questions the validity of the assumption that common activity plays a dominant role in changing attitudes. He asks doubtfully, "... does the experience of common activity really change attitudes?"⁷⁶¹ However, in a more positive light, he goes on to state, "This quality of functionalism as a relatively optimistic view of man and his potential, which is very much a reflection of philosophical considerations, has remained untainted by social scientific attempts to test its theory of attitude change".⁷⁶²

Furthermore, Mitrany holds human beings to be rational (a heritage of the Enlightenment), and that their loyalties will logically shift to organisations, which fulfil their needs. However, such a contention can be countered by the fact that loyalties can perhaps be more emotional and traditional rather than rational.⁷⁶³ For Harrison, Mitrany's extreme distaste for conventional arrangements might not have been too realistic. The drafting of a constitutional arrangement is not necessarily a negative development as it could well lead to a further process of integration through the 'sense of commitment' it induces.⁷⁶⁴ Moreover, constitutions are not fated to be permanent. Changes could be introduced if its content proved to be out of touch with contemporary conditions. Even though these criticisms question several traits of the functional approach, they are only partially successful. Even though functional organisations could be subjected to political disputes, it can also be argued that they would be much less so than pure political bodies. One can also argue that if one waits for changing attitudes to bring about new international organisations, time could be just spent on waiting, and this may never materialise. Finally, if it is somewhat controversial to define what a function is, it is clear that many functional organisations succeed in defining their functions and in acting principally on them (for example, organisations such as the WHO).

⁷⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

⁷⁶¹ Paul Taylor, "Introduction", p. xxi.

⁷⁶² *Ibid.*, p. xxiii.

⁷⁶³ Evan Luard, *Basic Texts*, p. 499.

One of the most important criticisms that could be made against Mitrany is that his theory avoids anything that relates to ‘controversial issues’. It is true that the end result of the functional approach is a peaceful world order, but nonetheless the means through which Mitrany wishes to attain this goal are solely material. Eastby explains, “... the purpose of government, whether in the old nation-state or in the new functional world, is to perform for society tasks or functions, particularly of a welfare nature, necessary to a satisfied material existence”.⁷⁶⁵ Mitrany’s end is world peace, but his means rely on a rational and mechanical human being, whose material needs play a salient role in their lives. Yet, these means do avoid the ‘non-material’ aspects of humankind. Sewell, thus, wonders whether Mitrany has put too much emphasis on ‘material’ rather than ‘human’ aspects of problems.⁷⁶⁶ In his way, Mitrany is considered to have escaped political reality, and Sewell argues that the foundation of his approach is too weak to deal with ‘the basis of obligation and the reality of sacrifice’.⁷⁶⁷ It can also be argued that this exclusive consideration of material needs represent a very masculine trait in an approach that seeks to avoid confrontation (and sometimes confrontation can be non-conflictual) by fulfilling the intellectual satisfaction of bringing needs to the fore. It allows for feelings to be subconsciously ‘repressed’, while favouring an uncontroversial approach. Moreover, if people cooperate in a certain area, and arrive at fruitful results, it does not mean that they will all forget about their dogmatic or ideological disputes. It seems intrinsic to humanity to hold convictions, and then to act on them.

The next question that can be posed is whether Mitrany chose the easiest route, and, therefore, failed to treat the deep-rooted causes of problems. Is it not easier to focus on material satisfaction rather than to deal with emotions in the pursuit of happiness? This is perhaps what Mitrany sought to do, namely, achieve world peace through the consideration of only one aspect of humanity: the material side. This approach, with its precept of technical self-determination, is

⁷⁶⁴ Reginald J. Harrison, *Europe in Question*, p. 34.

⁷⁶⁵ John H. Eastby, “Functionalism and Modernity”, p. 57.

⁷⁶⁶ Lucian M. Ashworth, “Bringing the Nation Back In”, p. 76.

⁷⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 77.

actually described by Long as ‘soulless’.⁷⁶⁸ Cooper, also referring to Mitrany’s discussion on technical self-determination, states, “It is noteworthy that something technical is a chief virtue rather than something moral”.⁷⁶⁹ It seems that by avoiding controversial issues, the functional approach avoids discussion, which can be considered a basic tool for conflict resolution and, thus, can be considered to dismiss political problems. Ashworth and Long note:

The functional approach to conflict resolution separates various issues into their respective areas and works on cooperation in those various areas. It deliberately does not specifically concentrate on the issues that have caused the conflict. It focuses on issues of co-operation and technical areas rather than embarking on attempts to bring opposing sides together by discussing the matters on which they differ.⁷⁷⁰

It is possible that the deliberate avoidance of controversial issues, even if issues are solved through functional organisations, could re-emerge at a later stage, if they are not promptly dealt with. Mitrany makes the dangerous assumption that human beings cannot deal with controversial issues except in conflictual way, and therefore need to be diverted from these issues by focusing on their needs. That is most probably why Mitrany tried to avoid changing attitudes before reforming the international order. Even though this comes from his early twentieth century experience when this seems to be the case, it is a rather pessimistic view of humanity’s potential to be able to tackle its problems through discussion and agreement.

Some might find it somewhat daunting that technical organisations should act as a principal guide for the advancement of humankind. Here, as in Kant’s writings, Mitrany has doubts about mankind’s future and avoids the tortuous road of world government: he adopts a middle-way solution. “Beyond this, there remains the habitual assumption... that international action must have some over-all political authority above it. Besides the fact that such a comprehensive authority is not now a practical authority, it is the central view of the functional approach that

⁷⁶⁸ David Long, “International Functionalism and The Politics of Forgetting”, p. 375.

⁷⁶⁹ Justin D. Cooper, “Organizing for Peace”, p. 5.

⁷⁷⁰ Lucian M. Ashworth & David Long, “Working for Peace”, pp. 18-19.

such an authority is not essential for our greatest and ‘immediate needs.’⁷⁷¹ The words used by Mitrany – ‘immediate task’ and ‘immediate needs’ – are significant. He probably did not wish to discuss an overall political authority as it would not be currently practical, and assumed that functional organisations, which would leave the question of political authority unresolved, were the best way of dealing with international order at the present.

Moreover, while internationalising functions such as industrial capacity are crucial, they do not relate to all human needs, and needs are often relative. They change between societies, and also between individuals. Needs are also often based on territory, and often rely on culture. If one focuses on non-cultural needs, then they are mostly similar in most societies. As Ashworth notes, even a function like food, can be very different in many societies, and thus it might be an impossible task to separate culture and need.⁷⁷² He goes on to state that Mitrany’s examples of successful functional organisations do not deal with basic needs but with such functions as transport, mail, and labour relations.⁷⁷³ As Harrison states:

So Norman Angell argued that the international system of nation states had blinded men to their real welfare needs. It had given them two conflicting sets of values, one deriving from loyalty to the nations and requiring defence of the national honour and the national interests (narrowly conceived); the other from simple human needs such as health, housing and transport. It is upon the second set of basic welfare needs that the functionalist approach is based.⁷⁷⁴

The reason why Mitrany wished to divide culture and need is that he felt that culture was the cause of division, and that politics should not be based on what divides us. However, we can disagree with Mitrany on this point, and ask whether culture is such a divisive factor, and argue that needs and culture are thoroughly inter-linked. When different cultures meet in a spirit free from prejudice and dominance, contacts and exchanges can, indeed, be very rich and fruitful. Of course, culture can be a cause of conflict, but is it truly culture, or rather our misrepresentation

⁷⁷¹ David Mitrany, *A Working Peace System: An Argument*, p. 37.

⁷⁷² Lucian M. Ashworth, “Bringing the Nation Back In”, p. 76.

⁷⁷³ *Ibid.*

⁷⁷⁴ Reginald J. Harrison, *Europe in Question*, p. 29.

of culture that provokes conflict? And how can one so radically separate culture and need, when culture is a need to identify an understanding of who we are?

This great failure to explore the non-material side of human beings and society is an easy way to question the long-term solution of functionalism as a means to a permanent, strong, prosperous, and peaceful world that is not solely based on the fulfilment of material needs. Cooper, moreover, makes the interesting point that as Mitrany focuses on science and technology and eschews ideology for which he has a strong antipathy (and henceforth constitutional arrangements), his "...certainty about this positive potential of science for human affairs approaches the level of an ideological commitment".⁷⁷⁵ Furthermore, Mitrany's formulation comes as a very easy target for feminist critiques, as Murphy noticed, women's place is not referred to. The public realm of a functional world can then be easily compared to a world of men.⁷⁷⁶ However, as Ashworth and Long note, "These critical observations are not so much devastating reasons for abandoning the functional approach altogether as they are a recognition that theoretical and practical work waits to be done".⁷⁷⁷ Critical theories themselves could play a major role in the reformulation of the functional approach and limiting ourselves to the approach that Mitrany put forward, without trying, as he would have wished, to adjust it, is to misunderstand functionalism.⁷⁷⁸ Indeed, it means that functional organisations can be extended to other organisations of civil society, and feminist theories can help to extend this definition to other civil society groups.⁷⁷⁹ Moreover, as many consider the functional approach to be more of a technocratic than a democratic nature, the approach of David Held, known as cosmopolitan democracy, along with other feminist and critical theories, could help to complement the functional approach and provide a 'basis of legitimacy in functional

⁷⁷⁵ Justin D. Cooper, "Organizing for Peace", p. 23.

⁷⁷⁶ Murphy, in: *Ibid.*, pp. 21-22.

⁷⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

⁷⁷⁸ Here Ashworth and Long note that Mitrany is far from being against democracy. "In fact, the two goals of functional organisation were rescuing democratic government and facilitating international cooperation". (Lucian M. Ashworth & David Long, "Working for Peace", p. 9).

⁷⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

organisations.⁷⁸⁰ The adjusted functional approach (which Mitrany would have most certainly sought to do), may complement other theories, and provide us with a very challenging cosmopolitan conception of world order.

4.2 Introduction: Cosmopolitan Democracy: A System of Humane Governance

Cosmopolitan democracy⁷⁸¹ comes from the perspective that the Cold War has unleashed new prospects for the participation and propagation of democracy. The post cold-war world is a transition to a world order in which democracy can be diffused transnationally in a highly complex and diversified system, which is detached from the centrality of the nation-state. The problem for Held, for which cosmopolitan democracy comes as a solution, is expressed as follows: “Territorial boundaries demarcate the basis on which individuals are included and excluded from participation in decisions affecting their lives but the outcome of these decisions often stretch beyond national frontiers”.⁷⁸² However, the project does not demand that the nation-state be demolished, but rather adjusted to timely globalising conditions. If cosmopolitan democracy does not wish to abolish the nation-state, neither does it seek to establish a democratic world state. Indeed, the project contends that the political vacuum bequeathed by the Cold War must be replaced by a new democratic world order, in which state and non-state actors, such as various international agencies and world citizens, participate transnationally and locally in a closely intertwined democratic system. “At issue is rethinking the nature, form, and content of democratic politics in the face of the complex intermeshing of local, national, regional and global relations and processes”.⁷⁸³ The transition from one international system to

⁷⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

⁷⁸¹ The use of the word ‘cosmopolitan’ by IR theorists has undoubtedly been influenced by Kant’s employment of the term. A number of recent scholars working in the field of political and international theory in British universities have written about ‘cosmopolitan theory’. This should immediately sound a note of caution against assuming that these modern authorities use the term to describe a world state. (Derek Heater, *World Citizenship and Government*, p. 181).

⁷⁸² David Held, in: Andrew Linklater, “Globalization and The Transformation of Political Community”, in: John Baylis & Steve Smith, (eds.), *The Globalization of World Politics*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 627.

⁷⁸³ David Held, *Democracy and the Global Order*, p. ix.

another will propel the diffusion of democracy, through the internationally inspired decisions of individuals who act as world citizens.

The term ‘cosmopolitan’ has been used in this theory in contrast to ‘international’ because the latter is said to evoke a system of democratic rules and procedures among states, which takes no account of their respective internal regime or constitution.⁷⁸⁴ In this sense, cosmopolitan democratic theorists refer to the internal as well as external aspects of governance, that is, they include every possible existing governing layer, from the internal constitution of states to their external arrangements, to international organisations and non governmental agencies. The term cosmopolitan, as it is used in ‘cosmopolitan democracy theory’, is explained by Held and Archibugi as follows: “The term cosmopolitan is used to indicate a model of political organisation in which citizens, wherever they are located in the world, have a voice, input and political representation in international affairs, in parallel with and independently from their own governments.”⁷⁸⁵ People are at the heart of the theory, and must be political participants deciding for themselves and highly concerned with matters involving not only their own countries, but those of citizens who suffer, for example, from human right violations and remain unprotected by their own governments.⁷⁸⁶ Accordingly, institutions must be set up in such a way that ‘people’ in possession of opinions, needs, and wants will always be able to raise their voice and express their concerns without allowing governmental rulings and procedures to impinge on their aspirations or wishes for governance.⁷⁸⁷ People, or if one is to emphasise diversity, ‘the peoples of the world’, have become the justification for the very existence and aim of a newly defined global politics. Utilising a most descriptive terminology, Falk refers to cosmopolitan democracy as, among other things, a system of ‘humane governance’ characterised by the

⁷⁸⁴ Daniele Archibugi & David Held, (eds.), *Cosmopolitan Democracy: An Agenda for A New World Order*, (Cambridge: Polity, 1995), p. 12.

⁷⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

⁷⁸⁶ Individuals or groups voluntarily involved or working with Amnesty International would be counted among such world citizens.

⁷⁸⁷ One of the institutional reforms envisaged concerns the United Nations. Such a reform includes establishing an Assembly of the Peoples of the United Nations, which would represent citizens rather

inclusion of issues such as vulnerable identities, the abolition of war, the environment, and more importantly, endeavours to achieve transnational democracy.⁷⁸⁸ In short, cosmopolitan democracy aims at the enhancement and development of democratic and legal processes within the nation-state and beyond, since it acts in line with intergovernmental and international spheres of political activity where world citizens participate extensively. Henceforth, democracy cannot find its full and true meaning within the sole confines of the nation-state: a democratic world order can be achieved, if, and only if, democracy does not remain ‘restricted, delimited – if not thwarted – within nations.’⁷⁸⁹

Cosmopolitan democracy aims to devise cosmopolitan institutions in addition to existing ones (for example nation-states) without undermining their legitimacy or significance; moreover, these will be able to legislate in matters concerning the internal legal system, or other arrangements of nation-states.⁷⁹⁰ Thus, according to the project, nation-states are not obsolete; they are simply outdated in their present form and need to concede some of their spheres of competence to cosmopolitan institutions so that democracy can be exercised across borders. Furthermore, it follows that international institutions – most particularly the United Nations – in their present form do not respond to timely conditions. From the desire to create a more democratic system of governance, and a truly global civil society where grassroots awareness is involved, stems the necessity to reform international organisations, including inevitably the most elaborate of all, the United Nations. The two principles -international democracy and a reformed UN- are, thus, highly interdependent as international democracy cannot be without a reformed UN, and an effective UN cannot possibly exist without international democracy. Despite distrust about the ability of the United Nations to diffuse international democracy

than their governments. (Daniele Archibugi, “From the United Nations to Cosmopolitan Democracy”, in: Daniele Archibugi & David Held, (eds.), *Cosmopolitan Democracy*, p. 123).

⁷⁸⁸ Richard Falk, *On Humane Governance: Toward a New Global Politics: The World Order Models*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), p. 1.

⁷⁸⁹ Daniele Archibugi & David Held, *Cosmopolitan Democracy*, p. 4.

⁷⁹⁰ For example, the European Court of Justice changed British law in the 1980s on issues as diverse as discrimination and equal pay. (David Held, *Democracy and The New International Order*, (London: Institute for Public Policy Research, 1993), p. 8).

during the Cold War and beyond, the advocates of cosmopolitan democracy recognise that a reformed UN has a central role to play in the transition towards a New World Order.⁷⁹¹ In Archibugi's words, "it is neither realistic nor useful to imagine a more democratic global governance without assigning a principal role to the United Nations".⁷⁹²

Accordingly, cosmopolitan democracy, as a system of governance, does not call for a drastic institutional change, but rather for the readjustment of the current system that would render its various established channels more interactive and interlocked. The change is more volatile than structural: while in the previous world order components of the international system (such as nation-states) could be described as static and inflexible, in the new order, they will have to be democratically linked to allow for the creation of new interactions and dynamics. In this model of governance, international organisations act as a link between the state and an active global civil society, which account for the notions of participatory politics and grassroots involvement.⁷⁹³ The reorganisation and renewal of the state will alter the contemporary form of democracy, and diffuse the renewed ancient political tradition on the internal and international levels. Indeed, cosmopolitan democracy does not wish to create, but rather seeks to adjust and accommodate. For instance, the political theory does not wish to create a world state or cosmopolis, but aspires to hold on to old institutions which will acquire new links and will be endowed with regionally, nationally, and internationally-minded active individuals, henceforth broadening and enriching the very concept of citizenship. In this sense, the system of governance is based on the preservation of current institutions, which will be linked by transformed international organisations and the rise of new political subjects.⁷⁹⁴ If cosmopolitan democracy is not concerned with creating a cosmopolis in the sense of a world state, it advocates a form of governance reminiscent of a universal city i.e. a democratic cosmopolis that

⁷⁹¹ Daniele Archibugi, "From the United Nations to Cosmopolitan Democracy", p. 121.

⁷⁹² *Ibid.*

⁷⁹³ Richard Falk, *On Humane Governance*, p. 254.

⁷⁹⁴ Richard Falk prefers the term 'citizens' to 'subjects' since the latter underlines passivity and gives a negative connotation to citizenship. (*Ibid.*, p. 253)

would comprise of several closely interrelated political subdivisions, universally ruled by world citizens.

This reconceptualisation of democracy is considered necessary due to the presence of extra-territorial forces mostly released by globalisation, which influence and shape global politics, and create the need for a new system of governance based on the participatory role and involvement of world citizens. It can all the more be argued that cosmopolitan democracy represents a new form of cosmopolis in which citizens enjoy multiple citizenships and are linked through different institutional channels, which aspire to be democratic. An interesting issue relates to the fact that even though cosmopolitan democracy calls for world citizenship, it does not seek to undermine the existence of the state or that of national citizenship. Likewise, Held recognises that cosmopolitan democracy is neither an optimistic nor a pessimistic vision, but rather a position of advocacy.⁷⁹⁵ This project, or new model of world governance, claims that “society always manages to create organs capable of serving its vital needs”, which accounts for the gradual move towards a global destiny. Secondly, the designed scheme places states at the centre of International Relations theory and does not seek to replace them.⁷⁹⁶ Falk reflects this duality when asserting that cosmopolitan democracy can be counted among the models of governance, which ‘provides us with the best and most realistic basis of hope for the future.’⁷⁹⁷ Hope is here (ideally) related to the improvement of the current model of political arrangement without (realistically) attempting to incorporate and impose drastic changes. Cosmopolitan democracy wishes to be considered as a realistic vision with a hopeful design for international politics, but yet it does not wish to be overly hopeful, and refuses to be categorised as ‘utopian’. As a case in point, Archibugi argues that, “the specific route which leads to world citizenship suggests that the cosmopolis could be an end of history and not an attainable

⁷⁹⁵ David Held, in: “Realism vs Cosmopolitanism: A debate conducted between Barry Buzan and David Held conducted by Anthony Mc Grew”, *Review of International Studies*, 1998, Vol. 24 (No.3), p. 394.

⁷⁹⁶ Daniele Archibugi, “Principles of Cosmopolitan Democracy”, p. 223.

⁷⁹⁷ Richard Falk, *On Humane Governance*, p. 255.

phenomenon”.⁷⁹⁸ The project represents a response to globalisation,⁷⁹⁹ and endorses the idea of the oneness of humankind, as recent theories such as critical international theories increasingly affirm that notions of identity, gender, religion, race and other such factors cannot be accepted as the cause of different and unequal entitlements and rights. In the words of Linklater, “Resistance to doctrines which claim that one race or nation has the right to dominate another, or that men are naturally entitled to more rights than women, is pronounced in most parts of the world”.⁸⁰⁰

This also ties in with the development of the hypothesis in the first chapter of this thesis. In fact, ethical cosmopolitanism has been rediscovered in the twentieth century, faced with the mounting of a material cosmopolitanism – known as globalisation – and, as such, both ethical and material aspects are put forward in the present chapter. In addition, it is important to note that world federalism no longer favours the urgency of world federal government, but rather advocates stronger human rights, global democracy, and cooperation. Globalisation is an opportunity to render ethical cosmopolitanism possible, but represents a danger, which can separate the human race through the unequal distribution of its benefits. I do not include an economic debate about globalisation,⁸⁰¹ but underline an essential point: a return to an ethical form of cosmopolitanism is not longer a vague dream, but has become a necessity in the face of global interdependence. Indeed, if the unity of humanity can now be realised, as physical contingencies no longer impede its realisation, the development of a cosmopolitan ethics, detached from overly national and material considerations, has to be fostered to match a material interdependence. This, in turn, shows the relevance of a return to spiritual/ethical values stressed by the Bahá’í model in Chapters Five and Six.

⁷⁹⁸ Daniele Archibugi, “The Reform of the UN and Cosmopolitan Democracy: A Critical Review”, *Journal of Peace Research*, 1993, Vol. 30 (No.3), p. 307.

⁷⁹⁹ See 4.2.1. Globalisation

⁸⁰⁰ Andrew Linklater, “Globalization and the Transformation of Political Community”, p. 626. The theoretical rationale underlying practices that tolerate the violation of human rights, the practice of apartheid, or the domination of men over women, is increasingly rejected.

4.2.1 Globalisation

The process of globalisation has had an important role to play in shaping cosmopolitan democracy, since it is believed to have shrunk the globe or changed traditional conceptions of time and space, and demands closer terms of political, social, and cultural interactions and understanding. As the world is shrinking in many ways, the system of governance should be ‘adapted to the diverse conditions and interconnections of diverse peoples and nations.’⁸⁰² What is the meaning of globalisation, and in which ways does it challenge traditional conceptions of governance?

Globalisation is a term currently used by many, but nonetheless no commonly agreed and clear-cut definition prevails. Cable states that globalisation has become a portmanteau term that can refer to many different things, but eventually comes to describe it as “... a mixture of international, multinational, offshore and global activities [that] involves a general progression from the domestic to the global”.⁸⁰³ One of the reasons behind the looseness of the term is its multi-faceted aspects, and yet its full meaning probably lies in the aggregate of its different facets.⁸⁰⁴ Some claim that globalisation actually started with the rise of the nation-state system in the late sixteenth century and is merely a continuation of the economic expansion that had then already commenced. For others, globalisation is a choice, rather than a destiny, and has hardly altered or undermined the role of the nation-state in our era:

This globalizing journey is not a new one. Over the past five centuries, technological change has progressively reduced the barriers to international integration. Transatlantic communication, for example, has evolved from sail power to steam, to the telegraph, to the telephone, commercial aircraft, and now

⁸⁰¹ See 4.2.1 Globalisation.

⁸⁰² David Held, *Democracy and The New International Order*, p. 12.

⁸⁰³ Vincent Cable, *Globalization and Global Governance*, (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1999), p. 1 & 4.

⁸⁰⁴ Arzeni describes globalisation as ‘the integration and merging of national economies as a result of the transnational activities of firms’. (Bretherton & Ponton in: Ian Clark, *Globalization and Fragmentation: International Relations in the Twentieth Century*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 21) It can also come to mean a social process which takes the form of a global civil society.

to the Internet. Yet states have become neither weaker nor less important during this odyssey.⁸⁰⁵

If globalisation is not a new trend, for authors such as Luard or Giddens, it has taken another meaning in our times, and has been recently greatly intensified. Luard speaks of “the breathtaking shrinkage of the world which has taken place over the last fifty years or so”.⁸⁰⁶ Moreover, Giddens claims that the recognition of an element of continuity in the formation of the states system does not mean that there is nothing new about the present global system.⁸⁰⁷ It is certain that if globalisation is not new and has multi-faceted meanings, it has now become an irrevocable feature of world politics. Woods notes that with the challenges posed by the end of the Cold War, globalisation ‘survived...when many of our other ordering and explanatory concepts did not’.⁸⁰⁸

One of the many definitions highlights the increasing interconnectedness between peoples and societies, which signifies that events in one part of the world have repercussions in other non-necessarily neighbouring parts. Van den Anker highlights that globalisation (which she mainly defines as economic expansion, and the growth of global networks such as NGOs and social movements) is intensified by the growing communication between peoples of the world characterised by social and cultural connections, and the transport of goods and peoples. She concludes by stating, “In short, globalisation is often defined as the process by which the world seems to shrink and actions in one place have major long-distance effects”.⁸⁰⁹ With a whole range of almost instantaneous communication systems (telephony, fax, and electronic mails/the World Wide Web, shared entertainment), the world has become a ‘global village’- to use a phrase that McLuhan famously coined in the sixties, and which Ohmae recently termed

⁸⁰⁵ Martin Wolf, “Will the Nation-State Survive Globalization?” *Foreign Affairs*, USA Council on Foreign Relations, January/February 2001, Vol. 80 (No.1), p. 179.

⁸⁰⁶ Luard in: Christien van den Anker, “Global Justice”, p. 129.

⁸⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸⁰⁸ Ian Clark, *Globalization and Fragmentation*, p. 16.

⁸⁰⁹ Christien van den Anker, “Global Justice”, pp. 128-129. Giddens notes that globalisation is characterised by a connection between different local communities triggered off by ‘an intensification of

‘borderless world’.⁸¹⁰ In 1995, the Commission on Global Governance drafted “Our Global Neighbourhood”, a report that marked the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations and described the ever closer interdependence of the peoples of the world, depicting them as neighbours of one village. Richter emphasises the fact that the world is increasingly becoming a single place “*Die Globalisierung... global networking that has welded together previously disparate and isolated communities on this planet into mutual dependence and unity of ‘one world’*”.⁸¹¹

Sir Shridath Ramphal⁸¹² highlights that globalisation has contributed to bring about a world that is more than the assortment of sovereign nation-states and separate peoples; indeed, he notes that there is a ‘human society beyond frontiers’ whereby each of us belongs to two countries, the planet and our native land.⁸¹³ The closer interaction and the mingling of the peoples and states of the world trigger new ways of thinking about governance, as diversity increasingly needs to be taken into account: no ‘single answer’ can now flourish in the face of intensified global conditions. However, as communication and information technology are developing and the world is increasingly ‘shrinking’, risks of a global nature are escalating. AIDS, environmental concerns, such as the ozone layer or pollution, now possibly affect human beings in every single nation-state, and consequently render the latter unable to deal with ‘global’ problems, which in turn raises the important question of its continued relevance. Furthermore, globalisation can be said to exacerbate exclusion or poverty in certain parts of the world, where poor and vulnerable people become even poorer and more vulnerable. If globalisation and interdependence are irrevocable features of the world economy, exerting their effects unto other spheres of human interactions, they do not necessarily lead to greater equality or justice. As Van

worldwide social relations’. In such a way local happenings are fashioned by events occurring many miles away and vice versa. (*Ibid.*)

⁸¹⁰ Steve Smith & John Baylis, “Globalization and Its Precursors”, in Baylis, John, & Smith, Steve, (eds.), *The Globalization*, p. 8 & Vincent Cable, *Globalization*, p. 2.

⁸¹¹ Jan A. Scholte, “The Globalization of World Politics”, in: Baylis, John, & Smith, Steve, (eds.), *The Globalization*, p. 15.

⁸¹² Sir Shridath Ramphal was part of the Commission on Global Governance that drafted our Global Neighbourhood in 1995. He also was Secretary General of the Commonwealth until 1990.

den Anker writes, "...globalisation and interdependence do not automatically imply equality. Inequality between and within nation-states is frequently increased by integration in the global economy".⁸¹⁴ The UN Secretary General Kofi Annan issued a caution in a report published in 2000 *We the Peoples—the Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century* which noted that whilst globalisation 'offered great opportunities', the benefits it engendered were 'very unevenly distributed while its costs are borne by all'.⁸¹⁵

Moreover, the permeability and transparency of borders (as regards economic transactions, communication systems, ideologies, or ecological disasters) challenge the claimed self-sufficiency of divided political communities. Along with intensified global risks, a feeling of insecurity and uncertainty has risen, causing citizens to experience a sense of alienation and loss of identity in the face of the shrinking of the world and the ever-closer interdependence of economic, financial, social, and political interactions.⁸¹⁶ As this sense of loss of identity is experienced, a reaction of extreme national feeling is mounting and challenging the cosmopolitan prospects for a diversified and unified global community, that is, notwithstanding, gaining ground.⁸¹⁷ Borders become permeable to such an extent that homogeneity within the nation-state is no longer congruent with the global village: citizens, independently of their will, are taking on multiple identities that question the established assumption underlying the cultural and ethnic homogeneity of nation-states. Robertson asserts that globalisation does not mean that a uniform and homogenous culture prevails, but rather that cultures become relative to each other and not 'unified or centralized'.⁸¹⁸

⁸¹³ Shridath Ramphal, *Global Governance*, (Cambridge: Global Security Programme, 1995), p. 2.

⁸¹⁴ Christien van den Anker, "Global Justice", p. 131.

⁸¹⁵ Julie Hyland, "United Nations meets in crisis at Millennium Summit", 15 September 2000, downloaded 15 April 2002, <<http://www.wsws.org/articles/2000/sep2000/un-s15.shtml>>

⁸¹⁶ See Arjun Appadurai, "Dead Certainty: Ethnic Violence in The Era of Globalization", in: Birgit Meyer & Peter Geshiere (eds.), *Globalization and Identity: Dialectics of Flow and Closure*, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), p. 306.

⁸¹⁷ Scholte makes the interesting point that globalisation is also characterised by 'the promotion of subnational, substate territorial identities'. (Scholte: in Christien van den Anker, "Global Justice", p. 132) The promotion of a smaller unit than that of the nation-state becomes more evident as the latter unit loses its influence. (*Ibid*)

Sociologists of International Relations highlight the tension between a world of sovereign nation-states and a 'global social system'.⁸¹⁹ Hurrell points to the formation of a single world community following the increasing interdependence of peoples and nation-states (as no community remains untouched by others), and a growing consciousness of 'global problems'.⁸²⁰ The physical compression of the world has caused a new form of 'global consciousness' that transforms the traditional state-centric approaches to world order and political community.⁸²¹ Similarly, Mann expresses "Today, we live in a global society. It is not a unitary society, nor is it an ideological community or state, but it is a single power network".⁸²² This unitary society is reflected in a horizontal form of governance, the extension of non-state actors such as international organisations, transnational groups, and a global civil society operating on grassroots level, as well as on a global basis. This represents a move away from state concerns, and a step toward a more humane system of governance. Indeed, we are moving from a 'world of states to a world more of peoples.'⁸²³ Nation-states will adapt to being absorbed or dislocated by a 'new supranational restructuring of the globe' as their traditional underpinnings of political, economic, or cultural terms are being rewritten.⁸²⁴

4.2.2 Globalisation: A Threat to the Westphalian Order?

The term global comes to define a new condition,⁸²⁵ namely interactions that go beyond and below the nation-state, intensified international transactions, and/or the involvement of non-state actors. Globalisation threatens the Westphalian order -that gave rise to realist International Relations- and defies notions of territoriality, sovereignty, the centrality of the nation-state, and

⁸¹⁸ Ian Clark, *Globalization and Fragmentation*, p. 23.

⁸¹⁹ Mc Grew: in *Ibid.*, p. 17.

⁸²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

⁸²¹ Roberston: in *Ibid.*, p. 23.

⁸²² *Ibid.*, p. 22.

⁸²³ Shridath Ramphal, *Global Governance*, p. 1.

⁸²⁴ Hobsbawn: in *Ibid.*, p. 3.

⁸²⁵ Jeremy Bentham in the 1780s coined the term 'international' to describe a new dimension in world politics, that is, the increased interactions between rising nation-states. (Chris Brown, *Understanding International Relations.*, 1st ed., p. 21 and Jan A. Sholte, *Globalization*, p. 13).

a single identity or citizenship.⁸²⁶ Even though it is more than dubious that the nation-state will disappear, several of the elements have become “less creedal, less assertive, less defining, and even less hallowed”.⁸²⁷ These elements are defined in terms of sovereignty, self-determination, and even non-intervention.⁸²⁸ On the one hand, globalisation seems to be leading to a homogeneous global culture, but in reality, with the proliferation of global risks, it could well be supporting the intensification of nationalism, the emergence of multiple identities, or the longing to hold on to one’s local identity exclusively. The duality of globalisation and fragmentation reveals the conflict between a world of nation-states, where nationalism appears as strong as ever, and an emerging global community, with the proliferation of NGOs and a growing transnational civil society. Consequently, the nature of the political community across the world is being challenged and transformed.⁸²⁹

Meyer and Geshiere explain that globalisation, instead of causing a homogeneous culture, seems to have intensified heterogeneity and cultural closure. “Flow [goods, peoples, images] goes hand in hand with a closure of identities which often used to be more fuzzy and permeable”⁸³⁰ In addition, Scholte notes “alongside...material changes, globalisation has also loosened some important cultural and psychological underpinnings of sovereignty. For example, as a result of the growth of transborder networks, many people have acquired loyalties that supplement and in some cases even override feelings of national solidarity that previously lent legitimacy to state sovereignty”.⁸³¹ This extra territorial sense of belonging permits an ideological detachment from the nation-state and national values at large, or could, to some, represent a threat to their local identity. There are, however, no doubts that state sovereignty is weakening as other forms of attachments are replacing or complementing loyalties to the nation-state. However, Cable notes that one of the domains where the nation-state still exerts

⁸²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

⁸²⁷ Shridath Ramphal, *Global Governance*, p. 1.

⁸²⁸ *Ibid.*

⁸²⁹ *Ibid.*

⁸³⁰ Birgit Meyer & Peter Geshiere, *Globalization and Identity*, p. 2.

⁸³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 22.

powerful control is in the regulation of population movements and migration policy. Anderson states, “Even tighter control over citizenship and residence are growing- perhaps because it is one domain in which traditional ideas of borders and territory can be effectively applied.”⁸³² Whereas economics may be increasingly global, Cable contends that politics is still national: international organisations such as the UN, bodies such as the European parliament are still largely dependent on national politics.⁸³³

Furthermore, Wolf, in his argument that the nation-state is not losing its supremacy in the face of globalisation, cannot fail to emphasise the nation-state’s influence over migration policy. “...government’s control over the movement of people in search of employment tightened virtually everywhere in the early part of the last century. With the exception of the free immigration policy among members of the European Union (EU), immigration controls are generally far tighter now than they were a hundred years ago”.⁸³⁴ However, an emphasis on peoples rather than states as legitimate units of concern is increasingly being highlighted: a growing number of non-governmental organisations and a global civil society emphasise the well being of the peoples of the world rather than their states. Globalisation, undoubtedly, is reshaping IR as it diminishes notions of territoriality,⁸³⁵ a state-centric view, and the prevalence of the nation-state, but the global process should be regulated in such a way that it respects the diversity of the human race. If not, it risks the escalation in extreme feelings of nationalism, tribalism, and separatism, and an emphasis on divided national units. Even though borders are physically disappearing, they are still very present in the minds of humans.

⁸³² *Ibid.*

⁸³³ Cable contends that is through national ministers that the IMF, the UN, the WTO, and the EU cooperate internationally. (Vincent Cable, *Globalization*, p. 31).

⁸³⁴ Martin Wolf, “Will the Nation-State”, p. 184.

⁸³⁵ A note of caution should be expressed: it diminishes territoriality in the physical sense, but could be said to heighten a territorial sense of belonging.

4.2.3 Cosmopolitan Democracy and Globalisation

The ability of the nation-state to protect the rights of its citizens has indeed been reduced by the new modern phase of globalisation.⁸³⁶ If international organisations testify to the intensification of globalisation, the problem for cosmopolitan democracy is that these institutions are not accountable to peoples. Linklater defines cosmopolitan democracy as “a condition in which international organisations, transnational corporations, global markets, ... are accountable to the peoples of the world” as opposed to mere national frameworks of decision-making and accountability.⁸³⁷ The proponents of cosmopolitan democracy have brought forward the fact that national democracies have very little, if no influence, on global markets or transnational corporations. Hence, democracy cannot be best served within the limits of the nation-state. In the words of Held, “... the problem ... is that regional and global interconnectedness contest the traditional national resolutions of the key questions of democratic theory and practice. The very concept of governance can escape the nation-state”.⁸³⁸ The priority lies in democratising international corporations and other international institutions in a way that they would become accountable to the peoples of the world at large.⁸³⁹ The democratic deficit that characterises the decision-making process of international organisations, in which wider populations have no say on decisions which affect them, must be remedied. To Hutchings, Held is making one of the boldest claims since Kant for the possibility of mapping the ethical cosmopolis, grounded on the notion of individual right, onto a political cosmopolis. “... His cosmopolitan citizens ... are also identified with the constituency of the people of the world as a whole and participate directly in decision-making affecting that constituency”.⁸⁴⁰ Globalisation has ushered in new political challenges, which demand members of different societies to come together as cosmopolitan citizens to express themselves in matters that concern the world at large and this cannot be

⁸³⁶ Linklater Andrew, “Cosmopolitan Citizenship”, in Kimberley Hutchings & Roland Dannreuther, (eds.), *Cosmopolitan Citizenship*, (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1999), p. 44.

⁸³⁷ Andrew Linklater, “Globalization and The Transformation of Political Community”, p. 621.

⁸³⁸ David Held, *Democracy and the Global Order*, p. 16.

⁸³⁹ *Ibid.*

confined to a solely ethical concern.⁸⁴¹ Rather, the development of new forms of political community will be introduced “in which citizens and aliens come together as co-legislators within a wider public sphere”.⁸⁴² Rights and duties of citizens do not solely belong to the nation-state, but to complex transnational political arrangements that possibly transcend it, such as the EU.⁸⁴³

For cosmopolitan democratic theorists, statist approaches that view citizenship as a characteristic of the nation-state only are insufficient, and nor are Kantian views of a mere feeling of compassion toward outsiders.⁸⁴⁴ The question whether globalisation changes some assumptions, such as the claim that citizens have duties to fellow citizens and not the rest of humanity is, according to Linklater, being challenged by cosmopolitan democracy. “Globalisation has encouraged the development of solidarities that cut across national borders and unite the citizens of different political communities”.⁸⁴⁵ Transnational corporations need to be accountable and responsible to world citizens.⁸⁴⁶ Moreover, the idea of world citizenship is enjoying great popularity in present times: issues such as the environment demand that citizens develop a greater sense of responsibility for the whole human species.⁸⁴⁷ Indeed, the expansion of global society has meant that popular participation is more acute and not confined to voting in national elections.⁸⁴⁸

⁸⁴⁰ Kimberley Hutchings, “Political Theory and Cosmopolitan Citizenship”, in: Kimberley Hutchings & Roland Dannreuther, (eds.), *Cosmopolitan Citizenship*, p. 25.

⁸⁴¹ *Ibid.*

⁸⁴² Andrew Linklater, in: *Ibid.*, p. 44.

⁸⁴³ *Ibid.*

⁸⁴⁴ *Ibid.* Van den Anker argues that it is not because of globalisation that we have moral duties to others (Beitz upheld such a position in 1979). Moreover, as Brown and Robinson claim, globalisation and interdependence can create greater inequality, and does not constitute a factor for the argument of global morality. (Christien van den Anker, “Global Justice”, p. 140) However, globalisation might intensify the morality factor. “The process of globalisation makes it extra clear that the effects of interaction demand moral responsibility”. (*Ibid.*, p. 138)

⁸⁴⁵ Andrew Linklater, “Globalization and The Transformation of Political Community”, p. 626.

⁸⁴⁶ Steve Smith & John Baylis, *The Globalization*, p. 10.

⁸⁴⁷ Andrew Linklater, “Globalization and The Transformation of Political Community”, p. 626.

⁸⁴⁸ Jan Scholte, A, “The Globalization of World Politics”, p. 27.

The cosmopolitan democracy project requires the whole-hearted allegiance of world citizens who enjoy multiple citizenships and give full significance to the term cosmopolitan. They are world citizens when involved with issues that require the application of global rights and duties, and regional and/or national citizens when transnational issues are not at stake. As Archibugi notes, “the term cosmopolitan...manages to capture the dual reference to citizens of the world and of existing states... Such a project proposes to integrate and limit the functions of existing states with new institutions based on world citizenship”.⁸⁴⁹ The involvement of citizens as agents of global change and the responsibility of the individual as a member of what Falk calls ‘a nascent global civil’ is principal ‘with regard to extending democratic values on the three different but interconnected layers.’⁸⁵⁰ In this regard, the empowerment of individuals to shape their own destiny is at the heart of the project instead of relying on governmental or institutional ruling.⁸⁵¹ The concept of a common destiny, or to be more precise, a ‘common global destiny’, places individuals or world citizens, as the most important agents of change contributing to the progress and survival of humanity. The world citizen, as a bearer of rights and duties, has the moral responsibility to adopt an international mindset so that the welfare of the people of the world can be secured. Moreover, the transformation of the individual is linked to his/her position as a new political agent in order to regenerate the World Order.⁸⁵²

More interestingly, in this scheme, the smallest political unit -the individual acting as a world citizen- and the widest one -the world seen as a single political entity- are tightly intertwined. The theme of acquiring a world citizens’ mindset is linked to political aims and requirements: it is not only morally acceptable to acquire a cosmopolitan mindset, but also necessary as regards world survival and security. It is, thus, necessary to be a world citizen participating actively in an international civil society, whose aims are to bring about a ‘new spirit of co-operation and

⁸⁴⁹ Daniele Archibugi, “Principles of Cosmopolitan Democracy”, p. 216.

⁸⁵⁰ Richard Falk, *On Humane Governance*, p. 15.

⁸⁵¹ See Commission on Global Governance, *Our Global Neighbourhood*, (New York: University Press, 1995).

⁸⁵² Daniele Archibugi, “Principles of Cosmopolitan Democracy”, p. 223.

peace.’⁸⁵³ More importantly, it is inadequate to claim that the nation-state is the only form of moral political community when transnational disasters result in increased interdependence.⁸⁵⁴ As Linklater notes, “Breaking down invidious distinctions between citizens and aliens, and building institutional arrangements which provide outsiders with unprecedented opportunities for representation and voice, are necessary responses to the contemporary problems of national democracy”.⁸⁵⁵ Breaking this dichotomy between citizens and aliens is also a concern of postmodernism in IR.

4.3 ‘Cosmopolitan’ Postmodern Perspectives in IR

If the cosmopolitan democracy or the critical international theory projects can be said to follow a line parallel to that of Kant, and hence bring about an extension and modification of the Enlightenment, the same cannot be said of the postmodern perspective. The latter wishes to do away with foundational epistemology, and as such, puts forward a quite alternative way of criticising the nation-state, a form that distrusts all the Western stories of the Enlightenment, such as reason, linear progress, and positivism. Although postmodernism can be described as clashing with the ‘modern’, it can be said to retain traces of the modern project of cosmopolitanism, a somewhat rearticulated cosmopolitanism that wishes to be ‘post-sovereign’, and less obsessed with the fixity and stubbornness of boundaries which promote unwarranted binary oppositions, closure, and totalisation.⁸⁵⁶ Hence, the postmodern project highlights a certain crisis in modernity (fixed sovereignty conceived in terms of modernity) and modernity’s implication in “relations of domination, control, and power”.⁸⁵⁷ It questions the modern/stability discourse by rendering notions of space problematic.⁸⁵⁸ As a case in point, Walker is alarmed by the modern political project, which pays tribute to political realism and state sovereignty. “As a

⁸⁵³ Mary Kaldor, in: *Ibid.*, p. 96.

⁸⁵⁴ Andrew Linklater, “Cosmopolitan Citizenship”, p. 47.

⁸⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

⁸⁵⁶ See Richard Devetak, “The Project of Modernity”, pp. 27-51.

⁸⁵⁷ George: In *Ibid.*, p. 28.

theory, or complex of theories, constituted through claims about sovereign identity in space and time, International Relations takes for granted that which seems to me to have become most problematic".⁸⁵⁹ Jenny Edkins and Véronique Pin-Fat hold that it is only without the notion of the sovereign, 'the master-signifier', that another evocation of the political is possible.⁸⁶⁰ Devetak has termed this 'initiative' a 'postmodern ethics', that is an ethics detached from territoriality and state sovereignty, from notions of them and us (the fostering of otherness), and 'inside and outside'.⁸⁶¹ This highlights the post-positivist emphasis on a 'new' ethics in global politics, which strengthens the main argument found in this thesis: that material cosmopolitanism needs to be complemented by a more ethical cosmopolitanism.⁸⁶²

Rorty, seeing positive points in both modern/postmodern positions, adopts a middle way solution between the claims of ironists for whom solidarity cannot exist as such due to anti-socialisation,⁸⁶³ and historicist writers on justice and human community for whom the desire for private perfection is irrational.⁸⁶⁴ Rorty, like Nietzsche and Heidegger, hopes for a private perfection that is 'a self-created, autonomous, human life', and like Marx or Habermas, who are 'engaged in a shared, social effort', aspires to less cruel and more just institutions. In Rorty's eyes, both kinds of writers utilise interesting tools towards a more comprehensive philosophy. In his words, "The one tells us that...we may find our own words... the other tells us that responsibility (of finding our own words) is not the only one we have".⁸⁶⁵ In short, human solidarity and self-creation are incommensurable but 'equally valid'.⁸⁶⁶ A liberal ironist is committed to seeing the contingency of his or her 'own beliefs and desires', and at the same time strives to ensure that 'suffering will be diminished, that the humiliation of human beings

⁸⁵⁸ Nevzat Soguk & Geoffrey Whitehall, "Wandering Grounds: Transversality, Identity, Territoriality, and Movement", *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 1999, Vol. 28 (No. 3), p. 675.

⁸⁵⁹ R.B.J. Walker, *Inside/Outside*, p. 8.

⁸⁶⁰ Jenny Edkins & Véronique Pin-Fat, "The Subject of the Political" in: Jenny Edkins, Véronique Pin-Fat & Nalini Persram, (eds.), *Critical Perspectives*, p. 3.

⁸⁶¹ Richard Devetak, "Postmodernism", p. 204.

⁸⁶² See Chapter One, (1.2. Aims and Objectives of the Thesis).

⁸⁶³ Nietzsche views socialisation as antithetical to something deep within us. (Richard Rorty, *Contingency, Irony and Solidarity*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 14).

⁸⁶⁴ Rorty includes writers such as Jürgen Habermas in this category.

⁸⁶⁵ *Ibid*, pp. xiv & xv.

by other human beings may cease.’⁸⁶⁷ Human solidarity is not to be seen as mere Kantian compassion, but as the imaginative ability to see people as fellow sufferers: it must be created rather than merely reflected upon, and it regards other human beings as ‘one of us’ rather than ‘them’.⁸⁶⁸

If postmodernism could be defined in its simplest term, it could be, as Lyotard puts it, a form of ‘incredulity towards metanarratives’⁸⁶⁹, or, in other words, a suspicion towards all grand projects or claims to truth. Nothing can be taken for granted, but rather all stable foundations can be deconstructed and rendered ‘unnatural’. Genealogical methods are used to that effect, i.e. going back to the origins of concepts to show that these are not necessarily fixed, or that it can indeed be historically contingent to favour one concept over another and treat it as absolute reality. Such is the case in International Relations, as concepts such as the nation-state, territoriality, and sovereignty have become unquestioned as hardened and timeless truths. These concepts should, however, be challenged inasmuch as they have become increasingly unable to foster security, have emphasised boundaries, and have as such prevented emancipation.⁸⁷⁰ Deconstruction or ‘double readings’ are additional methods used to unsettle the effects stemming from stable oppositions, which are not neutral but hierarchical. The term, which is privileged because of its unquestioned presence, gives a negative connotation to the opposing term.⁸⁷¹

As Ashley shows, this is the case with the terms ‘sovereignty’ and ‘anarchy’: “The heroic practice... turns on a simple hierarchical opposition: a dichotomy of *sovereignty* versus

⁸⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

⁸⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸⁶⁸ Rorty expresses also the idea of textuality, that the world cannot be real, but that we represent it as a text imbued with incommensurable interpretations. “The world does not speak, only we do”. (*Ibid.*, p. 6) As sentences only can be true, the world has no intrinsic nature or essential reality. (*Ibid.*, p. xvi).

⁸⁶⁹ Jean-François Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984), p. xxiv.

⁸⁷⁰ Ashley and Walker note that questions of boundaries are linked to the concept of emancipation. “with the hardening of boundaries, one’s own domain of freedom is now more limited”. (Richard K. Ashley & R.B.J. Walker, “Reading Dissidence/Writing the Discipline: Crisis and the Question of Sovereignty in International Studies”, *International Studies Quarterly*, 1990, Vol. 34 (No. 3), p. 394).

anarchy, where the former term is privileged as a higher reality, a regulative ideal, and the latter term is understood only in a derivative and negative way, as a failure to live up to this ideal and as something that endangers this ideal”.⁸⁷² Ashley employs a double reading tactic⁸⁷³ to question the very foundation of IR as an anarchical domain of power politics. Indeed, if we take the sovereignty/anarchy dichotomy as unproblematic, as in the case of realists, there is no other option but that of power politics. But if we take this dichotomy as a constructed one, more peaceful approaches to global politics could be envisaged. Bartelson, additionally, underlines the postmodern notion of power and knowledge when he notes that sovereignty has the power to organise an unquestioned social reality: “Without a proper mode of knowledge to render it intelligible, sovereignty cannot exist, and loses its power to organize political reality through a demarcation of inside from outside, or Same from Other”.⁸⁷⁴ As Walker notes,

The only alternative to the negation, of course, turns out to be an affirmation of the hope that someday, somehow, all that is presumed to be possible inside may be extended to the outside – a hope that is constantly deferred...From this, it is not too difficult to understand the slide from the limit constructed spatially as international anarchy and the ‘enemy’ as absolute Other to the limit constructed temporally as the ‘primitive’, the ‘oriental’, the ‘Third World’, and the ‘underdeveloped’.

In this sense, Walker envisions IR as one of the ‘guardians of the discursive boundary between the ‘normal and the ‘pathological’: the authentic community in which democracy might be possible and the world of strangers and dangers beyond.⁸⁷⁵ In an age of globalisation, Connolly questions the ‘tenacity of state territorialisation in contemporary politics’, and links it to the need for a more dispersed or ‘deterritorialised’ system of democracy, and alternative imaginary. The latter, similar to the cosmopolitan democracy project, would support ‘a more cosmopolitan democratic imagination that disaggregates standard conceptions of democracy and distributes

⁸⁷¹ Jacques Derrida, in: Richard Devetak, “The Project of Modernity”, p. 41.

⁸⁷² Richard K. Ashley, “Untying The Sovereign State: a Double Reading of the Anarchy Problematique”, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 1988, Vol. 17 (No. 2), p. 230.

⁸⁷³ The first reading offers a conventional reading and prevailing interpretation and the second unsettles what the first reading takes for granted.

⁸⁷⁴ Jens Bartelson, *A Genealogy of Sovereignty*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 2.

political identifications and democratic energies across disparate spaces'.⁸⁷⁶ The globalised terms under which we live have rendered the usual dichotomy between inside and outside blurred and complex, and hence the division is no longer between the parochial and the global, or the local and cosmopolitan: both can find themselves simultaneously at the same place and time. Diverse postmodern authors, such as R.B.J Walker, Jens Bartelson, and Cynthia Weber have scrutinised how centuries of modern political life have focused on sovereignty as a perpetuator of the inside/outside or domestic/international dichotomy and paralysed international relations.⁸⁷⁷ Feminist theories have also participated in this discourse, criticising rigid boundaries.⁸⁷⁸ Dalby remarks that feminist lenses allow for the "co-operation and construction of communities across borders".⁸⁷⁹

As such, a further objective of postmodernism is to unlock the dichotomies encouraged by sovereignty and territoriality that foster estrangement: inside/outside, or as underlined by postcolonial writers, the cultural humiliation and devaluation of the foreign Other. These dichotomies are also problematic to cosmopolitanism. Said, in his pioneering work *Orientalism* maintains that the 'common enterprise of promoting human community' is impeded by 'racial, ethnic, and national distinctions, in short by the Other'.⁸⁸⁰ More recently, Bhabha contemplates the idea of 'nationness' as the 'unheimlich terror of the space or race of the Other'.⁸⁸¹ Soguk and Whitehall underline that the history of migrants or slavery has been a cosmopolitan one as it has questioned from the start the fixed boundaries of the state and encourage 'transversality'.⁸⁸²

⁸⁷⁵ R.B.J. Walker, *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 152.

⁸⁷⁶ William E. Conolly, "Democracy and Territoriality", *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 1991, Vol. 20 (No.3), pp. 464 & 474.

⁸⁷⁷ Roland Bleiker, *Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 25.

⁸⁷⁸ Christine Sylvester constructs feminist reflections on hyphenated and multiple identities, what she calls the 'homeless homestanding'. The latter enables an 'identity slippage', the lack of self-sameness and emphatic co-operation. (Richard Devetak, "The Project of Modernity", p. 46).

⁸⁷⁹ Simon Dalby, *Contesting an Essential Concept-Dilemmas in Contemporary Discourse Security*, (Ottawa: The Norman Patterson School of International Affairs, No. 6, 1994), p. 7.

⁸⁸⁰ Edward Said, *Orientalism*, p. 328.

⁸⁸¹ Homi K. Bhabha, (ed.) *Nation and Narration*, (London: Routledge, 1990), p. 2.

⁸⁸² "In the transversality of space, frontiers are turned into crossings, and rivers into bridges". (Nevzat Soguk & Geoffrey Whitehall, "Wandering Grounds," p. 685).

“Migrants... are seen as threats that appear from nowhere and destabilize and undermine the security and coherence of the sovereign project”.⁸⁸³ In the case of colonisation, the ‘imposed lands’ do not only represent a question of survival, but a transversal knowledge ‘that frees the minds from the limits of the imposed lands’.⁸⁸⁴ As such, and more importantly, postmodernism not only challenges sovereignty, but also questions its very concept.⁸⁸⁵ “The target...is the traditional conception of community which is tied to notions of totality, boundedness, and identity, all of which is captured in the notion of sovereignty”.⁸⁸⁶ The redefinition of human community, which has rejected these unnecessary dichotomies, “...will necessarily involve a recognition of the claims of both identity and of difference. It must be rooted in an equal respect for the claims of both diversity and unity”.⁸⁸⁷ Yet, in its wish to disperse spaces, the postmodern celebrates diversity, at the expense of unity. As Foucault writes, “There are too many diverse kinds of relations... yet at the same time there is too little necessary unity”.⁸⁸⁸ Humanity, too encompassing and vague as a term, is no longer a useful tradition and a response to complex transactions across borders: it is too ‘large’ a term to render the realities of fragmentation valid.⁸⁸⁹ Yet, it is interesting to note that Walker uses the term ‘species’ when advocating a more cosmopolitan response to the global economy, planetary ecology and technology.⁸⁹⁰

The relation between unity and diversity is, thus, problematic as postmodernists fear that universal principles might threaten cultural diversity and impose a single way of being. “The idea that I think we need today in order to make decisions in political matters cannot be the idea of the totality, or of the unity, of the body. It can only be the idea of a multiplicity or a diversity”.⁸⁹¹ Postmodernists, thus, envision unity or universality only as a domineering and

⁸⁸³ *Ibid.*, p. 679.

⁸⁸⁴ Edouard Glissant, in: *Ibid.*, p. 683.

⁸⁸⁵ Richard Devetak, “The Project of Modernity”, p. 43.

⁸⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 44.

⁸⁸⁷ Walker, in: *Ibid.*, p. 45.

⁸⁸⁸ Foucault, in: Nevzat Soguk & Geoffrey Whitehall, “Wandering Grounds”, p. 691.

⁸⁸⁹ R.B.J. Walker, *Inside/Outside*, p. 16.

⁸⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 21.

⁸⁹¹ Steven Best & Douglas Kellner, *Postmodern Theory: Critical Interrogations*, (New York: The Guilford Press, 1991), p. 89.

homogenising totality, and celebrate diversity and multiplicity insofar as the modernist presumes, in the words of Walker, ‘that the different must always be resolved to the same’.⁸⁹² If postmodernism does not wish for the other to be brought in line with the same, it therefore advocates that the fear and otherness be transformed into a celebration of diversity. Hence, the other is no longer defined as an enemy, as an inferior being who must be alienated or suppressed so as to foster security and understanding across imaginary and constructed boundaries. In some ways, many postmodernists wish to cross boundaries to foster harmony, and hence underline the need to replace the dominant realist discourse of power with a more peaceful one.⁸⁹³ George, by underlining the role of resistance groups, as with Bleiker, points out in a very positive note, “...it is possible to change power relations and overturn irreducible ‘realities’...People can, for example, resist the damages of extreme nationalism...(or)...the transformation of global life into the construction of otherness...”⁸⁹⁴ Postmodernism, in its discourse on IR, encourages post-‘restricted’ and post-‘territorialised’ views of who we are, and as such it constitutes an alternative way to delve into our cosmopolitan theme. Postmodernists, thus, present various possibilities for cosmopolitanism: the deconstruction of the fixed notion of sovereignty, the abandonment of the East-West dichotomy, the possibility of other loyalties, and the critique of modernity as territoriality.

4.4 Synopsis of the Functional Approach, Cosmopolitan Democracy, and Postmodernism

Similar to postmodernism, another strong attack on the concept of state sovereignty, Mitrani functionalism, as we have seen, seeks to overcome the paralysing characteristics of the nation-state by surpassing territoriality. The functional approach, consequently, endeavours to ensure that structures of international organisations are not territorially based, but rather based on

⁸⁹² R.B.J. Walker, *Inside/Outside*, p. 78.

⁸⁹³ John Vasquez envisions realism and power politics as propelling a discourse of power that encourages war between states. (See John A. Vasquez, *The Power of Power Politics: A Critique*, (London: Pinter, 1983).

⁸⁹⁴ Jim George, *Discourses of Global Politics: A Critical (Re) Introduction to International Relations*, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994), p. 215.

human needs. As much as Mitrany bases his approach on the precondition of non-territoriality (he wanted to shape a ‘borderless’ world), the satisfaction of predominantly material needs through the faculty of reason is at the core of his functionalist approach. Thus, it has been argued that Mitrany fails to consider a post-rational approach, ‘is stuck’ with modernity, and works within the limits of the Enlightenment. Indeed, the functional approach contends that history is progressive, and that all peoples follow a rational path of progress. Yet, Long and Ashworth observe that the latter neither undermines the functional approach, nor invalidates its goals.⁸⁹⁵ We can also question whether Mitrany would have produced the functional approach (a peaceful global governance plan), had he not believed in the out of vogue rational path to progress, and thus in an ever-progressing motion towards world peace.

Mitrany proposed the functional approach in response to failures, which he perceived in the League of Nations: the incapacity to deal with the economic and cultural causes of conflict.⁸⁹⁶ Mitrany’s views, correspondingly, have been regarded as a way to deal with the ‘problem’ of exclusive and aggressive nationalism, as international organisations would provide for the fulfilment of needs across borders in a more effective way than state-sponsored nationalism. If sovereign states were a cause of war, Mitrany contended that international planning (through organisations that deal with a single function) should replace national planning, which empowered states, and hence led to war.⁸⁹⁷ He thought that people would then naturally shift their national loyalties to international organisations, as their growing economic needs would be fulfilled on an international basis, which would undermine nationalism, and by the same token, ethnic conflicts. This view explains that, according to the functional approach, an international government, would not amount to a new political organisation (regional or worldwide), but to manifold overlapping functional international organisations. In the same way, the fact that the provision of needs would be internationalised would help collapse the distinction between

⁸⁹⁵ Lucian M. Ashworth & David Long, “Working for Peace”, p. 20.

⁸⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

national and international, justifying the cosmopolitan character of the functional approach. Politics, in turn, does not disappear but is made invisible by focusing on technical organisations that would provide for the political goal of the satisfaction of “cosmopolitan need fulfilment”.⁸⁹⁸ The formula goes as follows: by linking people through their similarities across borders (material needs), and forgetting what, to Mitrany, divide people (for example cultural factors), the chances for peace are enhanced.

It can, however, be argued that Mitrany’s approach is rather ‘timid and cautious’, although it appears to offer a very direct perspective on the problems of world order. One might indeed ask whether it is so easy to forget about our problems, and concentrate solely on what unites us: would this imply that we are unable to discuss divergent issues explicitly, or deal with our cultural diversity in other ways than by conflict? It is as if Mitrany conceived of humanity as being in a rather ‘childlike’ stage, in need of diversions to put an end to conflict. Indeed, when children are in conflict, intervening adults often make them forget about their issues by encouraging them to concentrate on another activity, or by making them play a game, in which they can collaborate and enjoy together. It is to be hoped that by the time they reach adulthood, there will be additional ways in which they will be able to resolve their conflicts, firstly, by identifying the ‘problem’, and secondly, by possibly using the means of dialogue to resolve their differences. Furthermore, it remains a concern that the functional approach, by pushing culture aside to arrive at world peace, might endorse the position that cultural factors and diverse ideologies could forever remain an indestructible barrier to world peace. In a roundabout way, this would amount to saying that unity in diversity is indeed important (Mitrany praised the enjoyment of culture in the private sphere) but is, nonetheless, enshrined in the formula ‘let’s keep cultural diversity but let’s forget about it when it comes to serious issues.’ As children from different backgrounds do not find grounds to hate each other, there is

⁸⁹⁷ The new conditions of interdependence had rendered national planning a dangerous enterprise, as the state could embark on aggressive foreign policies to be able to satisfy its dependency on raw materials. (Lucian M. Ashworth, *Creating International Studies*, p. 84).

⁸⁹⁸ Lucian M. Ashworth, “Bringing the Nation Back In”, p. 79.

reason to believe that ethnic hatred is taught, rather than intrinsic. Therefore, the answer could also lie in the deconstruction of a mental illusion: deal with xenophobia by touching the mind (through, for example, world citizenship education),⁸⁹⁹ and the mind might be able to reject it. This aspect is elaborated in greater detail in Chapter Six.⁹⁰⁰ Rather than treating cultural diversity as the cause of an emotional disorder (‘nationalism’), it could also be useful to identify it as a potential means of healing that very disorder.⁹⁰¹

These statements seek to highlight what I see as a clearly innovative, pragmatic, and real (it exists), but incomplete approach, as this thesis recognises the importance of fulfilling material needs, but also underlines an ‘ethical’ dimension, as well as the need to define cultural diversity as something different than a constant irritant to world peace.⁹⁰² Hence, there are two main issues that the functional approach fails to examine. Firstly, it seeks to use a detour that pushes problems aside without attempting to look at them in the eye, and secondly, it ignores the more ‘non-tangible’ needs that humans may have, as they are treated as entities which only crave material satisfaction.⁹⁰³ However, it goes without saying that the strong cosmopolitan content of Mitrany’s approach has not only greatly enriched the cosmopolitan outlook, but has also strongly influenced more recent cosmopolitan approaches. According to Mitrany, the “historical problem of our time” is “the baffling division between the peoples of the world”⁹⁰⁴, a concern that remains the converging point for all contemporary cosmopolitans. Mitrany’s cosmopolitanism defines parochial politics as obsolete, and places the common life of humanity

⁸⁹⁹ World citizenship education is based around ‘the oneness of humankind’.

⁹⁰⁰ See Chapter Six, (6.3.1 World Citizenship and Universal Language: Cosmopolitan Communicative Tools)

⁹⁰¹ The Bahá’í faith, for example, by emphasising the principle of the oneness of mankind and the value of cultural diversity, maintains that it is a means to combat ethnic antagonism. (See Chapter Six)

⁹⁰² The oneness of mankind upholds that one diverse human species is the foundation of world peace.

⁹⁰³ An interesting argument is that focusing on the fulfilment of material needs ultimately leads to a feeling of incompleteness that is in turn fed by a non-tangible and emotional exclusive nationalism. (Lucian M. Ashworth, “Bringing the Nation Back In”, pp. 80-81).

⁹⁰⁴ David Mitrany, “A Working Peace System”, in *The Functional Theory of Politics*, p. 123.

above all other concerns⁹⁰⁵: territoriality becomes irrelevant as feelings of common humanity grow through the intermediary of functional international organisations.⁹⁰⁶

Of special interest to us, and in the context of the twentieth century approaches examined in this chapter, several aspects of the Mitranian approach, (mostly the non-territorial aspects, the inadequacies of the nation-state and state sovereignty, and the importance of international organisations), have been bequeathed to cosmopolitan democracy and postmodernism. For example, Mitrany's resistance to absolute truths (as his love for change demonstrates) can be seen as a preamble to the postmodern movement examined in this chapter. The functional approach can, thus, be regarded as a predecessor to more current formulations of cosmopolitanism as it seeks to move away from the logic of territoriality, nationalism, and static conceptions of world order. As a case in point, Paul Taylor noted, "the functional approach has been recognised as one of the main intellectual precursors of this new vision of world society, where the competitive elements of the billiard ball model are replaced by the cobweb image of 'interdependencies and cross-national contacts among states'.⁹⁰⁷ In addition, Ashworth and Long remark that, "Mitrany's vision of a functionally organized world was one with many overlapping, non-congruent international functional organisations, including for some purposes territorial states".⁹⁰⁸ These statements represent a clear link with the cosmopolitan democracy project. Held notes, for instance, that "pollution, drugs, human rights and terrorism are among an increasing number of transnational policy issues which cut across territorial jurisdictions... and which require international cooperation for their effective resolution".⁹⁰⁹ Nonetheless, cosmopolitan democracy suggests a more overtly 'political' and 'moral' solution to global politics. The project emphasises the need for regional governance structures, and the importance of dialogue across 'communities of fate' where issues such as the environment and the

⁹⁰⁵ See 4.1.4 From a Time of Power to a Time of Service

⁹⁰⁶ Mitrany, for example, cited the Universal Postal Union and the International Telegraphic Union as important developments in international organisation. (Lucian M. Ashworth & David Long, "Working for Peace", p. 7).

⁹⁰⁷ Paul Taylor, "Introduction", p. xvii.

⁹⁰⁸ Lucian M. Ashworth & David Long, "Working for Peace", p. 9.

protection of minorities have become the concern of the world community at large.⁹¹⁰ Held, accordingly, underlines the need and importance of cross-cultural dialogue, “citizenship in a democratic polity of the future is likely to involve a growing mediating role: a role which encompasses dialogue with the traditions and discourses of others with the aim of expanding the horizons of one’s own framework of meaning, and increasing the scope of mutual understanding”.⁹¹¹

The cosmopolitan democracy project personifies a clear response to the phenomenon of globalisation, which has shrunk the world through a revolution in communication and technology, and which in turn, demands that politics and democracy take a global twist. If globalisation highlights the global nature of current issues, there is a need for transnationalising decision-making at the global level, and giving legitimacy to transnational actors and forces, as powerful states not only make decisions for their own citizens, but for world citizens at large. In this sense, citizens should not only be citizens of their national communities, but also acquire additional memberships in wider regions and in the wider global order, underlying the need for ‘multiple citizenships’.⁹¹² Globalisation, however, brings its own problems such as growing inequality in terms of wealth, the lack of accountability of international organisations, and the lack of global citizenry participation. Accordingly, cosmopolitan democracy calls for the diffusion of democracy across territorial boundaries, not only within states, but also among states, and among the citizens of one state and another – the latter point reminding us of Kant’s idea of cosmopolitan law. Henceforth, cosmopolitan democracy seeks to extend and enhance democratic practice at the local, national, regional, and global levels, and in organisations that cut across territorial entities.

⁹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 162

⁹¹⁰ David Held calls the idea of a self-determining people, a ‘political community of fate’, which is characterised by ‘an intermeshing of national fortunes’, and which is no longer located within the boundaries of a single nation-state. (David Held, “From Executive to Cosmopolitan Multilateralism”, p. 161.)

⁹¹¹ David Held & Anthony Mc Grew, *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics, and Culture*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999), p. 449.

⁹¹² *Ibid.*

This project does not seek to dispose of the nation-state, but underlines its insufficiency in international affairs, as it now represents just one of the many elements of global order. “A cosmopolitan polity does not call for a diminution *per se* of state power and capacity across the globe. Rather, it seeks to entrench and develop political institutions at regional and global levels as a necessary complement to those of the state”.⁹¹³ These additional structures would serve to strengthen the notion of world citizenship. As Archibugi remarks, “the main aim of cosmopolitan democracy is to give voice to citizens in the world community in an institutional model parallel to states”.⁹¹⁴ By giving democracy a crucial place in global governance, cosmopolitan democracy centralises the notion of world citizenship, as citizens have a voice that transcends territorial boundaries, a phenomenon perceivable through a growing global civil society that creates cross-border organisations. In addition to this movement, new regional and global bodies (such as a global parliament which could monitor the accountability of international and transnational economic agencies) would be necessary in order to enhance transnational democratic practice. In this regard, cosmopolitan democracy proposes measures to strengthen world order, by placing emphasis on UN reform, the enforcement of human rights through a strong ICC, and the recognition of regional bodies such as the EU as independent and legitimate law-making bodies. The project also calls for a parliamentary assembly at the United Nations (as the voice of world citizens has to be heard in an institutional model parallel to states), the creation of an accountable peacekeeping force, and “the creation of new global governance structures with responsibility for addressing poverty, welfare, and related issues” in order to counteract the powers of “market-oriented agencies such as the WTO and the IMF”.⁹¹⁵ Cosmopolitan democracy, hence, stresses democratisation, transparency, and the accountability of functional global bodies.

⁹¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 179.

⁹¹⁴ Archibugi, Daniele, “From the United Nations to Cosmopolitan Democracy”, in: Archibugi, Daniele and Held, David, (eds.), *Cosmopolitan Democracy*, p. 135.

⁹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 178.

By linking citizens of one state with another, the cosmopolitan democracy project strives to break down the barriers between citizens and aliens, a point that is reiterated by postmodernism. Postmodernism wishes to deconstruct ‘absolute truths’, meaning, and permanence, and contends that rationality is destroying humanity by strongly insisting on ‘definition and categorization’ in a world that does not necessarily make sense.⁹¹⁶ Hence, the Hegelian claim to absolute wisdom is deconstructed as the world needs to be constantly questioned and not redefined in any rational way. However, as Eastby contends, postmodernism’s great flaw is that it offers no alternative to ‘limited modernity’. “... the movement offers no new vision for power and it offers no new claim to coherence in relation to modern rationalism”.⁹¹⁷ However, postmodernism contains a useful cosmopolitan model. Its ‘cosmopolitanism’ (it is certain that postmodernism would not wish to be labelled in this way) consists in its will to break away from fixed concepts such as ‘nation-state’, ‘state sovereignty’, and ‘territoriality’, concepts which are seen as promoting exclusion as they construct barriers between ‘citizens’ and ‘strangers’. Postmodernism alleges that the sovereign state is ‘a limited moral community’ as it promotes exclusion and estrangement, and is the promoter of an inflexible dichotomy between ‘us’ and ‘them’.⁹¹⁸ Walker notes that state sovereignty produces an ethics of ‘absolute exclusion’⁹¹⁹ and Jenny Edkins and Véronique Pin-Fat contend that, ‘sovereignty has precisely the task of preventing the emergence of an ethics of the real.’⁹²⁰ The ethics of state sovereignty, which affirms that the good life, guided by universal principles, can only be realised within the state and not beyond, has to be replaced by a post-sovereign politics.⁹²¹

These three approaches demonstrate how twentieth century cosmopolitanism refuses to be controlled by nation-states (whether they wish to see it disappear or not), and strive to adopt a more open, intricate, and multi-faceted vision of a world community that can no longer function

⁹¹⁶ John H. Eastby, “Functionalism and Modernity”, p. 63.

⁹¹⁷ *Ibid.*

⁹¹⁸ See Andrew Linklater, *Men and Citizens in The Theory of International Relations*, (London: Macmillan in association with the London School of Economics and Political Science, 1990).

⁹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 66.

⁹²⁰ Jenny Edkins & Véronique Pin-Fat, “The Subject”, p. 8.

within fixed and closed parameters. The days when realism reigned supreme over IR have drawn to a close. Cosmopolitan approaches are increasingly gaining ground, as together they make a strong case for the validity and contemporary necessity of cosmopolitanism. They highlight growing interactions that strip borders and exclusive political communities of any sound coherence and meaning that they might have enjoyed in the past.

4. 5 Summary of the Cosmopolitan Tradition: From its Infancy to the Present

Cosmopolitan thinking began with an ethical and philosophical ideal of ‘world citizenship’ embracing the whole cosmos or universe (and not only the world), and was characterised by the interplay of ideas, namely the ideas that the *polis* was not a self-sufficient and perfect socio-political unit, that moral considerations sustained by a system of natural law was essential, and that human beings, despite all their variations, constitute a single human species. This ancient cosmopolitanism has taken another form in the Middle Ages, being transferred to ideas of universal ‘religious’ empires based, as it was the case with Christianity, on a Christian version of a universal Roman Empire. (Thoughts of World Empire, however, rarely extended beyond Christian lands).⁹²² With the demise of the idea of ‘universal empire’ that accompanied the emergence of an international system composed of confined states, a ‘Westphalian system’ of world order emerged in which new ideas were conceived to sustain the concept of a religious service to humankind. Even with the rise of states, the cosmopolitan ideal found its niche in the Renaissance and the Enlightenment in secular programmes that were devised to appease relations between states, and which often represented embryonic plans for the United Nations or the International Court of Justice. Most of them were, however, dominated by the fallacious notion that these relations were condemned to be between states or between heads of states, and (except for the notable exception of Crucé) were mostly governed by European schemes and the Christian religion. In addition to Crucé’s ingenuity, Kant conceived of ‘a third level’, namely a

⁹²¹ R.B.J. Walker, *Inside/Outside*, p. 64.

⁹²² Derek Heater, *World Citizenship and Government*, p. 182.

cosmopolitan law sustained by world citizens that applies to the world as a whole, and not only to civil and international levels.

Cosmopolitanism has, thus, been the interplay of ideas of world citizenship and world state, the latter being predominant in the Middle Ages and Enlightenment, and the former being prevalent in ancient times, in 'Kantian' Enlightenment, and especially in the twentieth century (namely with critical theories such as cosmopolitan democracy). The cosmopolitan ideal has moved from an idea of moral cosmopolitanism, to expansionism based on the rights of rulers, and finally to the notion of the respect of peoples based on their rights and duties in the cosmopolis. As such, "It is highly unlikely that a renewed medieval Roman Empire would have made provision for any effective citizenly participation in the imperial political system. Cosmopolitan democracy theorists argue that global institutions should be governed by world citizens, and highlight the nation-state's limitations as it hinders the practice of global democracy and global values.

The protection of human rights advocated by most cosmopolitans represents an activist cosmopolitanism. Current cosmopolitanism can be depicted by the inclination (Linklater calls it a 'moral anxiety') to help 'foreigners' on the grounds of a common humanity, due to suffering, starvation, poverty, in other words, a human duty to respect and protect human rights and justice. Indeed, cosmopolitanism undermines the nation-state by intervening beyond its limits, and by diluting the notion of 'foreigner', as it propounds the idea that morality does not end at national boundaries. Cosmopolitanism challenges the predominance of the nation-state on many fronts: firstly, as a result of our global and technological age, and secondly, due to the incapacity of the nation-state to foster morality beyond its boundaries (i.e. caring for 'foreigners' is not as relevant as caring for fellow-citizens). Furthermore, the reality of human oneness calls into question the discriminatory divisions fostered by the nation-state (the nation-state is most of the times a safe haven for citizens, but treats non-citizens in less 'significant categories' such as immigrant, refugee, alien i.e. it creates an other). No longer a philosophical

speculation, or we might say an 'ideal', cosmopolitanism has become tangible as testified by numerous NGOs, the movement of peoples and ideas across borders, and the reality of dual and multiple loyalties and citizenships.

International organisations and a supranational unit such as the European Union, and other regional bodies demonstrate the inadequacy of the nation-state, and the advantage to unite not only for common benefits, but also for increasing understanding and communication across porous borders. Cosmopolitanism, in our times, constitutes a reaction against material global interdependence, the impotence of the nation-state to satisfy our needs (functionalism), and the rejection of discriminatory prejudices based on gender, race, class, or nation (a reiteration of the oneness of humankind). We can, indeed, state that we are moving towards a more mature form of cosmopolitanism, namely a more sensitive cosmopolitanism that wishes to be identified with the constituency of the human species. Furthermore, the twentieth century has seen decolonisation, technological and communications revolutions (globalisation), which if managed in a non-exclusive manner, offers inviting conditions for the realisation of a cosmopolis. The Bahá'í approach, which offers an unsung, but crucial cosmopolitan alternative to world order, shall now be scrutinised in the following chapters of this thesis.

In Chapter Six, the thesis will bring together the cosmopolitan concepts it examined and apply them to an as yet little known (Bahá'í) cosmopolitan model. Such a task can prove daunting without firstly examining the Bahá'í cosmopolitan model,⁹²³ as it has been developed from its inception to more recently, and independently from the cosmopolitan thoughts that we have examined up to Chapter Four. In Chapter Six, themes such as accountability in global governance; the humane based approach of the ICC and its concept of subsidiarity;⁹²⁴ and the notion of a universal language; will be linked to the Bahá'í approach.

⁹²³ See Chapter Five.

⁹²⁴ The concept of subsidiarity is thoroughly linked to a division of functions and powers and the making of decisions at the lowest possible level.

Chapter Five – The Bahá'í Faith as a Cosmopolitan Model

5.1. Introduction

The Bahá'í Faith and Bahá'í cosmopolitan thinking originate from Asia, most particularly nineteenth century Persia, and have, as such, a non-Western origin, unlike most known cosmopolitan perspectives in IR. Heater notes, “Turning to modern times, several writings advocating a world community or a formalised world constitution were produced in Asian countries in the nineteenth century. Of the Asian texts, we may particularly cite the teachings of the Persian prophet Bahá'u'lláh (b. 1817), the originator of the Bahá'í Faith (which has also attracted many adherents in Western countries)”.⁹²⁵ This chapter, which presents the Bahá'í Faith as a cosmopolitan model, will examine the origins of Bahá'í cosmopolitan themes, and the Bahá'í vision of unity and oneness brought by its founder, Bahá'u'lláh. It will also explore the visionary aspects of the Bahá'í perspective on global governance, and underline Bahá'í recommendations for the pacification of IR. Furthermore, it will delve into the complementary outlooks of Bahá'u'lláh's interpreters, 'Abdu'l-Bahá and Shoghi Effendi, who clarify and supplement Bahá'u'lláh's recommendations. The vision of oneness of the Bahá'í Faith is sustained by a practical image of world order. Indeed, after examining the theoretical and religious views of the Faith, its suggested international structural reforms for an improved global governance system will be discussed in the second part of this chapter.

This chapter will present the Bahá'í cosmopolitan writings and views independently of cosmopolitan ideas elaborated upon earlier, and will clearly speak of its importance for cosmopolitanism. Although these ideas are presented independently of the 'mainstream cosmopolitan tradition', the reader will be able to detect that the Bahá'í approach, as a cosmopolitan model, is not entirely dissociated from the 'mainstream' cosmopolitan tradition.

⁹²⁵ Derek Heater, *World Citizenship and Government*, p. x.

Indeed, cosmopolitan principles constitute the core of the Bahá'í Faith as “the universality of humankind, including the social and political oneness, are fundamental principles of the Bahá'í Faith”.⁹²⁶ The Bahá'í writings, no less than earlier prophetic religions, concern themselves with governance.⁹²⁷ Some Bahá'í writers underline that it is a novelty that the founder of a world religion advocates global federation as a means to accomplishing world unity. “Bahá'u'lláh brought, for the first time in religious history, explicit teachings about the need for an international federation capable of harmonizing the affairs of an interdependent world and bringing about world peace”.⁹²⁸ This call for a global federation could be explained by the global intent and character upon which the Bahá'í Faith bases its principles.

For its adherents, however, what some might call ‘Bahá'í ideas’ are not just the enunciation of certain principles, and the attempt at their practical realisation, nor a mere political philosophy that is relevant to cosmopolitan ideas, but rather a whole new divine revelation that answers to the social and spiritual needs of an ever interdependent humanity. In contrast to ‘secular’ cosmopolitan trends, the Bahá'í writings rely on a historical process that is divine in nature, hence finding several references to the intervention of ‘God’, (or what some political philosophers such as Kant called ‘The Hidden Plan of Nature’),⁹²⁹ and underline some certitudes about some aspects of the future. However, it is noteworthy that cosmopolitanism, in the Bahá'í ethos, is not just a vague appeal to human brotherhood, but contains clear guidelines on the elaboration of a system of global governance and the relevance of world peace in our times.⁹³⁰ It is to this peace programme, which at its core revolves around the oneness of

⁹²⁶ Phyllis Sternberg Perrakis, “Bahá'í Universalism”, *Dialogue and Universalism*, Warsaw University and Polish Academy of Sciences, Vol. 6, No. 11-12, 1996, p. 17.

⁹²⁷ Graham Hassall, “Contemporary Governance and Conflict Resolution: A Bahá'í Reading”, January 2000, downloaded 1st of July 2003, <http://bahai-library.com/?file=hassall_governance_conflict_resolution.html>

⁹²⁸ Brian Lepard, “From League of Nations to World Commonwealth”, in: Charles Lerche (ed.), *Emergence: Dimensions of a New World Order*, (London: Bahá'í Publishing Trust, 1991), p. 72. See also Foad Katirai, *Global Governance and the Lesser Peace*, (Oxford: George Ronald, 1981), p. 9, and Nalinie Mooten, Interview with Daniel Wheatley, conducted Via Email, 10 February 2003.

⁹²⁹ Kant: in David, Hoffman, *The Renewal of Civilization*, (Oxford: George Ronald, 1981), p. 37.

⁹³⁰ “As indicated by its many social teachings, the religion of Bahá'u'lláh is not just concerned with the spiritual development of the individual. Its broad sweep includes a wide range of social principles and

humankind (an ethical aspect crucial to the hypothesis), and which calls for the establishment of a federation of nations, that we will mainly attend.

5.1.1. Origins of Bahá'í World Order Themes

The Bahá'í Faith is centred upon three main figures – The Báb (1819-1850), Bahá'u'lláh (1817-1892), and 'Abdu'l-Bahá (1844-1921) – Who, for the first stage of its development guided the Bahá'í community at large. These three figures are not just the leaders of the Faith: for its members, the Báb is a herald-prophet, who along with bringing a whole new message to nineteenth century Iran (the religion He founded is referred to as the Bábí Faith) ushered in the start of a new religious cycle and announced the arrival of the founder-prophet of the Bahá'í Faith, Bahá'u'lláh. Bahá'u'lláh appointed His son 'Abdu'l-Bahá to guide the community after His passing.⁹³¹ The writings of these three figures constitute the Bahá'í sacred scriptures, as Hindus look to the Vedas and Bhagavad-Gita, Christians look to the Bible, or Muslims to the Koran. Interestingly, and in accord with their beliefs, Bahá'ís consider the latter Holy Scriptures, along with those of the main religions, to be divine in origin, hence refusing to think of their Faith in superior and different terms, but just as a further element in the revelation of the divine process.⁹³² Indeed, Bahá'u'lláh enjoins all to “Consort with the followers of all religions in a spirit of friendliness and fellowship”.⁹³³ As Udo Schaefer notes, “Such a belief necessarily results in the rejection of exclusivism whereby one religion is regarded as the sole bringer of salvation...The reconciliation of religions is a major goal of *Heilsgeschichte* (salvation),

teachings that aim to carry forward humanity's collective life on the planet” (Moojan, Momen, *The Bahá'í Faith: A Short Introduction*, (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 1999), p. 63).

⁹³¹ Whilst the Báb and Bahá'u'lláh are regarded as ‘Messengers of God’, ‘Abdu'l-Bahá, in the eyes of Bahá'ís, is a figure of exemplar attitude.

⁹³² See Shoghi Effendi, *The World Order of Bahá'u'lláh: Selected Letters*, (Wilmette: Bahá'í Publishing Trust, 1991), p. 119.

⁹³³ Bahá'u'lláh, *Gleanings from the Writings of Bahá'u'lláh*, (Wilmette: Bahá'í Publishing Trust, 1983), p. 95. This and other statements have inspired the Bahá'í International Community to be pro-active in the Inter-Faith dialogue.

because it is the foundation of ‘world wide reconciliation’ called for by Bahá’u’lláh, and which is the prerequisite for lasting world peace”.⁹³⁴

‘Abdu’l’Bahá designated His grandson Shoghi Effendi Rabbaní as the interpreter of the writings, and five years after Shoghi Effendi’s passing away in 1957, the Universal House of Justice, the first international permanent institution of the Bahá’í Faith, came into being. This event signalled the start of a new governance system within the Bahá’í community that was no longer based on a single figure. Along with the sacred scriptures of the Faith, the writings and statements of Shoghi Effendi and the Universal House of Justice constitute the official guidelines and literature of the Faith. ‘Abdu’l’Bahá interpreted and clarified the writings of Bahá’u’lláh, and Shoghi Effendi further elucidated the principles of world order that rests on the firm foundation of the oneness of humankind. Shoghi Effendi gave this principle considerable attention during his ‘mandate’ as Head of the Bahá’í Faith from the time of his designation as Guardian of the Bahá’í Faith in 1921 to his passing away in 1957.⁹³⁵

Bahá’u’lláh’s message of world order and peace is mainly expressed in a series of letters sent to the world secular and religious leaders.⁹³⁶ Most of the statements of ‘Abdu’l’Bahá were pronounced during His travels to Europe and Northern America between August 1911 and June 1913. During this journey, ‘Abdu’l’Bahá ‘warned of an imminent world war and the forces of social dislocation that such a conflict would unleash and elaborated Bahá’u’lláh’s principles of global concord’.⁹³⁷ The writings of Shoghi Effendi on the matter are enfolded in a series of

⁹³⁴ Udo Schaefer, “Bahá’u’lláh’s Unity Paradigm: A Contribution to Interfaith Dialogue on a Global Ethic”, *Dialogue and Universalism*, 1996, Vol. 6 (No. 11-12), pp. 27 & 28.

⁹³⁵ ‘Abdu’l’Bahá said, “In this wondrous Revelation, this glorious century, the foundation of the Faith of God and the distinguishing feature of His law is the consciousness of the oneness of mankind”. (Bahá’í World Centre (Commissioned by the Universal House of Justice), *Century of Light*, (New Delhi: Bahá’í Publishing Trust, 2001), p. 49) “It was this vision, for the 36 years of the Guardianship that provided the organising force of Shoghi Effendi’s work”. (*Ibid.*)

⁹³⁶ Peter Khan, “Introduction”, in: *Peace More Than an End to War*, p. xii.

⁹³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. xii. Both the statements of Bahá’u’lláh and ‘Abdu’l’Bahá relating to world order themes are complemented by other writings They produced.

letters entitled the *World Order of Bahá'u'lláh* written between 1929 and 1936. Indeed, the theme of world order, which he clarifies and expands upon, represents the bulk of his works.

More recently, world order themes are enclosed in the statements of the Universal House of Justice and those of the Bahá'í International Community (BIC). The history of the statements provided by the BIC goes back to the participation of the Bahá'í community with international organisation bodies: the Bahá'í Faith is an active member of the United Nations in the form of the Bahá'í International Community that was registered as a Non-Governmental Organisation in 1948. The involvement of the Bahá'í community with international organisations does not, however, start at this particular point in time, but in 1926, when at the League of Nations headquarters in Geneva an International Bureau was established to serve in League activities. The BIC is an NGO representing the Bahá'í Worldwide Community, and is an association of democratically elected national representative bodies called 'National Spiritual Assemblies'. Subsequently, the Bahá'í International Community gained consultative status with ECOSOC, UNICEF, and UNIFEM, has working relations with the WHO, and has worked closely with the UNEP, the UNHCR, UNESCO, and the UNDP.⁹³⁸ Among the main goals and activities of the BIC we can find the areas of grassroots participation in sustainable development; advancing the status of women; the education of children; developing a consciousness of world citizenship; the prevention of drug abuse; the elimination of racism; and the promotion of human rights education.⁹³⁹ The BIC statements that deal with the Bahá'í view of world order reflect the teachings of the sacred scriptures, and propose both a theoretical and practical foundations on which to base the Bahá'í ethos of international organisation.

⁹³⁸ Bahá'í International Community, "History of Active Cooperation with the United Nations", 2002, downloaded 5 February 2003, <<http://www.bic-un.bahai.org/pdf/00-0606.pdf>>

⁹³⁹ *Ibid.*

5.1.2 A System of Planetary Organisation

The fundamental conviction in the organic oneness and unity of the diversified elements of humanity is the basis of the belief-system found in both the theoretical and practical aspects of the Bahá'í Faith, and supports its corollary teachings. The requirement of the delineation of a new socio-political system to work along the lines of this assertion is not only a moral corollary, but also a timely and adjusting necessity. For Bahá'ís, this explains that what they believe to be the new divinely sent message has clear universal ramifications and a global intent.⁹⁴⁰ Bahá'ís maintain that Bahá'u'lláh's starting Revelation in the mid-nineteenth century (1863) and His arrival in this point of history are consistent with a trend of unification and globalisation of world structures that demand corresponding governing bodies.⁹⁴¹ Because the Bahá'í Faith is of a religious nature, the intervention of God in history is a given: following the belief in the organic unity of mankind, God sends 'Messengers' according to the needs of the times, and whilst the 'spiritual' message (such as the development of human virtues) does not alter, the social content of each Messenger evolves consistent with the needs and requirements of the time.⁹⁴² According to this statement, we encounter one of the main tenets of the Faith, namely the belief that there is only one religion, which is revealed from age to age, and whose social content must be adapted to the evolving and changing nature of society.⁹⁴³ This new vision of religion is explained by Shoghi Effendi in *The World Order of Bahá'u'lláh*, "religious truth is not absolute but relative ... Divine Revelation is progressive, not final".⁹⁴⁴ Here we discern a belief in a directional purpose in history: history is not left to itself or to haphazard changes and events, and although the idea of evolution is paramount ('Abdu'l'Bahá for example stated that,

⁹⁴⁰ The Universal House of Justice writes, "Bahá'u'lláh's principal mission in appearing at this time in history is the realisation of the oneness of mankind and the establishment of peace among the nations..." (The Universal House of Justice, Letter: Unity of Nations and the Lesser Peace, 19th of April 2001, Internal Document).

⁹⁴¹ The first permanent organisations that cut across national boundaries, such as the International Telegraphic Union and the Universal Postal Union, appeared subsequently in 1865 and 1874.

⁹⁴² Bahá'u'lláh, in this regard, stated, "Be anxiously concerned with the needs of the age ye live in, and centre your deliberations on its exigencies and requirements". (Bahá'u'lláh, *Gleanings*, p. 213).

⁹⁴³ Bahá'ís call this phenomenon 'progressive revelation'.


⁹⁴⁴ Shoghi Effendi, *The World Order of Bahá'u'lláh*, p. 58.

“creation is the expression of motion” or “that old ideas and modes of thoughts were fast becoming obsolete”)⁹⁴⁵ the latter does not necessarily follow smooth patterns. “Bahá’ís anticipate that the coming of age of humanity and the emergence of world order will be achieved in evolutionary stages replete with strife and chaos”.⁹⁴⁶ The Bahá’í model of history, hence, simultaneously follows a cyclical and evolutionary content: humanity is on an ever-progressive line composed of cyclical trends of rise and fall leading to its ultimate global unity in all human spheres.⁹⁴⁷ (See Figure)

Figure A: Cyclical View of History

Figure B: Unilinear View of History

Figure C: Bahá’í View of History (Non-Linear but evolutionary)



⁹⁴⁵ ‘Abdu’l’Bahá, *The Promulgation of Universal Peace*, (Wilmette: Bahá’í Publishing Trust, 1982), p. 140.

⁹⁴⁶ Janet Khan, “New Vision, New Values: The Emergence of A New World Order”, *Dialogue and Universalism*, 1996, Vol. 6 (No. 11-12), p. 82

⁹⁴⁷ “Bahá’ís see human life as evolutionary and perceive the rise and fall of civilizations as part of an evolutionary progression from family and tribes to city-states and nations”. (Peter Khan, “Introduction”, p. xi) This view of rise and fall leading upward also appears in Toynbee’s view of history. Toynbee notes “The single, finite movement from a disturbance to a restoration of equilibrium, is not enough if genesis is to be followed by growth... there must be an élan which carries the challenged party through equilibrium into an overbalance which exposes him to make a fresh challenge and thereby inspires him to make a fresh response in the form of a further equilibrium ending in a further overbalance – and so in a progression which is potentially infinite”. (Arnold Toynbee, *A Study of History*, (Vol. I), (London: Oxford University Press, 1935), p. 128).

According to the BIC, “Bahá’u’lláh asserts an opposing interpretation of the historical process” with its evolution operating similar to the different stages in the life of an individual, passing through the various stages of infancy, childhood, adolescence, and maturity.⁹⁴⁸ The present stage of human evolution is now amenable to the acceptance of the permanent principle of the oneness of humanity, and its practical realisation in institutional terms, which will ultimately lead to the unification of mankind. Indeed, the Bahá’í Faith identifies global unity as the essential goal of human history.⁹⁴⁹ Shoghi Effendi explains that the Cause of Bahá’u’lláh, “...stands identified with, and revolves around, the principle of the organic unity of mankind as representing the consummation of the whole process of human evolution”.⁹⁵⁰ As Laszlo and the BIC explain, “...disunity (stands) as a prelude to, and not as a contradiction of unity”.⁹⁵¹ “The wars, exploitation, and prejudice that have marked immature stages in the process should not be a cause of despair but a stimulus to assuming the responsibilities of a collective maturity”.⁹⁵² The tumultuous world condition is regarded as:

A natural phase in the organic process leading ultimately and irresistibly to the unification of the human race in a single social order whose boundaries are those of the planet. The human race, as a distinct organic unit, has passed through evolutionary stages analogous to the stages of infancy and childhood in the lives of its individual members, and is now in the culminating period of its turbulent adolescence approaching its long-awaited coming of age.⁹⁵³

Hence, for Bahá’ís, the unification of the world does not constitute a utopian goal to be striven for but not to be achieved, or a ‘matter of choice’; rather, it represents the next inescapable stage in the social evolution of mankind, however unpersuasive contemporary world events appear to

⁹⁴⁸ Bahá’í International Community, “Who is Writing the Future”, February 1999, downloaded 3 April 1999, <<http://www.bahai.org/article-1-7-3-1.html>> See also Shoghi Effendi, *The World Order of Bahá’u’lláh*, p. 164).

⁹⁴⁹ Foad Katirai, *Global Governance*, p. 13.

⁹⁵⁰ Shoghi Effendi, in: *The Bahá’í World* (Vol. III), *Appreciations of the Bahá’í Faith*, (Wilmette: Bahá’í Publishing Committee, 1941), p. 5.

⁹⁵¹ Ervin Laszlo, “Science and Prophecy”, *Dialogue and Universalism*, 1996, Vol. 6 (No. 11-12), p. 91.

⁹⁵² Bahá’í International Community, “Who is Writing the Future?”

⁹⁵³ The Universal House of Justice, “The Promise of World Peace”, in: National Spiritual Assembly of the United States, *Peace: More Than An End To War: Selections From The Writings of Bahá’u’lláh, the Báb, ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, Shoghi Effendi, and the Universal House of Justice (Compilation)*, (Wilmette: Bahá’í Publishing Trust, 1986), p. 5.

be.⁹⁵⁴ Alongside the trend towards maturity lies the underlying concept that the system of human organisation has evolved from family, tribe, city-state, and the nation.⁹⁵⁵ Conflicts that emerge along the way can be compared to the various crises in adolescence that are necessary to assume the responsibilities of adulthood. Refusing to accept the implications of a new stage of planetary organisation can, thus, only lead to drawbacks and crises that belong to a precedent stage of human evolution, namely that of a world structure based on the nation-state. In this respect, Janet Khan observes:

Associated with this changing reality (increasing interdependence of a now global society) there is a growing recognition that present day values, world-views, and administrative structures that were functional and adaptive in the age of self-sufficiency and unfettered national sovereignty, are proving inadequate to meet the challenges posed by the new stage of human history that is emerging.⁹⁵⁶

The Bahá'í cosmopolitan ethos is also grounded in the belief that the international community should intervene in the affairs of a state, namely in the case of gross human rights violations. The Bahá'í World Centre cites, for example, the breakthrough made in international law following the occurrence of WWII, and the trial of Nazi leaders for crimes committed against humanity. This meant, according to Bahá'í thought, that “the fetish of national sovereignty had its limits”.⁹⁵⁷ This acknowledgement explains the favour with which the Bahá'í community welcomes the creation of the International Criminal Court.⁹⁵⁸ Moreover, this can justify that the Bahá'í community could approve of, and lend its support to the idea of a global federation that endorses macro-policing actions against governments that threaten to commit genocide against their own peoples.⁹⁵⁹ Charles Lerche describes the Bahá'í model of human rights as a cosmopolitan model, as the human being stands at the centre of IR, and not at its margins. The

⁹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

⁹⁵⁵ Shoghi Effendi explains the concept of a trend toward global unity as follows: “Unification of mankind is the hall-mark of the stage which human society is now approaching. Unity of family, of tribe, of city-state, and nation have been successively attempted and fully established. World unity is the goal towards which a harassed humanity is striving. Nation building has come to an end”. (*Ibid.*, p. 202)

⁹⁵⁶ Janet Khan, “New Vision, New Values”, p. 77.

⁹⁵⁷ Bahá'í World Centre, *Century of Light*, p. 73.

BIC, furthermore, observes that, “since the body of humankind is one and indivisible, each member of the human race is born into the world as a trust of the whole”.⁹⁶⁰

In this regard, as testified by the example of human rights, the nation-state merely constitutes a transitional stage in the development of humanity, and has to be transcended by a more encompassing political entity. The state cannot be the highest authority in globalised conditions. Its destiny is merely “to build the bridge from local autonomy to world unity”.⁹⁶¹ In this regard, Shoghi Effendi wrote that, “Nation-building has come to an end. The anarchy inherent in state sovereignty is moving to a climax”.⁹⁶² Furthermore, emphasis in Bahá’í thought is not placed solely on states or leadership, but on peoples. The principle of collective trusteeship demands that the diverse cultures of the peoples of the world, which are essential to their identity, be protected under a system of national and international law.⁹⁶³ In 1947, the BIC underlined this crucial point, “Both state and people are needed to serve the strong pillar supporting the new institutions reflecting the full and final expression of human relationships in an ordered society”.⁹⁶⁴

If Bahá’ís believe that the unification of mankind is the next stage of its evolution, they do not believe that it will be an easy undertaking, nor that it will occur without hindrances. Although there is recognition of a trend towards global unity, there is similar recognition that barriers ‘stand in the way of its achievement.’⁹⁶⁵ Such barriers include: the numerous prejudices based on gender, class, race, nation, religion; ‘degree of material civilization; the lack of educational

⁹⁵⁸ See Chapter Seven (7.2 Humanising Globalisation). The call raised by the international community to establish the ICC is clearly one that responds to Bahá’í expectations for the fulfilment of greater justice. (The Universal House of Justice, Letter: Unity of Nations and the Lesser Peace.)

⁹⁵⁹ Nalinie Mooten, Interview with Daniel Wheatley, Conducted Via Email, 10 February 2003.

⁹⁶⁰ Bahá’í International Community, *Turning Point for All Nations*, (New York: United Nations Office, 1995), p. 4.

⁹⁶¹ Bahá’í International Community, in: Charles Lerche, “Justice as a Theme in The Revelation of Bahá’u’lláh, in: Charles Lerche, (ed.), *Toward the Most Great Justice: Elements of Justice in the New World Order*, (London: Bahá’í Publishing Trust, 1996), p. 9.

⁹⁶² Shoghi Effendi, *The World Order of Bahá’u’lláh*, p. 202.

⁹⁶³ Bahá’í International Community, in: Charles Lerche, (ed.), *Toward the Most Great Justice*, p. 10.

⁹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 9

⁹⁶⁵ Janet Khan, “New Vision, New Values”, p. 82.

opportunities and communication among peoples’;⁹⁶⁶ and other similar divisive trends that do not have any positive effects on the development of society at all levels. The idea that simultaneous negative and positive forces are at work constitutes an integral part of the Bahá’í belief in a dual process intended to bring about world unity. Indeed, the hindrances to global unity are identified by Bahá’ís as ‘disruptive forces’, and those that have a positive influence on global processes are identified as ‘integrative forces’. This dual phenomenon is part of a process that implicates the confusion now prevailing in human affairs. Indeed, this process calls for visions of world unity that Bahá’ís believe are constructive in nature, and it also reposes on opposing forces, which refuse to move beyond national sentiments.

Shoghi Effendi referred to “simultaneous processes of rise and fall, of integration and disintegration, of order and chaos, with their continuous and reciprocal reactions on each other”.⁹⁶⁷ The Universal House of Justice notes that the disintegration process can be identified with the numerous religious, political, racial or tribal conflicts taking place in several parts of the globe; the sudden collapse of civil order that has paralysed several countries; religious fundamentalism;⁹⁶⁸ the epidemic of terrorism as a political weapon; and among other great disasters, the surge of criminal networks.⁹⁶⁹ Among integrative forces we can find, for example, the call raised in favour of an International Criminal Court; world conferences;⁹⁷⁰ the realisation that nations are interconnected in the world of trade and finance (a condition that Shoghi Effendi identified as necessary for the development of an organic unified world); and related global aspects that call for a more efficient system of global governance. These two forces, as described by Shoghi Effendi, although clearly opposed in nature, will inevitably lead to the

⁹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

⁹⁶⁷ Shoghi Effendi, *The Advent of Divine Justice*, (Wilmette: Bahá’í Publishing Trust, 1990), p. 72.

⁹⁶⁸ The Universal House of Justice contemplates that the surge of religious fanaticism testifies to the break up of human values, which were brought by religions themselves. (See The Universal House of Justice, “The Promise of World Peace”, p. 8).

⁹⁶⁹ The Universal House of Justice, Ridvan message, April 2000, internal document.

⁹⁷⁰ Among others, the World Summit for Children in New York in 1990, the UN Conference on the Environment in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, and subsequently in 1993 and 1995, the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna, the World Summit for Social Development in Copenhagen, or the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing.

“unity of the human race and the peace of mankind”.⁹⁷¹ In the face of this dual process, peace, Bahá’ís believe, will emerge in stages, and will be characterised by a growing consciousness of world citizenship.⁹⁷²

The great differentiation of the Bahá’í Faith is also to be encountered in the statement about the reality of human nature that Bahá’u’lláh claimed is fundamentally spiritual. ‘Spiritual’ in this sense does not literally mean ‘religious’, as we would usually think of the term, but is akin to the formulation of a ‘global ethic’, morality in human affairs, and ‘human values’ in the field of global politics. Schaefer identifies that without “a world ethos, without a minimal consensus concerning durable values, irrevocable standards and fundamental moral attitudes, it is impossible to imagine a ‘new global order’, as envisaged and so urgently enjoined upon by Bahá’u’lláh in the nineteenth century”.⁹⁷³ The presence of morality and ethics⁹⁷⁴ is congruent with the idea of a divine polity being reflected in temporal affairs, and more importantly, it denotes that the relation between the two spheres is a practical one, and not a vague description of a world that is out of reach. ‘Abdu’l’Bahá states, “The spiritual world is like unto the phenomenal world. They are the exact counterparts of each other. Whatever objects appear in the world of existence are the outer pictures of the world of heaven”.⁹⁷⁵ ‘Abdu’l’Bahá mentions that heavenly attributes can be compared to the solidarity of mankind or the perfection of justice.⁹⁷⁶ The characteristics of this divine polity are, thus, the reflection of high requirements in the governing of human and international affairs, which accounts for the reference of ‘spirituality’ in the Bahá’í writings.⁹⁷⁷ There is, for example, a reflection of what is physical reality (the global interdependence of nations), and what Bahá’ís consider to be the spiritual

⁹⁷¹ *Ibid.*

⁹⁷² The House of Justice notes that the concept of world citizenship has emerged as a direct result of the ‘contraction of the world into a single neighbourhood through scientific advances and of the indispensable interdependence of nations’. (The Universal House of Justice, “The Promise of World Peace”, p. 13).

⁹⁷³ Udo Schaefer, “Bahá’u’lláh’s Unity Paradigm”, p. 30.

⁹⁷⁴ “It is now the time in the history of the world for us to strive and give an impetus to the advancement and development of inner forces – that is to say, we must arise to service in the world of morality...” (‘Abdu’l’Bahá, in *Peace: More Than An End To War*, p. 235.)

⁹⁷⁵ ‘Abdu’l’Bahá, *The Promulgation of Universal Peace*, p. 10.

⁹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

reality of the oneness of humankind (the brotherhood and sisterhood of all human beings).⁹⁷⁸

The BIC writes of the nature of the body of thought of Bahá'u'lláh:

The mainspring of Bahá'u'lláh's message is an exposition of reality as fundamentally spiritual in nature, and of the laws that govern that reality's operation. It not only sees the individual as a spiritual being, a "rational soul", but also insists that the entire enterprise that we call civilization is itself a spiritual process, one in which the human mind and heart have created progressively more complex and efficient means to express their inherent moral and intellectual capacities.⁹⁷⁹

For Bahá'ís, laying the foundations of a global society that reflects the oneness of humanity is a 'central spiritual issue' facing all the various peoples of the world.⁹⁸⁰ In brief, the manner in which the foundations of a system of global governance are established, depends, to a certain degree, on infusing a moral sense in its socio-political structures.

5.1.3 Bahá'u'lláh's Exhortation to Political Peace: Framework of the Bahá'í Vision of World Order

The cosmopolitan trait of the Bahá'í Faith starts with the words of the Báb,⁹⁸¹ Who along with proclaiming the concept of progressive revelation,⁹⁸² wrote that, "We have created you from a tree and have caused you to be as the leaves and fruits of the same tree, that haply ye may become a source of comfort to another...It behooveth you to be one indivisible people".⁹⁸³ The analogy of the 'tree' representing humankind, and the diverse nations and peoples being the 'leaves and fruits' are later re-echoed in the writings of Bahá'u'lláh: "Ye are the fruits of one tree, and the leaves of one branch. Deal ye one another with the utmost love and harmony, with

⁹⁷⁷ Later, I will develop this idea when looking at Bahá'u'lláh's advice to the kings and rulers of His day.

⁹⁷⁸ Moojan Momen, *The Bahá'í Faith*, p. 63.

⁹⁷⁹ Bahá'í International Community, "Who is Writing the Future?".

⁹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

⁹⁸¹ French Historian Nicholas described His writings as "powerful and enlightened liberalism". (John Huddleston, *The Earth is but One Country*, (Leicester: Bahá'í Publishing Trust, 1976), p. 141).

⁹⁸² Comparing the sun to the divine revelations, The Báb wrote, "the process of the rise and setting of the Sun of truth, will thus, indefinitely continue- a process that had no beginning, and will have no end". (The Báb, in: The Universal House of Justice, *Selections from the Writings of the Báb*, (Haifa: Bahá'í World Centre, 1976), p. 87).

⁹⁸³ *Ibid.*, p. 129.

friendliness and fellowship...⁹⁸⁴ ‘Abdu’l’Bahá also used images found in nature to elucidate the idea of the oneness of humankind, as it is depicted in the Bahá’í image. This is tantamount to stating that the world of nature does not differ from the ‘reality’ of the oneness of humankind in the human world. Alluding to the great tree of the human family, ‘Abdu’l’Bahá states, “For mankind may be likened to the branches, leaves, blossoms, and fruits of that tree”.⁹⁸⁵ He also explains that this image corresponds to the solidarity of the human race.

W. Kenneth Christian notes that, “The chief principle of Bahá’u’lláh’s teachings is ‘the oneness and wholeness of the human race.’ This is the pivotal point of all that He taught... To achieve the unity of the human race was Bahá’u’lláh’s compelling life purpose”.⁹⁸⁶ Indeed, such a statement is confirmed by ‘Abdu’l’Bahá (“The basis of the teaching of Bahá’u’lláh is the unity of mankind”)⁹⁸⁷, Shoghi Effendi⁹⁸⁸ and by the statements of Bahá’u’lláh himself. “Let your vision be world-embracing, rather than confined to your own self... It is incumbent upon every man, in this Day, to hold fast unto whatsoever will promote the interests, and exalt the station, of all nations and just governments”.⁹⁸⁹ Bahá’u’lláh’s message aims at the creation of a universal society between nations, the abolition of war, and the foundation of universal peace.⁹⁹⁰ “Love for humanity is a central value in the hierarchy of values. All actions should be directed towards the well-being of humankind, its welfare having absolute priority over all particular interests”.⁹⁹¹ Likewise, Janet A. Khan notes that Bahá’u’lláh’s teachings are intended to encourage ‘global unity and world order’.⁹⁹² In line with the conception of a world vision, Bahá’u’lláh speaks of ‘just’ governments, a concept which was elucidated in the various letters

⁹⁸⁴ Bahá’u’lláh, *Gleanings*, p. 288.

⁹⁸⁵ ‘Abdul’Bahá, *Promulgation of Universal Peace*, p. 16.

⁹⁸⁶ W. Kenneth Christian, “Introduction”, in: *Ibid.*, p. xi.

⁹⁸⁷ ‘Abdu’l’Bahá, *Paris Talks*, (London: Bahá’í Publishing Trust, 1995), p. 36.

⁹⁸⁸ Shoghi Effendi identifies the oneness of humankind as “the pivot round which all the teachings of Bahá’u’lláh revolve.” (Shoghi Effendi, *The World Order of Bahá’u’lláh*, p. 42).

⁹⁸⁹ Bahá’u’lláh, *Gleanings*, p. 95.

⁹⁹⁰ Udo Schaefer, “Bahá’u’lláh’s Unity Paradigm”, p. 24.

⁹⁹¹ *Ibid.*

⁹⁹² Janet Khan, “New Vision, New Values”, p. 79.

that He sent to the major monarchs⁹⁹³, rulers, and religious leaders between 1867 and 1873. These statements represent His advice to the temporal and religious leaderships. In the *Súriy-I-Mulúk* (Tablets to the Kings), He addresses all of the monarchs, as He calls on them to abide by the principles of justice and unity, to disarm, to move away from tyranny and oppression, to care for the poor and downtrodden, and describes the accumulation of riches from the peoples by sovereigns as ‘grievous injustice’. ‘Peoples’ are to be a crucial concern of the leadership. Bahá’u’lláh states in the *Súriy-I-Mulúk*: “Do not lay burden on your subjects...The poor are the trust of God in your midst, safeguard the rights of the downtrodden”.⁹⁹⁴ The Universal House of Justice says of the *Súriy-I-Mulúk*:

It introduces some of the great themes that were to figure prominently in the writings of Bahá’u’lláh over the next two and a half decades: the obligation of ...civil authority to institute the reign of justice, the necessity for the reduction of armaments and the resolution of conflicts among nations, and an end to the excessive expenditures that were impoverishing these rulers’ subjects.⁹⁹⁵

The idea of morality in human affairs is underlined, as well as the notion that temporal government must reflect divine virtues (such as showing justice, and discarding oppression and tyranny) in the management of their affairs and the treatment of the peoples.⁹⁹⁶ In the address to Queen Victoria, Bahá’u’lláh praises the Queen for abandoning the practice of slavery on both men and women, and also for abiding by the formulation of a democratic tenet in her government – a point that ‘Abdu’l’Bahá was to emphasise in His treatise *The Secret of Divine Civilization* in 1875.⁹⁹⁷ Bahá’u’lláh further expounds the principles that constitute the first stage of world peace for Bahá’ís, the Lesser Peace, a political peace among the nations of the world

⁹⁹³ Although there is a high station in the Bahá’í writings regarding ‘kingship’, the latter is endorsed if fulfilling several conditions, including the rejection of absolute monarchy, and the endorsement of a republican form of government. (See Ulrich Gollmer, “Bahá’í Political Thought”, in Udo Schaefer, (ed.), *Making the Crooked Straight: A Contribution to Bahá’í Apologetics*, (trans, Geraldine Schukelt) (Oxford: George Ronald, 2000), pp. 449-450).

⁹⁹⁴ The Universal House of Justice, *The Summons of the Lord of Hosts: Tablets of Bahá’u’lláh*, (Haifa: Bahá’í World Centre, 2002), pp. 36-37.

⁹⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. iv.

⁹⁹⁶ The link between divine and temporal leaderships, in the Bahá’í Faith, relates to the belief that temporal leadership must reflect moral (divine) virtues. “A just king is the shadow of God on earth”. Bahá’u’lláh (*Súrih-I-Haykal*) in: *Ibid.*, p. 112).

with a reference to the principle of collective security that He was among the first to expound and elaborate on.⁹⁹⁸ He writes, “Be united, O kings of the earth... Should any one among you take up arms against another, rise ye all against him, for this is naught but manifest justice”.⁹⁹⁹ Bahá’u’lláh also enjoins leaders to ‘take counsel together’ in a convened international gathering, to show concern for the whole of mankind, and to reflect upon the design of a world political community. He also calls for the reduction of armaments to the extent that they will only be required for internal or self-defence purposes.¹⁰⁰⁰ Bahá’u’lláh stated, “O Rulers of the earth! Be reconciled among yourselves, that ye may need no more armaments save in a measure to safeguard your territories and dominions”.¹⁰⁰¹

Referring to the contents of these Tablets, Shoghi Effendi explains, “the application of the highest principles in human and international relations are forcibly and insistently made, and the abandonment of discreditable practices and conventions, detrimental to the happiness, the growth, the prosperity and the unity of the human race, enjoined”.¹⁰⁰² The system of collective security propounded by Bahá’u’lláh asserts that political agreements alone are not sufficient to support it.¹⁰⁰³ It must stand on a stronger moral consciousness of human values, and in particular, must be grounded in the oneness of mankind. As we will observe, Bahá’u’lláh’s counsels to the leaders of His time, which represent the kernel of His exhortation to the Lesser

⁹⁹⁷ “It would be preferable if the election of non-permanent members of consultative assemblies in sovereign states should be dependent on the will and choice of the people. (‘Abdu’l-Bahá, *The Secret of Divine Civilization*, (Wilmette: Bahá’í Publishing Trust, 1990), p. 24).

⁹⁹⁸ Bahá’u’lláh was also among the first to evoke the phrase ‘New World Order’: “...the prevailing Order appeareth to be lamentably defective... Soon will the present-day order be rolled up and a new one spread out in its stead”. (Bahá’u’lláh, *Gleanings*, pp. 7 & 216).

⁹⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 43.

¹⁰⁰⁰ Bahá’u’lláh, in: *The Universal House of Justice, Summons of the Lord of Hosts*, pp. 90 & 93 and *Gleanings*, p. 249.

¹⁰⁰¹ Súrih-I-Haykal, *Summons of the Lords of Hosts- Tablets of Bahá’u’lláh.*, p. 93.

¹⁰⁰² Bahá’u’lláh, in: *Ibid.* p. 72.

¹⁰⁰³ “...the abolition of war is not simply a matter of signing treaties and protocols; it is a complex task requiring a new level of commitment to resolving issues not customarily associated with the pursuit of peace. Based on political agreements alone, the idea of collective security is a chimera”. (The Universal House of Justice, “The Promise of World Peace”, p. 14).

Peace, are at the heart of Bahá'í views on global governance, and constitute the basis of further elaborations provided by His successors and by the BIC.¹⁰⁰⁴

5.1.4 The Century of Light

The vision of a system of international interdependence, and the need for interlocking governance underlined by the oneness of humankind have also been expounded by 'Abdu'l'Bahá, Who advocated that a *sine qua non* condition for universal peace was universal suffrage, and Who elucidated the writings of Bahá'u'lláh.¹⁰⁰⁵ Of religious, racial, patriotic, or political prejudices, He said that they were the destroyer of the body politic inasmuch as all people have a single and common origin.¹⁰⁰⁶ More interestingly, 'Abdu'l'Bahá called the twentieth century 'the century of light', and records of His statements that international peace would indeed occur in this century were reported in various papers of the early twentieth century.¹⁰⁰⁷ This pronouncement has been sometimes mistaken as being congruent with Him stating that the Lesser Peace in the twentieth century would be a reality. Nonetheless, when 'Abdu'l'Bahá called the twentieth century 'the century of light', or when he referred to the twentieth century as the century of international peace, He alluded to a process of peace that started in the twentieth century, and not to events that took place during that time.¹⁰⁰⁸ It is fascinating to see that He denoted the potentialities of the twentieth century as containing the embryo and the impetus for the creation of international peace, and the creation of corresponding pending global institutions and outlook. The BIC notes, "The attainment of peace in the political realm is discernible through the workings of a process that can be seen as having been definitely established in the twentieth century amid the terror and turmoil that have

¹⁰⁰⁴ This vision of a system of collective security shall be later expounded when looking at the writings of Shoghi Effendi, the Universal House of Justice, and the Bahá'í International Community.

¹⁰⁰⁵ 'Abdu'l'Bahá, *The Promulgation of Universal Peace*, p. 134.

¹⁰⁰⁶ *Ibid.* p. 124.

¹⁰⁰⁷ For example the Montreal Daily Star in 1912.

¹⁰⁰⁸ In *Peace Among Nations*, The Bahá'í International Community notes, "The attainment of peace in the political realm is discernible through the workings of a process that can be seen as having been definitely

characterised so much of this period”.¹⁰⁰⁹ The twentieth century had unleashed the capacity for international peace and a global era. In ‘Abdu’l’Bahá’s words, “Inasmuch as this is the century of light, capacity for achieving international peace has been assured”.¹⁰¹⁰ The Bahá’í World Centre explains that this image refers to the growing “acceptance of the principle of oneness and its implications” and that “the physical unification in our time and the awakening aspirations of the mass of its inhabitants have at last produced the *conditions that permit achievement of the ideal*, although in a manner far different from that imagined by imperial dreamers of the past”.¹⁰¹¹ [Emphasis mine] It is relevant to see that the twentieth century has witnessed a breakthrough in international thinking, as it has witnessed the birth of ‘representative global institutions, including the United Nations and its subsidiary bodies.’¹⁰¹² ‘Abdu’l’Bahá declared that the ‘unity of nations’ would happen in the twentieth century, meaning that the peoples of the world would have developed a certain consciousness of world solidarity, essential to the establishment of a political union.¹⁰¹³ The Universal House of Justice clarifies that “the unity of nations can be taken as that unity which arises from a recognition among the peoples of the various nations, that they are members of one single family”.¹⁰¹⁴ One of the core teachings of ‘Abdu’l’Bahá is that the oneness of humankind stands as the primary principle regulating human life and reality; the main difference is that its realisation is now at hand due to the progress in technology, transport, and communication. As ‘Abdu’l’Bahá states,

In this day, means of communication have multiplied, and the five continents of the world have merged into one... In like manners all the members of the human family, whether peoples or governments, cities or villages, have become increasingly interdependent... Hence the unity of all mankind can in this day be achieved.¹⁰¹⁵

established in the twentieth century amid the terror and turmoil that have characterised so much of this period”. (Foad Katirai, *Global Governance*, p. 49).

¹⁰⁰⁹ Bahá’í International Community, *Peace Among the Nations*, (London: Bahá’í Information Office, 1999), p. 1.

¹⁰¹⁰ ‘Abdu’l’Bahá, *The Promulgation of Universal Peace*, p. 121.

¹⁰¹¹ Bahá’í World Centre, *Century of Light*, pp. 9 & 91.

¹⁰¹² Foad Katirai, *Global Governance*, p. 48.

¹⁰¹³ The Universal House of Justice, Letter: Unity of Nations and the Lesser Peace.

¹⁰¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁰¹⁵ ‘Abdu’l’Bahá, in: Bahá’í World Centre, *Century of Light*, p. 7.

‘Abdu’l’Bahá further reflected the writings of His father as He called for altruistic concerns and the welfare of humanity as a whole, rather than particularistic ones.¹⁰¹⁶ He also clearly defined cosmopolitanism, as it is enshrined in Bahá’í thinking, stating that some wars are “caused by purely imaginary racial differences; for humanity is one kind, one race and progeny habiting the same globe...These boundaries and distinctions are human and artificial, not natural and original”. Futhermore, He asserts, “This earth is one home and native land. God has created mankind with equal endowment and right to live upon the earth. As a city is the home of all its inhabitants although each may have his individual place of residence therein, so the earth’s surface is one wide native land or home” for everyone.¹⁰¹⁷ There is an argument in ‘Abdu’l’Bahá’s writings for the grounding of a spiritual, physical, and intellectual cosmopolitanism. There is the allusion that all human beings were created by one ‘Great Being’, as part of a spiritual bond between human beings, a spiritual cosmopolitanism: “racial assumptions and distinctions are nothing but superstition...All mankind are the children of one Father”;¹⁰¹⁸ the intellectual explanation that there is no biological difference between human beings and that we are all part of the same human species, “we are one physical race, even as we are of one physical plan of material body”,¹⁰¹⁹ and the intellectual grounding that physical borders are simply artificially created boundaries, and not a natural state of affairs, “Racial prejudice or separation into nations... is unnatural and proceeds from human motive and ...ignorance”.¹⁰²⁰ Abdu’l’Bahá also mentioned the organic evolution of humanity that is enshrined in all the fields of human science, including politics. He states, “The world of politics is like the world of man; he is seed at first, and then passes by the degrees of the condition of embryo and foetus... the political world in the same way cannot instantaneously evolve from the nadir of defectiveness to the zenith of perfection”.¹⁰²¹ Accordingly, the idea that the political

¹⁰¹⁶ “... May all your attentions centre in the welfare of humanity...” (‘Abdu’l’Bahá, *The Promulgation of Universal Peace*, p. 54).

¹⁰¹⁷ *Ibid.* pp. 118 & 287.

¹⁰¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 299 & 468.

¹⁰¹⁹ *Ibid.* p. 299.

¹⁰²⁰ *Ibid.* p. 287.

¹⁰²¹ ‘Abdu’l’Bahá, *The Secret of Divine Civilization*, p. 107.

realm must pass through different degrees before it can be functional is here alluded to; likewise, an appropriate system of global governance will gradually evolve to become increasingly efficient.

5.1.5 Human Nature and Peaceful World Order: An Alternative Image

According to ‘Abdu’l’Bahá, the aim of the creation of men and women, who have been given the endowment of the intellect and understanding, is not targeted at destruction, but rather constitutes a means by which a peaceful society can emerge.¹⁰²² He stated, “I hope that you will use *your understanding* to promote the unity and tranquillity of mankind...”¹⁰²³ Bahá’í belief dwells on the fact that “men have been created to carry forward an ever-advancing civilization”.¹⁰²⁴ The purpose in creating humankind is, thus, the achievement of its full potential to do good, and to promote the evolution of society.¹⁰²⁵ In this statement, we come across the premise of the Bahá’í idea of human nature, which is not imprisoned in the narrow confines of being inherently either ‘good or evil’, but constitutes an image that asks for endeavour and accounts for the free will of human beings. For Bahá’u’lláh, each individual represents a ‘supreme talisman’ and a ‘mine rich in gems of inestimable value.’ This potential must be developed through proper education, with which each person can optimise the ability to practice ‘free will’.¹⁰²⁶ Individuals are not left to themselves with a fixed nature that they cannot be held responsible for, but have the capacity to control their behaviour. Whereas humans cannot control bodily conditions, such as hunger or tiredness, they can control their capacity to behave justly or unjustly, aggressively or non-aggressively. ‘Abdu’l’Bahá states:

¹⁰²² ‘Abdu’l’Bahá, *Paris Talks*, p. 33.

¹⁰²³ *Ibid.*, p. 42.

¹⁰²⁴ Bahá’u’lláh, *Gleanings*, p. 214.

¹⁰²⁵ “The purpose of the creation of man is the attainment of the supreme virtues of humanity ...the purpose of man’s creation is, therefore, unity and harmony, not discord and separateness”. (‘Abdu’l’Bahá, *Paris Talks*, p. 4).

¹⁰²⁶ Loni Bramson-Lerche, “An Analysis”, p. 4. “The reality underlying this question is that the evil spirit, Satan or whatever is interpreted as evil, refers to the lower nature in man”. (‘Abdu’l’Bahá, *Foundations of World Unity*, (Wilmette: Bahá’í Publishing Trust, 1968), p. 77).

Some things are subject to the free will of man, such as justice, equity, tyranny, in other words good and evil actions; it is evident that these actions are, for the most part, left to the will of man. But there are certain things to which man is forced and compelled, such as sleep, sickness, decline in power...he is not responsible for them. But in the choice of good and bad actions he is free, and he commits them according to his own will.¹⁰²⁷

‘Abdu’l’Bahá calls these two sides of human nature the ‘lower’ and ‘higher’ natures.¹⁰²⁸ This image of human nature can also be captured in the writings of Bahá’u’lláh, “Noble have I (God) created Thee, yet thou hast abased thyself. Rise then unto that for which thou was created”.¹⁰²⁹ Human beings have to ‘endeavour’ to let their ‘higher nature’ dominate: human nature is, thus, a matter of choice. By acting on their lower nature, human beings allow disasters in civilisation, which occur on the grounds that the purpose of creation is not being fulfilled, or that the nobility intended for creation is being ignored. Human reality is that of the ‘higher nature’. The Bahá’í concept of human nature portrays, thus, a positive, rather than a negative, image. The complexity of human nature is explained by ‘Abdu’l’Bahá:¹⁰³⁰ “Man is the highest degree of materiality, and at the beginning of spirituality – that is to say, he is the end of imperfection and the beginning of perfection... Not in any of the species in the world of existence is there such a difference, contrast, contradiction, and opposition as in the species of man”.¹⁰³¹ In parallel, it is important to make the paramount point that in the Bahá’í image, lower nature is not real, as it is not part of human reality. Evil is the absence of good, as darkness is the absence of light, and in this way, it is crucial to state that the ‘lower nature’ constitutes an absence of the ‘higher nature’.¹⁰³² The creation of humankind is reminiscent of a higher nature, leaving no doubt as to the nobility of creation. Gollmer explains:

¹⁰²⁷ ‘Abdu’l’Bahá, in: *Peace: More Than An End To War*, p. 99.

¹⁰²⁸ ‘Abdu’l’Bahá, *Paris Talks*, p. 55. See Kant and the concept of Reason vs Nature in Humanity, Chapter Three, (3.4.1 The Duality in Kant’s Writings).

¹⁰²⁹ Bahá’u’lláh, *The Hidden Words of Bahá’u’lláh – Part I from the Arabic*, (Wilmette: Bahá’í Publishing Trust, 1985), p. 9.

¹⁰³⁰ Bahá’u’lláh quotes the Koran when He states, “Man is My mystery, and I am his mystery”. (*Peace: More Than End To War*, p. 227).

¹⁰³¹ ‘Abdu’l’Bahá in: *Peace: More Than An End To War*, pp. 38-39.

¹⁰³² “Evil is non-existent; it is the absence of good; sickness is the loss of health; poverty the lack of riches”. (‘Abdu’l’Bahá, *Foundations of World Unity*, p. 78).

The Bahá'í Faith does not have a dualistic image of the world with distinction between believers and infidels¹⁰³³, good or evil, saved or unsaved. Its principle is that of unity: metaphysically as the unity of God, the Creator of all human beings and his universal mercy; practically as an ethical standard in all dealings with the people and nations of the world and as a responsibility for the preservation of creation.¹⁰³⁴

Since the capacity for a higher nature does exist, and the attainment of this higher nature is the aim of creation, Loni Bramson-Lerche remarks, “With regard to the capacity for aggression, the Bahá'í teachings differ sharply from the opinions of the ‘realist’ school of political science”.¹⁰³⁵ Hence, this certainly explains why the Bahá'í literature on the subject is often defined as ‘utopian’, when in fact it claims that human beings were created for a nobler purpose than that of unceasing conflict. Danesh Hossein describes the Bahá'í model of world order as one that asserts the “fundamental nobility of every human being and the ultimate victory of the human spirit”.¹⁰³⁶ The possibility of achieving a peaceful society is also justified by the fact that the individual is a ‘social being’ in need of ‘cooperation and association’.¹⁰³⁷ It is noteworthy that the capacities for building a peaceful society are greater in our age than they were in previous ages, leading us back to ‘Abdu’l’Bahá’s reference to the twentieth century as ‘the century of light’.¹⁰³⁸ Indeed, Bahá’u’lláh notes that our age is the day “... in which all that lay latent in man hath been and will be made manifest”.¹⁰³⁹

The Universal House of Justice maintains that a ‘paralysis of will’ and ‘a paralysing contradiction’ have prevailed in human affairs due to the inherent belief in the aggressiveness of human beings. Accordingly, the Universal House of Justice asserts that this has generated self-imposed obstacles to the creation of a just and peaceful social system. The international Bahá'í

¹⁰³³ ‘Abdu’l’Bahá states, “Let us never say, ‘I am a believer and he is an infidel’”. (‘Abdu’l’Bahá, *Paris Talks*, p. 152).

¹⁰³⁴ Ulrich Gollmer, “Bahá'í Political Thought”, p. 443.

¹⁰³⁵ Loni Bramson-Lerche, “An Analysis”, p. 4.

¹⁰³⁶ Hossein B. Danesh, *Unity: The Creative Foundation of Peace*, (Toronto: Bahá'í Publishing Trust, 1986), p. 118.

¹⁰³⁷ ‘Abdu’l’Bahá, *The Promulgation of Universal Peace*, p. 35.

¹⁰³⁸ Similarly, Toynbee views the point of a civilisation’s decline as the point at which a rejuvenating ‘higher religion’ emerges.

¹⁰³⁹ Research Department of the Universal House of Justice, *Tablets of Bahá’u’lláh: Revealed After the Kitáb’I’Aqdas*, (Wilmette: Bahá'í Publishing Trust, 1988), p. 219.

body recognises, on the one hand, the longing of people for peace and the ‘apprehensions tormenting their daily lives’, and on the other hand, it challenges the conflicting statement that human beings are inherently selfish and aggressive and incapable of achieving a peaceful and dynamic social order.¹⁰⁴⁰ The need to reassess mankind’s true nature is, thus, crucial when thinking of the possibilities that exist within the international community to achieve a more peaceful order. *The Promise of World Peace* states,

As the need for peace becomes more urgent, this fundamental contradiction which hinders its realization, demands a reassessment of the assumptions upon which the commonly held view of mankind’s historical predicament is based. Dispassionately examined, the evidence reveals that such conduct, far from expressing man’s true self, represents a distortion of the human spirit. Satisfaction on this point will enable people to set in motion constructive social forces which, because they are consistent with human nature, will encourage harmony and cooperation instead of war and aggression.¹⁰⁴¹

This statement can be linked to the Bahá’í belief that humankind passes through different stages leading to world unity, one of which is an immature stage replete with war, strife, and exploitation.¹⁰⁴² The paralysis of will ‘rooted in a deep-seated conviction in the quarrelsome of mankind’ has hindered world leaders to move beyond the notion of national sovereignty, and meet the challenge of establishing an appropriate world institutions and world mechanisms for the achievement of peace.¹⁰⁴³ Henceforth, in the Bahá’í model, all efforts that aim at relieving some of the world’s problems cannot be solely pragmatic; they have to be raised to the level of principle. In this regard, the Universal House of Justice states, “the primary challenge in dealing with issues of peace is to raise the context to the level of principle, as distinct from pure pragmatism. For, in essence, peace stems from an inner state supported by a spiritual or moral attitude, it is chiefly in evoking this attitude that the possibility of peace can be found...”¹⁰⁴⁴ This inner attitude grounded in the view that human beings are and were created to be noble, stand at the basis of the Bahá’í image of human nature, and the centrality of the individual in the

¹⁰⁴⁰ The Universal House of Justice, “The Promise of World Peace”, p. 5.

¹⁰⁴¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁴² See also Kant, “Idea For A Universal History With A Cosmopolitan Purpose”, in: Hans Reiss, *Kant: Political Writings*, p. 44.

¹⁰⁴³ *Ibid.* p. 11.

governance scheme. It, furthermore, disposes of the idea that world order schemes can be founded on political concerns only, without any reference to evoking the moral attitude that lies at the basis of the true reality of man.

5.2 The Oneness of Humankind and Institutional Cosmopolitanism

Shoghi Effendi wrote that, "...the principle of the Oneness of Mankind, the cornerstone of Bahá'u'lláh's...dominion implies nothing more nor less than the enforcement of His scheme for world unification".¹⁰⁴⁵ The oneness of humankind, which entails its unity, has its corollary in the socio-political sphere: it propounds that unity is the principle regulating all spheres of human life, including the socio-political realm. As such, the principle is not fated to remain only on ideological and emotional levels, with no institutional and practical implications. If it were the case, the principle would remain on the level of theoretical good wishing.¹⁰⁴⁶ Shoghi Effendi further explained that unless the efforts of world leaders were directed towards giving thought to this system of global governance that was now based on global, rather than national structures, they were bound to encounter setbacks. Shoghi Effendi states,

The oneness of mankind...is applicable not only to the individual, but concerns itself primarily with the nature of those *essential relationships that must bind all the states and nations as members of one family*. It does not constitute merely the enunciation of an ideal, but stands inseparably associated with an *institution...adequate to...demonstrate its validity, and perpetuate its influence*. It implies an organic change in the structure of present day society... it constitutes a challenge, at once bold and universal, to outworn shibboleths of national creeds – creeds that have had their day...It calls for no less than the reconstruction and the demilitarisation of the whole civilised world...[emphasis mine]¹⁰⁴⁷

Although it implies the need for unity, the oneness of humankind does not suggest that uniformity is a relevant consideration in its application. On the contrary, the machinery that can

¹⁰⁴⁴ *Ibid.* pp. 14-15.

¹⁰⁴⁵ Shoghi Effendi, *The World Order of Bahá'u'lláh*, p. 36.

¹⁰⁴⁶ 'Abdu'l-Bahá stated, "What profit is there in agreeing that universal friendship is good, and talking of the solidarity of the human race as an ideal?" 'Abdu'l-Bahá further explained that unless these principles were transformed into the world of action, they would be of no use. ('Abdu'l-Bahá, *Paris Talks*, p. 3).

best incarnate this principle must be made to reflect the diversity inherent in the human family, and in all the aspects of human life. The Bahá'í Faith is a firm believer in the oneness of humanity, if only sustained by a strong corollary of the preservation and flourishing of diversity. Not only the diversity found in the different shapes and colours of the human family, but also the diversity of thought and opinion. In this instance, 'Abdu'l'Bahá noted,

Consider the world of created beings, how varied and diverse they are in species, yet with one sole origin. All the differences that appear are those of outward form and colour. This diversity of type is apparent throughout the whole creation...The diversity of the human family should be the cause of love and harmony, as it is music where different notes blend together in the making of a perfect chord.

He added, "Likewise...All are seeking truth, and there are many roads leading thereto...Do not allow difference of opinion, or diversity of thought to separate you from your fellow men".¹⁰⁴⁸

The principle of 'unity of diversity', which stands at the basis of the Bahá'í Faith as an inherent element of the oneness of humankind, does not simply constitute a theoretical and ethical aspect; it constitutes, for Bahá'ís, a gift of beauty to mankind, which has been misused for hatred and conflict. 'Abdu'l'Bahá, so many times, emphasised the diversity of the human family as the different flowers varied in colour and form that constitute a beautiful garden, and contrasted this image with the dullness of a single typed flourished garden. He used the example of the vegetal word to explain the beauty of diversity in the human world:

The differences in manners, in customs, in habits, in thoughts, opinions and in temperaments are the cause of the adornment of the world of mankind. ...If in a garden the flowers and fragrant herbs, the blossoms and fruits, the leaves, branches and trees are of one kind, of one form, of one colour and of one arrangement, there is no beauty or sweetness, but when there is variety, each will contribute to the beauty and charm of the others...¹⁰⁴⁹

¹⁰⁴⁷ Shoghi Effendi, *The World Order of Bahá'u'lláh*, p. 43.

¹⁰⁴⁸ 'Abdu'l'Bahá, *Paris Talks*, pp. 44-45.

¹⁰⁴⁹ 'Abdu'l'Bahá, *Bahá'í World Faith*, p. 295.

5.2.1 Federalism or Commonwealth Models

Indeed, the oneness of humankind and unity in diversity, which stand at the very heart of the principles that have shaped the whole process of life are, thus, not just to be applied to the individual, but to the governance system, and have to be the guiding thrust behind the *machinery* that can best serve the interests of humankind in its structural aspects. It is significant that, in this instance, the Bahá'í Faith upholds the principle of federalism, or that of the commonwealth,¹⁰⁵⁰ when considering a new system of global governance.¹⁰⁵¹ The BIC, therefore, underlines, "...one of the time-tested models of governance that may accommodate the world's diversity within a unified framework is the federal system". The BIC further observes, "Federalism has proved effective in decentralizing authority and decision-making in large, complex, and heterogeneous states, while maintaining a degree of overall unity and stability. Another model worth examining is the commonwealth, which at the global level would place the interest of the whole ahead of the interest of any individual nation".¹⁰⁵² Moreover, these systems of governance were promoted by 'Abdu'l'Bahá, who emphasised in 1912 that centralisation was most likely to encourage despotism and that it was, thus, urgent to find ways to discourage its practice as a system of governance.¹⁰⁵³

"You can best serve your country..." was 'Abdu'l'Bahá's rejoinder to an official serving in the federal government of the United States, "if you strive, in your capacity *as citizen of the world* to assist in the eventual application of the principle of federalism underlying the government of your own country, to the relationships now existing between the peoples and nations of the

¹⁰⁵⁰ The commonwealth model takes a more confederal form than the federal model. The federal model has a rule of law, which operates from the federal centre, whereas the commonwealth model can issue sanctions when, for example, human rights are not respected. The commonwealth/confederation model has no legal force over member-states.

¹⁰⁵¹ Tellingly many grass-roots socio-economic development programmes have proved very efficacious without the need for a central authority to control them, which demonstrates that a governance model certainly does not have to resemble a Hobbesian style government. (Foad Katirai, *Global Governance*, p. 13).

¹⁰⁵² Bahá'í International Community, *Turning Point For All Nations*, p. 7.

¹⁰⁵³ "...to cast aside centralisation which promotes despotism is the exigency of the time". ('Abdu'l'Bahá, *The Promulgation of Universal Peace*, p. 167.)

world”.¹⁰⁵⁴ [Emphasis mine] Indeed, world federalists, in parallel, have taken the example of the US federation to support their argument for global federation.¹⁰⁵⁵ Here, ‘Abdu’l’Bahá’s recommendation was further elaborated by Shoghi Effendi. Explicitly, when providing one of the possible examples of ‘some form of political unity’, as enshrined in the Bahá’í writings, Shoghi Effendi mentioned a ‘World Federal State’, whilst he acknowledged that its realisation was most likely to be tortuous and induced by sufferings.¹⁰⁵⁶ He, furthermore, explained that ‘the establishment of a world commonwealth, a world federal system liberated from... war... in which Force is made the servant of Justice’ was the consequential institutional form of the unity of mankind.¹⁰⁵⁷

Shoghi Effendi, as early as 1954, described the world as a global neighbourhood (‘needs of a world already contracted into a neighbourhood’) when advocating the option of a world federal government to counteract ‘anachronistic conceptions’ or the ‘obsolescent doctrine of absolute sovereignty’.¹⁰⁵⁸ Indeed, world federalist thinking advocated world federal government, especially in the inter-war years and after WWII, to do away with the outdatedness, and the ill foundation of state sovereignty.¹⁰⁵⁹ In Bahá’í thought, this world federal government devoid of ‘anachronistic conceptions’ would be a major step towards the establishment of the Lesser Peace and the unification of mankind.¹⁰⁶⁰ The main organs of the world federal government would comprise a world parliament or legislature that is able to create a code of enforceable international law previously universally agreed upon; a world executive, backed by an international force, which would ‘carry out the decisions arrived at and apply the laws enacted

¹⁰⁵⁴ Shoghi Effendi, *The World Order of Bahá’u’lláh*, p. 37.

¹⁰⁵⁵ Global federalism has been influenced by the transformation of the United States at the end of the eighteenth century from a confederal to a federal model. The latter initiated the idea of the individual as a subject of world law.

¹⁰⁵⁶ Shoghi Effendi, in: Helen Bassett Hornby (Compiled by), *Lights of Guidance: A Bahá’í Reference File*, (New Delhi: Bahá’í Publishing Trust, 1994), p. 130.

¹⁰⁵⁷ *Ibid.* p. 436.

¹⁰⁵⁸ Shoghi Effendi, *Citadel of Faith*, (Wilmette: Bahá’í Publishing Trust, 1999), p. 126.

¹⁰⁵⁹ Advocates of a world federal government included: Auguste Forel, Auguste Schvan, and Paul Otlet (during the First World War), Bertrand Russell and Oscar Newfang, Rosika Schwimmer, Maverick Lloyd (in the inter war years). During the Second World War, federal advocates consisted of Ransome, Beveridge, Zilliacus, Culberston and Adler. (Derek Heater, *World Citizenship and Government*, p. 110-112).

by the world parliament'; and a world tribunal, whose decisions and judgment would be binding on the parties and applicable to all disputes arising in the universal system. Alongside these main organs of the world federal government, a number of umbrella organisations, including 'a complex transnational network of individuals, private organisations and international agencies' functioning with autonomy.¹⁰⁶¹ (Significantly, the BIC defines the global governance system as a sum of intricate relationships between individuals and groups who determine how they manage common international concerns, underlining the importance of the input of the global citizenry).¹⁰⁶² This institutional form provides the possible format that can embody the words of Bahá'u'lláh, frequently cited as the 'motto' of the Bahá'í Faith, 'The earth is but one country, and mankind its citizens.'¹⁰⁶³

Significantly, Shoghi Effendi was not proscriptive when he advocated federalism or the commonwealth as two possible models of world governance, but it is relevant that the BIC reiterated, as soon as 1995, that federalism was a useful structure for some form of global government. In this regard, according to Bahá'í thought, while bearing in mind that federalism is considered the most favourable form for the management of diversity and decentralisation in a global governance system, it is reminiscent that this vision of a world federal government, although a clear destiny in the Bahá'í vision of a future global order, does represent a long-term and drastic project as things now stand.¹⁰⁶⁴ The Bahá'í model calls for incremental steps to be taken in order to reform international institutions, and move towards a new system of global governance. Accordingly, it contains a transformationist paradigm:¹⁰⁶⁵ the nation-state is in a period of change, and will eventually cede some of its influence to world political arrangements. Changes in the political arena will not happen unexpectedly and incoherently, but as a result of

¹⁰⁶⁰ Shoghi Effendi, *Citadel of Faith*, p. 126.

¹⁰⁶¹ *Ibid.* p. 94.

¹⁰⁶² Daniel Wheatley, "Global Governance: Has a Paradigm Shift in World Government Theory Brought The Lesser Peace Closer?" in: Babak Bahador & Nazila Ghanea, (eds.), *Processes of The Lesser Peace*, (Oxford: George Ronald, 2002), p. 244.

¹⁰⁶³ Bahá'u'lláh, *Gleanings*, p. 250.

¹⁰⁶⁴ Bahá'í World Centre, *Century of Light*, pp. 91-92.

¹⁰⁶⁵ Daniel Wheatley, "Global Governance: Has a Paradigm Shift", p. 237.

expediency and urgency following both the will of peoples and world leaders.¹⁰⁶⁶ The new generation of world federalists has adopted a step-by-step approach, rather than the maximalist approach of the realisation of a world federal government: for example, they advocate UN democratisation through an assembly of world citizens, or have worked for the establishment of the ICC.¹⁰⁶⁷

5.2.2 The Lesser Peace, or Bahá'í Programme for a Political Unity of Nations

Bahá'ís believe that peace will come in stages, the first of which concerns a political peace among nations: the 'Lesser Peace'. The Lesser Peace relates to what 'Abdu'l'Bahá named 'unity in the political realm', and is explained by Shoghi Effendi as a 'unity which politically independent and sovereign states achieve among themselves.'¹⁰⁶⁸ The second stage, the 'Most Great Peace', refers to the social, spiritual, and political unification of mankind, a peace in which spirit and humanity would be infused into the political peace. Daniel Wheatley notes:

The Bahá'í writings show our self-perception and identity as being one of the major areas of difference between the Lesser Peace and the Most Great Peace. It is only in the Most Great Peace when a man shall travel to any city on earth, and it will be as if entering his own home. The Lesser Peace will see the end of war between nations...but it will not necessarily be accompanied by feelings of universal humanity...¹⁰⁶⁹

The political peace, the most immediate peace,¹⁰⁷⁰ has been mentioned by Bahá'u'lláh when He wrote to the rulers, kings, and religious leaders of His age, and was further expounded by 'Abdu'l'Bahá and Shoghi Effendi. The formulation of a world government based on a federal system of governance and decentralisation is crucial to the Bahá'í model of governance, as it seeks to maintain decision-making at appropriate levels, and functions according to the

¹⁰⁶⁶ See 5.2.4 'The Great Assemblage': Foundation of Global Governance and The Lesser Peace.

¹⁰⁶⁷ See Chapter Seven (7.2 Humanising Globalisation).

¹⁰⁶⁸ Shoghi Effendi, in: Bahá'í World Centre, *Century of Light*, p. 128.

¹⁰⁶⁹ Nalinie Mooten, Interview with Daniel Wheatley, Conducted Via Email, 10 February 2003.

¹⁰⁷⁰ The Most Great Peace refers to a very distant future, as it is part of an eschatological promise.

principle of subsidiarity. The latter represents an element of the ‘Lesser Peace’, the term Bahá’u’lláh used when elaborating on the concept of collective security.¹⁰⁷¹ Wheatley details,

As well as calling for disarmament,¹⁰⁷² Bahá’u’lláh, ‘Abdu’l’Bahá and Shoghi Effendi laid down guiding principles for a global legislature, international weights and measures, a supreme tribunal, a global peacekeeping force...Shoghi Effendi expands upon the practical necessities of the Lesser Peace. This includes the creation of a global executive, a global legislature, an international armed force in crisis management, a world taxation system, a global currency, global communications networks¹⁰⁷³ and a supreme international tribunal...‘Abdu’l’Bahá also speaks of the organisation necessary ... in terms of a ‘Parliament of Man’ and a ‘Supreme Tribunal’.¹⁰⁷⁴

The Supreme Tribunal was also defined by ‘Abdu’l’Bahá as a ‘Highest Court of Appeal’, an ‘International Tribunal’, the ‘Great Council’, or an ‘International World Conference’.¹⁰⁷⁵ This tribunal, which would have abiding jurisdiction in international affairs only, would need to be set up so as to prevent war, and would be composed of representatives from each nation of the world, whose election would be based on using some form of population criteria. This election would need to be confirmed by the cabinet, the upper house, and the president of the nation, and should have at its basis the sanction of the peoples of the world. ‘Abdu’l’Bahá made the following suggestion as to a future world court in the late nineteenth century:

A Supreme Tribunal shall be established by the peoples and governments of every nation, composed of members elected from each country and government. The members of this Great Council shall assemble in unity. All disputes of an international character should be submitted to this Court, its

¹⁰⁷¹ The occurrence of a World Federal Government is, according to the BIC, ‘the inevitable destiny of humankind’, but it does, however, ‘represents a long-term picture of a global society’. (Bahá’í International Community, *Turning Point For All Nations*, p. 6).

¹⁰⁷² ‘Abdu’l’Bahá held the view that it was essential that disarmament, which was so crucial to the development of international peace, happened simultaneously, as partial disarmament would only cause other nations to be suspicious and increase their armaments as a result. (In: *The Universal House of Justice, Peace*, p. 20).

¹⁰⁷³ Shoghi Effendi wrote in 1936, “A mechanism of world inter-communication will be devised, embracing the whole planet, freed from national hindrances and restrictions, and functioning with marvellous swiftness and perfect regularity”. (Shoghi Effendi, *The World Order of Bahá’u’lláh*, p. 203).

¹⁰⁷⁴ This vision is alluded to in the statements of the Bahá’í International Community, namely in *Turning Point For All Nations*. See also J. Tyson, *World Peace and World Government: A Bahá’í Approach*. (Oxford: George Ronald, 1986), p. 57 & Daniel Wheatley, “Global Governance: Has a Paradigm Shift”, p. 229.

¹⁰⁷⁵ ‘Abdu’l’Bahá, in: *Peace: More than an End to War*, pp. 199-203.

work being to arrange by arbitration everything which otherwise would be a cause of war. The mission of this Tribunal would be to prevent war.¹⁰⁷⁶

This vision of a world judicial system is part of Shoghi Effendi's elaboration of the Bahá'í vision of a future world order. Shoghi Effendi explains that the statement of Bahá'u'lláh regarding His elaboration of collective security are none other than the demand for 'the curtailment of unfettered national sovereignty' and that of a system of a world commonwealth of the nations of the world or the formulation of a system of world government, whose main organs have been above mentioned.¹⁰⁷⁷ Shoghi Effendi details his thoughts, reminiscent of the call for a 'World Federal State':

Some form of a world super-state must needs be evolved, in whose favour all the nations of the world will have willingly ceded every claim to make war, certain rights to impose taxation and all rights to maintain armaments, except for purposes of maintaining internal order within their respective dominions. Such a state will have to include within its orbit an international executive adequate to enforce supreme and unchallengeable authority on every recalcitrant member of the commonwealth; a world parliament whose members shall be elected by the people in their respective countries and whose election shall be confirmed by their respective governments; and a supreme tribunal whose judgement will have a binding effect even in such cases where the parties concerned did not voluntarily agree to submit their case to its consideration. A world community...in which the fury of a capricious and militant nationalism will have been transmuted into an abiding consciousness of world citizenship – such indeed, appears, in its broadest outline, the Order anticipated by Bahá'u'lláh...¹⁰⁷⁸

It is to bear in mind, however, and as briefly mentioned, that this picture of world order represents in the words of the BIC, and of the Bahá'í World Centre, 'a long-term picture of a global society' and a '*radical restructuring* of the administration of the affairs of the planet'.¹⁰⁷⁹ [Emphasis mine] There is no doubt, for Bahá'ís, that the elaboration of a system of world government is a radical undertaking as things now stand. More importantly, this system of

¹⁰⁷⁶ 'Abdu'l-Bahá, *Paris Talks*, p. 161.

¹⁰⁷⁷ "We see you adding every year unto your expenditures and laying the burden thereof on the people whom ye rule; this verily is naught but grievous injustice.... Be reconciled among yourselves, that ye may need armaments no more save in a measure to safeguard your territories and dominions...Should any one among you take up arms against another, rise ye all against him, for this is naught but manifest justice". (Bahá'u'lláh, in: Shoghi Effendi, *The World Order of Bahá'u'lláh*, p. 40).

¹⁰⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 40-41.

¹⁰⁷⁹ Bahá'í International Community, *Turning Point For All Nations*, p. 6 and Bahá'í World Centre, p. 91.

world government would not come into being without the approbation of the members of the human race, who would have developed a strong sense of world citizenship that would have replaced ‘a militant nationalism’. In highlighting these aspects, Shoghi Effendi, in 1931, made it absolutely clear that the intentions latent in the words of Bahá’u’lláh do not aspire to replace the existing local or national structures by international ones, nor to substitute our existing loyalties for other ones, but rather seek to supplement humanity with the international structures and loyalties that are necessary to the flourishing and development of society. Similar to the federalist tradition, the Bahá’í ethos does not intend to replace lower levels of governance and lesser loyalties, but rather seek to complement them with the requirements of an interdependent world. It does not call for a vague attachment to the world as a whole, but for evolving and multiple loyalties from the grassroots to the whole. Shoghi Effendi notes:

Far from aiming at the subversion of the existing foundations of society, it (the meaning of Bahá’u’lláh’s intent) seeks to broaden its basis...with the needs of an ever-changing world. It can conflict with no legitimate allegiances, nor can it undermine essential loyalties. Its purpose is neither to stifle the flame of a sane and intelligent patriotism in men’s hearts, so essential if the evils of excessive centralization are to be avoided... It calls for a wider loyalty, for a larger aspiration that has animated the human race. It insists upon the subordination of national impulses and interests to the imperative claims of a unified world. It repudiates excessive centralisation on the one hand, and disclaims all attempts at uniformity on the other. Its watchword is unity in diversity.¹⁰⁸⁰

The Bahá’í call is based on the belief that it is absolutely necessary to abandon theories that seek to ‘deify the state’, that are only materialistic in their aspects,¹⁰⁸¹ that promote the interests of certain members of the human race to the disadvantage of others, and that do not attempt to adjust themselves to the needs of an increasingly cosmopolitan age. Accordingly, the Universal House of Justice writes:

...all too many...ideologies, alas, instead of embracing the concept of the oneness of mankind, and promoting the increase of concord among different

¹⁰⁸⁰ Shoghi Effendi, *The World Order of Bahá’u’lláh*, p. 41.

¹⁰⁸¹ The Universal House of Justice highlights the link between purely materialistic doctrines and the belief in the inner aggressiveness of man: “Most particularly, it is in the glorification of material pursuits at once the progenitor and common feature of all such ideologies, that we find the roots which nourish the falsehood that human beings are incorrigibly selfish and aggressive”. (The Universal House of Justice, “The Promise of World Peace”, p. 9).

peoples, have tended to *deify the state*, to subordinate the rest of mankind to one nation, race or class, to attempt to suppress all discussion and interchange of ideas, or to callously abandon starving millions to the operations of a market system that all too clearly is aggravating the plight of the majority of mankind, while enabling small sections to live in a condition of affluence scarcely dreamed of by our forebears.¹⁰⁸² [Emphasis mine]

There is no denial that one of the most firm calls launched by the Bahá'í community is the abandonment of theories and ideas that are standing in the way of the realisation of humankind as one body, that are viewing all of humankind as an interdependent family, and that are still insisting upon nationalistic and divisive claims. It is suggested that we abandon parochial notions, such as racism, which in its extreme can lead to genocide, or nationalism, that has persisted and demonstrated its pernicious effects on the body of humankind. If racism or nationalism cannot generate the prosperity of humankind, it is here suggested that we now start shaping our institutions, our efforts, and our world-view on a more encompassing and humane dimension. Shoghi Effendi embodied this all-important statement in his writings:

The call of Bahá'u'lláh is primarily directed against all forms of provincialism, all insularities and prejudices. If long-cherished ideals and time-honoured institutions, if certain social assumptions and religious formulae have ceased to promote the welfare of the generality of mankind, if they no longer minister to the needs of a continually evolving humanity, let them be swept away and relegated to the limbo of obsolescent and forgotten doctrines. Why should these, in a world subject to the immutable law of change and decay, be exempt from the deterioration that must needs overtake every human institution? For legal standards, political and economic theories are solely designed to safeguard the interests of humanity as a whole, and not humanity to be crucified for the preservation of the integrity of any particular law or doctrine.¹⁰⁸³

5.2.3 Unity, Diversity and Continuity

It is crucial to state that Bahá'í appeals, which promote a federal structure and decentralisation, only call for additional structures to global governance, and do not advocate the abolition of the nation-state system, as they view governance in an evolutionary, and not adversarial base¹⁰⁸⁴. In

¹⁰⁸² *Ibid.* pp. 8-9.

¹⁰⁸³ Shoghi Effendi, *The World Order of Bahá'u'lláh*, p. 42.

¹⁰⁸⁴ Foad Katirai, *Global Governance*, p. 23. For an adversarial approach, see the postmodern approach, Chapter Four, 4.3 'Cosmopolitan' Postmodern Perspectives in IR.

this light, Katirai observes, “While systems founded on an adversarial base may regard compromise as essential because two positions are mutually exclusive, those founded upon an evolutionary base see each stage as a precursor to the next higher and more complex one.” Accordingly, Katirai goes on to state, “In the Bahá’í vision human social evolution, from the basic family unit to the ultimate unity of humankind, is seen as passing through many stages, one of which is characterised by the unity of the nation-states.”¹⁰⁸⁵

The Bahá’í Faith, thus, presents the image of a transformationalist, and not hyperglobalist model, which signifies that it recognises that the nation-state is in a period of transition, and not about to be extinct. The Bahá’í stance in relation to global governance is clearly between the insinuations of hyperglobalizers, who affirm that the nation-state is going to disappear due to transnational processes and the global economy,¹⁰⁸⁶ and between statist statements, which put forward that the nation-state is not going to be even slightly challenged by the processes of globalisation.¹⁰⁸⁷ Moreover, the Bahá’í Faith highlights the idea of a ‘turning point’ in international affairs, or a transition between national sovereignty and world unity, which many international theorists recognise.¹⁰⁸⁸ The proponents of cosmopolitan democracy, likewise, although not advocating a federal solution, admit that the fate of the nation-state is outside of its hands. Heater notes, “The political scientists who have devised the concept of cosmopolitan democracy and those of like mind are sometimes dubbed ‘transformationalists... they reject the interpretation of the ‘hyperglobalists’ who foresee the trend of globalization as involving the complete collapse of the nation-state’.”¹⁰⁸⁹

Shoghi Effendi did not hesitate to point out the anachronism of the nation-state, as he clearly contended that the leaders of human institutions “...in utter disregard of the spirit of the age, are

¹⁰⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁸⁶ See for example, Keichi Ohmae, *The End of the Nation State*. (London: Harper Collins, 1995).

¹⁰⁸⁷ Hirst and Thompson think that the processes of globalisation have not perturbed sovereign nationhood to the slightest. (See Daniel Wheatley, “Global Governance, Has A Paradigm Shift”, p. 236).

¹⁰⁸⁸ See Laszlo, Toulmin, Held or Rosenau. (Chapter One, p. 1).

¹⁰⁸⁹ Derek Heater, *World Citizenship: Cosmopolitan Thinking*, p. 152.

striving to adjust to national processes, suited to the ancient days of self-contained nations...”¹⁰⁹⁰ More recently, Peter Drucker argues that the nation-state is no longer the self-contained unit that it used to be in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Indeed, for Drucker, the obsolescence of the nation-state demands the creation of institutions, which would “overlap national boundaries and serve transnational social and economic needs”.¹⁰⁹¹ Toulmin argues that the new age is characterised by adaptability and diversification instead of the old age of stability and hierarchy. The nation-state is currently unable to respond to our needs, and should be complemented by more global institutions. “... We are learning that in an evolving world, institutions must be adaptable to deal with evolving human problems”.¹⁰⁹²

Bahá'u'lláh proclaimed that the era of the unity of nation had given way to the era of the unity of the world. Indeed, for Bahá'ís, the times surrounding each religious dispensation are distinguished by a particular theme, the current one being the unity of humankind. In the evolutionary religious context with which the Bahá'í Faith views all aspects of human life, including social and political aspects, Shoghi Effendi explains that the main theme surrounding the Christian era was that of the individual, and that the era of Islam had been marked by the thematic of the unity of the nations:

Of...Islamic Dispensation it hath been revealed ‘Love of one’s country is an element of the Faith of God’. This principle was established by the Apostle of God (Muhammad) inasmuch as evolution of human society required it at that time. Nor could any stage above and beyond it have been envisaged, as world conditions preliminary to the establishment of a superior form of organisation were as yet unobtainable. The conception of nationality, the attainment of the state of nationhood, may, therefore, be said to be the distinguishing characteristics of the Muhammadan Dispensation, in the course of which the nations...of the world, particularly in Europe and America, were unified and achieved political independence.¹⁰⁹³

¹⁰⁹⁰ Shoghi Effendi, *The World Order of Bahá'u'llah*, p. 36.

¹⁰⁹¹ Stephen Toulmin, *Cosmopolis*, p. 7.

¹⁰⁹² *Ibid.*, p. 192.

¹⁰⁹³ Shoghi Effendi, *The Promised Day Is Come*, p. 196.

Due to the nature of its evolutionary and non-adversarial approach, the Bahá'í Faith recognises that the continued evolution of Christianity and Islam (which does not mean that their messages are questioned; rather it highlights an intrinsic link between religions) signifies that the adoption of a world vision complements individual and national concerns. The present religious theme, thus, is characterised by world unity, as the era of the self-sufficiency of nation-states has come to an end. Bahá'u'lláh refers to the love of one's country as still being a valid, yet insufficient and outdated, notion. He said, "It is not his to boast who loveth his country, but it is his who loveth the whole world."¹⁰⁹⁴ While Bahá'ís do advocate 'a universal way of life'¹⁰⁹⁵, universal institutions, and the consciousness of world citizenship, they do not seek to diminish sane patriotic feelings, and the love that one individual may have for his or her culture, language, traditions, provided they do not become more important than globalising concerns. U Thant, Secretary General of the UN from 1962 to 1971, embodied this image as he stated, "I do not criticize national pride. National pride is natural. I say only that the sense of belonging to the human community must be added to, and become dominant over other allegiances".¹⁰⁹⁶ The Bahá'í image of world order is grounded in a holistic, rather than partial world-view, and takes its main insight from the principle that what is of benefit to the whole is of benefit to the part, as humankind is viewed as 'one organically whole entity'.¹⁰⁹⁷ From this principle stems the consequential ideas of continuity, unity, and complementarity. The love of one's country is contained in the love of the world as the whole, continuity depicts different stages from the part to the whole (from the family unit to the world), and all of the parts are contained and act interdependently in this greater whole.

The Bahá'í vision contains some convictions about the future of humankind, due to its intrinsic religious character; namely Bahá'u'lláh envisions the inevitability of world peace, but warns

¹⁰⁹⁴ Bahá'u'lláh, *Gleanings*, p. 95. See Chapter Six for Rousseau's views on the matter.

¹⁰⁹⁵ In 1955, Shoghi Effendi enjoined Bahá'ís to "achieve a universal consciousness and a universal way of life". (in: Jan T. Jasion, "The Universalism of the Bahá'í As Reflected In the Writings of Shoghi Effendi", *Dialogue and Universalism*, 1996, Vol. 6 (No. 11-12), p. 105).

¹⁰⁹⁶ In: Foad Katirai, *Global Governance*, p. 15.

¹⁰⁹⁷ Moojan Momen, *The Bahá'í Faith*, p. 63.

that this phase will not come unhindered. Bahá'ís are confident, despite all of the world turbulences – which they consider to be a transitional step from a system of national sovereignty to a world commonwealth of nations – that peoples of vision and insight will lead humanity to world peace.¹⁰⁹⁸ In its 1985 statement, *The Promise of World Peace*, the Universal House of Justice explains that flaws in the international system are partly due to the fact that state sovereignty has remained intact, and that this status quo impedes the adoption of relevant solutions to the threatened collapse of the international economic system, the spread of international anarchy and terrorism, or the inability of sovereign nation-states to prevent war.¹⁰⁹⁹ This report proclaims that due to ‘unfettered national sovereignty’, and the attachment to old patterns of behaviour, the path to world peace could be possibly horrifying. The statement reads, “Whether peace is to be reached only after unimaginable horrors precipitated by humanity’s stubborn clinging to old patterns of behaviour, or is to be embraced now by an act of consultative will, is the choice before all who inhabit the earth”.¹¹⁰⁰ Furthermore, the House of Justice promotes the idea that ‘love of humanity’ does not leave out ‘love of one’s country’, and that ‘unbridled nationalism’, which distinguishes itself from ‘a sane patriotism’, must be superseded by a love for humanity in general.¹¹⁰¹ Shoghi Effendi explains that all that the call raised by Bahá'u'lláh implies and proclaims, is:

The insufficiency of patriotism, in view of the fundamental changes effected in the economic life of society and the interdependence of the nations, and as the consequence of the contraction of the world, through the revolution in the means of transportation and communication –conditions that did not and could not exist either in the days of Jesus Christ or of Muhammad. It calls for a wider loyalty, which should not, and indeed does not, conflict with lesser loyalties. It

¹⁰⁹⁸ Peter Khan, “Introduction”, p. xi.

¹⁰⁹⁹ In the words of Bahá'u'lláh, “signs of impeding convulsions and chaos can now be discerned, inasmuch as the prevailing order appears to be lamentably defective”. (Bahá'u'lláh, *Gleanings*, p. 216).

¹¹⁰⁰ The Universal House of Justice, “The Promise of World Peace”, p. 3. This image can be found in the writings of Kant, who thought that nature would eventually lead us to reason and peace. In the Bahá'í approach, we have a choice between reason and nature to attain peace. If not attained by ‘an act of consultative will’ (reason), peace will be realised by ‘unimaginable horrors’ (nature).

¹¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, p. 13. An ‘unbridled’ nationalism is exclusive and aggressive (defines itself against an ethnic ‘other’, and can lead to genocide) while a ‘sane’ patriotism relates to a sense of belonging to a local community, itself part of a wider cosmopolitan community, to which one still belongs. A ‘sane’ patriotism favours cosmopolitan allegiances and loyalties over local and national ones. Hence, I can be Thai, and be attached to Thailand, but I do not let this lesser affection predominate over my identity as a world citizen.

instils a love which, in view of its scope, must include and not exclude the love of one's own country. ... It does insist, however, on the subordination of national considerations and particularistic interests to the imperative and paramount claims of humanity as a whole, inasmuch as in a world of interdependent nations and peoples the advantage of the part is best to be reached by the advantage of the whole.¹¹⁰²

5.2.4 'The Great Assemblage': Foundation of Global Governance and the Lesser Peace

The process of the growing consciousness of world solidarity – which, in Bahá'í thought, constitutes an element and aspect of the twentieth century – was referred to by 'Abdu'l'Bahá as 'the unity of nations'. The latter is to gradually shed its reflection in the political domain, the Lesser Peace. Indeed, Bahá'í thought maintains that the growing sense of world consciousness can be associated with certain organisational developments in the political domain.¹¹⁰³ The 'unity of nations'¹¹⁰⁴ will, thus, be a crucial stage in the development of a political peace among nations. Bahá'u'lláh expounded on the Lesser Peace in the letters He sent to the major rulers of His age, and advised them to reduce their armaments, and develop a system of collective security. "O rulers of the earth! Be reconciled among yourselves, that ye may need no more armaments save in a measure to safeguard your territories and dominions...Be united... Should anyone among you take up arms against another, rise ye all against Him, for this is naught but manifest justice".¹¹⁰⁵ In another passage, Bahá'u'lláh referred to the Lesser Peace as a gathering of world leaders, at which a system of security, unity, and concord among the nations would be devised. "The time must come when the imperative necessity for the holding of a vast, an all-embracing assemblage of men will be universally realised. The rulers and kings of the earth must needs attend it, and, participating in its deliberations, must consider such ways and means as will the lay the foundations of the world's Great Peace among men".¹¹⁰⁶

¹¹⁰² Shoghi Effendi, *The Promised Day is Come*, p. 200.

¹¹⁰³ The United Nations can be regarded as one of the world organisational developments.

¹¹⁰⁴ See 5.1.4 The Century of Light.

¹¹⁰⁵ See 5.1.3 Bahá'u'lláh's Exhortation to Political Peace: Framework of the Bahá'í Vision of World Order.

¹¹⁰⁶ Bahá'u'lláh, *Gleanings*, p. 249.

Shoghi Effendi explains that, “The principle of collective security He unreservedly urges; recommends the reduction in national armaments; and proclaims as necessary and inevitable the convening of a world gathering at which the kings and rulers of the world will deliberate for the establishment of peace among the nations”.¹¹⁰⁷ This call, reiterated more recently by the Universal House of Justice and the BIC, now addresses itself to the heads of nation-states, who have at this time become the highest-ranking decision-makers, as well as to the global citizenry, who participates and gives input (heard or unfortunately unheard) to these decisions.¹¹⁰⁸ The Lesser Peace will, thus, be characterised by the delineation of a global order that comprises institutions and laws to which nation-states abide, and endowed with the means with which collective decisions can be enforced, while being substantially supported by civil society organisation and participation.¹¹⁰⁹ The Bahá’í vision only endorses a programme of global governance if it obtains a consensus from the peoples of the world, nation-states, international organisations, and NGOs, in brief all the major stakeholders.¹¹¹⁰ This consensus is “the essential ingredient of any successful system of global governance. It is the cornerstone of the Lesser Peace and the fruits of the ‘Great Assemblage’ of the leaders of the nations called by Bahá’u’lláh and ‘Abdu’l’Bahá, wherein the foundations of a new global order and the unity of the nation-states will be laid as the Lesser Peace”.¹¹¹¹ This consensus would be based on the global acceptance of common core values, and the establishment of a general treaty or international constitution, which would distinguish itself from old ‘cosmopolitan’ notions of world conquest, or universal conquests for personal and authoritarian designs, which did not have at their basis the principle of true justice, and the normative equality of peoples and nations.¹¹¹²

¹¹⁰⁷ Shoghi Effendi, *God Passes By*, (Wilmette: Bahá’í Publishing Trust, 1999), pp. 216-218.

¹¹⁰⁸ Bahá’u’lláh, in His time, appealed to ‘kings and rulers’, while more recently the Bahá’í International Community calls on the heads of nation-states to consider the convocation of a world gathering. (Bahá’í International Community, *Turning Point For All Nations*, p. 4).

¹¹⁰⁹ More importantly, the Universal House of Justice does not believe that a system of collective security will work if only based on political agreements and protocols. The Universal House of Justice calls such a system of collective security ‘a chimera’: it can only work with a strong moral foundation.

¹¹¹⁰ Foad Katirai, *Global Governance*, p. 2.

¹¹¹¹ The Lesser Peace, being the term used by Bahá’ís, to depict a political unity of nations.

¹¹¹² “During...long evolutionary process... as ever larger and more diverse populations came under the control of one or another system of government, the temptation of universal empire repeatedly seized the

The call to world leaders to establish the Lesser Peace and obtain from it the sanction of the peoples of the world have been raised by Bahá'u'lláh, 'Abdu'l'Bahá, the Universal House of Justice, and the Bahá'í International Community. Bahá'u'lláh called for the convocation of a 'vast all-embracing assembly'; 'Abdu'l'Bahá advocated for this assemblage to make of Peace the cause of universal consultation, underlining that it should seek to establish a union of the nations of the world and establish a binding treaty; at the present time, the Universal House of Justice highlights that this convocation is 'long overdue'. The BIC summons 'a convocation of world leaders... to consider how the international order might be redefined and restructured to meet the challenges facing the world', with significant participation and input from civil society. The BIC suggests that this summit, which they propose could be called the 'World Summit on Global Governance'¹¹¹³, could draw on the experience underlying various successful UN conferences.¹¹¹⁴ In particular, the Millennium People's Forum, held by the United Nations in May 2000 and co-chaired by the BIC, was the first of its kind in UN history to be a channel for civil society to forward discussions and ideas to the General Assembly.¹¹¹⁵ One of the foundations of peace is that peoples would gradually come to recognise their common destiny (which is also enshrined in the principle of oneness) and would, from this premise, have the will to act together, at least in matters vital to their concerns.¹¹¹⁶ In the context of the Lesser Peace, an integrative process is characterised by growing global cooperation. World conferences, the creation of the League of Nations and the United Nations, the increasing number and participation of NGOs, and the strengthening of regional organisations (such as the EU) are identified as a momentum towards the Lesser Peace.

imaginations of the Caesars and Napoleons during such expansion". (Bahá'í World Centre, *Century of Light*, p. 91).

¹¹¹³ The Commission on Global Governance also summoned such a summit, which it called a 'world conference on governance'. (Commission on Global Governance, *Our Global Neighbourhood*, p. 351).

¹¹¹⁴ Bahá'í International Community, *Turning Point For All Nations*, p. 4.

¹¹¹⁵ Daniel Wheatley, "Global Governance: Has a Paradigm Shift", p. 245.

¹¹¹⁶ These values of common concern comprise the elimination of prejudices based on class, gender, race, level of economic and material development, and the right of all to an education, training, and socio-economic development. (Ulrich Gollmer, "Bahá'í Political Thought", p. 431).

One of the outcomes of this World Summit, ‘Abdu’l’Bahá specified, would be the enunciation of a treaty binding on governments. In particular, all states and nations would have to submit to a body of contract, in which clear principles of international relations and laws are laid down, and consequential agreements and obligations would be ascertained and binding.¹¹¹⁷ (These also include, as stated, worldwide disarmament, the delineation of international borders and frontiers, the submission of disputes to binding arbitration or judgement by a world court, and a ‘system of collective security to ensure that international treaties are not violated.’¹¹¹⁸) The steps leading to the Lesser Peace, according to the Universal House of Justice, are part of this ‘integrative process’ articulated by Shoghi Effendi, and comprise the features that can be identified as stages towards global unity.

The various world conferences are part of this process that testifies to “an emerging unity of thought in world undertakings”.¹¹¹⁹ The ‘promptitude and spontaneity with which these government leaders have been acting together in responding to a variety of world crises in different parts of the world’, ‘the cries...for attention to be given to the feasibility of achieving some form of global governance’, ‘the greater involvement of the United Nations’, or ‘the call raised for an international criminal court to be established’ are some of the signs that Bahá’í contemplate as prerequisites for the Lesser Peace.¹¹²⁰ In addition, the Universal House of Justice identifies important and auspicious steps to world order which have gradually included the creation of the League of Nations, followed by the United Nations whose formation corresponded with the process of the ending of nation-building characterised by the independence of numerous nations. The Universal House of Justice also identifies their

¹¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 431.

¹¹¹⁸ *Ibid.* and Brian Lepard, “From League of Nations”, p. 91. Shoghi Effendi did not call for a rigid system of collective security, but for a flexible and elastic system. (See Shoghi Effendi, *The World Order of Bahá’u’lláh*, p. 191) In this way, the projection of a global order, in the Bahá’í viewpoint, “...does not contain a fixed, static model... It does not present specific future events, but rather presents a vision calling to action, providing guidance for the creation of a more peaceful future...” (Ulrich Gollmer, “Bahá’í Political Thought”, p. 431).

¹¹¹⁹ ‘Abdu’l’Bahá also refers to ‘a unity of thought in world undertakings’. The Bahá’í World Centre elucidates that this alludes to ‘programmes of social and economic development, humanitarian aid and concern for protection of the environment and its oceans’. (Bahá’í World Centre, *Century of Light*, pp. 127-128).

involvement with older nations in matters of mutual concern. The international body elaborates on a number of steps that have been taken towards the elaboration of world order:

The consequent vast increase in cooperation among hitherto isolated and antagonistic peoples and groups in international undertakings in the scientific, educational, legal, economic and cultural fields; the rise in recent decades of an unprecedented number of international humanitarian organisations; the spread of women's and youth movements calling for an end to war; and the spontaneous spawning of widening networks of ordinary people seeking understanding through personal communication.¹¹²¹

The House of Justice subsequently proposes that the numerous groups that have come together in the form of regional organisations to co-operate in matters of common interest, such as the Association of South East Asian Nations, the African Union, the European Union, or the international congresses that testify to an urge to unity, are reflective of this trend. Mentioning the integrative and disruptive processes, the Universal House of Justice concludes, "Together with the opposing tendency to warfare and self-aggrandizement against which it ceaselessly struggles, the drive towards world unity is one of the dominant, pervasive features of life on the planet during the closing years of the twentieth century".¹¹²²

5.3 The Bahá'í International Community's Views on International Organisations: Precursors of Global Institutions

The BIC recognises that the world is not ready for this system of planetary government, and takes an incremental approach to the reform of the international landscape that it recognises has grown in complexity since 1945. As early as 1955, the first decade review of the UN charter, the BIC proposed some guidelines for the reform of the United Nations Organisation¹¹²³, based on the vision articulated by Bahá'u'lláh during His lifetime. These suggestions have been

¹¹²⁰ The Universal House of Justice, Letter: Unity of Nations and the Lesser Peace.

¹¹²¹ The Universal House of Justice, "The Promise of World Peace", p. 4.

¹¹²² *Ibid.* p. 21.

¹¹²³ Among these proposals were included the gradual removal of the veto, the references to permanent members, the elimination of the term 'enemy' in any article of the UN Charter, and the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice.

endorsed by the BIC thirty years later, although further expounded and complemented – a sign that not much has changed in regards to the functioning of the UN in the last thirty years. In accordance with its evolutionary mindset, the Bahá'í International Community does not call for UN abolition, but for its reform. The Bahá'í image of world order, furthermore, recognises the transitional period delineating present times. This transition from a world based on national sovereignty to a system of global governance, set around international institutions that will develop into global institutions centred on humanity rather than nation-states, has been termed a 'turning point'.¹¹²⁴

Highlighting the Bahá'í support for these organisations, the Universal House of Justice notes, "The tentative steps towards world order, especially since World War II, give hopeful signs. The increasing tendency of groups of nations to formalize relationships which enable them to co-operate in matters of mutual interests...prepare the path to world order".¹¹²⁵ While recognising the great achievements of the United Nations, and being active observers of the organisation of the League of Nations, Bahá'í statements seek to reform organisations that embody a world vision while still based on the dated principle of national sovereignty. The BIC accordingly notes, "Each attempt [the League of Nations and the United Nations] sought to address emergent recognition of global interdependence while preserving intact state sovereignty above else".¹¹²⁶ This does not signify that these organisations are not valued by the Universal House of Justice and the BIC; rather, the Bahá'í bodies contend that international organisations should become more global. Indeed, the Bahá'í International Community considers that the intricate agglomerate of institutions and relationships governing the international system, including the defunct League of Nations and the contemporary United Nations, point toward the recognition of an interdependent humanity, and a more adequate future global governance system. Per se, "Often the United Nations most avowed critics have

¹¹²⁴ Precisely, the Bahá'í International Community entitled its 1995 document on Global Governance 'Turning Point For All Nations'.

¹¹²⁵ The Universal House of Justice, "The Promise of World Peace", p. 11.

¹¹²⁶ Bahá'í International Community, *Turning Point For All Nations*, p. 2.

been its most avid supporters”.¹¹²⁷ Although the League of Nations and the United Nations are far from being perfect bodies, they represent international processes and organisations, which will eventually become more global. Shoghi Effendi wrote in 1936,

Though the great outcry raised by post-war nationalism is growing louder and more insistent every day, the League of Nations is as yet in its embryonic state, and the storm clouds that are gathering may for a time totally eclipse its powers and obliterate its machinery, yet the direction in which the institution itself is operating is most significant. The voices that have been raised ever since its inception, the efforts that have been exerted, the work that has already been accomplished, foreshadow the triumphs which this presently constituted institution, or any other body that may supersede it, is destined to achieve.¹¹²⁸

Moreover, despite all its failures, the League represented the first proper attempt by the nations to ‘assume collective responsibility’ and ‘collective action’. Consistent with the Bahá’í proposition that there is a progression in all aspects of international relations and history in general, the League of Nations, followed by the perfected United Nations, are processes that will eventually lead to a more complete and cosmopolitan system needed for the organisation of the planet, namely the long-time picture of a world federal state or world commonwealth of nations based on a cosmopolitan model – where not only states, but peoples are crucial elements. Both the federal and commonwealth models represent alternative routes to world order that would be increasingly centred on humanity, rather than nation-states.

According to Shoghi Effendi, the process, which launched the League of Nations, represented the attainment “to that stage at which the oneness of the whole body of nations will be made the ruling principle of international life”.¹¹²⁹ Indeed, Bahá’ís assign a very important role to international organisations as regards their potential to participate in a new design of global governance. Lepard remarks, “...the history of international organisation has reflected a steady

¹¹²⁷ Foad Katirai, *Global Governance*, p. 72.

¹¹²⁸ Shoghi Effendi, *The World Order of Bahá’u’lláh*, p. 191. ‘Abdu’l-Bahá looked down upon the Versailles settlement, which to Him was only capable of bringing about an even fiercer war. Even if the League of Nations had been brought into being and represented a breakthrough in the concept of collective security, it represented the beginning of a long process of international organisations that would eventually lead to the Lesser Peace. However, it was not an effective collective body as such. (See Shoghi Effendi, *The World Order of Bahá’u’lláh*, p. 30).

evolution towards higher and higher forms of unity and towards the development of a new awareness that the diverse peoples of the earth together constitute a single world community”.¹¹³⁰ Moreover, the idea of process contains a powerful element of optimism, which considers punctual failures (such as the League of Nations or the refusal for an economic unity in Europe) as an impetus towards an improved structural form. As Shoghi Effendi wrote:

The fierce opposition which greeted the abortive scheme of the Geneva Protocol; the ridicule poured upon the proposal of a United States of Europe which was subsequently advanced, and the failure of the general scheme for the economic unity of Europe, may appear as setbacks... And yet, are we not justified in driving fresh encouragement when we observe that the very consideration of these proposals is in itself an evidence of the steady growth in the minds and hearts of men?¹¹³¹

We can now notice that each of these institutions has been realised, although ridiculed, and then hailed as failures.

5.3.1 Ethical Reforms

Part of the suggestions of the BIC relating to UN reform is based on a reconsideration of human values, and a new starting point for building a new system of global governance. The most important ethical consideration in review is the interdependent relationship existing between the individual and the international community, meaning that the individual unit is a responsibility of the world community as a whole, in which national citizenship or artificial constructed states are absolutely irrelevant. Individual human beings, who are the units that make up humanity, must be protected regardless of artificially constructed states. This is an important aspect of human rights, as these rights originate from the body of mankind as opposed to national communities that often impede their realisation. This notion can be found in Thomas Paine’s words “my principles are universal. My attachment is to all the world, and not any particular

¹¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 193.

¹¹³⁰ Brian Lepard, “From League of Nations”, p. 79.

¹¹³¹ Shoghi Effendi, *The World Order of Bahá’u’lláh*, p. 44.

part”.¹¹³² Thomas C. Walker explains, “For Paine, there was a unity between the individual and mankind. Particular national attachments should carry little weight with enlightened men and women”.¹¹³³ The BIC reiterates this point. Since the body of humankind is indivisible, “each member of the human race is into the world as a trust of the whole”.¹¹³⁴ This relationship represents the foundation of human rights, and is an important consideration for reforms to be brought into the international system. Additionally, discussions about the international order must include the generality of humanity, and not only sections of people, usually leaders in all fields of human knowledge. This discussion should involve men and women at the grassroots levels, and should lead to a self-reinforcing process and growing awareness of world citizenship.¹¹³⁵ Finally, reforms pertaining to the United Nations, and other international institutions, can only be envisaged in the light of their future role in the international system. If criticism outweighs praise of the United Nations, it is necessary, according to the BIC, to view the United Nations, not in its present form, but with an ‘evolutionary mindset’ i.e. with the view of how it might operate within the future international order, and the possible achievements and benefits it might be able to provide.¹¹³⁶

This cosmopolitan basis is linked to more practical measures to reform the UN body whose functioning operations have remained unchanged for the last fifty years. Indeed, Bahá’í suggested reforms are very much in line with the reforms brought by the Commission of Global Governance.¹¹³⁷ Among many others, a point of common venture would be the call for the adoption of new values along with the development and reform of the international system. The BIC describes the report of the Commission on Global Governance, *Our Global*

¹¹³² Thomas C. Walker, *The Forgotten Prophet*, p. 60.

¹¹³³ *Ibid.*

¹¹³⁴ Bahá’í International Community, *Turning Point For All Nations*, p. 4.

¹¹³⁵ *Ibid.*

¹¹³⁶ *Ibid.* p. 7

¹¹³⁷ The BIC also mentions the early work of the lawyers Glenville Clark and Louis B. Sohn, *World Peace Through World Law*, and indicates that this work represented a ‘milestone’, and was among the ‘first solid proposals’ in its early advocacy of the abolition of the veto power in the early 1950s. The BIC also quotes works such as the ‘Stockholm Initiative’, *Common Responsibility in the 1990s* and Benjamin Ferencz’s work *New Legal Foundations for Global Survival*. (*Ibid.*, p. 23).

Neighbourhood, as ‘one of the most balance and thoughtful’ which ‘argues for the widespread adoption of new values, as well as structural reforms in the United Nations system’.¹¹³⁸ The adoption of new values should not just be a theoretical grounding, but according to the Bahá’í viewpoint ought to be enshrined in a Bill of Rights. In 1955 the BIC stated,

It is recommended that the United Nations adopt a Bill of Rights, which guarantees to every individual freedom of speech, of the press, of religion, and of thought, as well as freedom from racial and religious discrimination, freedom from arbitrary arrest and imprisonment, equality of sexes, equality before the law, equality of opportunity, and other such basic rights.¹¹³⁹

The Commission on Global Governance re-echoes this wish by underlining the necessity of elaborating a global Charter of civil society. “We...urge the international community to unite in support of a global ethic of common rights and shared responsibilities. In our view, such an ethic – reinforcing the fundamental rights that are already part of the fabric of international norms – would provide the moral foundation for constructing a more effective system of governance”.¹¹⁴⁰ Referring to rights and responsibilities such as a secure life; equitable treatment; participation in governance at all levels; equal access to information; equal access to the global commons; the promotion of equity, including gender equity; and the preservation of humanity’s cultural and intellectual heritage; the Commission goes on to state, “We believe this list of rights and responsibilities in the minimum basis for progress in building a more civil global society... Over time, we hope that these principles could be embodied in more binding international document – a global Charter of Civil Society –...”¹¹⁴¹

In 1947, a Bahá’í declaration on Human Rights (soon followed by a Bahá’í statement on Women’s Rights) was submitted to the United Nations. After becoming an accredited NGO at the United Nations in 1948, the BIC sent a letter to former Secretary General, Mr Dag

¹¹³⁸ *Ibid.* p. 3.

¹¹³⁹ Bahá’í International Community, in: Foad Katirai, *Global Governance*, p. 124.

¹¹⁴⁰ Commission on Global Governance, *Our Global Neighbourhood*, p. 56.

¹¹⁴¹ *Ibid.* p. 57.

Hammarskjöld in 1955, which included proposals for the revision of the UN Charter.¹¹⁴² In the 1955 statement, the BIC put forward several suggestions regarding UN reform, as it highlighted that ‘real sovereignty is no longer vested in the institutions of the national state because the nations have become more interdependent’, ... ‘that the existing crisis is moral and spiritual as well as political;’ ... ‘and that the existing crisis can only be surmounted by the achievement of a world order representatives of governments as well as the nations of mankind.’¹¹⁴³ As well as underlining the erosion of national sovereignty, and placing emphasis on moral aspects of governance, this statement joined the advocacy of Bahá’u’lláh and ‘Abdu’l’Bahá when They called for a more adequate representation of ‘peoples’ in governance, in addition to ‘governments’. Both are complementary when it comes to decision-making in the international community. The basis of these considerations was to stand at the heart of practical reforms that demanded the timely readjustment of the *modus operandi* of the UN. In this respect, the Bahá’í International Community suggests a body of proposals relating to the operation of the main organs of the United Nations. These entail suggestions for the reforms of the legislative, executive, and judicial functions of the UN.

The BIC deplors the lack of cosmopolitan ingredient within the structure and functioning of international organisations. Indeed, most of these failures are due to the fact that the United Nations represents an assemblage of nation-states, which often strive to maximise their self-interests. Accordingly, the BIC remarks, “The United Nations lacks not only the clear authority but also the requisite resources to act effectively in most instances. Accusations of the United Nations’ failures are in fact indictments of member-states themselves”.¹¹⁴⁴ Similarly, the report of the Commission on Global Governance remarks:

When governments or people speak of reform of the United Nations, they address a process of change that has to begin in national behaviour, not on the banks of the East River in New York. National behaviour is a product of national decision-making and national policies: it is here that strengthening of

¹¹⁴² In: Foad Katirai, *Global Governance*, p. 67.

¹¹⁴³ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁴⁴ Bahá’í International Community, *Turning Point For All Nations*, p. 7.

the UN must begin. Worthwhile reforms of UN structures ought to be pursued, and we propose several in this report, but the greatest failings of the UN have not been structural: they have been collective failings of the member-states... The point cannot be made more emphatically.¹¹⁴⁵

5.3.2 Structural Reforms: Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Functions of the UN

In the first part of this chapter, it was noted that the Bahá'í view of history is a progressive one, namely one that passes through different stages. The collective life of humanity has, thus, been compared with the life of an individual going through childhood, adolescence, and maturity.¹¹⁴⁶ As this view concerns the common life of humanity as a single body, it applies to international organisations, and their constant improvement. The League of Nations could, hence, be compared to the embryonic stage of the life of international institutions, and Bahá'í reforms concerning the international system are intrinsically linked to the view that evolution is a feature of human life. As such, international organisations are thought to lead to ever-closer integration in the life of humanity, founded upon the growing recognition of the oneness of humankind. The realisation of the oneness of humankind, an ethical foundation, is linked to giving more means of enforcement to the main organs of the United Nations, which are to safeguard the individual from abuse and injustice, and to advance the process of peaceful change. Bahá'ís, thus, view the improvement of the UN as a move towards the goal of human history, i.e. global unity.¹¹⁴⁷ Structural reforms are also enshrined in the belief that human nature is not inherently aggressive, that transformation is possible,¹¹⁴⁸ and that the physical integration of humankind is a mirror of the oneness of mankind, as discussed above. This signifies that the oneness of humankind propounds that unity is the principle regulating all spheres of human life, including the socio-political sphere.¹¹⁴⁹ Insofar as, in the words of 'Abdu'l'Bahá, the individual is “in

¹¹⁴⁵ Commission on Global Governance, *Our Global Neighbourhood*, pp. 227-228.

¹¹⁴⁶ See 5.1.2 A System of Planetary Organisation.

¹¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁴⁸ See 5.1.5 Human Nature and Peaceful World Order: An Alternative Image.

¹¹⁴⁹ See 5.2 The Oneness of Mankind and Institutional Cosmopolitanism.

need of cooperation and association”¹¹⁵⁰, his/her well-being is better served through operations which can optimise this human need, which due to the global stage in which we find ourselves, take the form of intricate global cooperation. Morality and ethics, as we have seen in the first part of this chapter, are the reflection of more global cooperative and practical efforts,¹¹⁵¹ reflected in the proposal for retaining independent functional organisations, which promote global integration, and international peace.

Thus, Bahá’í practical reforms keep in line with promoting a vision of unity sustained by the principle of oneness, seek to maintain and reinforce the spirit of collaboration in an interdependent and single humanity, and stress the importance of the participation of peoples in world affairs. In brief, Bahá’í practical reforms are linked to the more theoretical views of the Faith, as they seek to enhance more peaceful relations central to the vision of human integration and oneness, developed by Bahá’u’lláh, ‘Abdu’l’Bahá, and Shoghi Effendi.¹¹⁵² We have seen that the normative basis of the oneness of mankind is also thoroughly linked with the notion of breaking away from the concept of state sovereignty, which by underpinning the centrality of states, fails to recognise the fact of global interdependence, and limits international affairs to an outdated state-centric view.¹¹⁵³ Since “the anarchy inherent in state-sovereignty is moving to a climax”,¹¹⁵⁴ the United Nations must demonstrate the ability to disregard this concept. This theoretical background is reflected in the suggested reforms for the three main organs of the UN, which are the General Assembly, the Security Council, and the International Court of Justice. The reforms of the UN, as proposed by the BIC, are in line with the vision of Shoghi Effendi, when he referred to the very long-term vision of a world federal government. Namely, he mentioned that the world parliament should create binding law, that an international force should back up the world executive, and that the world tribunal should have binding decisions

¹¹⁵⁰ See 5.1.5 Human Nature and Peaceful World Order, (‘Abdu’l’Bahá, *The Promulgation of Universal Peace*, p. 35).

¹¹⁵¹ See 5.1.2 A System of Planetary Organisation.

¹¹⁵² See 5.1.3 Bahá’u’lláh’s Exhortation, 5.1.4 The Century of Light, 5.2 The Oneness of Mankind.

¹¹⁵³ See 5.2 the Oneness of Mankind and Institutional Cosmopolitanism.

¹¹⁵⁴ Shoghi Effendi, *The World Order of Bahá’u’lláh*, p. 202.

on the parties and on all disputes that may arise in the international system.¹¹⁵⁵ Shoghi Effendi, furthermore, noted that the world parliament should be elected by the peoples, and that the supreme tribunal should have ‘a binding effect even in such cases where the parties concerned did not voluntarily agree to submit their case into consideration’.¹¹⁵⁶ This is reflected, as we shall see in the next section, in the more incremental reforms of the three main organs of the UN.

Starting with the General Assembly, the BIC identifies its main failures with the ‘undue weight to state sovereignty and a mix of anarchy and conservatism’ as well as its inability to enforce sanctions.¹¹⁵⁷ It, henceforth, calls for a more representative General Assembly, indeed, one that would represent more accurately both the peoples and nations of the world. This call is reminiscent of the advocacy cited in the writings of ‘Abdu’l’Bahá in 1875, “... it would be preferable if the election of non-permanent members of consultative assemblies ... should be dependent on the will and choice of the people...”¹¹⁵⁸ Indeed, unlike people’s acceptance of national and local legislative bodies, international legislative bodies are likely to entice suspicion insofar as they are not adequately represented.¹¹⁵⁹ Additionally, the resolutions of the UN should have the force of law, and be endowed with provisions and sanctions, so that they can address the needs of an increasingly interdependent humanity more efficiently, and abandon certain paralysing aspects of state sovereignty. The BIC states:

In a reformed United Nations, the legislative branch and its voting structure will need to represent more accurately the people of the world as well as nation-states. Second, General Assembly resolutions are not binding unless they are separately ratified as a treaty by each member state. If the current system, which places state sovereignty above all other concerns, is to give way to *a system which can address the interests of a single and interdependent humanity*, the resolutions of the General Assembly – within a limited domain of issues – must gradually come to possess the force of law with provisions for both enforcement and sanctions. These two shortcomings are closely linked

¹¹⁵⁵ See 5.2.1 Federalism or Commonwealth models.

¹¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁵⁷ Bahá’í International Community, *Turning Point For All Nations*, p. 8.

¹¹⁵⁸ See 5.1.3 Bahá’u’lláh Exhortation, ‘Abdu’l’Bahá, *The Secret of Divine Civilization*, p. 24.

¹¹⁵⁹ This also explains the suspicion shown towards the discussion, for example, of a world government.

inasmuch as the majority of the world's people, suspicious and fearful of world government, are unlikely to submit to an international institution unless it is itself more genuinely representative.¹¹⁶⁰ [Emphasis mine]

These reforms are suggested so as to promote the image of a single and interdependent humanity, which constitutes the more normative principles of the Faith that have been reviewed in the first part of this chapter, and the emphasis that Bahá'u'lláh placed on 'peoples' in His recommendations on a global governance system, or the equivalent of a global civil society.¹¹⁶¹ For the short-term reforms of the GA, the BIC proposes five measures. Firstly, it suggests that minimum requirements should be raised and determined by the way a government conduct itself towards its peoples:

Without an unshakeable commitment to regular and periodic elections, universal participation by secret ballot, freedom of expression, and to other such human rights, a member state stands in the way of the active and intelligent participation of the vast majority of its population in the affairs of its own communities. We propose that there should be consequences for member-states violating these standards. Similarly, nations seeking recognition should be denied membership until they openly espouse these standards or make recognizable efforts to move in that direction.¹¹⁶²

The demands for a more democratic representation within the General Assembly, and for raising minimum requirements for membership (this would include, for example, a commitment to human rights) are regarded as foundational in the operations of the General Assembly. Violations of human rights in national systems are most certainly bound to have negative effects on the international system as a whole, as they impede on citizenry participation, which is crucial to the flourishing of international society. The Bahá'í Faith holds no dogmatic views on how population differences would be handled, as long as they are part of a fair system. What is suggested is changing the 'one state, one vote' principle of the General Assembly into 'some form of proportionate representation', which would make the General Assembly a more equal partner with the Security Council.¹¹⁶³ In a letter in 1942, Shoghi Effendi explained that even

¹¹⁶⁰ Bahá'í International Community, *Turning Point For All Nations*, p. 8.

¹¹⁶¹ See 5.1.3 Bahá'u'lláh's Exhortation to Political Peace.

¹¹⁶² Bahá'í International Community, *Turning Point For All Nations*, p. 8.

¹¹⁶³ Jeffrey Huffines, "Bahá'í Proposals", in: Babak Bahador & Nazila Ghanea, (eds.), *Processes*, p. 19.

though ‘Abdu’l’Bahá provided a clear vision of global governance, these concerned more fundamental principles than a rigid formula:

Though it is premature to try and endeavour to foresee on what basis various nations would be represented on any international council, or in any international form of government, it is clear from the Bahá’í standpoint that it could only be carried out on the basis of true justice; and justice does not imply one race having a preponderating vote over some other race’s representatives, and thus being in a position to dominate them.¹¹⁶⁴

Other proposals relating to the legislative function include the setting up of an International Commission in order to study the question of international boundaries instead of relegating the problem to the World Court. The latter commission would serve as a study-ground and as a practical agency for the assessments of threats against various civil groups, and the results of its research would serve as a warning system for growing tensions among various groups.¹¹⁶⁵ The 1995 report of the BIC deplors the way in which nation-states were initially arbitrarily designed, a situation that has led to many conflicts, and which highlights the need for a more genuine general reassessment and agreement on national borders. “In order to establish a genuine community of nations *in the long run*, it will be necessary to settle finally all disputes among borders. This research would serve that end”.¹¹⁶⁶ [Emphasis mine] This measure aims at providing a short-term remedy for ethnic conflicts, as these conflicts also have to be tackled at the level of principle, that is, by promoting global values that would seek to efface hatred and exclusiveness in the very long-term. If like Mitrany, we could say that this would bring about discord, according to the Bahá’í view, this is a short-term measure (as with most proposals that relate to UN reforms) that could provide a basis upon which ethnic conflicts could be brought to appeasement. As boundaries were mostly arbitrarily designed (the boundaries of the majority of the nations are identical with the boundaries of colonial states established by the European powers), the Bahá’í view contends that there should be an authority to settle boundary disputes

¹¹⁶⁴ Shoghi Effendi, in: Foad Katirai, *Global Governance*, p. 97.

¹¹⁶⁵ Bahá’í International Community, *Turning Point For All Nations*, p. 9. This proposal is reminiscent of the call made by ‘Abdu’l’Bahá to have a binding treating that would, among other things, be entitled to fix international borders in a more fitting manner.

¹¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

adequately. It is in the light of this recognised hindrance to peace and security that the latter proposal is made. That the Bahá'í ethos does not seek to do away with groupings such as the nation-state is mirrored in this BIC proposal, and in the call for reassessing international borders for greater security, and as a preventive measure against conflicts. More importantly, there is recognition that boundaries are artificial and imagined, but since they exist, there must be short-term mechanisms to deal with them.

Anderson's observation that nations are no more than "imagined communities" that require considerable social and political engineering to propagate, echoes 'Abdu'l-Bahá's much earlier description of nations and peoples as "limited unities" which are "imaginary and without real foundation".¹¹⁶⁷ "The artificial and arbitrary nature of national boundaries, coupled with insufficient mechanisms for handling boundary disputes, has been one of the major sources of inter-national conflict in the past two centuries".¹¹⁶⁸ Indeed, the Bahá'í model rests on a long-term vision, which through intermediary steps, sets to achieve a real unity among peoples. In a time of ethnic hatred, a more adequate reconfiguration of boundaries would serve as a 'warning system'. Though like Mitrany, the Bahá'í ethos seeks to render frontiers 'meaningless', it is more in a sense of feelings, attitudes, and principles. It is clear that the Bahá'í Faith does not simply base its commitment to peace on ideological commitments either. It seeks to promote an active peace, not only based on a political basis, but on the release of the powers of the individual; the reduction of the gap between extremes of wealth and poverty; and the promotion of sustainable development measures. More importantly, world citizenship education is viewed as a long-term preventive measure against ethnic-based conflicts. "Consciousness of the oneness of humanity, if taught to the next generation, could protect it from ethnic and religious conflict and encourage processes of collaboration and conciliation. It could generate a desire to

¹¹⁶⁷ In the first part of this chapter, we saw that 'Abdu'l-Bahá spoke of the oneness of humankind and the artificiality of boundaries. (See 5.1.4 Century of Light.)

¹¹⁶⁸ Graham Hassall, "Contemporary Governance".

base decisions on just principles and lead to the development of laws that are ‘universal in both character and authority’”.¹¹⁶⁹

As regards financial arrangements, which are a great impediment to the successful conduct of UN operations, the BIC underlines that voluntary arrangements would never be sufficient, and suggests that an expert task force should be established to search for new solutions. The BIC adds, “In studying alternatives, the Task Force should be mindful of several fundamental principles. First, there should be no assessments without representation. Second, in the interest of fairness and justice, assessments should be graduated. Third, mechanisms for encouraging voluntarily contributions should not be overlooked”.¹¹⁷⁰ In addition to these proposals, the BIC, in line with the writings of Bahá’u’lláh¹¹⁷¹ and ‘Abdu’l’Bahá, calls for an Expert Commission to be appointed in order to make a commitment to “an auxiliary international language and script”, whose aim would be to “facilitate the transition to a global society through better communication”. Moreover, reflecting the need for greater global integration, the BIC promotes the establishment of a Commission for the development of an international currency.¹¹⁷² In view of the federal mindset that the Bahá’í International Community is endowed with, and the weight it gives to the diversity of peoples and the protection of minorities, such a statement does not imply the demise of any culture or language, but rather seeks to supplement the existing world languages. The first part of this chapter dealt with the federalist views of the Faith, and its emphasis on unity. Likewise, this Bahá’í reform suggests that unity could be structurally realised through the input of an expert task force, which would study and seek to implement a universal auxiliary language. “Such a move”, the BIC states, “would go far toward promoting a spirit of unity”.¹¹⁷³ This is an aspect of the Bahá’í view that theory (unity) and practice (in this

¹¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁷¹ See Bahá’u’lláh, *Gleanings*, pp. 249-250.

¹¹⁷² Bahá’í International Community, *Turning Point For All Nations*, p. 10.

¹¹⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 9

case the devise of a universal language) are interrelated; indeed, ‘Abdu’l’Bahá spoke of treading the spiritual path with practical feet.¹¹⁷⁴

In addition, the BIC holds the view that the Security Council “suffers from an inability to take decisive action”. Hence, the BIC makes four suggestions for the short term. It proposes “as a transitional step, measures to be introduced to curb the exercise the veto power to reflect the original intention of the Charter”.¹¹⁷⁵ Other measures to strengthen the decision-making role of the Security Council and its enforcement powers include the creation of an International Force under the command of the Security Council and Secretary General financed by the General Assembly, whose personnel would come from all parts of the world. “If properly implemented, this Force would also provide a sense of security that might encourage steps towards global disarmament, thereby making possible an outright ban on all weapons of mass destruction”.¹¹⁷⁶ The BIC adds, in line with the counsels of Bahá’u’lláh to the sovereigns of His time, that states should only need armaments for internal security, and for their own defence.¹¹⁷⁷ Other proposals related to the strengthening of the Security Council include furthering the concept of collective security to local problems, as many local threats are ‘the result of the complex breakdown of the present-day global order’. “These threats include but are not limited to international drug trafficking, food security, and the emergence of new global pandemics”.¹¹⁷⁸ The value of oneness touches upon the centrality of human rights, and the demand for more solid action to tear apart the concept of state sovereignty. Collective action is not only required in the case of military aggression, but also in the case of human aggression within the state (genocide), and other problems occurring as the result of the breakdown of the global system. Secretary General Kofi Annan observed “the collective interest *is* the national interest ...when we read the Charter

¹¹⁷⁴ Lady Blomfield, *The Chosen Highway*, (Wilmette: Bahá’í Publishing Trust, 1956), p. 210.

¹¹⁷⁵ In this regard, the BIC states, “The original intention of the UN Charter in conferring veto power on the five Permanent Members was to prevent the Security Council from authorizing military actions against a Permanent Member or requiring the use of its forces against its will. In fact, beginning with the Cold War, the veto power has been exercised repeatedly for reasons that relate to regional or national security”. (Bahá’í International Community, *Turning Point For All Nations*, p. 11).

¹¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.* See 5.1.3 Bahá’u’lláh’s Exhortation.

today, we are more than ever conscious that its aim is to protect human beings, not to protect those who abuse them”.¹¹⁷⁹

In addition, if the international system is to be based on the normative principles of ‘unity in diversity’, the concepts of the veto and of the permanent membership in the Security Council clearly jeopardise principles of equality and fairness. The oneness of mankind also justifies that Bahá’í reforms have been suggested as early as 1955 as regards removing the veto and permanent membership in the Security Council, and the importance of democracy in international relations. Laszlo remarks that international organisations are bodies that are not truly global, but international: they still operate within the climate of state sovereignty and self-interest as opposed to the global interest.¹¹⁸⁰ “Such arrangements”, Katirai states, “are not just bad governance but in dire contradiction to what the Commission on Global Governance calls the ‘principles of universality and the equality of member-states’ that so many, including the nation-states, presume should underlie international undertakings”.¹¹⁸¹

The BIC, as briefly noted, recognises the great importance of functional-styled executive organisations such as the WHO or UNICEF, bodies with which it closely works.¹¹⁸² Moreover, the creation of these organisations coincides with the vision of the ‘century of light’, as it refers to “the growing acceptance of the principle of oneness and its implications”.¹¹⁸³ For ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, physical integration would advance “the conditions that permit achievement of the ideal” (universal peace), as these organisations are a “reflection” of the “consciousness of world solidarity”, crucial to the prelude of the Lesser Peace.¹¹⁸⁴ Not only do functional organisations embody effectiveness, but they are also based on the moral need for collective

¹¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁷⁹ In: Rod Rastan, “An International Legal”, in: Babak Bahador & Nazila Ghanea, (eds.), *Processes*, pp. 206 & 208.

¹¹⁸⁰ Ervin Laszlo, “Science and Prophecy”, p. 99.

¹¹⁸¹ Foad Katirai, *Global Governance*, p. 77.

¹¹⁸² See 5.1 Introduction.

¹¹⁸³ See 5.1.4 Century of Light.

¹¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

action that supports the unity of mankind and the prosperity of its peoples. The BIC positively remarks, “As an international organisation, the United Nations has demonstrated humanity’s capacity for united action in health, agriculture, education, environmental protection, and the welfare of children”.¹¹⁸⁵ Additionally, mentioning the independent organisations in the UN family, and as part of the suggested reforms it proposed, the BIC notes that these successful executive functions (WHO, UNICEF, The UPU, or the ILO) should retain and reinforce their independence.¹¹⁸⁶ These proposals emphasise the functional mindset of the BIC, as they call for expert task forces to search for appreciate solutions. These functional organisations have demonstrated the capacity for “united action in health, agriculture, education, environmental protection, the welfare of children” as well as the “collective moral will to build a better future”.¹¹⁸⁷ Morality and ethics are here another example of the reflection of more global cooperative and practical efforts,¹¹⁸⁸ which are found in the proposal for retaining independent functional organisations, which promote global integration, and consequently international peace.

Finally, the importance of the judicial function of the UN is underlined. “In any system of governance, a strong judicial function is necessary to moderate power of the other branches and to enunciate, promulgate, protect and deliver justice... no lasting world civilization can be founded unless it is firmly grounded in the principle of justice”.¹¹⁸⁹ Emphasising the positive elements of the International Court of Justice created in 1945, such as the diversity of a varied international judicial panel, the BIC calls for the extension of the Court’s jurisdiction and suggests that other organs of the United Nations, not only member states, be given the right to bring cases before the Court. This suggestion is reflective of cosmopolitan propositions that states cannot be the sole actors in international relations and law. As well as expanding the Court’s jurisdiction, the BIC calls for the expansion of issue areas such as international

¹¹⁸⁵ Bahá’í International Community, *Turning Point For All Nations*, p. 2.

¹¹⁸⁶ *Ibid.* p. 12.

¹¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

¹¹⁸⁸ See 5.1.2 A System of Planetary Organisation.

terrorism and drug trafficking. Without doubt, proposals that involve the subject of the International Court of Justice require that it should deliver legally binding decisions. The crucial place of the theme of ‘justice’ in Bahá’í thought justifies its support for the creation of bodies such as the ICC that places human rights over state interests.¹¹⁹⁰ “Justice”, the BIC states, “is the one power that can translate the dawning consciousness of humanity’s oneness into a collective will through which the necessary structures of global community life can be confidently erected”.¹¹⁹¹ Clearly, practicing justice is another facet of the ethical, normative, and cosmopolitan principles of the Faith based on humanity, and not on states.¹¹⁹²

In light of the ‘ethical’ and ‘spiritual’ nature of the Bahá’í Faith, these practical measures to reform the United Nations are not, however, sufficient. The BIC recognises the crucial importance of releasing the powers latent in the individual, and providing development paradigms not only with a material, but also a moral and spiritual dimension.¹¹⁹³ The BIC also seeks to instill a closer relationship between peoples and their international organisations in order to invalidate the dichotomy between them and us.¹¹⁹⁴ Furthermore, the encouragement of the greater participation of women in international affairs – who, in Bahá’í eyes, have a great role to play in the establishment of Universal Peace- and the promotion of a more just system of global economic justice are important aspects of the BIC institutional reform programme. The BIC, thus, notes:

Bahá’u’lláh announced the arrival of the time, foretold, in all of the world’s scriptures, when humanity would at last witness the uniting of all peoples into a peaceful and integrated society. He said that human destiny lies not merely in the creation of a materially prosperous society, but also in the construction of a global civilization where individuals are encouraged to act as moral beings who

¹¹⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁹⁰ See Chapter Seven, (7.2 Humanising Globalisation).

¹¹⁹¹ Bahá’í International Community, *Turning Point For All Nations*, p. 12.

¹¹⁹² See Charles Lerche in 5.1 2 A System of Planetary Organisation.

¹¹⁹³ “Development should not be confused with the creation of an unsustainable consumer society... Education is the best investment in economic development... Because of the spiritually damaging nature of dependency, schemes which focus solely on redistributing material wealth are doomed to failure in the long run”. (Bahá’í International Community, *Turning Point For All Nations*, p. 15).

¹¹⁹⁴ See Commission on Global Governance, *Our Global Neighbourhood*, pp. 226-227.

understand their true nature and are able to progress towards a greater fulfilment that no degree of material bounty can provide.¹¹⁹⁵

5.4 Synopsis of Bahá'í Cosmopolitanism: Theoretical and Global Political

Recommendations

Bahá'í belief revolves around the recognition of Bahá'u'lláh, prophet founder of the Bahá'í Faith, as being a 'Manifestation of God' i.e. a divine enunciator of a renewed religious and social message to mankind for today. The relationship that is cultivated between Bahá'ís and Bahá'u'lláh is of the same nature as that fostered between Christians and Christ, or between Muslims and Muhammad.¹¹⁹⁶ When this link has been made through recognition and awareness, and not imposition, this relationship is, in most cases, one that reinforces belief. Moreover, this connection is sustained through a certain mysterious or mystic element, whose objective is an increase of spiritual awareness, or the development of human virtues. The relationship prevailing between Bahá'ís and Bahá'u'lláh is, furthermore, cultivated through recognition of those Whom they call 'Manifestations of God', namely Abraham, Krishna, Buddha, Moses, Jesus, Zoroaster, Muhammad or the Báb. The appearance of Bahá'u'lláh constitutes, for them, a renewal of this process of divine revelation that is unceasingly furthered in accordance with the various conditions in which mankind finds itself throughout different ages. 'Abdu'l'Bahá, thus, referred to creation as "the expression of motion"¹¹⁹⁷, which accounts for the non-static, non-rigid, and flexible nature of the vision of humanity as enshrined in the Bahá'í Faith. It also explains that there cannot be a 'single' solution to the problems of mankind, which is timeless, eternal, and fixed. Humanity is in constant evolution, and therefore there always needs to be a readjustment of our mindset and structures to these challenges. This vision, in turn, upholds that

¹¹⁹⁵ Bahá'í International Community, *Turning Point For All Nations*, p. 22.

¹¹⁹⁶ It should be noted that in Christianity, Christ is considered to be God, while in Islam, Muhammad is considered to be a 'Divine Messenger'. For Bahá'ís, Abraham, Krishna, Moses, Zoroaster, Buddha, Christ, Muhammad, the Báb, and Bahá'u'lláh are "Manifestations of God", Who carry a Divine message to mankind.

¹¹⁹⁷ See Section 5.1.2 A System of Planetary Organisation ('Abdu'l'Bahá, *The Promulgation of Universal Peace*, p. 140).

mankind has the capability of transformation; an image that underpins that human nature has the potential of overcoming its lower nature.¹¹⁹⁸

Bahá'í belief is not only a personal and private matter, but also one that triggers action outside of the home, at the level of international relations. In this regard, Bahá'ís hold the view that the level of principle is highly relevant in shaping international relations. Accordingly, the concept of the paralysis of will, which is sustained by the belief in the inherent aggressiveness of human beings, impedes the action that would promote peaceful change. In this case, the principle of the oneness of humankind would assist in the structural transformation of mankind as one home. The interdependence of the 'spiritual' and 'material' realms is underlined, and can be compared to the reflection of the light in a mirror. The light is contained in the mirror through its reflection; yet, it is independent of the mirror. Likewise, the oneness of mankind, as a 'spiritual' principle, represents a reflection of the global governance system that is a material reality through which the growing interdependence of the nations and peoples of the world can be witnessed. 'Abdu'l'Bahá noted in section 5.1.2, "Whatever objects appear in the world of existence are the outer pictures of the world of heaven".¹¹⁹⁹ The oneness of mankind does not correspond to an ideal, which is 'out of reach', but to a way of life on the individual and institutional levels. Jasion observes that Bahá'ís "are to great extent trying to develop a life-style and an attitude both individually and as a community which reflects the... intentions of universalism".¹²⁰⁰

For Bahá'ís, the principle of oneness of humanity is, thus, so central that it cannot be detached from any material action, nor any other principles as enunciated in the Bahá'í writings.¹²⁰¹

Hence, the significance of the oneness of humankind is in line with the Bahá'í interest in a

¹¹⁹⁸ For the development of the theme of human nature, see 5.1.5 Human Nature and Peaceful World Order: An Alternative Image.

¹¹⁹⁹ 'Abdu'l'Bahá, *The Promulgation of Universal Peace*, p. 10.

¹²⁰⁰ Jasion, Jan, T., "The Universalism of the Bahá'í", p. 106.

global governance system, and with recommendations that foster institutional reforms in view of the realisation of universal peace.¹²⁰² In fact, the oneness of humankind is a reflection of universal peace as it calls for the reconciliation of the diverse elements of humanity that are essentially one, but that through the fostering of prejudices, have emerged as divided units and peoples. There is, thus, a cohesive link between structural reforms that are meant to improve the global system and render it more peaceful, and the more normative principles of the Bahá'í Faith that call for the decrease and effacement of divisive prejudices that represent a denial of the oneness of humankind. Peace is a combination of the decrease of various prejudices based on, for example, national, religious, or racial grounds (an enhancement of the oneness of humankind), and structural reforms aimed at improving relations between nations and peoples, decreasing conflict, and promoting prosperity (again an enhancement of the oneness of humankind). The recommendations relating to global governance cannot, therefore, be divorced from the more normative principles of the Bahá'í Faith. This also justifies that the Bahá'í Faith complements structural reforms of the UN with the need for the development of human values, i.e a global ethic based on the consciousness of oneness.

In line with a global governance system, “Bahá'ís believe that the nation-state system is outmoded and that new values are needed to evolve a social and political system appropriate for the unification of the human race, which is the principal Bahá'í doctrine”.¹²⁰³ Indeed, Bahá'u'lláh deplored that the “prevailing order appeareth to be lamentably defective”.¹²⁰⁴ This defectiveness is not resolved in a postmodern fashion, which suggests deconstructing main paradigms of power without proposing how to fill up the void, but rather constitutes reforms for positive social and political change that criticise a narrow and modern nationalism that deifies

¹²⁰¹ This importance is highlighted in the words of ‘Abdu’l’Bahá, “the most important principle of divine philosophy is the oneness of the world of humanity”. (‘Abdu’l’Bahá, *The Promulgation of Universal Peace*, p. 31).

¹²⁰² For a more detailed view of structural reforms, see 5.3.2 Structural Reforms: Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Functions of the UN.

¹²⁰³ Loni Bramson-Lerche, “An Analysis”, p. 7.

¹²⁰⁴ Bahá'u'lláh, *Gleanings*, p. 216.

the state.¹²⁰⁵ Change does not mean that Bahá'í suggestions repose on 'eradication', but mainly on the transformation of values and structures, which are commonly termed a 'paradigm shift'.¹²⁰⁶ Bahá'í views also rely on the power of discourse, association, and dialogue as promoters of change. Indeed, Bahá'u'lláh referred to the "free association of peoples"¹²⁰⁷ which, through the fostering of familiarity and tolerance, would lead to "concord, which is conducive to order".¹²⁰⁸ The intermingling of the peoples of the earth, if channeled through means of peaceful dialogue and tolerance, would produce conditions of unity. This aspect is strongly linked to a positive image of human nature, which rejects the essentiality of human aggressiveness, and maximises human discursive and communicative potential.

Intrinsically transformationalist, the Bahá'í model seeks to "broaden the basis" of a global society that still functions on parochial notions, and to "remould its institutions in a manner consonant with the needs of an ever-changing world".¹²⁰⁹ As the present Westphalian system of International Relations is defective and cannot respond to global needs, Bahá'ís envisage a more cosmopolitan formulation of politics. "Nationally organised forms of government and state are increasingly impotent in the face of global problems that include environmental deterioration, population explosion, the depletion of resources of energy, the outbreak of war and the conclusion of peace, the establishment of security, and of economic and social justice".¹²¹⁰ Indeed, the problem of aids, the environment, the global economy, and migration are transnational issues that the nation-state is incapable of dealing with unaided. Moreover, the Internet and new satellite communications have bypassed nation-state borders. Through recognition of complex global conditions, the Bahá'í approach takes on normative views that revolve around the criticism of the nation-state as an outmoded form of political organisation,

¹²⁰⁵ Graham Hassall, "Contemporary Governance".

¹²⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

¹²⁰⁷ Bahá'u'lláh in: Horace Holley, (ed.), *Bahá'í Scriptures, Selections from the Utterances of Bahá'u'lláh and 'Abdu'l-Bahá*, (New York: Brentano's Publisher's, 1923), p. 145.

¹²⁰⁸ *Ibid.*

¹²⁰⁹ See 5.2.2 The Lesser Peace or Bahá'í Programme for a Political Unity of Nations (Shoghi Effendi, *The World Order of Bahá'u'lláh*, p. 41).

¹²¹⁰ Graham Hassall, "Contemporary Governance".

and advocates a global federation that would limit national sovereignty in global affairs. The organs of such an organisation would include “a global executive, a global legislature, an international armed force for crisis management, a world taxation system, a global currency, global communications network and a supreme international tribunal”.¹²¹¹ In this model, federalism based on subsidiarity¹²¹² is presented as favourable for the management of diversity that would ensure that decisions are made on the lowest possible level, respecting grassroots involvement and decision-making. As a short-term and timely measure, however, the Bahá’í model seeks to strengthen world order by attempting to give more voice to a global citizenry, underlining the importance of democratic and accountable processes within the global system. All the same, the fact that the Bahá’í writings encourage a federal world government does not indicate the acceptance of the state as a form of political community over humanity. This is reflected in both the ethical cosmopolitan writings of the Faith, which denounce the over-emphasis on artificial boundaries, and the transformationalist views of the Faith, which do not foresee the eradication of nation-states. The words ‘federal’ and ‘government’ have become dirty words, but, nonetheless, are based on notions, which have been recently reiterated with other more acceptable ‘words’. It would consist of a world parliament (cosmopolitan democracy theorists are in favour of such a parliament which would give more voice to the ‘people’), a supreme tribunal (a hybrid ICJ with compulsory jurisdiction, and a humanitarian ICC), and a world executive (that would support a more efficient global peacekeeping force).

The Bahá’í perspective on global politics is inspired by a cosmopolitanism, which is akin to IR views that denounce the nation-state as inappropriate, obsolete, insufficient, and constraining. Henceforth, Shoghi Effendi called for a more cosmopolitan reformulation of political theories, which he deemed more adequate to respond to our present needs. Noting that the call launched

¹²¹¹ See 5.2.2 The Lesser Peace or Bahá’í Programme for a Political Unity of Nations.

¹²¹² World federalist Charles Handy notes, “it is important to realise that one owes something not only to one’s immediate group or subsidiarity, but also to the larger whole, which means that, occasionally, the immediate interests of the smaller unit must be sacrificed to the interests of the whole and for the ultimate benefit of all”. ¹²¹² Charles Handy, “On Federalism”, 6 February 1992, downloaded 18 June 2002, <<http://www.federalunion.org.uk/federalism/charleshandy.shtml>>

by Bahá'u'lláh was made against all forms of “provincialism, insularities and prejudices”, he observed that it was necessary to relegate ‘theories’ based on these outdated notions to “obsolescent and forgotten doctrines”.¹²¹³ “For legal standards, political and economic theories are solely designed to safeguard the interests of humanity as a whole...”¹²¹⁴ In this cosmopolitan turn, the Bahá'í approach views the present system as a transitional stage of internationalism towards globalism, and likewise seeks to reform the UN, which is still based on the notion of state sovereignty. The BIC, being appreciative of the ideals that the organisation embodies and actions it has successfully completed, acknowledges that while the UN has played a significant role in preventing the outbreak of a third world war, it has not been able to live up to the goals as set out in its Charter. Furthermore, it did not introduce an era of peace and prosperity for all, as testified by the growing local, in particular ethnic and sectarian – especially since the end of the Cold War – and national and regional conflicts costing millions of lives.¹²¹⁵ The Universal House of Justice underlines: “Flaws in the prevailing order are conspicuous in the inability of sovereign states organised as the United Nations to exorcise the spectre of war, the threatened collapse of the international economic order, the spread of anarchy and terrorism, and intense suffering which these and other afflictions are causing to increasing millions”.¹²¹⁶

The UN embodies a very valuable international body, which nonetheless needs to be reformed for better efficiency and the adoption of a more useful role in international affairs. Indeed, “the UN is a body composed of national governments and permanent membership of the Security Council is often cited as the embodiment of classic state-centric power politics”.¹²¹⁷ It should become more global, as it fails to protect the individual, the central unit of a cosmopolitan order.¹²¹⁸ As seen in the later part of this chapter, the main organs of the UN would have to become more representative of the peoples of the world, and more effective. Bahá'í reforms, for

¹²¹³ Shoghi Effendi, *The World Order of Bahá'u'lláh*, p. 42.

¹²¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹²¹⁵ Bahá'í International Community, *Turning Point For All Nations*, p. 2.

¹²¹⁶ The Universal House of Justice, “The Promise of World Peace”, p. 4.

¹²¹⁷ Daniel Wheatley, “Global Governance: Has a Paradigm Shift”, p. 236.

example, call for the GA to have law-binding authority; the compulsory jurisdiction of the world court; promote the ICC and highlight the need for its strengthening. It also calls for a military capacity for peacekeeping, the phasing out of the veto, and a forum for civil society at the General Assembly. It foresees the future of the UN in the very long-term vision of a world federal government. Graham Hassall writes:

In recent years the Universal House of Justice and its agencies have elaborated on such subjects as the future of the United Nations Organisation, and the challenges of social development. *The Prosperity of Humankind* suggests that reassessment of structures and processes of government will include redefinition of the terms “power” and “authority”; formulation of laws that are “universal in both character and authority”; ... a conscious effort to ensure that “technological breakthroughs” and “limited resources” are not reserved for privileged minorities; and the continued development of laws protecting human rights and the whole range of civil, political, social and economic rights.¹²¹⁹

In addition, there are some clear guidelines that are reminiscent of the Bahá'í proposal for a new system of global governance. The inadequacies of the Westphalian system are underlined by the Bahá'í vision of peace, whose preliminary stage is a political unity among the nations, which is termed the Lesser Peace. These characteristics form the core of the system of global governance proposed by Bahá'u'lláh, 'Abdu'l-Bahá, Shoghi Effendi, and the Bahá'í International Community. Specifically, the call for an international gathering (formulated by the main figures of the Faith, the Universal House of Justice and the Bahá'í International Community) is regarded as crucial for the future structure of a system of global governance, and is envisaged as part of the process of peace among nations. Based on an international agreement and consensus by the peoples of the world, as well as substantial input from civil society, this gathering is presented as a landmark towards a global political peace. The Lesser Peace is, hence, characterised by a convocation of world leaders with substantive input from civil society, which will engender a firm doctrine of collective security, and be based on the consensus of the peoples of the world. This consensus will also take the form of an international treaty or constitution that will enshrine a set of common values. Bahá'u'lláh initially called for a ‘vast all

¹²¹⁸ For a view of the suggested reforms of the UN, see 5.3.2 Structural Reforms: Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Functions of the UN.

embracing assembly', and 'Abdu'l'Bahá encouraged this assembly to make the cause of peace the object of universal consultation. Collective security, as envisaged by Bahá'u'lláh and explained by Shoghi Effendi, represents the curtailment of national sovereignty; disarmament; and the elaboration of a system of a federal and decentralised world government. It is also the means by which various pandemics can be prevented, and not only military aggression. (This clear intrusion in intra-state affairs is a way of weakening national sovereignty). Bahá'ís view the various UN sponsored conferences as a premise of this call made by Bahá'u'lláh, and the search of common solutions that rely on the realisation of a common destiny. The fact that a majority of world governments have willingly committed to international treaties such as the Kyoto protocol, the Ottawa convention to ban landmines, or the Rome statute that created the ICC, represents another facet of the recognition of a common destiny and global processes.

It can be also said that the Bahá'í approach on global cooperation stands in parallel to the views developed by twentieth century cosmopolitans. Functionalists, cosmopolitan democracy theorists, and world federalists call for the strengthening of global institutions; the ethos of world citizenship; stronger global mechanisms for the enforcement of human rights; and the development of functional international organisations that deal more appropriately with global problems by separating issues. Bahá'í reforms emphasise the importance of preserving successful UN institutions with independent executive functions, such as the UPU, the ILO, and the WHO. The various co-operative efforts that have helped to promote socio-economic development, and the determination to embody a common approach have rendered the UN the forum of a world vision and discussion. The Universal House of Justice notes, "The increasing attention being focused on some of the most deep-rooted problems of the planet is yet another hopeful sign...all such measures, if courageously enforced and expanded, will advance the day when the spectre of war will have lost its power to dominate international relations".¹²²⁰ Whilst many cosmopolitans push for some kind of international system of governance to avoid the

¹²¹⁹ Graham Hassall, "Contemporary Governance".

¹²²⁰ The Universal House of Justice, "The Promise of World Peace", p.12.

perpetuation of the idea that the nation-state is a ‘supreme creation’, and whilst they desire to see an efficient and brotherly/sisterly order as a cherished aspiration, the Bahá’í teachings contain a clear promise as to the occurrence of a world order firstly devoid of war and moving towards a fulfilling social order. If Bahá’ís believe in the eventual occurrence of world unity, they view changes in the international system as the result of ‘expediency and urgency’, prompted by world leaders and the peoples of the world.¹²²¹

In a more ‘religious’ context, Bahá’ís hold the view that the revelation of Bahá’u’lláh, intended for a global age, has unleashed forces that trigger and inspire the peoples of the world to be emotionally and intellectually attracted by the prospect of a unified world. This is reflected in the increase of international organisations, which adopt an ethos of global collaboration, the increase of NGOs in which peoples are concerned with their fellow-human beings as opposed to ‘non-nationals’, and in the unifying process that was triggered by the global institutional structure of the League of Nations. For Bahá’ís there is, thus, no coincidence that the Bahá’í writings on global governance, and other cosmopolitan inspired writings have a strong and definite parallelism. It goes without saying that there are not only ‘good-willed’ global co-operative programmes, but also a strong rejection of unity. Ethnic conflicts supported by nationalism, racism, terrorism, and religious fundamentalisms embody this rejection. The idea of a process explains that setbacks (i.e. the rejection of unity) call for the need for solutions, and propel the necessity of engendering more collaborative methods. Global problems bring about the need for global solutions, which will eventually set up more effective mechanisms for unity. As such, “there is growing recognition of the complexity of human affairs, in which opposing agents of chaos and order, of growth and decay, generate ‘open’ historical moments in which the destinies of whole peoples and nations are determined”.¹²²² The Bahá’í approach is visionary in its nature: the manner in which world peace is triggered is a matter of choice, but its

¹²²¹ See 5.2.1 Federalism or Commonwealth models.

¹²²² Graham Hassall, “Contemporary Governance”.

occurrence is eventually inevitable: it is, in a ‘mystically’ inspired sense, an eschatological ‘promise’ involving opposing forces.

If one explores the main avenues towards world peace -as enshrined in the Bahá’í writings- it is a matter of choice for humanity to decide the manner in which it can be achieved. Whatever path is chosen, Bahá’í thinking upholds that humanity will be eventually unified in all its different aspects, and all its diversity. The Universal House of Justice underpins this hopeful note: “Whatever suffering and turmoil the years immediately ahead may hold, however dark the immediate circumstances, the Bahá’í community believes that humanity can confront this supreme trial with confidence in its ultimate outcome”.¹²²³

¹²²³ The Universal House of Justice, “The Promise of World Peace”, p. 6.

Chapter Six – The Bahá’í Faith and the Cosmopolitan Tradition

6.1 Introduction

In this chapter, the cosmopolitan themes explored in the various chapters of this thesis shall be linked to Bahá’í views. Specifically, the cosmopolitan conceptions of world peace that relate to human nature and global institutions; the idea of world citizenship that connects with the theme of a universal language and communication; the possibility of a cosmopolitan loyalty to the ‘world’; and the aspects of elitism and global governance shall be reviewed, and related to Bahá’í views. The section on world peace also links up with analogous concepts such as reason, progress, the question of the ‘universal’, and highlights the spiritual/ethical components of the Bahá’í Faith. The concepts of transnational institutions and global political cooperation shall be thereafter examined by specifically emphasising the problem of ‘elitism’ in global governance, which dates back ancient and Enlightenment cosmopolitan forms. In a discussion on elitism that challenges an undemocratic form of global governance, we shall explore why it is necessary to utilise the ancient and ‘spiritual’ values of cosmopolitanism propounded by the Stoics¹²²⁴ to tackle the inequalities engendered by globalisation.¹²²⁵

This latter discussion constitutes an extension of Chapter Four, which focused on neo-idealist writers such as David Held and Richard Falk,¹²²⁶ and which addressed the question of accountability in governance. This section, furthermore, elucidates the idea promoted by the Bahá’í Faith: the necessity of fostering global values, and the importance of normative commitments such as the promotion of the common good. This brings together the discussions in Chapter Two, which focused on the Stoic notions of ethics and virtues, and the debates in Chapter Four, which addressed global governance and globalisation. It will be shown that

¹²²⁴ See Chapter Two for an elaboration of early and late Stoicism.

¹²²⁵ See Chapter Four, (4.2.1 Globalisation).

¹²²⁶ For neo-idealist writers, see specifically Chapter Four, (4.2 Cosmopolitan Democracy: A System of Humane Governance).

cosmopolitanism can benefit from Bahá'í views, as they put the 'spiritual' ahead of the 'material', without neglecting the latter, as it is laid out in the hypothesis. Indeed, the Bahá'í approach contributes to the secular cosmopolitan tradition by reinforcing the concept of ethics. Bahá'í cosmopolitanism, thus, asserts the spiritual/ethical nature of cosmopolitanism, and not only its material form in terms of technological and physical interdependence. The Universal House of Justice mentioned that the Revelation of Bahá'u'lláh was an invitation to 'freedom from want' (material dimension), 'freedom from war', and 'freedom to unite' (spiritual dimensions).¹²²⁷ If this emphasis on values can be viewed as abstract and naive (because of their non-tangibility, normativity, and seemingly 'non-rationality'), the fact that recent cosmopolitans highlight their necessity renders the Bahá'í normative elements highly relevant to the discourse. Throughout this chapter, the ethical dimension brought by the Bahá'í Faith through its principle of the oneness of humankind – which justifies the whole Bahá'í programme for peace – and the contributions made by the Bahá'í Faith to the cosmopolitan discourse shall be underlined. Furthermore, the postmodern and critical conceptions of world order shall be likewise embodied as a more sensitive and intricate cosmopolitanism, and will be related to the Bahá'í approach. Through its connections to the cosmopolitan tradition, and through its normative components, the Bahá'í model thereby assists in developing a stronger cosmopolitan stronghold within IR.

6.2 Cosmopolitan Conceptions: Human Nature, Global Institutions, and World Peace

Throughout the cosmopolitan tradition, these three themes are closely interrelated. For example, human nature is a way of conceiving of the future of mankind (as the shape of humankind's future is regarded as an outcome of the attributions given to human nature), and determines what is possible of achievement in IR. The cosmopolitan tradition portrays human nature as being essentially and potentially positive, and, therefore, attests to the possibility of peace being established through designed mechanisms ('world government' or international organisations).

¹²²⁷ The Universal House of Justice, Letter: Individual Rights and Freedoms, 29th of December 1988, Internal Document, p. 13.

The idea of world peace is linked to the view that history leads to better forms of government and relations, an idea mostly found in the ‘idealist’ views of IR, inherited from Enlightenment cosmopolitan perspectives reviewed in Chapters Two and Three. The themes of progress, change, reason and a non-static human nature have fed the ‘idealist’ or liberal international components of IR, and constitute its main essence: change can bring about ever more peaceful human relations. In Chapter One, it was noted that, “realists take war and anarchy for granted, whereas Enlightenment thinkers like Kant hope to transcend and change them. For example, Kant insisted that the idea that peace will be achieved by the balance of power is pure illusion”.¹²²⁸ Hence, cosmopolitanism, claims cooperation rather than power and order, and, hence, a system of collective security rather than a balance of power. The triad of human nature, global institutions, and world peace can also be located in Bahá’í cosmopolitan thinking, which, as observed in Chapter One, contains strong normative elements. Belief, as was contended in Chapter One, influences behaviour: in the Bahá’í vision, a positive image of human nature signifies enhancing the pacification of IR, through the preliminary intervention of global co-operative arrangements: to that end, a system of collective security and a federal global system are recommended.

That human nature is seen as inherently positive in the Bahá’í Faith does not mean that unjust actions cannot be committed, but that human beings, through free will and their potential to surpass a lower nature (that does not correspond to their true ‘reality’) can attain to peaceful relations.¹²²⁹ The Bahá’í view sustains that conceiving of human nature as belligerent creates ‘paralysis’, which prevents global institutions and peoples from achieving world peace. The argument that human nature is inherently aggressive constitutes, in the Bahá’í image, an obstacle to the design of a peaceful future for humankind. Hence, the Bahá’í approach stands opposed to the realist view of aggressiveness, which maintains that humans are inherently and

¹²²⁸ T.V. Paul & John Hall, *International Order*, p. 8.

¹²²⁹ This does not mean that the Bahá’í Faith simply envisages a ‘good’ or ‘bad’ image of human nature. It upholds a more complex view, i.e. a normative view that denotes the possibility of transformation. See Chapter Five, (5.1.5 Human Nature and Peaceful World Order: An Alternative Image).

basically power-hungry. In Chapter One, Gilpin defined realism as “pessimism regarding moral progress and human possibilities”.¹²³⁰ Bahá’í thinking, on the contrary, asserts an empowering exposition of human nature: humanity is accountable for its actions, as the attributes of human nature cannot excuse conflicts. Moreover, social institutions do not alter human nature, as it is the case with Rousseau (when man enters into civil society, he loses his qualities of goodness). It is not because of social contact that war is perpetuated (Rousseau), but rather because of the absence of a unified and just global system, the deification of the nation-state, and the lack of recognition of the oneness of humanity. In this regard, it is important to note that the Bahá’í approach, due to its religious character, does not alter its belief-system when events seem to oppose its assertions, as it is possible in IR theory¹²³¹. Its visionary component surpasses the contingency of world events: the seeming failure of the League of Nations, for example, does not signify its unsoundness; rather, it embodies the need for improved collective action realised through the creation of the UN and current reform calls.

The cosmopolitan tradition maintains that the state of nature or war can be surpassed, as it is not a natural state for humankind. World peace is, thus, believed to be a ‘civilised’ aim of human striving that undermines the wastefulness of wars, in terms of human and material gains (we will not, however, enter into this debate). The reason why world peace is regarded as a most noble goal is because it is conceived in the form of an ideal that correlates to the nature of the individual, whose end is, according to Marcus Aurelius, cooperation and harmony. World peace is also conceived in terms of upholding moral and ethical conduct in international affairs, which basically maintains that war is immoral and peace ethical. Erasmus, for example, conceived of peace in terms of a moral principle, and a human ideal.¹²³² Crucé also contended that warlike inclinations were not the true nature of humankind, and proposed an international organisation to maintain peace: what led people to be warlike was the division into diverse political units, but

¹²³⁰ Gilpin in: Mastanduno, Michael, *Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies after the Cold War*, (New York: Chichester: Columbia University Press, 1999), p. 20.

¹²³¹ For example, Angell after WWI reviewed his views on human nature. (Lucian M. Ashworth, *Creating International Studies*, pp. 60-61).

not the nature of humankind.¹²³³ Bentham viewed wars not only as ‘an evil but the complication of all other evils’ that failed to produce a system of justice between states.¹²³⁴ Bentham, thus, thought of remedying the state of war through a system of international law in the form of a common tribunal that would regulate relations between states. Justification for wars as a means of diplomacy could be replaced by co-operative arrangements among states.

The Bahá’í approach is correlated with the view that world peace is an ethical/spiritual goal, and demands appropriate institutions for its maintenance, but is detached from the cosmopolitan turn around the end of the eighteenth century that sustained that progress and the advantages of peace should be conceived exclusively in material terms. One of the heirs of the Enlightenment, in the form of British utilitarianism inspired by Bentham, regarded progress as essentially material, and asserted that through the sum of individual self-interest, the (material) happiness of the greatest number would be achieved. In Chapter Two, we saw how Bentham sought not to ‘touch people’s hearts’, but draw the lines of common utility between them.¹²³⁵ For Bahá’ís, however, materialism can neither be the goal of human striving, nor the means to genuine peace. The Bahá’í view contends that an over-emphasis on materialism fails to produce peaceful relations, as it glorifies material pursuits and human self-interest, which in turn, seek to justify belief in the aggressiveness of human nature, itself a main cause of war.

The fact that material ideologies assert that human needs are served exclusively through material satisfaction means, thus, that they stand opposed to Bahá’í thinking. If materialism does not correspond to an adequate way of looking at human relations, this does not mean that Bahá’í thinking looks down on global interdependence, scientific advancements, and technological innovation, as they can serve the fulfilment of more ethical needs. Indeed, material progress, which engenders interdependence, creates the conditions for a more ethical

¹²³² See Chapter Two, (2.8 Renaissance to Enlightenment Cosmopolitan Authors)

¹²³³ *Ibid.* (2.8.1 Emeric Crucé & Comenius: Enlightened Preceptors of Cosmopolitanism?).

¹²³⁴ *Ibid.* (2.8.3 The Idea of Peace of Jeremy Bentham).

¹²³⁵ Elizabeth V. Souleyman, *The Vision of Peace*, p. 200.

peace. Peter Khan notes, “Scientific accomplishments in agriculture, automation, and electronics allow individuals to have more time to enrich their spiritual lives and develop their social relationships”.¹²³⁶ Moreover, it was noted in the previous chapter that ‘Abdu’l’Bahá and Shoghi Effendi observed that the twentieth century offered the material conditions that allowed peace to become a concrete possibility due to global financial and technological interdependence. Material interdependence and well-being are not an end in themselves, but rather constitute the necessary conditions through which a more mature stage of international relations can be achieved. Here, Bahá’í cosmopolitanism could represent a basis on which ethics and matter could be harmonised: indeed, without undermining the centrality of material interdependence for world unity, Bahá’í views assert the insufficiency of material satisfaction and need-fulfilment, due to an essentially spiritual exposition of reality, as discussed below.

We can also note that throughout the cosmopolitan tradition, the notion of change has propelled co-operative ways, rather than competitive means (such as the balance of power), to achieve peace. Indeed, the idea of a balance of power is not in accord with the reality of a non-power hungry human nature. Since war is unnatural, it is essential to construct a ‘state of peace’ necessary for the establishment of peaceful relations between states, and consequently remedy the state of nature.¹²³⁷ The idea that there can be a noble goal or aim in international affairs has been propounded by cosmopolitan ‘idealists’, who prioritised world peace as being the aim of their paradigms, and stressed that through the common human attribute of reason, mankind as a whole could achieve peace: Marcus Aurelius, Dante, Crucé, and Kant are among the ‘cosmopolitans’ who entertained such a vision.¹²³⁸ Since cosmopolitan views wish to set up an alternative society that has the potential of transformation, thereby linking it to a normative ‘idealism’, Bahá’í views, which enshrine a cosmopolitan and normative ethos, mirror these aspects. More than mirroring these aspects, they add a non-rational side to the heritage of ancient, and Enlightenment cosmopolitanism, claiming that humans are not only rational, but

¹²³⁶ Peter Khan, “Introduction”, in: *Peace More Than an End to War*, p. ix.

¹²³⁷ This idea can be found throughout perpetual peace projects.

also spiritual beings. If rationality (which stems from the notion of ‘Logos’ in ancient times) is a common attribute, and, justified the need to have peace, Bahá’í views contend that rationality stands as an insufficient tool for world order. Human capacity, from a Bahá’í perspective, is complemented by strong ‘spiritual’ components that can be described as a preliminary to a ‘post-rational’ approach in IR, eminent from the 1980’s. The Bahá’í Faith enounces a more moderate attitude than the glorification of human reason in its conception of world peace: the power of transformation does not solely depend on reason that triggers freedom, but on the divine elements of order.

While laying importance on the fact that humans should be freed from traditional beliefs, or superstitions, and use their faculties to choose whichever world-view flows from their quest, the Bahá’í vision does not believe that everything can be fulfilled solely through human capacity, or technological and scientific advances. Another level or a divine element of order complements human capacity through ‘revealed’ messages.¹²³⁹ The one level (divine) does not obliterate the other (rational), i.e. world peace represents a divine promise, “the next stage in the evolution of the planet”, but its unfolding and timing rely on human intervention. The triad of reason, freedom, and progress in liberal internationalism is not sufficient in the Bahá’í vision. The element ‘spirit’/‘divine orientation’ or more visionary aspects of world order are underlined. These elements relate to the oneness of humankind: human spirit,¹²⁴⁰ like reason, is common to all humans. A useful clarification is that ‘reason’, in the Bahá’í vision, is not viewed in ‘male’ or ‘female’ categories, but is regarded as the capacity of all to see and determine, to whatever extent is possible, the sentiments and sensibilities intellectually or emotionally attached to their choices. It is not being detached from the subject of inquiry, but mystically, emotionally, and intellectually involved: a more intricate vision of reason that relies on elements of intuition. And

¹²³⁸ See Chapters Two and Three.

¹²³⁹ For Bahá’ís, as we saw in Chapter Five, Bahá’u’lláh represents the new ‘revealed’ divine messenger.

¹²⁴⁰ ‘Abdu’l’Bahá also calls ‘spirit’ the ‘rational soul’, in this context the emphasis is on soul. He notes, “... The human spirit, unless assisted by the spirit of faith, does not become acquainted with the divine secrets and the heavenly realities”. (‘Abdu’l’Bahá, *Some Answered Questions*, (Wilmette: Bahá’í Publishing Trust, 1981), p. 208).

if reason is often conceived of as a 'male' attribute (not man, but male), spirit in turn can be defined in more female terms, as it relies on intuitive, and 'emotional' aspects. Moreover, the Bahá'í view contributes to providing humans with more than the common attribute of reason and biological factors that assert that we constitute one race. The world is a spiritual organic unity that justifies, as it is debated later on, the need for a 'global ethic'. Unlike postmodernists who believe that there is no reality, but only various texts that help us describe the world, the Bahá'í Faith has a clear conception of what constitutes 'reality'.

This does not signify that humans are not allowed to have different cultures, ideas, and conceptions about that reality (or none at all) that differ in their essence. In the Bahá'í view, that we describe the world as multidimensional is a positive fact of human speculations. It is part of diversity, and it signifies the enrichment of our world-views. There is, however, as opposed to incommensurable realms as enshrined in postmodernism, the belief that differences, cultures, and ideologies are commensurable, accounting for the possibility of unity and peace. Our differences do not obliterate our essential unity (a universal that includes differences).¹²⁴¹ To claim, like postmodernists do, that it is impossible to have universals, would threaten the cosmopolitan project at its core, since the latter deals with categories that unites humans (universal) in their diversity (differences), and feeds the imaginary of a better 'real' world that does not only exist in our minds. The 'problem' can be delineated as follows: by seeking to defend and safeguard the 'abstract' word 'differences', and favour the latter over 'unity in diversity', the ethical will to alleviate concrete human suffering could be transposed to a Western 'idea' or imposition, when it is clear that human suffering knows no barriers and seems to be blind to categories such as Western or non-Western, rich or poor, white or black, male or female. The concept of unity in diversity seeks to preserve local cultures (differences), and also emphasises the possibility of cooperation among the diverse peoples and outlooks of the world (unity) without necessarily having to impose ideas and ways of being (the respect for different cultures challenges the ideas of cultural imposition).

In the same way, the attack that we cannot have a common history, and that there are just discontinuities does not mean the impossibility of imagining, and constructing a common future of peace.¹²⁴² Despite historical contingencies, the shrinking of the world through technological and physical processes has linked us in a way unimaginable to our ancestors. That we may have a common history, and in the Bahá'í Faith, that this history is attached to us being a single human species, cannot just be described as irrelevant. In the Bahá'í vision, differences and discontinuities do not have to stand against a unified vision of a common future. 'Purpose' in history is just another word for envisaging the possibility of increasing well-being in a world composed of similar, yet diverse human beings, who do not have to remain, opposed. Womens' and civil society movements stand for this possibility of 'peace' based on common political action that can assist in making the world 'a better place'.

This is an important point to stress: according to the cosmopolitan project, to have different ideas and conceptions cannot prevent us from finding solutions, as this would mean the demise of the project of world unity and world peace, i.e. it would represent an excuse to the idea that we cannot be one in our diversities. Assumptions about the world are not just ways of competing, but also of mediating. What constitutes the 'universal' is the validation of non-universals, a 'unity in diversity'. Moreover, where postmodernism eschews grand ideas and projects, its emphasis on solidarity with 'others', is another way of conceiving a more humane, sensitive, inclusive, and ethical peace 'project'.¹²⁴³ In the Bahá'í vision, there is no picture of a world imposed on us, but rather created through cooperation, human participation, and communicative deliberations. The idea that we can utilise the power of speech, discourse, and organisations to shape a future that is not imposed, but collectively created, prevails. This is reflected in this vision of a 'spiritual' reality.

¹²⁴¹ We are all humans, yet we can have different tastes, and different ideas.

¹²⁴² See Kant in Chapter Three, (3.4.1 The Duality in Kant's Writings)

¹²⁴³ See Chapter Four, (4.3 'Cosmopolitan' Postmodern Perspectives in IR).

Indeed, going back to the notion of ‘reality’ enshrined in the Bahá’í Faith, the BIC observed that, “the mainspring of Bahá’u’lláh’s message is an exposition of reality as fundamentally spiritual in nature”, that asserts the possibility of creating “more complex and efficient means” for humans “to express their moral and intellectual capacities”.¹²⁴⁴ Global governance and peace are, thus, spiritual issues, raised to the level of ‘principle’ as opposed to mere pragmatism. The Universal House of Justice wrote, “the primary challenge in dealing with issues of peace is to raise the context to the level of principle... for in essence peace stems from an inner state supported by a spiritual or moral attitude...”¹²⁴⁵ As opposed to the rational and scientific Enlightenment views on peace, the Bahá’í approach maintains that the divine intervenes in history, and that a reflection of social and political order should be ‘spiritual’. An important clarification is that ‘spiritual’ does not mean ‘blind obedience’ to an order in which one is insignificant, but rather signifies the elaboration of laws that reflect the human potentiality to be just, and, hence, the human propensity to reflect human virtues, as enshrined in the divine. Furthermore, the divine is not conceived as ‘ascetic’, and as the possessor of irrevocable and exclusive truth, but as reflection of virtues that is essentially tolerant, open, and practical. The Bahá’í Faith gives importance to the equilibrium between ‘faith’ and ‘reason’, ‘science and religion’. This is found in the principle of the oneness of humankind: a scientific fact, it is the basis of a spiritual principle, around which all other principles of the Bahá’í Faith revolves.¹²⁴⁶

6.2.1 Dante, The Enlightenment, and Recent Visions of Peace

In order to relate cosmopolitan visions in different times further to the Bahá’í vision of peace, some complementary points need to be highlighted. Although the Renaissance and the Enlightenment used the common faculty of reason as a basis for its peace programmes, it was still influenced by the Christian vision of ‘service to mankind’, which leads to a common road

¹²⁴⁴ See Chapter Five, (5.1.2 A System of Planetary Organisation) or Bahá’í International Community, “Who is Writing the Future?”.

¹²⁴⁵ The Universal House of Justice, “The Promise of World Peace”, p. 11.

¹²⁴⁶ See Chapter Three, (3.4.8 Kant and the Unity of Mankind).

of salvation, the precursor of this linear historical path to progress, and peace.¹²⁴⁷ The Bahá'í vision stands close, but is somewhat different from this version. The path to world peace is non-linear: it follows an upward trend (not dependent on the will of man), but is constrained by chaos and catastrophic events (contingent upon human will).¹²⁴⁸ This justifies the fact that world peace is held to be inevitable in the Bahá'í Faith. The Bahá'í Faith believes in a divine process or a divine 'plan' that is not, understandably, more expressly found in secular IR theories. The Kantian idea that antagonism within society would lead to world peace can be linked to the Bahá'í view that the achievement of peace is part of a complex and intricate process. The Bahá'í view, however, maintains that antagonism does not stem from human nature, which Kant thought to be inherently pugnacious, but rather from the lack of recognition of the oneness of humanity. The obstacle to world peace, according to the Bahá'í Faith, does not stem from human nature, but rather from disregarding the level of 'principle'.

In the antecedent medieval model of Dante, who used the three tools of human nature, world government, and world peace for his governance system, world government (in the figure of a world monarch) would usher peace not as an end in itself, but rather as a means to produce the adequate conditions in which the rational capacities of man could be fulfilled. Dante conceptualised peace as corresponding to divine aspects of governance, in that "peace and world government resemble God".¹²⁴⁹ Kant, similarly, thought that peace could not be conceived as an end in itself; rather, it constituted the means by which the capacities latent in humankind could be released. For Kant, the highest purpose of nature represents the matrix within which all the capacities of the human race would be able to develop.¹²⁵⁰ This idea has an interesting correlation with the view that world government, which is essential to world peace, is a premise for developing the full capacities of humankind, as found with the idea of a two-

¹²⁴⁷ Kant, for example, was influenced by religious faith, and, therefore, his concept of reason was transcendental (moral), rather than utilitarian (material).

¹²⁴⁸ See Chapter Five, (5.1.2 A System of Planetary Organisation).

¹²⁴⁹ See Chapter Two, (2.6 Dante or a Paradigm of Medieval Cosmopolitan Thought).

¹²⁵⁰ Kant, "Idea For A Universal History With A Cosmopolitan Purpose", in: Hans Reiss, *Kant: Political Writings*, p. 44.

level peace image in the Bahá'í Faith. The first being a political peace that tranquillises relations in IR – and somehow still necessitating a consciousness of human solidarity (the Lesser Peace) – and the second superior level of peace, in which true feelings of humanity, as well as human expression would be developed (the Most Great Peace). In the Bahá'í vision world peace is more than an end to war: it is based on releasing the powers of the individual, a connection with the idea of 'emancipation', in the sense of moral empowerment. Peter Khan observes, "the goal toward which Bahá'ís are labouring surpasses disarmament and the pacification of hitherto discordant peoples; rather it is a creative fellowship designed to help produce a social order in which all humankind will find fulfilment and self-expression".¹²⁵¹

During the Enlightenment, the state of peace became at the centre of the *philosophes'* concerns, as they proceeded to conceive of perpetual peace projects. Perpetual peace was conceptualised with the view that conflict was not a natural feature of the international systems, and that sovereigns, united through a system of transnational organisation, would produce conditions of peace. These schemes mainly follow a pyramidal form: states and sovereigns are the basic units. This has been criticised by authors such as Rousseau, who thought it naïve that sovereigns, thought to be the cause of wars, would be ready to forsake war, selfishness, and self-interest for peace. This justified criticism is a strong element undermining a pyramidal form, which relies solely on states and sovereigns as principal tools for peace, and disregards the human level and democratic input. As it is seen in a latter part of this chapter, most recent cosmopolitan, as well as Bahá'í, views have challenged such a stance. Indeed, the central unit in the Bahá'í vision in IR is not centred on the 'nation-state', but on 'humanity'. The Bahá'í Faith neither believes that IR is in an irreversible impasse, nor does it uphold that governments should be given sole responsibility for producing peace. Bahá'í views can be separated from more secular theories, due to their essentially visionary sense of divine direction in history, but assert that human aspects are absolutely essential in shaping global peace.

¹²⁵¹ Peter Khan, "Introduction", in: *Peace More Than an End to War*, p. xii.

The Universal House of Justice, for instance, notes that both governments and peoples (in the form of organisations of civil society) will contribute to pacifying relations. According to the Bahá'í stance, peace cannot be sustained just through arguing that the oneness of humankind is the regenerating principle behind world order. If the level of principle is important, it is the basis for shaping institutional arrangements: the principle of oneness does not become a natural element of cooperation, but the basis for human intervention via global institutions, and a system of collective security (cooperation) to maintain peace. This is an important clarification, as it stands opposed to those idealist visions, which maintain that peace will be the natural product of interdependence, or contact between peoples and nations.¹²⁵² World peace, through the promotion of the weakening of the powers of particularistic units, such as nation-states, has remained a constant inspiration of the twentieth century, but has taken on more intricate characteristics. Cosmopolitanism has been realised to a certain extent, and cosmopolitan writing is still largely based on how to improve global and international organisations (cosmopolitan democratic theorists, in Chapter Four, place global institutional reform on their agenda).¹²⁵³ But one of the major problems that faces cosmopolitanism is that global interdependence has not produced more peaceful relations. Rather, it has widened the extremes of poverty and wealth, itself an obstacle to a more equal and just world, a condition of world peace. Neo-cosmopolitans, or neo-idealists, thus, announce that global interdependence must be brought to control if it is to engender real cosmopolitanism. David Mitrany (we may say a predecessor to neo-cosmopolitanism) conceived of a more complex view of peace, a social view of peace, in which war is thought to take the form of hunger, illiteracy, or pollution: social and economic issues now constitute the real problems of mankind. Peace cannot be achieved without economic prosperity, and the fulfilment of basic material human needs.

¹²⁵² This view is mostly found in liberal internationalism of the nineteenth century. Adam Smith thought that through free trade, an invisible hand would co-ordinate economic activity and benefit all. See Adam Smith, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, (London: J.M. Dent, 1910.)

¹²⁵³ Different ways to achieve world peace have been conceived: the oldest idea being global federalism with the concept that nations should unify, and set up mechanisms between them that would forsake war.

The idea of peace sustained by a global political organisation shifts to the idea of sectoral functional organisations: Mitrany, in this regard, does not promote a tranquil peace between the nations of the world, but ‘an active peace’ in which different elements of the international order are interlinked. Based on the views that we have moved from a metaphysical age to a scientific age, and that progress constantly leads us to world unification, Mitrany thought in terms of what he regarded as a ‘practical’ solution to peace. This idea of world peace (although Mitrany would not have liked the simile) is found in the ideals of peace of world federalists, who have moved from advocating just a political peace, to advocating social justice encapsulating economic development; the protection of the environment; the promotion of human rights; and the enhancement of peace through growing involvement of global civil society movements, whilst keeping UN reform on their agenda.¹²⁵⁴

This social view of peace, which accounts for fulfilling the material needs of world citizens, constitutes, as we have seen, an essential component of Bahá’í views, which not only call for political unity, but also for a decrease, and an end to poverty. However, the Bahá’í vision is essentially a non-material vision: by favouring the ‘spiritual’, it maintains that more material problems will be solved through a spirit of reciprocity. The element ‘spirit’ requires more than material satisfaction for the fulfilment of human needs, which although essential, do not represent the full picture. As the Universal House of Justice observes:

The endowments which distinguish the human race from all other forms of life are summed up in what is known as the human spirit; the mind is its essential quality. These endowments have enabled humanity to build civilizations and to prosper materially. But such accomplishments alone have never satisfied the human spirit, whose mysterious nature inclines it towards transcendence...¹²⁵⁵

Another aspect of Bahá’í views on peace is that they are clearly gendered, a fact that has not been really prominent in the cosmopolitan tradition at the time of the writings of Bahá’u’lláh in

In perpetual peace systems, the Abbé conceived of a Congress, and Kant gave serious thought to a confederation of nations.

¹²⁵⁴ See, for example, Chapter Seven (7.2 Humanising Globalisation).

¹²⁵⁵ The Universal House of Justice, “The Promise of World Peace”, p. 6.

the mid-nineteenth century, and even throughout a good span of the twentieth century. Drawn from the principle of the oneness of humankind, Bahá'u'lláh promoted the equality of the sexes, the education of girls and women, and more recently the Universal House of Justice notes that without the emancipation and participation of women in world affairs, world peace is unattainable. 'Abdu'l-Bahá noted that the education of each child is compulsory, but if resources within a family are not sufficient to educate all children, priority should be given to the education of girls "since, through educated mothers, the benefits of knowledge can be most effectively and rapidly diffused throughout society".¹²⁵⁶ Very recently, this injunction has become the mantra of development economics.¹²⁵⁷ Until recent decades women did not really have a place in the cosmopolitan tradition: as it is seen in the Middle ages with Aquinas and Dante, they were considered to be other, inferior marginalised beings.¹²⁵⁸ In the Enlightenment, Kant did not think that women should have the right to vote,¹²⁵⁹ (they were, according to him and his enlightened contemporaries, lacking reason), and most cosmopolitan writers have the tendency to make women invisible, or not a subject of concern for world peace.¹²⁶⁰ By contrast, the House of Justice notes,

The emancipation of women, the achievement of full equality between the sexes, is one of the most important, though less acknowledged prerequisites of peace. The denial of such equality perpetrates an injustice against one half of the world's population and promotes in men harmful attitudes and habits that are carried from the family to the workplace, to political life, and ultimately to international relations... Only as women are welcomed into full partnership in

¹²⁵⁶ 'Abdu'l-Bahá, *Divine Philosophy*, (Compiled by Elizabeth Fraser Chamberlain), (Boston, MA: Tudor Press, 1918) p. 83.

¹²⁵⁷ See Joseph Stiglitz, *Globalization and Its Discontents*, (London: Allen Lane, 2002), p. 76. Various International Organisations, including UNICEF, support this view. (See UNICEF, "Progress for Children", 15 April 2005, downloaded 18 April 2005, <<http://www.unicef.org/>>)

¹²⁵⁸ This explains, for instance, that throughout Chapters Two and Three, the term 'man' is utilised to depict these authors' views on cosmopolitanism. 'The whole of the human race' often excluded women. As Bahá'í writings are translated from Persian where the subject 'he' is gender neutral, the term 'man' in the English translations actually refer to both sexes indiscriminately.

¹²⁵⁹ Kant, "The Metaphysics of Morals", Reiss, Hans, *Kant: Political Writings*, p. 139.

¹²⁶⁰ Plato promulgated a certain type of emancipation for women as they could be promoted as guardians in his Utopia (Cf. *the Republic*), but, nevertheless, they were to remain inferior to their male counterparts in the practice of their profession. Moreover, in *the Statesman* Plato concedes that there is a natural division between women and men comparable with the division between odd and even, which, indeed, can only be a perpetual one. (Julia Annas & Robin Waterfield, (eds.), *Plato: Statesman*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 475.

all fields of human endeavour will the moral and psychological climate be created in which international peace can emerge.¹²⁶¹

Bahá'í views can contribute to the cosmopolitan tradition by including a more gendered cosmopolitanism, rendering women central to cosmopolitanism, and thereby reconciling (male) Enlightenment forms of cosmopolitanism to more sensitive approaches that have been recently introduced in IR. Furthermore, with the emphasis on human spirit, they can bring reconciliation between secular trend and religious views that work towards inclusion and unity. Clearly, this does not mean fundamentalism, or exclusivity, but the enunciation of human values, tolerance, and positive co-operative visions of the pacification of IR.

6.3 The Ethics of World Citizenship: An Alternative to Confined Particularism

The notion of world citizenship has been constant in cosmopolitan thinking throughout the ages, and it is here important to revisit the development of this idea, and how it converges with Bahá'í formulations. Indeed, cosmopolitanism's etymology is 'cosmopolite' which means 'citizen of the world.'¹²⁶² Bahá'ís often refer to themselves as "citizens of the world", a cosmopolitan identity vouchsafed to them by Bahá'u'lláh. This permits an ideological detachment from one's country, and allows for the adoption of a vision that depicts one's home as the vastness of the planet, or one's country as something more than the sole territorial possession of its nationals. Citizenship thereby extends to the whole spectrum of the world. Starting with the Stoics, reiterated by Kant, and refined by cosmopolitan theorists such as David Held and Daniele Archibugi, this concept has been ubiquitous in the cosmopolitan tradition. In the ancient ideal, world citizenship meant moving away from the narrow confines of the *polis*, to enlarge one's horizons towards more open forms of communities¹²⁶³, a version sustained by the Bahá'í vision. It was also a way of expressing a form of human solidarity¹²⁶⁴: in the Bahá'í Faith this

¹²⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

¹²⁶² See Chapter One, (1.3 The Etymology and Concept of Cosmopolitanism).

¹²⁶³ See Chapter Two, (2.2. Stoicism: Political Implications).

¹²⁶⁴ Gerard H. Rendall, *Marcus Aurelius*, p. lxxxviii.

‘consciousness of world solidarity’ (or ‘unity of nations’ as opposed to ‘political peace’) can assist in creating and developing global institutions based on upholding the rights of world citizens.

The Bahá’í view, which moves away from the limitations of political communities, ascertains that the ideal also serves as a guide for diluting extreme particularism, and displacing jingoistic attachments unto a world level. The idea of world citizenship has also been strong, insofar as it has clear and definite connections with the ethics of the oneness of humankind, which sustains the main ideas of cosmopolitanism. World citizenship has been nurtured by the Stoics through the notions of ethics and development of good virtues, which require that civic virtue is not replaced, but rather extended to a citizenship of the whole cosmos. More recently, the BIC notes that some of the facets of world citizenship should serve to promote “human dignity, understanding, ... cooperation, ... and a desire to serve”¹²⁶⁵, and that it does not exclude love of one’s country. The BIC thereby confirms that separation of ethics from cosmopolitanism is impossible, and stresses the importance of expanding loyalties towards outer circles.

In Chapter Two, we observed how the UDHR and the ICC have come to embody world citizenship trends by placing emphasis on individuals, rather than states. The entitlement of human rights, based on humanity, rather than states and other limited affiliations, has been strongly reiterated in the twentieth century. Natural law propounded by the Stoics – or a law beyond the state level stemming from the commonalities of humanity – was clearly the predecessor to Kant’s idea of cosmopolitan law – itself antecedent to the present formulation of universal human rights. Kant clearly worked on this definition as he thought (in the more extensive definition that he gave to world citizenship), that the surface of the earth was the possession, or common land of all the world’s peoples. Kantian views entertained that the human race shares the right of the earth’s surface in common, not only in the sense of an

original possession which has been subsequently partitioned, but as a habitable land for the world's peoples.¹²⁶⁶ "Only under this condition (a universal right of humanity) can we flatter ourselves that we are continually advancing towards perpetual peace".¹²⁶⁷

More interestingly, Kant links the universal entitlement of the earth's surface to world citizenship and perpetual peace.¹²⁶⁸ This right to world citizenship is strongly reasserted by the words of Bahá'u'lláh, "the earth is but one country and mankind its citizens",¹²⁶⁹ but in a much clearer fashion. Much has been debated about what Kant really meant when he suggested world citizenship, whereas it is clear, from the Bahá'í perspective, that Bahá'u'lláh defined every one of us as citizens of the world (not only as outsiders sharing concern for one another) as part of a new divine plan for mankind. In short, world citizenship is a human right: it follows from natural membership of mankind. This message speaks of the planet, and not any partitioned habitable plot of land, as the proper location for the entitlement of rights and duties shared by all human beings, and detached from the more contingent location of a particular limited political community. It is not just an appeal to human brotherhood, but a clear call for strengthening global organisations based on the respect of peoples as world citizens in order to achieve the goal of world peace. This has found further relevance in an age where limited political communities can no longer deal with territorial issues by themselves, as it is stressed by the functional approach in Chapter Four.

Kant constructed his cosmopolitan arguments on the basis of a *Denkungsart*, or attitude of mind, and also in a more juridical-political sense, in the form of a federation of nations as a means to create perpetual peace. Whilst clearly in line with thoughts that promote world citizenship and world peace, Bahá'í views centralise spiritual foundations such as the oneness of

¹²⁶⁵ BIC, "World Citizenship: A Global Ethic for Sustainable Development", (Based on a Concept Paper shared at the 1st Session of the United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development), New York, 14-25th June 1993, downloaded 28 July 2003, <<http://www.bic-un.bahai.org/93-0614.htm>>

¹²⁶⁶ See Chapter Three, (3.4.7 Kant and the Idea of Cosmopolitan Right/Law).

¹²⁶⁷ Kant, "Perpetual Peace", Hans Reiss, *Kant: Political Writings*, p. 108.

¹²⁶⁸ Derek Heater, *World Citizenship: Cosmopolitan Thinking*, p. 101.

humankind, or the ethical basis of world citizenship, as a prerequisite for world peace. Without the latter, the Bahá'í conception of citizenship and peace stands unattainable: “Universal acceptance of this spiritual principle is essential to any successful attempt to establish world peace”.¹²⁷⁰ Here again, conceptions of world peace are closely related to other central cosmopolitan themes such as world citizenship. Rational aspects of world order, present in Kantian modes of thought, are here complemented once again by more ‘spiritual’ elements underlying the oneness of humankind that define world citizenship – indeed, Thomas of Aquinas also underlined the fact that elements of revelation (faith) should be complemented by elements of reason in politics.¹²⁷¹ The Bahá'í conception of world citizenship is, furthermore, strongly linked to dissipating the dichotomy between citizen and stranger that has fed notions of identity in IR: its assertion of world citizenship is a rejection of erecting barriers between peoples of the earth, the ‘inhabitants of one city’¹²⁷² in order to eliminate discriminations, prejudices, and ‘Otherness’.

If world citizenship was more an attitude of mind in ancient times, the Renaissance, and the Enlightenment, it developed to embrace more concrete characteristics in later stages. Indeed, in the twentieth century, the notion of ‘global commons’, and the argument that we all have responsibilities in preserving the planet’s resources, constitute a more practical trait of world citizenship. More than an attitude of mind, world citizenship has become an increasingly tangible reality. The Bahá'í view upholds that this tangibility has been materialised through the physical interdependence of the nations. As the Universal House of Justice states, “The concept of world citizenship is a direct result of the contraction of the world into a single neighbourhood through scientific advances and of the indisputable interdependence of nations”.¹²⁷³ This version of world citizenship has been transferred to concrete actions such as citizens’ support for UN

¹²⁶⁹ Bahá'u'lláh, *Gleanings*, p. 250.

¹²⁷⁰ The Universal House of Justice, “The Promise of World Peace”, p. 15.

¹²⁷¹ See Chapter Two, (2.5 Thomas of Aquinas: Concept of a Single Divine Being).

¹²⁷² Bahá'u'lláh, *Gleanings*, p. 217.

¹²⁷³ The Universal House of Justice, “The Promise of World Peace”, p. 15.

reform, and efforts for relieving world poverty.¹²⁷⁴ Moreover, recent formulations of world citizenship recognise our complex and ‘interlocking’ global conditions, and promote the idea of multiple citizenships, and the democratisation of political communities. In Chapter Four, critical theorist Linklater remarked that, “the idea of world citizenship is enjoying great popularity in present times: issues such as the environment demand that citizens develop a greater sense of responsibility for the whole human species”.¹²⁷⁵

The Bahá’í Faith is in accord with these notions (the BIC equates world citizenship with the fact that “the peoples of the world develop a profound sense of responsibility for the fate of the planet and for the well-being of the entire human family”),¹²⁷⁶ and clearly views the long-term picture of the globe as one diverse homeland, and its dwellers as citizens. This is in line with the complexity of our multiple communities, brought by increasing physical conditions of interdependence. Like the pyramidal¹²⁷⁷ form of citizenships found in the Bahá’í image, cosmopolitan democracy advocates the cultivation of ‘internationally-minded individuals’ as ‘agents of global change’ and as a ‘global civil society’ that shares a ‘common global destiny.’¹²⁷⁸ Similar to the federalists,¹²⁷⁹ cosmopolitan democracy theorists propose another layer of citizenship (a world citizenship) that would complement limited regional and national citizenships. Strong links can be drawn between Bahá’í, federalist, and cosmopolitan democratic forms of citizenships that advocate multiplicity of rights and responsibilities, and propound a more intricate form of world citizenship. The world is one home, but contains multi-faceted relationships and links that render world citizenship multi-layered, not single.

¹²⁷⁴ Derek Heater, *World Citizenship: Cosmopolitan Thinking*, p. 5.

¹²⁷⁵ Andrew Linklater, “Globalization and The Transformation of Political Community”, p. 626.

¹²⁷⁶ BIC, “World Citizenship: A Global Ethic for Sustainable Government”.

¹²⁷⁷ The word ‘pyramidal’ here means that identities are not exclusive, but complement each other. This meaning is different from the pyramidal or elitist form of governance.

¹²⁷⁸ See Chapter Four, (4.2.3 Cosmopolitan Democracy and Globalisation).

¹²⁷⁹ The notion of holding multiple citizenships and identities (such a case is possible within the European Union, where one can be Scot, Brit, and European) constitutes a strong trait of the federalist tradition, and is now propounded by most cosmopolitans.

The three themes of peace, world government, and world citizenship are thoroughly linked throughout the cosmopolitan tradition, and reinforced by Bahá'í appeals of the recognition of a common humanity, and recognition of the planet as a common home. The Bahá'í Faith, significantly, does not consider world citizenship to be elitist (and here we can note that world citizenship with the Stoics and in the Enlightenment was restricted to those thought worthy of the title). This rejection of elitism means the inclusion of grassroots involvement in deliberating on a new system of global governance, not only by politicians, academics, members of NGOs, but also by developing ways for men and women at the grassroots level to voice their concerns. World citizenship here expands to notions of social justice within and between states, equality of the sexes, and ethnic and national conciliations.¹²⁸⁰ So far, the notion of world citizenship in the cosmopolitan tradition has not always included a great concern for women's rights.¹²⁸¹ By contrast, in the Bahá'í approach, the denial of women's rights stands in sharp opposition to the oneness of humankind, and thereby acts as an impediment to creating a vision of world citizenship that honours "gender and race".

Drawing on the idea of natural law, the Bahá'í view on world citizenship assists in reiterating the basic cosmopolitan proposition that as members of the human race, we have similar rights and duties wherever on earth. When in 1955, the BIC suggested the adoption of an International Bill of Rights to guarantee "freedom of speech, of the press ... of thought, and freedom from discrimination..." it did so in the spirit of keeping up with the idea of entitlements and rights granted by world citizenship. In a similar way, the Commission on Global Governance advocates a global charter of civil society, and urges "the international community to unite in support of a global ethic of common rights and shared responsibilities".¹²⁸² World citizenship, in the Bahá'í Faith, denounces the limitedness of particular and national interpretations of identity that repose on the unit of the nation-state. Indeed, it seeks to enshrine democratic norms on the international level. Shoghi Effendi spoke of the need for global structures of world citizenship

¹²⁸⁰ BIC, "World Citizenship: A Global Ethic for Sustainable Government".

as the antithesis of an “excessive and narrow nationalism”:¹²⁸³ “a world community...in which the fury of a capricious and militant nationalism will have been transmuted into an abiding consciousness of world citizenship- such indeed, appears, in its broadest outline, the Order anticipated by Bahá’u’lláh...”¹²⁸⁴

More than a timely necessity and a characteristic of our times, world citizenship constitutes a part of a ‘common destiny’, and a corollary of the vision of a world community. The visionary aspect conceives of world citizenship as the next developmental stage for humanity that will come to complement lesser loyalties, and eradicate exclusive nationalism. The Bahá’í Faith here offers a useful ground for stressing oneness, and debating on the uses and effects of the principle of world citizenship. More importantly, the Bahá’í Faith utilises the cultivation of world citizenship, not only as ideal, or as an ethic, but also as a concrete alternative to destructive forms of nationalism that compress the idea of community to the nation-state. Indeed, education, communication, and world citizenship are the means by which Bahá’ís tackle nationalism. Cosmopolitan democratic theorists now highlight the fact that statist approaches that view citizenship as a characteristic of the nation-state are no longer sufficient, and neither are Kantian views of a mere feeling of compassion toward outsiders.

6.3.1 World Citizenship and Universal Language: Cosmopolitan Communicative Tools

World citizenship (and more specifically world citizenship education), according to the Bahá’í Faith, is conceived of as an antithesis of extreme nationalistic feelings, and also as a most suitable form of identity in our global times. This is based on Shoghi Effendi’s contention that the world order of Bahá’u’lláh aims at transmuting a militant nationalism “into an abiding

¹²⁸¹ See 6.2.1. The Medieval Model (Dante), The Enlightenment, and Recent Visions of Peace.

¹²⁸² See Chapter Five, Commission on Global Governance, *Our Global Neighbourhood*, p. 56.

¹²⁸³ See Chapter One, (1.1.1 The Nation State as Denial of the Oneness of Mankind)

¹²⁸⁴ Shoghi Effendi., *The World Order of Bahá’u’lláh*, pp. 40-41.

consciousness of world citizenship”.¹²⁸⁵ Since the realities of the oneness of humankind (or ‘world citizenship’ in the ethical sense) are not necessarily taught in the home, cosmopolitans think that they should be taught in schools. Through cosmopolitan education, and specifically with the support of biological and ethical arguments, the ill foundation of various prejudices based on race, sex, or religion could be demonstrated. This idea keeps in line with the development of cosmopolitanism. Since its inception cosmopolitanism is a tradition that has been taught. “Zeno founded his *stoa poikelé* as a school. He and his successor, Chrysippus, were teachers; those attending the painted porch were students”.¹²⁸⁶ In the Stoic revival, Montaigne propounded cosmopolitan education, “This great world...a mirror into which we must look if we are to behold ourselves from the proper standpoint. In fact I would have this be my pupil’s book”.¹²⁸⁷ And in the Enlightenment, Kant, keeping with the cosmopolitan idea, stressed the importance of world citizenship education:

One principle of education which those men especially who form educational schemes should keep before their eyes is this – children ought to be educated, not for the present, but for a possibly improved condition of man in the future; that is, in a manner which is adapted to the idea of humanity and the whole destiny of man ... Here, however, we are met by two difficulties – (a) parents usually only care that their children make their way in the world, and (b) sovereigns look upon their subjects merely as tools for their purposes. Parents care for the home, rulers for the state. Neither has as their aim the universal good and the perfection to which man is destined, and for which he has also a natural disposition. But the basis of a scheme of education must be cosmopolitan.¹²⁸⁸

Heater translates Kant’s idea as such: “parents want the schools to prepare their pupils to obtain good jobs; governments want the schools to prepare the pupils to be good citizens of the state; but the schools should be educating their pupils in world citizenship”.¹²⁸⁹ In our times, Martha Nussbaum argues that world citizenship education widens the student’s perspective and fosters

¹²⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

¹²⁸⁶ Derek Heater, *World Citizenship: Cosmopolitan Thinking*, p. 165.

¹²⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

¹²⁸⁸ Kant, Immanuel, (trans. A Churton), *Education*, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1960), pp. 14-15.

¹²⁸⁹ Derek Heater, *World Citizenship: Cosmopolitan Thinking*, p. 157.

“the ability of what it might be like to be in the shoes of a person different from oneself”.¹²⁹⁰ Bahá’í teachings, in line with dissipating divisions based on race or nation, clearly support the project. “The Bahá’í teachings prescribe education for world citizenship, the fostering of effective communication, and the eradication of prejudice”.¹²⁹¹

In Chapter Two, one of the prevalent figures in cosmopolitan thinking advocating world citizenship education in the seventeenth century, Moravian bishop Comenius, saw that “... the whole world is a school for the entire human race...” within the framework of the Christian church and precepts.¹²⁹² Deeply imbued with the belief in the oneness of humankind, and the wish to see universal peace realised, Comenius thought of three important traits that can also be found in the Bahá’í teachings: the idea that the oneness of humankind/world citizenship should be taught (in *Panpedia*, Universal Education and *Panorthosia*, Universal Reform), the advocacy of a universal language, and the idea of consultation (in *Panegersia* or Universal Awakening).¹²⁹³ “In this book he gives some of his views on how the world should be governed on a world-wide basis, condemning the solution of one world monarch and favouring the creation of consultation through various local assemblies which are to report to a general universal assembly” (Panegersia).¹²⁹⁴ UNESCO, which has come to embody the ideas of Comenius, (international cooperation through education), epitomises the gist of world citizenship education: “since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed”. The teaching of a world citizenship is also strongly advocated in the Bahá’í teachings, and underlined by the Universal House of Justice as a necessary timely aspect. “In keeping with the requirements of the times, consideration should

¹²⁹⁰ Martha C. Nussbaum, in: Martha C. Nussbaum & Joshua Cohen, (eds.), *For Love of One Country*, pp. 10-11.

¹²⁹¹ Peter Khan, “Introduction”, p. xi.

¹²⁹² See Chapter Two, (2.8.1 Emeric Crucé & Comenius: Enlightened Preceptors of Cosmopolitanism?).

¹²⁹³ “Comenius sketched out a scheme of political institutions to achieve the objective of improving human affairs. The plan involved a global network of assemblies through which matters of universal import would be debated. Comenius asserted that ‘Because the matter is of common concern no one should therefore be excluded from this consultation about human affairs, no one should be allowed to exclude himself.’ Comenius makes consultation on world issues equally a right and a duty”. (See Chapter Two, (2.8.1 Emeric Crucé & Comenius: Enlightened Preceptors of Cosmopolitanism?) and Derek Heater, *World Citizenship: Cosmopolitan Thinking*, p. 80).

also be given to teaching the concept of world citizenship as part of the standard education of every child”.¹²⁹⁵ Indeed, the shrinking of the world demands that complementary conceptions of cosmopolitan forms of identity be ‘taught’ in order to foster the unity of the species. The cosmopolitan logic can be depicted as follows: as problems are increasingly global, the adoption of a global consciousness is required to approach them in a more efficient manner.¹²⁹⁶

The long-term implications of the Bahá’í message mean that world citizenship, if taught throughout several generations, would dissipate the traces of exclusive group sentiments, thereby sapping the mental illusion of otherness that feeds ethnic conflicts. Contemporary cosmopolitans contend that, “wars are often started or exacerbated by contempt for or hatred of another, alien country, people or group. Learning and acknowledging that these human divisions are relatively minor in the cosmopolitan context may well breed a consciousness of world citizenship, and temper the will to conflict”.¹²⁹⁷ Bahá’ís, who advocate world citizenship education, take inspiration from the example of their own communities, which have been successful in infusing a sense of world citizenship through the principle of the oneness of mankind, thereby transforming the love for nationalism to more open, and inclusive sentiments. This demonstrates that the ‘enjoyment’ of nationalism is possible to be substituted for cosmopolitan enthusiasm.¹²⁹⁸ Drawing on the example of the diverse Bahá’í community, Peter Khan observes, “the world-wide Bahá’í community, represented in over one hundred thousand cities, towns, and villages around the planet, demonstrates the capacity of Bahá’í principles to create a dynamic unity among peoples who were hitherto alienated or antagonistic”.¹²⁹⁹ Bahá’ís construct this argument, not through the force of cosmopolitan principles that have been reiterated throughout the ages, but through the example of world citizenship characteristics put into practice by their members. Furthermore, through Bahá’í local and national Assemblies that

¹²⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 166.

¹²⁹⁵ The Universal House of Justice, “The Promise of World Peace”, p. 14.

¹²⁹⁶ For example, treating the problem of AIDS within national boundaries might be reduced to naught.

¹²⁹⁷ Derek Heater, *World Citizenship: Cosmopolitan Thinking*, p. 169.

¹²⁹⁸ See Lucian M. Ashworth, “Bringing the Nation Back In”, p. 81.

¹²⁹⁹ Peter Khan, “Introduction”, p. x.

rely on consultative decision-making and co-operative action, Bahá'ís practice the skills of inter-communicative dialogue. Peter Khan goes on to state, “Whether working as Assembly members or in other capacities, Bahá'ís can practice interacting harmoniously and creatively with people of all ages, cultures, races, socio-economic and educational backgrounds”.¹³⁰⁰ Harmony, here, is not contingent upon sameness.

This practical example has demonstrated the possibility of transforming feelings of hatred, and nationalism into world citizenship consciousness, and justifies the value of addressing problems at the level of principle. Henceforth, principles are not theoretical speculation or idealisation, but become a way of life. This aspect contributes to strengthening the concept and value of the ‘level of principle’ in cosmopolitanism. Recently, this level of analysis has been recognised as one of the principles of cosmopolitanism that refers to “reciprocal recognition” i.e. “treatment based on principles upon which all should act”.¹³⁰¹ Drawing on its integrative principles, the Bahá'í Faith calls, through the medium of communication and consultation, for erasing the bases of conflicts, and for devising constructive solutions. This approach is also increasingly found in the works of David Held in Chapter Four, which refer to the concept of ‘deliberative democracy’. Held and Mc Grew underline the need for cross-cultural dialogue “citizenship in a democratic polity of the future is likely to involve a growing mediating role: a role which encompasses dialogue with the traditions and discourses of others with the aim of expanding the horizons of one’s own framework of meaning, and increasing the scope of mutual understanding”.¹³⁰² Held, furthermore, asserts the value of communication on a pyramidal level for a system of global governance, “A global process of consultation and deliberation, organised at diverse levels, represents the best hope of creating a legitimate framework for accountable and sustainable global governance”.¹³⁰³

¹³⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

¹³⁰¹ David Held, “From Executive to Cosmopolitan Multilateralism”, p. 169.

¹³⁰² David Held & Anthony Mc Grew, *Global Transformations*, p. 449.

¹³⁰³ David Held, “From Executive to Cosmopolitan Multilateralism”, p. 177.

This aspect of communicative deliberations has been a crucial element of the Bahá'í Faith since its inception. Bahá'í writer Graham Hassall observes, "Consultation exemplifies a practice of governance that is given considerable attention in the Bahá'í Writings. Open consultation is acknowledged as an essential component of a united society... The Bahá'í approach to consultation recognises the power of discourse to influence to either positive or negative effect. Bahá'u'lláh counsels on the proper use of language".¹³⁰⁴ Differences are considered to be an enriching factor in discussion. In the words of 'Abdu'l'Bahá, "the shining spark of truth cometh forth only after the clash of differing opinions".¹³⁰⁵ Truth here does not constitute a homogeneous imposition, but is rather the product of different ideas, deliberations, and discussions, which form the basis of solutions and action. This route certainly takes more effort, but deals consciously with the root causes of conflicts. Moreover, it views differences as valuable to finding enduring solutions, and not as an impediment. Indeed, if we all had the same ideas, there would be no need to discuss, as we could simply guess each other's minds. Speaking from a cosmopolitan point of view, the fact that we have different ideas contributes to enriching our world-views, or improving the results of co-operative deliberations.

Recently, Habermas and Linklater have introduced communicative models upon which to maximise discursive results. Habermas has introduced the idea of a "dialogic politics", and Linklater refers to the idea of global communities of discourse, namely a "discourse ethics" or a "dialogic cosmopolitanism".¹³⁰⁶ Even though they recognise that it might not always be possible to reach agreement, dialogue does not have to result in consensus, but should reflect diversity, and heterogeneity of thought. Whereas Comenius conceived of the idea of consultation as a right and a duty, these new versions rely on emphasising the right to 'inclusion', especially in transnational conditions. Habermas has drawn on the work of the American educational psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg, who observed that the more advanced stage of moral development is the obedience of rules not for their own sake, but for social responsibility to

¹³⁰⁴ Graham Hassall, "Contemporary Governance".

¹³⁰⁵ 'Abdu'l'Bahá, *Selections from the Writings of 'Abdu'l'Bahá*, p. 87.

others.¹³⁰⁷ Following this premise, he deduces that our basic moral intuitions stem from something deeper and more universal than our traditions, and that the development of a universal moral code is superior to any group or state loyalties, as it reaches beyond the confines of exclusive territoriality that limits the voices of ‘outsiders’. In short, discourse ethics is linked to world citizenship, as it includes all those affected by transnational processes, and the possibility of reaching a basis on which all can act. It is not based on the fatalistic view that differences impede meaningful discourse. “One of its central beliefs (discourse ethics) is that the validity of the principles on which one acts can only be determined through a dialogue which is in principle open to all human beings”.¹³⁰⁸

Here, Bahá’í communities can be useful models, as they highlight the process by which various voices can be heard. Due to the heterogeneity and diversity of their communities, all are encouraged to participate in reciprocal dialogue (independently of socio-economic, cultural, educational backgrounds, gender, and age etc.), and in a spirit that is founded on the possibility of a unity of different views and traditions. All are morally equal and significant, and are acting participants in the affairs of the community. Moreover, through the fostering of the idea of virtues, power is substituted for the notion of service, and allows for attitudes that encourage the evanescence of notions of ‘otherness’. Consultation is not only an effective dialogic tool, but should also be complemented with attitudes of “fellowship, kindness, and unity”¹³⁰⁹, namely a reiteration of ethics. Linklater lately reproduces the gist and ethics of inter-cultural communication by emphasising “the possibility of an agreement about the principles of co-

¹³⁰⁶ Andrew Linklater, *The Transformation of Political Community*, (Cambridge: Polity, 1998), p. 88.

¹³⁰⁷ Jürgen Habermas, *Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), p. 117.

¹³⁰⁸ Andrew Linklater, *The Transformation of Political Community*, p. 91.

¹³⁰⁹ Bahá’u’lláh, *Tablets of Bahá’u’lláh*, p. 89.

existence”.¹³¹⁰ Thus, world citizenship is not only concerned with global knowledge; rather, it also seeks to cultivate the characteristics of ‘a global attitude’.¹³¹¹

In addition, so crucial is the idea of communication that Bahá’u’lláh called for the devise of a universal auxiliary language as a means to enhance communication between the peoples, and foster a global idea and identity. The promotion of a universal language, in the Bahá’í Faith, is viewed in the light that ineffective communication can be a barrier to peace. Likewise, Lothian, like other world federalists, gave thought to “the problem of communication and language” and proposed “that everyone learns a second ‘universal’ language for facilitating such communication and peaceful relations”.¹³¹² Here, the Kantian notion that differences of languages can impede peace has been positively substituted for the advocacy of an auxiliary universal language through which barriers to effective communication can be eliminated. The BIC reiterates the call made by Bahá’u’lláh and ‘Abdu’l’Bahá to devise, or use an existing language in addition to the diverse languages of the world to “facilitate the transition to a global society through better communication.”¹³¹³

6.4 The Question of Loyalty: A Necessarily Controversial Issue?

In Chapter Two, we observed that Diogenes “... rejected the status of a polites, a citizen, in favour of that of a kosmopolites, a citizen of the ‘cosmos’, the universe”.¹³¹⁴ Bahá’ís do not proclaim themselves to be, as Diogenes the Cynic did, a world citizen who completely rejects his or her ‘country’ to give exclusive attention to the world as a whole – what has sometimes been described as an excessive cosmopolitanism. Indeed, the Bahá’í advocacy is not formed on

¹³¹⁰ Andrew Linklater, *The Transformation of Political Community*, (Cambridge: Polity, 1998), p. 96.

¹³¹¹ Proponents of world studies believe that “global education should rightly be as much about affective learning as cognitive learning, as much about acquiring appropriate attitudes and behaviour patterns as about acquiring knowledge”. (Derek Heater, *World Citizenship: Cosmopolitan Thinking*, p.177).

¹³¹² Lothian, “The Ending of Armageddon”, in: Patrick Ransome, (ed.), *Studies in Federal Planning*, (London: Lothian Foundation, 1990), p. 14.

¹³¹³ Bahá’í International Community, *Turning Point For All Nations*, p. 166/See Chapter Five, (5.3.2 Structural Reforms: Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Functions of the UN).

an adversarial, but evolutionary base.¹³¹⁵ Bahá'ís, more like the Stoic ideal, uphold that families, neighbourhood, village, city, and nation are lower units on which the primary form of their allegiance – the world – can be sustained. Nussbaum explains, “The Stoics stress that to be a world citizen one does not need to give up local identities, which can be a source of great richness in life. They suggest that we think of ourselves not as devoid of local affiliations, but as surrounded by a series of concentric circles”.¹³¹⁶ An alternative, or complementary view is that of “multiple, interlocking, identities” in which the local and the global are intertwined, and not necessarily regarded as two opposing terms. A person can, thus, hold several cultural attachments, several citizenships, and different kinds of affiliations. In short, this form of loyalty maintains that there cannot be a cosmopolis without a polis,¹³¹⁷ and that it is possible to enjoy complementing, multiple, and hyphenated identities.

Appiah refers to the latter as a ‘rooted cosmopolitanism’, or ‘a cosmopolitan patriotism’, namely a cosmopolitanism, which does not advocate a vague love of mankind, but which is rooted in the love of lesser loyalties that could counteract the easy criticism that cosmopolitans are rootless or displaced.¹³¹⁸ Some opponents of cosmopolitanism refer to the “empty rhetoric of cosmopolitan citizenship”¹³¹⁹, “a nebulous cosmopolitan order”,¹³²⁰ and even prominent cosmopolitan author Nussbaum talks of cosmopolitanism as offering “...little or nothing for the human psyche to fasten on”.¹³²¹ Yet, cosmopolitanism advocates the preservation of communities (local, national, regional), and simply upholds that the time has come to expand this community to the world. Hence, rooted cosmopolitanism cannot be empty or nebulous, as it does not contradict the fact that one can be attached to a particular community. The idea of

¹³¹⁴ See Chapter Two, (2.2.1 Origins and Impact of Stoicism).

¹³¹⁵ See previous chapter, Katirai, Foad, *Global Governance*, p. 23.

¹³¹⁶ Martha C. Nussbaum, With Respondents, (Ed: Cohen, Joshua), *For Love of One Country: Debating The Limits of Patriotism*, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1996), p. 8.

¹³¹⁷ See Chapter One, (1.3 The Etymology and Concept of Cosmopolitanism).

¹³¹⁸ Anthony, K. Appiah, “Cosmopolitan Patriots”, in Nussbaum, Martha C., & Cohen Joshua, (eds.), *For Love of One Country* p. 22.

¹³¹⁹ Danilo Zolo, *Cosmopolis*, p. 133.

¹³²⁰ Gertrude Himmelfarb, “The Illusions of Cosmopolitanism”, in Martha C. Nussbaum, *For Love of One Country*, p. 76.

¹³²¹ Martha C. Nussbaum, in: *Ibid.*, p. 15.

rooted or sensitive cosmopolitanism is evoked by Appiah, the federalist ethos, and critical theories, and has been advocated by the Bahá'í Faith as a positive form of loyalty. If Bahá'ís, however, had to make a choice between the interests of their own country or the whole world, they would choose the latter, as they believe that the interests of the part are better served by the interests of the whole. In the words of Shoghi Effendi, the oneness of humankind "...insists upon the subordination of the national impulses and interests to the imperative claims of a unified world":¹³²²

Though ... imbued with the love of their own country, and anxious to promote at all times, its best interests, the followers of the Bahá'í Faith, nevertheless, viewing mankind as one entity, and profoundly attached to its vital interests, will not hesitate to subordinate every particular interest, be it personal, regional or national, to the over-riding interests of the generality of mankind, knowing full well that in a world of interdependent peoples and nations the advantage of the part is best to be reached by the advantage of the whole, and that no lasting result can be achieved by any of the component parts if the general interests of the entity itself are neglected...¹³²³

There is, thus, no ambiguity as to the hierarchy of loyalties: the world is the primordial loyalty around which others gravitate. This Bahá'í stance is a reversal of the usual cosmopolitan argument that one should, above all, love his or her country to be able to love the world,¹³²⁴ or that loyalties necessarily decrease as they are directed towards outer expanding circles. The Bahá'í view upholds that one has to love the whole world in order to be able to love one's own country in a more open and inclusive way. This has been described by the Universal House of Justice, in *The Promise of World Peace*, as a 'sane patriotism'.¹³²⁵ The Bahá'í view maintains that we are not to lose our lesser loyalties, abandon, belittle and disregard our past, or our present location, but that we are able to enlarge our scope to the appreciation of the differentiation of our fellow human beings, who live parallel lives to ours, wherever they may reside. Stressing the value of pyramidal structures, Shoghi Effendi observed that the world-wide

¹³²² Shoghi Effendi, *The World Order of Bahá'u'lláh*, p. 42.

¹³²³ Shoghi Effendi, *The Promised Day is Come*, p. vi.

¹³²⁴ Unlike Alexander Pope in "An Essay on Man", Bahá'ís believe that the first allegiance of humans should be attached to the world as a whole. "God love from Whole to Parts, but human soul must rise from Individual to the Whole..." (Alexander Pope, in Sissela Bok, "From Part To Whole", in: Martha C. Nussbaum, *For Love of One Country*, p. 43).

Law of Bahá'u'lláh "...can conflict with no legitimate allegiances, nor can it undermine essential loyalties. Its purpose is neither to stifle the flame of a sane and intelligent patriotism in men's hearts, not to abolish the system of national autonomy so essential if the evils of excessive centralization are to be avoided".¹³²⁶

Unlike Rousseau, who in *Émile* stated, "Distrust those cosmopolitans who search out remote duties in their books and neglect those who lie nearest"¹³²⁷, or contended that people who are not like us do not mind their pain,¹³²⁸ the cosmopolitan will look for the advantages of the whole in order to serve "those who lie nearest" in a more befitting way. Moreover, with our globalised conditions, "those who lie nearest" could mean different peoples at different times as travel has collapsed conventional understandings of distance. A cosmopolitan would also reject the idea of "peoples who are not like us" to substitute it for "people who are basically like us, and differ only (and thankfully!) in customs and opinions". When Bahá'u'lláh notes that, "It is not his to boast who loveth his country, but it is his who loveth the whole world," He calls for a loyalty that surpasses the nation to cover transnational horizons, multiple identities, and the collapse of notions of strangeness and otherness. The Bahá'í perspective does not view the question of loyalties as a contradicting, opposing, or exclusive matter, but rather as a complementary one.

Furthermore, according to cosmopolitan views, to pledge our primary allegiance to humanity as a whole does not mean that we have to love a distant Mongolian child more than our brothers and sisters. It does not mean either, that we are to consider him or her of less moral worth than our brothers or sisters. Indeed, it goes as far as to state that we could, by knowing him or her, make geographical distances irrelevant to the degree of our affections. As it is still possible to love our family by being further away in the geographical sense, it is also possible to extend our affections to people who were once away from us. The notion of spatial loyalty is, thus, a

¹³²⁵ The Universal House of Justice, "The Promise of World Peace", p. 13.

¹³²⁶ Shoghi Effendi, *The World Order of Bahá'u'lláh*, p. 41.

¹³²⁷ Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, *Emile*, p. 7.

¹³²⁸ See Martha C. Nussbaum, "Reply", in: Martha C. Nussbaum, *For Love of One Country*, p. 132.

relative matter. In parallel, viewing humanity as an organic whole could mean that what affects distant human beings, affect me as well, and that our lives are interconnected. Love of the whole of mankind does not necessarily mean that our loyalties and affections go to every single human being on earth, whom we cannot all possibly know; neither is it the abstraction of a noble idea. Indeed, it could simply mean that distance is not a justification not to care for those who are further away from us in the world of humanity. Nussbaum explains, “If I tried to help all the world’s children a little bit, rather than to devote an immense amount of love and care to [my own child] I would be no good as a parent. But that does not mean that we believe our own country or family is really worth more than the children or families of other people – all are still equally human, of equal moral worth”.¹³²⁹ The question of loyalty is thereby linked to the main premise of cosmopolitanism, which asserts that “humankind belongs to a single moral realm in which each person is equally worth of respect and consideration”.¹³³⁰

The Bahá’í view subscribes to the idea of subsidiarity, which sustains that the locality is important in the management of local affairs, and should remain responsible for its own jurisdiction. In the sense of loyalties, I would understand that the same principle applies: we cannot disregard the affections that go with the local realm, even though the whole (global) is given priority over the part (the local) for the greatest benefits of the latter. Having a naturally more pronounced concern for people closer to us in the concentric circle could be compared to this principle of subsidiarity where problems have to be tackled at the lowest level possible: the part is only considered in the view of the greater whole for which wider benefits would be sought. Taylor depicts the idea as follows, “we have no choice but to be cosmopolitans and patriots, which means to fight for the kind of patriotism that is open to universal solidarities against other, more closed kinds”.¹³³¹ More importantly, the necessities of the time are no longer particular or national, but increasingly global, and it is in this state of mind that the Bahá’í

¹³²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 136.

¹³³⁰ David Held, “From Executive to Cosmopolitan Multilateralism”, p. 169.

¹³³¹ Charles Taylor, “Why Democracy Needs Patriotism”, in: Martha C. Nussbaum & Joshua Cohen, (eds.), *For Love of One Country*, p. 121.

appeal is made. Accordingly, our loyalties have to be readjusted. Heater links this idea to the notion of ethics, which as we have seen, is prevalent in cosmopolitanism. He does so by encapsulating the idea that morality expands at the same rate as our loyalties. “One of the arguments in favour of believing that commitment should increase rather than decrease with distance is that this frame of mind ensures an expansion of virtuous conduct and thought”.¹³³² This idea can be retraced to the Enlightenment, as it was propounded by Montesquieu, “If I know anything advantageous to my family but not to my country, I should try to forget it. If I know of anything advantageous to my country which was prejudicial to Europe and to the human race, I should look upon it as a crime”.¹³³³

6.5. An Organic Representation of the World and the Notion of Global Interdependence

The Bahá’í image is rooted in an organic representation of the world, and has found its counterpart in the cosmopolitan tradition as a whole. Nussbaum, while explaining the Stoic idea of cosmopolitanism of Marcus Aurelius, notes that, “A favored exercise in this process of world thinking is to conceive of the entire world of human beings as a single body, its many people as so many limbs”.¹³³⁴ This image of the world asserts that one cannot remain indifferent in the face of incidences which take place far away from us, firstly because of a moral attitude resting on the concept of oneness (we have a certain responsibility for fellow human beings), and secondly, because of the subsequent causes and effects of global relations and interdependence. In the words of Marcus Aurelius “...For what is advantageous to the whole can in no wise be injurious to the part”.¹³³⁵ In the Enlightenment, Rousseau noted, “As soon as the multitude is united in one body, one cannot injure one of the members without attacking the body, and still less can one injure the body without the members being affected”.¹³³⁶ Kant also spoke of our

¹³³² Derek Heater, *World Citizenship*, p. 49.

¹³³³ Montesquieu, in: Thomas Schlereth, *The Cosmopolitan Ideal*, p. 191.

¹³³⁴ Martha C. Nussbaum, in: Martha C. Nussbaum & Joshua Cohen, (eds.), *For Love of One Country*, p. 10.

¹³³⁵ See Chapter Two, (2.2.3 Later Principles of the Middle and Late Stoa).

¹³³⁶ Rousseau, *The Social Contract*, Victor Gourevitch, (ed.), *The Social Contract and Other*, p. 52.

interdependence in terms of upholding human rights, which have universal application. “The peoples of the earth have thus entered in varying degrees into a universal community, and it has developed to the point where a violation of rights in one part of the world is felt everywhere”.¹³³⁷ This image, thereby, asserts the widening of one’s horizons to focus beyond our own selves and our immediate surroundings for the sake of safeguarding oneness, global stability, and respect for human rights. It has been fostered from the Stoics to Martha Nussbaum, Richard Falk, and David Held.

The Bahá’í writings sustain this organic view of the world on the basis of moral foundations based on our essential oneness, and assert that the conditions (global interdependence) which now permit the realisation of an ideal (global unity) have been unleashed in the twentieth century.¹³³⁸ Throughout the cosmopolitan tradition, the somehow abstract image of unity and interconnectedness has led to the more concrete formation of various international organisations, which speak of the need for uniting in matters of common interest, and tackling supranational issues, which can no longer be segregated on a territorial basis. This has been expressed in Mitranian functionalism and the cosmopolitan democracy project in Chapter Four. Mittrany notes that the end of political organisation was to “make it possible that people with different views and divergent sentiments should yet work peacefully for common ends”, and David Held remarks that the system of governance that must prevail has to be “adapted to the diverse conditions and interconnections of diverse peoples and nations”.¹³³⁹ If the interconnectedness of mankind, and the wish to overcome particular entities were more an ethical idea in ancient times and in the Enlightenment, global interdependence has been made the conditions of globalisation more concrete and palpable, as it is examined in Chapter Four.

¹³³⁷ Kant, “Perpetual Peace”, Hans Reiss, *Kant: Political Writings*, pp. 107-108.

¹³³⁸ See Chapter Five, (5.1.4 The Century of Light).

¹³³⁹ David Held, *Democracy and The New International Order*, p. 12.

However, globalisation shows that interdependence does not necessarily bring about global prosperity, or the reduction of poverty, as a case in point.¹³⁴⁰ Bahá'u'lláh confirms the Bahá'í view of an organic world by emphasising that it has been affected by various problems (in this case, global injustice), which require an adequate solution (for example, the fostering of global values). “Regard the world as the human body which, though at its creation whole and perfect, hath been afflicted, through various causes, with grave disorders and maladies”.¹³⁴¹ If there are ‘maladies’ that pertain to the whole body of mankind, the Bahá'í view upholds that there should also be a remedy. Like the contention of Mitrany, there is no natural co-ordination such as the notion of harmony of interests that will ensure that the whole body functions properly without intervention. Here, the notion of global interdependence requires the devise of political ‘machinery’ and proper co-ordination that is essential to the well being of the whole. This would guarantee, for example, that a system of ‘global’ human welfare counteracts the effects of what Shoghi Effendi identified as ‘unbridled capitalism’.¹³⁴² In this regard, the Bahá'í Faith differs from the ‘end of history’ contention that Western capitalism is victorious over other economic or political forms. The Bahá'í Faith propounds a post-material view that encourages the rediscovery of human values, freedom from oppression, global justice, and citizenry empowerment. There is neither competition of different world-views, nor an ideological end point claiming victory.

More recently, Bahá'í writings highlight that equating material interdependence or globalisation with cosmopolitanism is a mere misconception. This can be compared to more recent forms of cosmopolitanism, that are explored below, which call for the rediscovery of ancient values. The Bahá'í view does not only accept global interdependence as a grand cosmopolitan theme, but contends that it should be managed in order to benefit the ‘world as a whole’ – which coincides with the image of an interdependent organic world order. This is where the Bahá'í image contributes to the cosmopolitan tradition by asserting the significance of humane values in the

¹³⁴⁰ See Chapter Four, (4.2.1 Globalisation).

¹³⁴¹ Bahá'u'lláh, *Gleanings*, p. 254.

face of materialistic paradigms that cannot respond to all our needs, and that indeed divide mankind in terms of privileged and underprivileged populations. According to this view, the issues of inequality as regards the question of access to resources can begin to find a ground for resolution, if peoples no longer looked at themselves as strangers, but as members of a single human or world community. In the preceding chapter, it was seen that Bahá'u'lláh emphasised the need to care for the poor, and, thus, underlined the need for social justice.

This can be linked to contemporary cosmopolitanism, which wishes to give spirit to the global neighbourhood, or in other words, to humanise globalisation and render economic globalism (what Falk calls negative cosmopolitanism)¹³⁴³ more inclusive. Relating to social justice, Mathias Koenig-Archibugi observes, “A person’s opportunity to attain material prosperity and other advantages depends to a significant extent on where he or she happens to live. Many observers would agree that such arbitrariness in the distribution of life chances represents the main ethical problem of our times”.¹³⁴⁴ In an age where so many feel that globalisation has arrived uninvited, cosmopolitans advocate that we might do well to turn our thoughts to those ancient principles of justice, accountability, community, and the oneness of mankind – values which were depicted especially throughout Chapter Two with the Stoics and the *philosophes*.

More recently, Carl Friedrich von Weizsacker argued that we are in the era of ‘global domestic politics’. Indeed, as all politics are increasingly planetary in implications, there is, thus, a need to be concerned about the “direction, institutions, and processes of global governance”.¹³⁴⁵ The BIC underlines that good governance is defined both by the “quality of leadership, the quality of the governed and the quality of the structures and processes in place” and by “democracy, the rule of law, accountability, transparency and participation by civil society”. More importantly, it

¹³⁴² Shoghi Effendi, *Citadel of Faith*, p. 154.

¹³⁴³ Richard Falk, “Revisiting Cosmopolitanism”, in: Martha C. Nussbaum & Joshua Cohen, (eds.), *For Love of One Country*, p. 60.

¹³⁴⁴ Mathias Koenig-Archibugi, “The Challenge to Governance”, in: David Held & Mathias Koenig-Archibugi, (Eds) *Taming Globalization*, p. 5.

also defines itself by the “spiritual and material well-being of all members of society”.¹³⁴⁶ Hence the BIC further notes, “This consensus must be enlarged...Governance must be guided by *spiritual values including an ethic of service to the common good*... It should seek to enhance people’s ability to manage change and should offer opportunities to increase their capacities and their sense of worth...At the global level, a truly participatory system of governance will also need to be established”.¹³⁴⁷ [Emphasis mine] There is here renewal of those more ancient values of ‘service’, which have been reiterated by philosophers such as Erasmus where Christian values fostered the need to serve all mankind. Erasmus observed in Chapter Two, “Among themselves their alliances must be based...on sincere friendship that shares in efforts toward the *common good of all*”.¹³⁴⁸ [Emphasis mine]

These values are all the more needed as the forces surrounding the supra-national era are often depicted as illegitimate forces, which govern the globe without a proper mandate granted by the peoples of the world. Hence, cries to democratise global forces are striving to be heard. “As nation-states cede their decision-making capacities to international bodies, the world is coming to be governed not by its citizens but by institutions manoeuvring to exploit a dearth of global accountability”.¹³⁴⁹ David Held, the proponent of the pioneering theory of ‘Cosmopolitan Democracy’ explains, “Territorial boundaries demarcate the basis on which individuals are included and excluded from participation in decisions affecting their lives but the outcomes of these decisions often stretch beyond national frontiers”.¹³⁵⁰ This uneasiness around an illegitimate cosmopolitanism has caused many to doubt its so-called claimed benefits, and have, thus, often depicted it as excessive naivety. However, there is a difference between the forces of

¹³⁴⁵ Charles Lerche, “Everything That Rises Must Converge: Global Governance and The Emergence of The Lesser Peace”, in Babak Bahador & Nazila Ghanea, (eds.), *Processes*, p. 253.

¹³⁴⁶ Bahá’í International Community, “Valuing Spirituality in Development”, A concept paper presented to the "World Faiths and Development Dialogue," hosted by the President of the World Bank and the Archbishop of Canterbury at Lambeth Palace, London, England, 18-19 February 1998, downloaded 2 January 2003, <<http://www.bic-un.bahai.org/98-0218.htm>>

¹³⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

¹³⁴⁸ Erasmus, “The Complaint of Peace”, pp 193-194.

¹³⁴⁹ George Monbiot, in: Derek Heater, *World Citizenship: Cosmopolitan Thinking*, p. 136.

¹³⁵⁰ David Held, *Democracy and the New International Order*, p. 8.

globalisation dominated by a market driven ethos, transnational corporations, or what is perceived as the dominance of elite groups such as the G8 and their closed meetings, and an ethically driven cosmopolitanism that seeks to establish a world community governed by a just and democratic world where the peoples of the world have their fair share of participation, and where benefits are distributed in an inclusive manner. “A credible cosmopolitanism has to be combined with a critique of the ethically deficient globalism embodied in neoliberal modes of thought and the globalism that is being enacted in a manner that minimizes the ethical and visionary content of conceiving of the world as a whole”. Falk goes on to state, “Without a more careful clarification, there is a danger of conflating the emergent regionalisms and globalism that are reconstituting the world with those exalted cosmopolitan expectations and hopes that invoke the prospect and a genuine ‘species consciousness’, and draw upon classical images of an ethically unified global community”.¹³⁵¹

‘Hope’ can be found in this plethora of citizen’s movements, global conferences conducted under the United Nations on themes such as human rights, the environment, or social development that involve the interaction of peoples with structures of authority that Falk depicts as ‘neocosmopolitanism’. This can also be regarded as a strong aspect of a global civil society, which can be described as pioneering a more tangible version of world citizenship:

Transnational and grassroots participants and processes, including voluntary associations of citizens, now engage in many varieties of action covering the spectrum from the extreme local to the global commons and beyond, and are often animated by an ethical consciousness that gives contemporary reality to the cosmopolitan outlook. Because this consciousness is created out of this fabric of transnational social forces, it could perhaps be identified as neocosmopolitanism.¹³⁵²

¹³⁵¹ Richard Falk, “Revisiting Cosmopolitanism”, pp. 57-58. Those exalted cosmopolitan conceptions which draw on virtues associated with world citizenship links to the twin concepts of “the adoption of moral conduct” and “the recognition of the fellowship of man”, as elaborated in Chapter Two.

¹³⁵² Richard Falk, “Revisiting Cosmopolitanism”, p. 58. ‘Globalization from below’ (NGOs, UN conferences, various citizen’s movements or what the Commission on Global Governance calls a ‘a global associational revolution’) that is ‘people – (and nature) oriented’ contrasts with ‘globalization from above’ which is ‘capital-driven and ethically neutral’. (*Ibid.*)

Finding the appropriate readjustment between ‘globalisation from above’ and ‘globalisation from below’, and easing the conflicting relationship prevalent between both processes, is the key to an ethically inspired globalism, or a positive cosmopolitanism. This legacy of positive cosmopolitanism is found in the Bahá’í model of governance, which notes that both governments and peoples should be involved in the manner in which world affairs are conducted. “Both state and people are needed to serve as the strong pillar supporting the new institutions reflecting the full and *final expression of human relationships* in an ordered society. In delaying to fulfil the historic mandate given the peoples and nations of our age to unite, we give opportunity and encouragement to subversive forces whose weapon is confusion and whose aim is chaos”.¹³⁵³ Here again, it is noticeable that Bahá’í views distinguish themselves from other cosmopolitanisms by asserting that human unity is neither a long-dreamed aspiration, nor needed practicality, but rather the next stage in the collective ‘spiritual’ journey of humankind – a view which is linked to the visionary promise made by Bahá’u’lláh.

In 1994, the Universal House of Justice reiterated the significance of both governments, and organisations of civil society. While alluding to the Lesser Peace, the Supreme Body of the Bahá’í Faith remarked, “It seems clear that two entities will push for its realisation: the governments of the world, and the peoples of the world through the instrumentality of the organisations of civil society”.¹³⁵⁴ The numerous organisations of civil society can be linked to ‘Abdu’l-Bahá’s statement *The Seven Candles of Unity*, in which He underlined that the ‘Unity of Thought in World Undertakings’ (what the Universal House of Justice clarifies to be “...the myriad activities taking place in different parts of the world involving a wide range of non-governmental organisations and networks in an urgent search for values, ideas and practical measures that can advance prospects for the peaceful development of all peoples”) is part of a notable contribution to the emergence of the Lesser Peace.¹³⁵⁵ (This can also be linked to

¹³⁵³ Bahá’í International Community, “A Bahá’í Declaration”.

¹³⁵⁴ The Universal House of Justice, in: Jeffrey Huffines, *Bahá’í Proposals*, p. 17.

¹³⁵⁵ The Universal House of Justice, Letter to National Spiritual Assemblies, *An Introduction to the Prosperity of Humankind*, 23rd of January 1995, Internal Document.

Mitranean functionalism, which called for uniting peoples across issues of common interest, although these were mainly material issues). For Bahá'ís, the various world conferences are part of this constructive process characterised by distinctive input from global civil society that took place in the last decade or so, and that Falk described as an “hopeful sign”, “globalisation from below”, or “neocosmopolitanism”. In the year 2000, the Bahá'í community noted the significance of gatherings of over one thousand NGOs assembled in New York in May at the invitation of Secretary General Kofi Annan; in August the Millennium World Peace Summit of Religious and Spiritual Leaders; and in September the Millennium Summit, as these meetings have been marked by a consciousness of the need for reconciliation based on our common humanity. In Chapter Four, for example, we saw how transnational movements gave force to cosmopolitanism via the realisation of world citizenship, and called for shaping global institutions through which a channel for citizenry participation can be built. Cosmopolitan democracy theorists, for example, denounce the lack of democracy on the international level, and promote the idea of a ‘global parliament’ that could assess the democratic accountability of global institutions.

The Bahá'í International Community takes on a step-by-step approach to the problems of global governance by focusing, for example, on issues such as a more representative General Assembly. CAMDUN is one of the projects that combined the individual's initiative INFUSA (The International Network for a UN Second Assembly) and the World Citizen's Assembly, and started a series of conferences from 1989 onwards.¹³⁵⁶ Given the popular support for the enhancement of the UN, Heater notes, “the concepts of world government and world citizenship merge in the notion of a UN parliamentary assembly”.¹³⁵⁷ Such initiatives are in line with the Bahá'í calls for a more representative General Assembly, which join the aspirations of the ‘new’ cosmopolitans. These cosmopolitans wish to abandon the notion of elitism promoted in

¹³⁵⁶ See CAMDUN “Campaign for A More Democratic United Nations”.

¹³⁵⁷ Derek Heater, *World Citizenship and Government*, p. 153.

the Late Stoa and in the Enlightenment when early Stoics sought to exclude the ‘unwise’, or when Rousseau described the whole of mankind as a mere abstraction of *philosophes*.¹³⁵⁸

The need for fusing ethical with material is asked for. The Bahá’í community recognises that numerous conferences and meetings, although of great relevance to the integrative process to the Lesser Peace, has passed unnoticed for the majority of the world’s peoples to whom these will change nothing in the circumstances of their daily lives. If Bahá’ís recognise that in the view of purely material considerations “the earth has already taken on something of the characteristics of ‘one country’ and the inhabitants of various lands the status of its consumer ‘citizens’” with “the result that vast sums now pass instantly through them (permeable borders) at the command of a computer signal”, they, nonetheless, observe that the process ought to be controlled if consequences catastrophic in their social, political, economic, and environmental impacts are to be avoided.¹³⁵⁹ If, due to this process, the powers of the nation-state have clearly been abated, the process of globalisation has to be accompanied by a more just and unified system of controls that would reduce its numerous cancerous effects, one of which is the ever-deepening gap between the extremes of wealth and poverty.¹³⁶⁰ A fairer system, which would not seek to excuse these failures as inevitable and fated, is to reassess the philosophies that seek to reinforce this dichotomy. For Bahá’ís, it is relevant that justice and unity are essential components if globalisation’s negative effects are to be levelled off.¹³⁶¹

At the moment, we survive in a material ‘global unity’, and we need to infuse more values into this process in order that it can be transformed into a more sustainable and fulfilling reality.

¹³⁵⁸ Pierre Hassner, “Rousseau and the Theory”, p. 202. In certain strands of Stoicism, in the Renaissance, and the Enlightenment, *philosophes* conceived of world citizenship as an attribute of *philosophes* only. This notion was elaborated in Chapter Two and Three.

¹³⁵⁹ Bahá’í World Centre, *Century of Light*, p. 132.

¹³⁶⁰ See Chapter Four, (4.2.1 Globalisation).

¹³⁶¹ Bahá’í World Centre, *Century of Light*, p. 135. *Century of Light* notes, “The violence of the riots set off by the meetings of the World Trade Organisation, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund...testifies to the depth of the fear and resentment that the rise of globalisation has provoked”. (*Ibid.*, p. 133) Globalisation needs to be complemented by principles of justice and equity. “...the fate of humanity in the century now opening will be determined by the relationship established between these

Although this material reality is a pre-condition for a more ethical one, it cannot be left to its own devices, as it perpetrates inequalities. We need to widen the horizon of a limited paradigm based on the sole material prosperity of humankind. In addition to the material aspects of our beings, we need to appeal to the spiritual, ethical, and self-fulfilling values of policies. It is by recognising the consciousness that we form a single body, that we are a single species, what is often considered a simplistic statement, that these values will be able to emerge, and that the challenges of our New World Order can be better addressed. If this statement might not have meant much in the age of self-contained nations, it cannot be disregarded in an age of globalisation. In the words of the BIC:

Laying the groundwork for global civilization calls for the creation of laws and institutions that are universal in both character and authority. The effort can begin only when the concept of the oneness of humanity has been wholeheartedly embraced by those in whose hands the responsibility for decision-making rests, and when the related principles are propagated through both educational systems and the media of mass communication. Once this threshold is crossed, a process will have been set in motion through which the peoples of the world can be drawn into the task of formulating common goals and committing themselves to their attainment.¹³⁶²

In short, we would need a more balanced view of governance, in which leadership is redefined towards the altruistic service of mankind, and where the governed are actively participating in whatever decisions might affect their lives: global governance should be rendered more democratic and transparent in the shaping of global policies. The Bahá'í magazine *One Country* epitomises Bahá'í thought on the process of globalisation as it reads,

The negative effects of globalization can be softened only through new and higher levels of international cooperation and consultation, filtered through a new system of moral values that puts human welfare and social justice ahead of the prominently materialistic paradigm currently in vogue. Call this global governance. Call it world government. But one way or another, the forces of globalization will require the creation of some sort of international super

two fundamental forces of the historical process, the inseparable principles of unity and justice". (*Ibid*, pp. 134-135).

¹³⁶² The Bahá'í International Community, "The Prosperity".

authority, one that can ensure that human rights and worker's prerogatives are upheld, and that the environment is protected, as globalization proceeds.¹³⁶³

Globalisation, without cosmopolitanism, could fail.¹³⁶⁴

6.6 The Bahá'í Teachings, Critical International Theory, and Postmodern Views

The problems with the Enlightenment and Modernity are identified by this statement of Devetak, "Although Kant's argument is couched in terms of retaining autonomy for the state, it is clear that his vision of a 'great political body of the future', his 'kingdom of ends', would demand a certain level of conformity by peoples around the world...This conception of historical progression pays very little attention to the vast cultural differences that exist..."¹³⁶⁵ Views of the Enlightenment are intrinsically linked to Western superiority and universal homogenisation, and these views are challenged by critical or postmodern theories. This is also expressed by the Bahá'í approach, which emphasises the equality and dignity of all the peoples of the world.¹³⁶⁶ Critical international theory wishes to extend the project of cosmopolitanism in the Enlightenment, while modifying its negative aspects. More importantly, it wishes to preserve the ethics of the spirit of critique supported by a challenge to traditions, and the cosmopolitan project of unifying the peoples of the world.¹³⁶⁷ Critical international theory aspires to transform the political realities, which are considered to be immanent and natural, one of them being embodied in the idea of power politics.

¹³⁶³ One Country, The Online Newsletter of the Bahá'í International Community, "Perspective: The Exigencies of Globalisation", Vol. .9, No. 2, July-September 1997, downloaded 21 November 2000, <<http://www.onecountry.org/oc92/oc9202as.html>>

¹³⁶⁴ David Held, "From Executive to Cosmopolitan Multilateralism", p. 182.

¹³⁶⁵ Richard Devetak, "The Project of Modernity", pp. 32 & 33.

¹³⁶⁶ Devetak, however, gives an alternative view of unity in diversity in the Enlightenment: "Montesquieu emphasises the problem of ethnocentrism in a letter where one of the Persian travellers realises that 'all our judgments are made with reference covertly to ourselves'... the implication is that ethnocentric prejudices are undermined by the experience of otherness". (*Ibid.*, p. 34).

¹³⁶⁷ If Enlightenment thinkers portray ethnocentric views, Devetak shows that it was not the case for Montesquieu for whom, "the question of balancing the diversity of peoples with the unity of humanity is a question of justice..." (*Ibid.*).

In other words, “Eschewing the particularism associated with the state, Critical International Theory defends ‘the idea of the unity of the species...For Critical International Theory, freedom and universalism can no longer be confined to the limits of the state or nation. The realisation of the ‘good life’ is not to be confined to these particularistic limits, but is to be universalised to humanity”.¹³⁶⁸ The sovereign state, which perpetuates forms of exclusion, is the main target of a redefinition of community. Communities can no longer be defined against others, but as embracing others, without assimilating them. An interesting version of critical international theory is that of Linklater’s, who does not wish to favour universality at the expense of diversity. This version takes into account that there ought to be “...limits to universality, just as there ought to be limits to difference”.¹³⁶⁹ Hoffman notes that this signifies “the idea of a cosmopolis as the embodiment of diversity”.¹³⁷⁰ Therefore, it is possible to hold on to the project of universality while integrating diversity.

These statements are akin to Bahá’í statements that assert that universality is possible and desirable inasmuch as it does not represent a threat to our humanity, which is essentially diverse.¹³⁷¹ Even postmodernist views, which distrust all universal projects (as they are understood to be necessarily domineering and homogenising) do, however, include an important hint of cosmopolitanism and hope. In the words of George, “...*it is possible to change power relations and overturn irreducible ‘realities’*...People can, for example, resist the damages of extreme nationalism...(or)...the transformation of global life into the construction of otherness...”¹³⁷² (Emphasis mine). While Postmodernist views stress difference, and contend that there are no self-evident truths such as ‘the oneness of humankind’, the Bahá’í views highlight unity, with a special emphasis on diversity, and hold the oneness of humankind to be a regulative principle of human existence. One might say that these two ways represent ‘a

¹³⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 38.

¹³⁶⁹ Linklater, in: *Ibid.*, p. 40.

¹³⁷⁰ Hoffman, in: *Ibid.*

¹³⁷¹ Bahá’í International Community, “Combating Racism”, Statement submitted to the United Nations Second World Conference to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination, August 1983, downloaded 2 January 2003, <<http://www.bic-un.bahai.org/83-0323.htm>>.

cosmopolitanism from two directions'. Even if the means are different, the end, that is a fairer and more co-operative world, is 'essentially' the same.

Because new theories stress inclusion, especially in terms of gender and race, and denounce boundaries that separate 'us' from 'them', the oneness of humankind, as represented in the Bahá'í Faith, can reinforce these views by emphasising the essential 'reality' of our oneness, and, thus, assists the current articulation of the cosmopolitan tradition. This formulation does not necessarily have to be based on the denunciation of colonisation, sexism, or nationalism as movements created to exploit, exclude, demean, or eradicate on the basis of 'otherness', but can also be reinforced by the principle of the oneness of humankind, which is validated by biological and moral factors, and which, hence, cannot be denied as fallacious and imaginary. Because international politics has accepted the naturalness of political divisions and a system based on the state and the spatial nature of the world, the principle of the oneness of humankind can assist the current articulation of the cosmopolitan tradition in underlining the artificiality of physical and mental boundaries in the view of our inherent oneness.

It is also important to stress that the 'universal' in the Bahá'í Faith is different from the 'universal' in the liberal project. The criticisms of feminist, critical, or postmodern theories targeted at the Enlightenment and Modernity are that the idea of the universal was conceived in a singled-dimensional way. For example, universal meant imposing order in a male middle class Western fashion, through colonisation, and various dichotomies, for example, the dichotomy between 'advanced' and 'backward'. If through Bahá'í lenses, we examine the oneness of humankind, we see that it speaks against the removal of the dignity of peoples discriminated against because of race, gender, degree of material civilisation, class, and criticise oppression in the name of the universal. However, this does not mean that the Bahá'í Faith renounces the idea of universal human rights in the name of preserving diversity. In the name of diversity, genital female mutilation could be viewed as an aspect of culture, but yet it represents an aspect that

¹³⁷² Jim George, *Discourses*, p. 215.

violates the rights of the person in the name of culture. Dangerously, peoples in power have denounced “Western universal human rights” as a go ahead for inflicting all kinds of injustices on their populations, and not as a genuine call for preserving diversity.¹³⁷³ The balance between unity and diversity is, hence, asserted in the Bahá’í model. Bahá’u’lláh’s universalism is based on a project of world unity that calls for upholding universal human rights while dissipating divisive notions of stranger/citizen, backward/civilized; notions that do not accept ‘otherness’ as a sound category. The Bahá’í Faith stands as a concrete example that ‘universal’ does not necessarily equate with Western views of the world. Bahá’u’lláh is a nineteenth century male Persian figure (but, more importantly, a ‘Manifestation of God’ for Bahá’ís) Who advocates women’s rights not only as a social, but also as a spiritual principle of world order. When Bahá’ís speak of the ‘whole of humankind’, they, hence, speak for all, and not only for privileged categories.

¹³⁷³ See Geoffrey Robertson, *Crimes Against Humanity*, p. xxiv. Robertson argues that it is often despotic states denying free speech and political rights, which denounce human rights as Western. Furthermore, he notes “it was the bloc of Latin American states, supported by delegates from China, India, and the Philippines, which successfully insisted on the inclusion of the ‘new’ or ‘second generation’ social and economic rights, despite opposition from the US and its ‘liberal’ Western allies. (*Ibid.*, p. 33).

Chapter Seven – Conclusion

7.1 Cosmopolitanism: The Choice of a World-View

In the first chapter of this thesis, cosmopolitanism is presented as a description (or the way the world ‘functions’, i.e. a growing global civil society network, the rise of NGOs, or a new found consciousness of world citizenship), and as a prescription. The prescriptive aspects of cosmopolitanism join the normative turn in International Relations, which is concerned with our imaginative propensity to represent the world with the principles we choose to prioritise in our world-view. Cosmopolitanism, as a long-enduring tradition of thought, has favoured a new morality in world politics that is no longer centred on bounded political communities such as the modern nation-state. Cosmopolitan values and world-views, therefore, propound the need for a global ethic in world politics. As a case in point, Linklater notes in *Men and Citizens* that totalising projects such as nation-states have not been entirely successful to dominate modern political life, as they are incapable of ‘eroding the sense of moral anxiety when duties to fellow-citizens clash with duties to the rest of humankind’.¹³⁷⁴ Indeed, the thesis has demonstrated that there is a valid justification to support the cosmopolitan project, as testified by this notion of ‘moral anxiety’ to extend humane duties across boundaries,¹³⁷⁵ as it is shown in Chapter Four. In this respect, Thomas G. Weiss and Cindy Collins emphasise that in debates about humanitarian action, the recognition of one bond common to all humankind implies rights and obligations, including ‘the justification for compromising the integrity of the sovereign authority should that authority fail to fulfil its duties to the welfare of its people.’¹³⁷⁶ In this sense, cosmopolitanism challenges the realist paradigm in IR, which has impeded inclusive

¹³⁷⁴ Andrew Linklater: in: Richard Devetak, “Critical Theory”, p. 171. This can be reflected in the surge of global concern and international aid to the Tsunami in the Indian Ocean in December 2004.

¹³⁷⁵ The name of an international humanitarian group, ‘Médecins sans Frontières’ (Doctors Without Borders), reflects the idea of the irrelevance of boundaries when the issue of saving lives is at stake. Hence, the notion of ‘moral anxiety’ refers to the perception that duties and loyalties can no longer be totally exclusive.

¹³⁷⁶ Thomas G. Weiss & Cindy Collins, *Dilemmas in World Politics: Humanitarian Challenges and Intervention* (2nd ed.), (Oxford: Westview Press, 2000), p. 17.

forms of political communities through a rigid dichotomy between ‘inside’ (the perfect community of the nation-state with citizens who have developed fellowship through emotional attachment to their nation) and ‘outside’ (the realm beyond the nation-state in which relations between states are anarchical, and people are strangers).

This thesis, as stressed in Chapter One, has been concerned with analysing the development of cosmopolitan thoughts that sought to break this rift, either by undermining the nation-state with international organisations or world government, or by deconstructing it, and showing it to be an unnatural construction. (Before the nation-state came into being in the sixteenth century, the Stoics, who criticised the unethical and exclusive nature of the *polis*, stressed this idea of the limitedness of bounded political units. Dante, in the Middle Ages, who advocated a world ‘organisation’, also underlined this concept). Recently, bridging the gap between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ has been advanced for three main reasons: firstly, because the nation-state divides the oneness inherent in the human race; secondly, because an alternative world is thought to be conceivable; and finally because the reconciliation between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ can contribute to increasing human solidarity across borders.

In parallel, the idea of engendering cosmopolitan institution(s) does not entail the suppression of human diversity or the undermining of local or national institutions in the form of sane¹³⁷⁷ cultural attachments known as patriotism, the latter allowing for forms of loyalties other than the traditional parochial ones.¹³⁷⁸ This important cosmopolitan characteristic is expressed by David Held, “It is important to clarify that cosmopolitanism is not at loggerheads with all aspects of state tradition; nor does it deny cultural difference or the enduring significance of national culture. It is not against cultural diversity. Few, if any, contemporary cosmopolitans

¹³⁷⁷ Here we can define the term sane as ‘inclusive’, and as denoting a positive attachment to one’s background or origin, without letting the latter being predominant or a cause of aggressive and exclusive attachment. ‘Sane’, thus, refers to the possibility of adding other loyalties to our lesser ones, and to a recognition that our local form of identity is only one of the many elements that defines us.

hold such view”.¹³⁷⁹ Local identities are sane as long as they do not become an excuse for the practice of exclusion, conflict, and racial, religious, and cultural hatred, leading sometimes to genocide or the impoverishment of civilisation. The Universal House of Justice describes sane attachments to one’s country or nation: “With each passing crisis in world affairs, it becomes easier for the citizen to distinguish between a love of country that enriches one’s life, and submission to inflammatory rhetoric designed to provoke hatred and fear of others.”¹³⁸⁰ Indeed, the exclusive attachment to one’s national community has not fostered this sense of unity. Luban notes, “Nationalism may have originated as an ideology of liberation and tolerance; in our century it is drenched in blood”.¹³⁸¹ And McCarthy alleges,

The growing heterogeneity of most populations makes any model of political community based on ethnocultural homogeneity or on forced assimilation to a hegemonic culture increasingly unsuitable as a normative model. The political theoretical challenge it raises is, rather, to think unity in diversity, to conceptualise forms of political integration that are sensitive to, compatible with, and accommodating of varieties of difference. Reconciling national diversity with cosmopolitan unity is one component of a response.¹³⁸²

Furthermore, Bahá’í political scientist W. Andy Knight observes:

Civil wars and internecine violence exploded in places like Afghanistan, Cambodia, Rwanda, the Former Yugoslavia, Bosnia, and Columbia. The debacle in Somalia, followed by a genocide in Rwanda, ethnic cleansing in Serbia and Kosovo, and the politically-motivated slaughter in places like the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Sudan, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Mozambique, and the continued violence in the Middle East, Chechnya, Sudan, Uganda, Ethiopia/Eritrea, Zimbabwe, parts of Central and Latin America, and Asia indicated a persistent adherence to a culture of violence in the latter part of the twentieth century... To this can be added longstanding and continuing problems of unchecked population growth, crushing debt burdens, barriers to trade, transnational crime, drug

¹³⁷⁸ Patriotism from the Latin ‘patriota’ or fellow countryman does not prevent the adoption of other loyalties. (Judy Pearsall, (ed.), *The Concise Oxford Dictionary*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 1046).

¹³⁷⁹ David Held, “From Executive to Cosmopolitan Multilateralism”, p. 168.

¹³⁸⁰ The Universal House of Justice, “To the World’s Religious Leaders”, April 2002, downloaded 16 October 2003, <<http://www.uga.edu/bahai/english.pdf>>

¹³⁸¹ David Luban, “The Romance of the Nation State”, in: Charles Beitz, Marshall Cohen, Thomas Scanlon, & John Simmons, (eds.), *International Ethics*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), p. 239.

¹³⁸² Thomas McCarthy, “On Reconciling”, p. 2.

trafficking, the trafficking in women and children, poverty, famine, natural and man-made disasters, political oppression and corruption, the spread of HIV/AIDS, SARS, Mad Cow Disease...¹³⁸³

Henceforth, the choice of employing cosmopolitanism was, firstly, made in consideration of the ‘reality’ of the oneness of mankind, but also on the grounds that particularistic theories have failed or are failing to manage current world affairs as they foster the politics of human suffering.¹³⁸⁴ In order to counteract notions of domination and homogenisation, Linklater and Shapcott make the case for what they call a ‘thin cosmopolitanism’.¹³⁸⁵ Devetak explains, “in recognising the diversity of social bonds and moral ties, a thin cosmopolitanism ethos seeks to multiply the types and levels of political community; recognise the community of humanity at the same time as it recognises regional, national and subnational associations”.¹³⁸⁶ Likewise, Bahá’í thinking underlines the importance of a cosmopolitan community made up of various levels and layers of communities, local, national, international, and cosmopolitan.¹³⁸⁷

In order to highlight the narrative of the thesis, one of the objectives of this project was, “to rediscover a persisting (cosmopolitan) tradition that had been left at the margins of IR, especially with the inception of the Cold War, and the hegemony of the realist tradition”.¹³⁸⁸ Chapters Two through to Four have laid the ground for presenting this enduring set of Western cosmopolitan ideas. These chapters have been concerned with highlighting the thoughts associated with human oneness, which sought to destabilise the state in numerous ways. Chapter Two laid the foundations for human oneness, and underlined the idea of an ethical universal commonwealth, which was articulated by the Stoics in ancient times. Chapters Two and Three showed how Dante in the Middle Ages, or Kant in the Enlightenment, attempted to

¹³⁸³ W. Andy Knight, “The New World (Dis)order? Obstacles to Universal Peace”, Paper Presented to the annual Association of Bahá’í Studies (ABS) Conference, Alberta, (3-6 September 2004), pp. 12-13.

¹³⁸⁴ With the end of the Cold War, realist views are being questioned, and the need to develop a more global or less statist world outlook has become necessary. In addition, human rights or environmental degradation pose “challenges to the norms of the Westphalian system”. (Chris Brown, *Understanding International Relations*, 2nd ed., p. 245).

¹³⁸⁵ Richard Devetak, “Critical Theory”, p. 172.

¹³⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

¹³⁸⁷ For Bahá’í Cosmopolitanism, see Chapter One, (Part III).

¹³⁸⁸ See Chapter One, (1.2. Aims and Objectives).

create a transnational system of governance based on a common fellowship in order to remedy the state of war beyond the state. Linklater notes, for example, that Kant's injunction to *ius cosmopolitanum* was an appeal "to co-nationals to transcend the parochial world of the sovereign state by respecting the rights of humanity".¹³⁸⁹ Chapter Four explored twentieth century cosmopolitanism,¹³⁹⁰ which is concerned with questioning the nation-state on the grounds of its territorial nature, and thereby highlighted the global issues that collapse boundaries. Non-territorial aspects such as human rights, the environment, HIV/AIDS, and globalisation are all issues that the nation-state is simply impotent to deal with. As a response, functional international organisations, cosmopolitan democracy, human rights organisations, or federal global institutions have been advocated. These cosmopolitan chapters have attempted, through the study of transnational ideas pertaining to political community, to demonstrate the irrelevance of bounded forms of political communities. Accordingly, these ideas have underlined the necessity for a return to the cosmopolitan tradition of thought in IR, supported by the Bahá'í model in Chapter Five.

Indeed, the thesis did not exclusively seek to highlight a persisting cosmopolitan tradition of thought; it also sought to redefine IR along the principle of the oneness of humankind,¹³⁹¹ a point addressed by the Bahá'í model of world order. The Bahá'í model places the principle of the oneness of humankind at the heart of both its belief system and its community life. The oneness of humankind, and its corollary of unity in diversity, suggests that as we are one (unity), world order should not perpetuate division through political communities such as the nation-state. Theories and communities must adjust to the reality of an interdependent global age (a description) on the grounds of our creation as one diverse human race, which is a 'reality' that should be fostered (a prescription). This is one of the main means by which the Bahá'í model can lend support to the cosmopolitan tradition. It assists the cosmopolitan tradition in

¹³⁸⁹ Andrew Linklater, *The Transformation of Political Community*, p. 205.

¹³⁹⁰ Namely, the functional approach, cosmopolitan democracy, post-positivist approaches, and world federalism have been presented.

¹³⁹¹ See Chapter One, (1.2. Aims and Objectives).

rediscovering a set of values, enshrined in the oneness of humankind, which had been advocated from the Stoics onwards. This point has been addressed in Chapter Six, which has shown some of the commonalities between the cosmopolitan tradition and the Bahá'í approach, and which has underlined the contributions made by the Bahá'í approach to cosmopolitan IR through its emphasis on values, which can offset the negative effects of material cosmopolitanism, and which can offer the means by which an ethical and material cosmopolitanism can be reconciled, as laid out in the hypothesis in Chapter One. Bahá'í views link with cosmopolitanism through its ideas on unity, and can also affect the way IR looks at the world, essentially through its vision of oneness and its ethical/spiritual nature.

7.2 Humanising Globalisation: Reconciling Global Civil Society with an Ethically Deficient Post-Cold War Order

In order to underline the growing nature of global issues in world order, the following section will highlight some of its important aspects, as a response to a material cosmopolitanism known as the process of economic globalisation, and in the form of global civil society inputs, and the creation of the International Criminal Court. One of the contentions advanced in Chapter Four is that even if globalisation, in the form of global physical and financial interdependence, is a tangible reality in many spheres of life, the latter is far from being controlled by fair and humane processes. This argument has been expanded in Chapter Six, but in this conclusion, it is essential to trace by which mechanisms the divisive aspects of globalisation can be tackled in order to generate greater justice and peace. Peace, in this sense, is more than an 'end to war'; indeed, it is to ensure that the battle for food, safe water, health, and dignity, or 'human security',¹³⁹² do not have to be the daily plight of so many of the world's peoples.¹³⁹³ In this

¹³⁹² The Commission on Global Governance indicates that human security 'is a people-centred approach that is concerned not so much with weapons as with basic human dignity.' (Commission on Global Governance, *Our Global Neighbourhood*, p. 80).

¹³⁹³ We live "in a world in which 1.2 billion people live on less than a dollar a day; 46 per cent of the world's population live on less than 2\$ a day; and 20 per cent of the world's population enjoy 80 per cent of it income." (David Held, "From Executive to Cosmopolitan Multilateralism", p. 164).

respect, it is crucial to state that globalisation is not inevitably flawed; rather the concern lies with the way it is managed, controlled, and governed. Numerous strides have also been achieved by globalisation such as transnational civil society movements and the growing consciousness of a global social fabric. As Martin Shaw argues, “There is a strongly emerging practical consciousness of worldwide human commonality.”¹³⁹⁴

My argument is, more precisely, that greater benefits could be engendered if globalisation was governed in a fairer and more democratic way. I have been concerned with highlighting that an ethical cosmopolitanism, in the form of democratic input through citizenry participation and humane values, should offset the market-oriented process of globalisation (i.e. a material cosmopolitanism, or a capitalism stemming from European thought at the end of the eighteenth century)¹³⁹⁵ to render it more equitable, and the term ‘spiritual’ has been used in this case to depict the need for a more just global agenda. In this instance, the Bahá’í model has proven germane to underline, as laid in the hypothesis, the need for social and spiritual principles to manage economic globalisation, which corresponds to a material level of interdependence; admittedly one in need of unity and justice. Similarly, the United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan notes in the Millennium Summit Statement,

The central challenge we face today is to ensure that globalization becomes a positive force for all the world’s people, instead of leaving billions of them behind in squalor. Inclusive globalization must be built on the great enabling force of the market, but market forces alone will not achieve it. It requires a broader effort to create a shared future, based upon our common humanity in all its diversity.¹³⁹⁶

¹³⁹⁴ Martin Shaw, “Globality as a Revolutionary Transformation”, in Shaw, M., (ed.), *Politics and Globalisation*, p. 160.

¹³⁹⁵ The latter upheld that an invisible hand works through human self-interests to serve the ‘common good’. This view, depicted as classical liberalism, is a predecessor to ‘neo-liberalism’.

¹³⁹⁶ Kofi Annan, “Millennium Report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations”, 3 April 2000, downloaded 4 April 2005, <<http://www.un.org/millennium/sg/report/>>

If the end of the eighteenth century produced a material cosmopolitanism, it also engendered more balanced views, which J. G. Ruggie¹³⁹⁷ has termed an ‘embedded liberalism’.¹³⁹⁸ Cosmopolitan liberals such as Thomas Paine, although in favour of market individualism, showed equal concern for “social security, family benefits, public education, not out of charity but as a right derived from membership of society”,¹³⁹⁹ and were less fundamentalist in their market-oriented approach than today’s neo-liberals who believe that the market should be left unfettered at all costs.¹⁴⁰⁰ This neo-liberal view, which in its ethos speaks in the name of the ‘common good’, actually endorses a particularistic world-view that functions according to ‘self-interest’, often that of rich countries,¹⁴⁰¹ and economic global entities such as global corporations and economic institutional elites.¹⁴⁰² In this way, “the ideology of globalization promotes the belief that the interests of humanity and even of the earth itself will also be best served if world markets are ‘left unfettered by ethical, moral, social, or environmental considerations.’”¹⁴⁰³ Moreover, the BIC notes that even if material equality is impossible ‘it is becoming increasingly obvious that unbridled capitalism does not provide the answer either. Some regulation and redistribution is necessary to promote material justice.’¹⁴⁰⁴

¹³⁹⁷ J. G. Ruggie’s responsibilities, as Assistant Secretary General and chief adviser for strategic planning to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, included designing and managing the Global Compact and he ‘also played a leading role in preparing Annan’s celebrated report to the United Nations Millennium Summit, entitled ‘We the Peoples: the UN in the 21st Century’. (David Held & Mathias Koenig-Archibugi, (eds.), *Taming Globalization*, p. x.)

¹³⁹⁸ This term denotes that the government has a role in mitigating the failures of the market. This can take the form of social safety nets, as was adopted in Europe and the United States after WW2. (See J.G. Ruggie, “Taking Embedded Liberalism Global: the Corporate Connection”, in: *Ibid.*, p. 93).

¹³⁹⁹ Geoffrey Robertson, *Crimes Against Humanity*, p. 9.

¹⁴⁰⁰ Joseph Stiglitz writes, “Adam Smith was far more aware of the limitations of the market, including the threats posed by imperfections of competition, than those who claim to be his latterday followers.” (Joseph Stiglitz, *Globalization*, p. 219).

¹⁴⁰¹ For example, Stiglitz notes that the losses stemming from unfair trade rules are not compensated by international aid, and often worsen the gap between ‘rich and poor’. (Joseph Stiglitz, “Globalization and Development”, in: David Held & Mathias Koenig-Archibugi, (Eds), *Taming Globalization*, p. 56).

¹⁴⁰² Bahá’í thinking recognises that materialism provokes economic and social crises and was fathered by nineteenth century European thought. Subsequently, it observes that materialism gained influence through the achievements of American capitalist culture and also through Marxism.” (Bahá’í World Centre, *Century of Light*, p. 89).

¹⁴⁰³ Ritchie in: Charles Lerche, “Globalization and Its Conflicts”, in: Charles Lerche (ed.), *Healing the Body Politic: Bahá’í Perspectives on Peace and Conflict Resolution*, (Oxford, George Ronald, 2004), p. 281.

As globalisation is partly controlled by global corporations, critiques argue that it promotes Western liberal values in the name of universalism.¹⁴⁰⁵ In parallel, Claude Ake, an African critical thinker, noted that “nations participate in global governance according to economic power, which is coextensive with their rights. The global order is ruled by an informal cabinet of the world’s economically most powerful countries... status in this new order is a function of economic performance.”¹⁴⁰⁶ The IMF, for instance, takes decisions for countries which have no representation on its Board of Governors. The global order, so interdependent, is yet far from being fair, just, humane, and truly universal, and has been described as a ‘neo-colonialism’.¹⁴⁰⁷ The current global economic order operates on discriminatory measures, based on status according to wealth. This can be associated with a denial of the oneness of humankind, according to which ‘degree of material development’¹⁴⁰⁸ should not constitute discrimination in global governance. To make the neo-liberal, global capitalist system seem natural, inevitable, and beneficial, amounts to taking the very dangerous position that abject poverty, hunger, infectious diseases, the lack of education, and a division of the world into ‘rich and poor’ are also fatalistically and irrevocably natural. In this respect, the BIC remarks:

The challenge goes beyond ensuring an equitable distribution of opportunity, important as that is. It calls for a fundamental rethinking of economic issues in a manner that will invite the full participation of a range of human experience and insight hitherto largely excluded from the discourse. The classical economic models of impersonal markets in which human beings act as autonomous makers of self-regarding choices will not serve the needs of a world motivated by ideals of unity and justice.¹⁴⁰⁹

¹⁴⁰⁴ For instance, this can take the form of an international taxation system. (See Bahá’í International Community, *Turning Point For All Nations*, p. 28) See also the Commission on Global Governance, *Our Global Neighbourhood*, p. 219.

¹⁴⁰⁵ See Charles Lerche, “Globalization and Its Conflicts”, p. 280. Huntington, for example, stated, “The efforts of the West ... to maintain its military predominance and to advance its economic interests engender countering responses from other civilizations...” (In: *Ibid.*, p. 286).

¹⁴⁰⁶ In: *Ibid.*, p. 280.

¹⁴⁰⁷ “Mind-sets are not changed overnight, and this is as true in the developed as in the developing countries. Giving developing countries their freedom (generally after little preparation for autonomy) often did not change the view of their former colonial masters, who continued to feel they knew best.” (Joseph Stiglitz, *Globalization*, p. 24.)

¹⁴⁰⁸ The Universal House of Justice, “The Promise of World Peace”, p. 15.

¹⁴⁰⁹ Bahá’í International Community, *The Prosperity of Humankind*, (London: Bahá’í Publishing Trust, 1995), p. 26.

Indeed, the Bahá'í approach includes “social and economic justice and environmental balance as desired social goals and does not hesitate to promote these preferred values.”¹⁴¹⁰ The world is more interdependent, yet, it is far from being united and integrated. Among the problems engendered by globalisation are the many ‘isms’ caused by social dislocation and cultural standardisation (a denial of diversity), and the process by which many (in this case, in many parts of the so-called ‘developing world’) feel excluded as they sense and apprehend that they have become ‘irrelevant’ in the face of the ‘Mc Donaldisation’ of the world. Hence, we can anticipate why the Bahá'í model, based on grassroots values, calls for the principle of ‘subsidiarity’ and ‘decentralisation’ in international affairs. Indeed, with centralisation, or the process by which decisions are taken away from those affected by them, people lose their ability to shape their own destiny, and are deprived of the dignity to choose for themselves. Ironically, globalisation, a non-territorial process, has underlined the importance of lower governance levels in global politics, including ‘the country level’. As Martin Shaw observes, “Globality is not the simple negation of nationality and internationality... it relies on producing new forms of both.”¹⁴¹¹ The Cardoso Report,¹⁴¹² likewise, stresses the significance of the ‘country level’, which it associates with the ‘imperative of decentralization’¹⁴¹³:

United Nations intergovernmental processes produce global goals and norms that transcend culture and sovereignty. To be meaningful they must be informed by realities on the ground, as viewed by the communities most affected and those working with them, and to be effectively implemented ... they require operational strategies that are owned by all stakeholders. This calls for emphasizing the country level in the operational and normative work of the United Nations and for strong local-to-global links between the two. This would also bring stronger Southern voices into global policy debates, helping to redress the usual North-South imbalance.¹⁴¹⁴

¹⁴¹⁰ Charles Lerche, “Introduction”, in: Charles Lerche (ed.), *Healing the Body Politic*, p. viii.

¹⁴¹¹ Martin Shaw, “Globality”, p. 173.

¹⁴¹² Kofi Annan established a panel of eminent persons to review the relationship between the UN and civil society. He, accordingly, selected ‘the Panel of Eminent Persons on United Nations-Civil Society Relations’ and appointed Henrique Cardoso, the former president of Brazil to chair the commission. (See Panel of Eminent Persons on United Nations-Civil Society Relations (UN Report), “We The Peoples: Civil Society, the United Nations and Global Governance”, 11 June 2004, downloaded 4 April 2005, <<http://www.globalpolicy.org/reform/initiatives/panels/cardoso/0904sgreport.pdf>>)

¹⁴¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴¹⁴ *Ibid.*

We can discern that the problem with the phrase ‘world government’ can be one of terminology. Indeed, the ‘world government’ referred to by the Bahá’í writings is not a centralised, undemocratic, and ineffective governance machine. Rather, it is a pyramidal structure, which respects lower level of governance. In parallel, the BIC promotes the view that in development paradigms, the maxims ‘small is beautiful’ and ‘think globally, act locally’ are adequate to tackle economic issues¹⁴¹⁵ as people feel that they can control their destiny. Here sovereignty, meaning the respect for lower levels of governance, is necessary. As late Professor Claude Ake observes “sovereignty has done little to prevent the majority of countries in the global south being subject to policies *imposed* on them by global financial institutions.”¹⁴¹⁶ [Emphasis mine] Indeed, cosmopolitanism does not necessarily equate to the idea of ‘bigness’. As Indian writer and political analyst Arundhati Roy states, “The further and further away geographically decisions are taken, the more scope you have for incredible injustice. That is the primary issue.”¹⁴¹⁷ She also notes that ‘the economics of globalization’ is not the only term which should be utilised in this matter, but rather stresses the concept of the ‘psychology of globalization’.¹⁴¹⁸ In this respect, the Commission on Global Governance calls for a global ‘politics of care’¹⁴¹⁹ in order to face the many vulnerabilities resulting from globalisation. If peoples’ mental, spiritual, and material needs are not cared for, there is a high probability that there will be many (counter) reactions; indeed, traumatic ones.¹⁴²⁰

John Burton observed that human needs are comprised of security, identity, learning, recognition, valued relationships, bonding, and control over their own environments: ‘that there are human development needs that must be satisfied and catered for by institutions, if these

¹⁴¹⁵ Bahá’í International Community, *Turning Point for All Nations*, p. 24.

¹⁴¹⁶ Ake in: Charles Lerche, “Everything That Rises Must Converge”, p. 256.

¹⁴¹⁷ Arundhati Roy, *The Chequebook and the Cruise Missile: Conversations with Arundhati Roy* (interview by David Barsamian), (London: Harper Perennial, 2004), p. 15.

¹⁴¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 55.

¹⁴¹⁹ Commission on Global Governance, *Our Global Neighbourhood*, p. 54.

¹⁴²⁰ This approach can be seen as an ‘extension’ of Mitrany’s focus on material needs to include more emotional ones.

institutions are to be stable, and if societies are to be significantly free of conflict.¹⁴²¹ In the same vein, Charles Lerche indicates, “If a particular social order is only legitimized for a portion of the society, one would expect that, given enabling conditions, those whose needs are not met would react... If the means to the fulfilment of basic needs are seen to be eroded by processes of globalization, reaction, rejection, and increasing hostility are to be expected.”¹⁴²² The BIC emphasises the shift to a ‘world of peoples’ as the NGO recognises the importance of ‘the meaningful participation of citizens in the conceptualisation, design, implementation, and evaluation of programmes and policies that affect them’, and a notion of empowerment, which ‘should seek to enhance people’s ability to manage change and should offer opportunities to increase their sense of worth.’¹⁴²³ As the Cardoso report acknowledges:

The United Nations must also do more to strengthen global governance and tackle democratic deficits. This work should be guided by principles of inclusion — ensuring equitable outcomes, participation — involving people in decisions that affect them, and responsiveness — listening to peoples’ concerns and being answerable to them.¹⁴²⁴

The Cardoso report goes on to state:

Even the most ardent proponents of globalization now agree that it must be managed to promote inclusion. Policies favouring the powerful at the expense of the weak might serve the short-term interests of the powerful but at the long-term expense of everyone. Inclusion requires equal opportunities for nations and peoples, policies and development strategies that are equitable and decision-making processes that are democratic and participatory. It also requires respecting citizens and their rights, celebrating cultural diversity and redefining security to embrace the notion of human security. Civil society is pivotal in all this.¹⁴²⁵

Indeed, I have elaborated on the negative aspects of globalisation, but ironically, the ‘counter’ forces which seek to make the process more equitable were able to emerge as a result of the

¹⁴²¹ John W. Burton, *Conflict: Resolution and Prevention*, (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1990), pp. 23&47.

¹⁴²² *Ibid.*, pp. 295-296.

¹⁴²³ Bahá’í International Community, “Valuing Spirituality in Development”.

¹⁴²⁴ Panel of Eminent Persons on United Nations–Civil Society Relations (UN Report), “We The Peoples: Civil Society, the United Nations and Global Governance.”

¹⁴²⁵ *Ibid.*

social linkages ushered by globalisation itself. As borders collapse and global civil society create meaningful links which can result, for example, in debt reduction for developing countries through pressure from the Jubilee Movement, there is also the rise in a global ‘uncivil society’.¹⁴²⁶ W. Andy Knight hints at the new ‘methodology’ of attack on the United States since Pearl Harbour “... on 9-11-2001 that attack came not from another state, but from a non-state actor – al Qaeda... Not only did it further undermine the foundational principles of Westphalia, it struck at the heart of Hegemon – the glue that has essentially been holding together the underlying structure of the Westphalian prevailing world order.”¹⁴²⁷ Numerous illicit activities such as the spread of terrorism and transnational organised crime require an appropriate response through the development and strengthening of multilateralism. Kofi Annan, in this respect, created the High-level Panel to generate new ideas about how the UN might become more effective to approach the erosion caused by unilateral action by states in the new century. The report contends that as there is ‘an emerging norm of a responsibility to protect civilians from large-scale violence’, the international community should intervene to thwart humanitarian disaster whenever a state fails to protect its citizens.¹⁴²⁸

In relation to the latter, Ruggie, Keohane, and Stiglitz denote that as we have no global government similar to national governments which were present to mitigate the social riddles caused by the declining transportation and communication costs on the national level¹⁴²⁹, we need more multilateralism, and more importantly, more inclusive forms of governance, as enshrined in civil society movements, i.e. ‘a global public domain’. J. G. Ruggie observes, “Embedding the global market within shared social values and institutional practices represents a task of historic magnitude. The reason is obvious: there is no *government* at the global level to

¹⁴²⁶ This is a term used by the Millennium Summit Report by Kofi Annan. (See, Kofi Annan, “Millennium Report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations”).

¹⁴²⁷ W. Andy Knight, “The New World (Dis)order? Obstacles to Universal Peace”, p. 14.

¹⁴²⁸ High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (UN Report), “A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility”, 2 December 2004, downloaded 4 April 2005, <<http://www.un.org/secureworld/>>. As we can see this follows the principle of ‘subsidiarity’.

act on behalf of the common good, as there is at the national level.”¹⁴³⁰ The UN Secretary General, referring to this concept of ‘embedded liberalism’ found in Western national economies in the form of social safety nets, upheld during the World Economic Forum in 1999, “Our challenge is to devise a similar compact on the global scale, to underpin the new global economy... Until we do the global economy will be fragile and vulnerable – vulnerable to backlash from all the ‘isms’ of our post-cold-war world: protectionism, populism, nationalism, ethnic chauvinism, fanaticism and terrorism.”¹⁴³¹ It follows that ethnic conflicts, HIV/AIDS, terrorism, fundamentalisms, and the environment are not separable issues.¹⁴³² As the Millennium Summit Statement of the Secretary General reads,

Extreme poverty ... makes many other problems worse. For example, poor countries – especially those with significant inequality between ethnic and religious communities – are far more likely to be embroiled in conflicts than rich ones... Moreover, poor countries often lack the capacity and resources to implement environmentally sound policies. This undermines the sustainability of their people’s meager existence, and compounds the effects of their poverty.¹⁴³³

As a response to the many challenges of globalisation, Kofi Annan’s Global Compact, a UN initiative that involves corporations, global civil society and labour in order to promote corporate social responsibility has been launched to ‘implement human rights, labor standards and environmental stability in its global domain.’¹⁴³⁴ Organisations signing the compact agree that their operations will abide by fundamental ethical principles. In this sense, it is upheld that global corporations should not promote ‘unethical’ results. The Bhopal disaster, for instance, provoked by Union Carbide’s gas leak which caused thousands of deaths in the state of Madhya

¹⁴²⁹ See J.G. Ruggie, “Taking Embedded Liberalism Global”, p. 95; Joseph Stiglitz, “Globalization and Development”, p. 54; Robert O. Keohane, “Global Governance and Democratic Accountability”, in: David Held & Mathias Koenig-Archibugi, (Eds), *Taming Globalization*, p. 132.

¹⁴³⁰ J.G. Ruggie, “Taking Embedded Liberalism Global”, p. 95.

¹⁴³¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁴³² Stiglitz, for example, draws the links between the erosion of the environment and poverty. “Poverty can lead to environmental degradation, and environmental degradation to poverty. People in countries like Nepal with little in the way of heat and energy resources are reduced to deforestation...which leads to soil erosion, and thus to further impoverishment.” (Joseph Stiglitz, *Globalization*, p. 224).

¹⁴³³ Kofi Annan, “Millennium Report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations”.

¹⁴³⁴ J.G. Ruggie, “Taking Embedded Liberalism Global”, p. 95.

Pradesh, India, has triggered more corporate social responsibility in the form of ‘certification institutions’, for instance, the award-winning ‘Responsible Care’. Ruggie writes,

The most dramatic instance of successfully promoting a new agreement – even participating fully in its negotiation – is the land-mines ban, which was begun, literally, by two people with a fax machine, and ended up helping to produce an international treaty... More conventional CSO lobbying contributed to the creation of the International Criminal Court. CSOs also are a powerful source of political pressure for reforming international organizations, especially the Bretton Woods institutions and the WTO.¹⁴³⁵

Geoffrey Robertson, in view of the growing importance of global corporations as global actors, contends that it is imperative that international legal mechanisms be created for states and multinationals ‘to provide resources, which are available to them ... for basic rights of health, education and social security.’¹⁴³⁶ More significantly, he maintains that ‘human rights auditing’, i.e. the process by which ethical reports are produced on behalf of multinationals, should become human rights principles, and not merely ‘a public relations exercise’.¹⁴³⁷ Shoghi Effendi, who referred to a world parliament as a global law making body, conceived it in cosmopolitan terms, insofar as it would intend to ‘satisfy the needs’ of all peoples.¹⁴³⁸ The second and third generation of human rights define these socio-economic needs as rights. In relation to the latter, David Held also alludes to the idea of a global parliament which would monitor the accountability of global corporations to deal with their social failures. The ICC, which does not as yet include corporate responsibility,¹⁴³⁹ has, however, started meaningful and innovative work in implementing human rights on non-state actors, i.e. on human beings.

Indeed, a crucial aspect of global federalism, which was mentioned in Bahá’í chapters, relates to the idea of an ICC that tries individual violators of international law for crimes against

¹⁴³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 106.

¹⁴³⁶ Geoffrey Robertson, *Crimes Against Humanity*, p. 522.

¹⁴³⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁴³⁸ Shoghi Effendi, *The World Order of Bahá’u’lláh*, p. 203.

¹⁴³⁹ This is viewed as one of the shortcomings of the ICC. “Multinationals breathed a corporate sigh of relief when the Rome conference mistakenly decided to exclude corporate criminal responsibility from the purview of the ICC.” (Geoffrey Robertson, *Crimes Against Humanity*, p. 522).

humanity, genocide, and war crimes.¹⁴⁴⁰ The Nuremberg Tribunals – which can be regarded as a predecessor to the ICC – were set up after WWII after the horrors of genocide, and for the first time in history dealt with crimes committed in the name of the state.¹⁴⁴¹ It was Trinidad and Tobago in 1989 that reintroduced the idea of an ICC to the UN General Assembly, and support for the idea has been expressed after numerous violations of human rights in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda.¹⁴⁴² In 1993 and 1994, the Security Council established what are known as ‘ad hoc’ tribunals or International Criminal Tribunals in the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR), but these were geographically and temporarily limited and failed to act as a deterrent.¹⁴⁴³ Unlike the ad hoc tribunals, the ICC was a product of a multilateral treaty. After a five-week conference in Rome in July 1998, 120 nations voted to adopt a statute creating the ICC. The Rome Statute was ratified in April 2002 by 60 states and the jurisdiction of the Court came into effect in July that same year. Although the statute was opposed by seven powerful and populous states (including the United States, India, and China), and despite cynics, the ICC came into being less than four years after the Rome conference.¹⁴⁴⁴

As world federalists do not fail to realise, the ICC has its imperfections. It is ironical that the United States, although the Clinton administration had been favourable to the idea of a world criminal court, weakened the Court’s powers through concessions (during the Rome conference, states in favour of the ICC remained hopeful that the US would eventually ratify the statute), and ultimately rejected the Court. In the end, “Its jurisdiction is severely limited by realpolitik: its prosecutor can only act after a reference from the Security Council, or else by permission of the Court in respect of crimes committed on the territory or by nationals of states that have

¹⁴⁴⁰ ‘USA for an International Criminal Court’ states, “The implications of the Court in protecting the rights of women in cases of mass rapes, genocides, torture, forced servitude, and gender apartheid are profound. The Rome Treaty establishing the ICC recognises sexual and gender violence as crimes - a first for international law”. (See USA for the International Criminal Court, “Women and the ICC”, downloaded 23 May 2002, <http://www.usaforicc.org/facts_women-icc.html>)

¹⁴⁴¹ Federal Union, “The International Criminal Court” (by Daniel Wheatley), October 2001, downloaded 15 June 2002, <<http://www.federalunion.org.uk/articles/icc.htm>>

¹⁴⁴² *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁴³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁴⁴ Geoffrey Robertson, *Crimes Against Humanity*, p. xxxiii.

ratified the treaty”.¹⁴⁴⁵ Hence, the International Criminal Court will depend on the Security Council (if a case is not brought up by a state party), which is likely to refer cases when combatants do not have superpower support in the Security Council.

The ICC does, however, represent a breakthrough, and the strength of the coalition of NGOs (as such, if the government of the United States has not yet ratified the statute, citizens rallied in organisations like ‘America for the ICC’ or ‘Citizens for Global Solutions’ actively promote the Court) has assisted in demonstrating the force of human rights over states interests. The World Federalist Movement, which is the International Secretariat for the global NGO coalition for an ICC (well over a thousand NGOs worked towards the implementation of an independent ICC) noted in July 2002, “The Rome Statute represents not only the greatest advance in international law and justice in 57 years, but it represents one of the greatest achievements of a new type of international diplomacy and law-making...The Rome Statute, for the first time, holds *individuals* that the worst crimes against humanity accountable to international law and justice”.¹⁴⁴⁶ This achievement is championed by world federalists: The fact that the ICC deals with individuals as opposed to member-states is, for world federalists, a testimony to the shift from a confederal to a federal system. Glossop observes, “One of the differences between a confederation and a federation is that in a confederation the central body does not interact with individuals in member states but only with governments of the member states. The ICC takes the world community beyond that limitation”.¹⁴⁴⁷ Moreover, Glossop remarks that nationals will no longer be in the position of using their governmental position to avoid prosecution for human rights abuses.¹⁴⁴⁸ That the ICC operates whenever national justice systems have broken down is reminiscent of the principles of federalism. Indeed, global federalism does not intervene when national systems can function effectively, as it operates according to the principle of

¹⁴⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁴⁶ Webster, Lucy, “Statement of the World Federalist Movement to the First Assembly of State Parties of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court”, WFM Council Vice-chair, 9 September 2002, downloaded 11 November 2002, <<http://www.worldfederalist.org/ACTION/aspstmt902.html>>

¹⁴⁴⁷ Glossop, Ronald, J, *Confronting War*, p. 275.

¹⁴⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

subsidiarity. The ICC is, thus, an example of ‘real existing federalism’. Daniel Wheatley remarks,

The one concrete example of a structure created at the global level that federalists worked for is the new International Criminal Court. Its efficacy is yet to be established, but it has begun investigations into war crimes in Uganda and DR Congo. Combined with the ad hoc tribunals that have been set up in various states, I would say these are examples of noble intentions finally gaining the means to carry out real action.¹⁴⁴⁹

The International Criminal Court, stemming as a result of global civil society efforts, is a tangible example of the growing influence of non-state actors in IR, and the adequate relevance of the World Federalist Movement as an NGO in world affairs. Indeed, the WFM has been leading a coalition of more than a thousand NGOs in the promotion of the ICC, and believes that global civil society can strongly influence world affairs.¹⁴⁵⁰ Moreover, global federalism also underlines that world citizenship is not a farfetched notion: it is burgeoning through membership in various NGOs, which favour world interests over national interests.

7.3 The Bahá’í Faith, Cosmopolitanism, and IR: Viewing the World with New Lenses

7.3.1 The Bahá’í Approach and Cosmopolitan IR

As part of the conclusion, and to reinforce and refine the main arguments in Chapter Six, I will now proceed to highlight some of the similarities, and yet essential dissimilarities of form between IR and the Bahá’í approach, and how the latter can lend support to a growing cosmopolitan IR. Indeed, Bahá’í principles seem to be closely linked to the negatively labelled ‘idealist’ (‘Wilsonian’ IR), or neo-idealist (Held, Falk, and Archibugi call for the democratisation of international structures, and global civil movements) branches of IR. Indeed, idealists (as they came to be pejoratively called) promoted the ideals of the League of Nations,

¹⁴⁴⁹ Nalinie Mooten, Interview with Daniel Wheatley, Conducted Via Email, 23 March 2004

¹⁴⁵⁰ Most world governments, for example, have signed international treaties banning the use of landmines.

the concept of collective security, world citizenship, education, disarmament, an international police force, and arbitration. In addition, the respect for human rights, the alleviation of poverty, and the rule of law are strong features of this conceived order. If, however, the ‘idealist’ or ‘liberal’ branch of IR can be criticised for being too universalising, Bahá’í principles emphasise the need for diversity in unity. In other words, as we are ‘one human family’ (oneness), we have different viewpoints, and sometimes grow to adopt different values (diversity), but we are still able to collaborate, and care for each other.

In this respect, and in order to illustrate the inclusiveness of the Bahá’í perspective on cosmopolitanism, it can also be said that the latter represents a departure in sacred thinking as it does not rely on a believer/infidel dichotomy, but rather stresses the importance of tolerance and philanthropy.¹⁴⁵¹ Bahá’u’lláh noted that it was indispensable that the peoples of the world “...observe tolerance and righteousness, which are two lights amidst the darkness of the world and two educators for the edification of mankind.”¹⁴⁵² By proclaiming the oneness of humanity, Bahá’u’lláh, in addition, dissolved the dichotomy between believer and infidel. He wrote, “There can be no doubt whatever that the peoples of the world, or whatever race or religion, derive their inspiration from one heavenly source...”¹⁴⁵³ ‘Abdu’l’Bahá, in this regard, notes that there is no justification to account for one’s own belief as “light and all others as darkness”.¹⁴⁵⁴ Bahá’í thinking, therefore, moves away from division (religious beliefs are not a condition to be excluded from the cosmopolis) towards ideas on unity based on the premise that human beings, regardless of gender, race, religion, and class form part of the same, yet diverse, human family. Denominations cannot preclude our common humanity.

It is also relevant to the cosmopolitan tradition that the Bahá’í model does not concentrate on ‘events’, but rather on the notion of ‘process’. Interestingly, it is this focus on events, which

¹⁴⁵¹ See Chapter Five, (5.1.5 Human Nature and Peaceful World Order: An Alternative Image)

¹⁴⁵² Bahá’u’lláh, *Tablets of Bahá’u’lláh*, p. 36.

¹⁴⁵³ The Universal House of Justice, “To the World’s Religious Leaders”.

¹⁴⁵⁴ ‘Abdu’l’Bahá, in: Horace Holley, (ed.), p. 348.

discredited the ‘idealist’ and more normative branch of IR, and promoted the realist tradition through the arguments of the failure of the League of Nations, and the advent of WW2. The Bahá’í model, by focusing on a process, sees that ‘integrative and disruptive’ forces work in opposition to each other, but will eventually lead to peaceful human and state relations.¹⁴⁵⁵ In the very long run, the numerous organisations of civil society and the other organisational consequences flowing from the interdependence of nations can foster cosmopolitan values, and override parochial and conflict-ridden values. W. Andy Knight, referring to world disorder as ‘disruption’ and ‘disintegration’, writes, “what is clear from the writings of Bahá’u’lláh, ‘Abdu’l’Bahá and Shoghi Effendi is that world disorder is a prerequisite for the ushering in of World Order...”¹⁴⁵⁶ This very concept can be linked to this phase of ‘transition’ and ‘transformation’ acknowledged by various IR theorists in Chapter One.¹⁴⁵⁷ Martin Shaw, also underlines the concept of ‘global transition’, and propounds the idea that catastrophes (disintegration) often represent a stimulus for transformation “the gains in the development of international law enforcement have been responses to some of the worst, genocidal episodes among many crimes against humanity, in which millions have suffered.”¹⁴⁵⁸

In addition to its views on IR, Bahá’í ethical cosmopolitanism could be said to represent a lineage to post-positivist, and normative thinking, while retaining the spirit of criticism,¹⁴⁵⁹ and cosmopolitanism in modernity. This is a more moral side to cosmopolitanism akin to Bahá’í thinking, which has recently been introduced by critical theories. Bahá’í views, indeed, contribute to reinforcing the ‘sensitive turn’ taken by cosmopolitanism, which stresses diversity, in the sense of abandoning a domineering and homogeneous universalism. Bahá’í views have been anticipatory of the new ‘sensitive’ turn promoted by critical international theory, feminist

¹⁴⁵⁵ See Chapter Five, (5.1.2 A System of Planetary Organisation)

¹⁴⁵⁶ W. Andy Knight, *The New World (Dis)order? Obstacles to Universal Peace*, p. 17.

¹⁴⁵⁷ See, for example, James N. Rosenau, *The Study of Global Interdependence: Essays on Transnationalisation of World Affairs*, (London: Frances Pinter Publishers, 1980)

¹⁴⁵⁸ Martin Shaw, “Globality”, p. 172.

¹⁴⁵⁹ In the Bahá’í Faith, this delineates the importance of thinking independently from cultural heritage and traditions.

theory, or postmodernism from the last two decades of the twentieth century onwards.¹⁴⁶⁰ Indeed, at the time of Bahá'u'lláh, in the midst of the nineteenth century, and 'Abdu'l'Bahá, in the early twentieth century, the deconstruction of 'otherness' had already been promoted as a means to bring about the unity of mankind, and the solidarity of the human race. In the 1910s, 'Abdu'l'Bahá deplored how the notions of otherness impeded the realisation of the oneness of humankind, and hence the achievement of an unbounded global community. He stated, "See ye no strangers.... for love and unity come hard when ye fix your gaze on *otherness*".¹⁴⁶¹ [Emphasis mine] Lately, these anticipatory views have been introduced in new critical IR theories, with the aims of fostering inclusiveness, and deconstructing strangeness and otherness. In particular, critical international theory holds that, by promoting divisions, the division between inside and outside alienate peoples from one another, erect barriers of strangeness, and directly infringe on more peaceful relations.

Chapters Five and Six showed that "Bahá'í views relate, and are not entirely dissociated from the 'mainstream' cosmopolitan tradition".¹⁴⁶² Like the latter, they are concerned with the promotion of the common good, the need for more global and peaceful forms of communities, and they seek to discredit the view that human nature is inherently belligerent.¹⁴⁶³ Bahá'í views promote global values, the ethos of world citizenship, and the improvement of international institutions (like the United Nations), global institutions (like the International Criminal Court), and the idea of consultation amidst diverse communities.¹⁴⁶⁴ Bahá'í international thinking, indeed, connects to this branch of IR that is concerned with regional and global integration, world order, communities of fate, functional organisations, and the unity of mankind. It calls for the creation of a political, economic, and social system, which will distribute the benefits of

¹⁴⁶⁰ These theories proclaim that discrimination on the basis of race, class, gender... do not serve the welfare of humankind. Their cosmopolitanism is enshrined in restoring a sense of denied dignity to members of the human race.

¹⁴⁶¹ Research Department of the Universal House of Justice, *Selections from the Writings of 'Abdu'l'Bahá*, p. 24.

¹⁴⁶² *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁶³ Kant stands as an exception to this, as he upheld human nature to be essentially warlike.

¹⁴⁶⁴ 6.3.1 World Citizenship and Universal Language: Cosmopolitan Communicative Tools.

interdependence fairly, and not to the advantage of the powerful, thus avoiding extremes in wealth and poverty (here the emphasis is on ‘creation’). Indeed, although the interdependence of nations is a cosmopolitan aspect (in the form of globalisation, as a case in point), the Bahá’í view upholds that it is not sufficient for bringing international prosperity in a natural harmony of interests. Bahá’ís, like cosmopolitans such as Richard Falk and David Held point to the much darker side of globalisation. The democratisation and accountability of global institutions is an important facet of this issue, as it is shown in the preceding section, and with the mounting importance of global civil society. The Bahá’í perspective is, in this sense, not idealistic, but rather normative: “It proposes pursuit of change in desired directions through both intellectual and social engagement and not through intellectual idealization alone.”¹⁴⁶⁵ World order will not simply usher better conditions due to conditions of global interdependence, but global will and intervention, and unprecedented efforts are required. W. Andy Knight clarifies that although the Bahá’í view upholds that peace is ‘inevitable’, it does not view it as “an ephemeral ‘thing’ out there that will somehow fall from heaven into the laps of humanity...”¹⁴⁶⁶ In order to be universal and sustainable, peace requires ‘a fundamental transformation of world order’.¹⁴⁶⁷

7.3.2 The Bahá’í Perspective: A Spiritual Avenue to IR?

*Spiritual principles that transcend any particular culture, religion, and nationality can have a transforming effect...*¹⁴⁶⁸

*The Bahá’í teachings reflect an unequivocally globalist perspective.*¹⁴⁶⁹

¹⁴⁶⁵ Graham Hassall, “Contemporary Governance”.

¹⁴⁶⁶ W. Andy Knight, “The New World (Dis)order? Obstacles to Universal Peace”, p. 1.

¹⁴⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁶⁸ Cheshmak Farhoumand-Sims & Charles Lerche, “Perspectives on Peace Building”, in: Charles Lerche, (ed.), *Healing the Body Politic*, p. 19.

¹⁴⁶⁹ Charles Lerche, “Globalization and Its Conflicts”, p. 300.

For Bahá'ís, IR theories are the result of speculation, worked out by the human mind. By contrast, they believe that Bahá'í principles do not flow from an activity of the human mind, but are the result of a fusion of reason (to search and choose principles) and faith (to trust the reality of principles that are beyond the speculations of the human mind).¹⁴⁷⁰ World order is, therefore, the amalgamation of elements of human agency (we decide to intervene) and more revelational elements that belong to a non-human and more mystical plan (even if we decided not to intervene, the unity of humanity remains an aspect of a divine plan for mankind). Human agency can decide upon the means and rapidity by which to achieve a process of unity, but this process has already been set in motion. Bahá'í views are, thus, essentially different, in the sense that they have been advocated by a world religion, which asserts the spiritual nature (ethics) of cosmopolitanism, and not only its material side, i.e. global, technological, and physical interdependence. The Bahá'í model reflects the concerns of the secular cosmopolitan approach, and at the same time remains a non-secular approach: the spiritual destiny of mankind lies in its unity. In this way, the Bahá'í model offers a reconciliation between the more ethical views of cosmopolitanism propounded in Chapters Two and Three from ancient times to the Enlightenment, and the more material approach, supported, for example, by the functional views of David Mitrany in Chapter Four.

The Bahá'í model could represent a basis for highlighting both the relevance of the welfare of humanity in terms of fulfilling basic material needs, and those of a spiritual/ethical nature, which denote the ethics of oneness.¹⁴⁷¹ Material goals are essential (for example, each should have the basic human right to food) to fulfil the real purpose of humanity, which is 'spiritual' in nature. The reality of humanity is 'spiritual' in the sense that human beings potentially reflect the virtues of a 'higher nature', an aspect given to the whole of mankind, and not only to privileged categories. (This justifies the fact that achieving the unity of humanity does not

¹⁴⁷⁰ It was seen in Chapter Five that the basis of faith, for Bahá'ís, lies in the Revelation of Bahá'u'lláh as a new 'divine' revelation for our global age.

represent a utopian goal). In turn, the oneness of humankind is both a ‘material’ (biological/scientific) and a ‘spiritual’ principle (value-laden), which can assist the re-imagination of IR along more inclusive parameters. The Bahá’í approach has, thus, reinforced cosmopolitanism through exposition of a reality that reflects a ‘spiritual’ principle of oneness, and whose direction is geared towards a cosmopolitan path. As Cheshmak Farhoumand-Sims and Charles Lerche note, “In our rapidly globalizing era, relevant models of peace building must envision humanity as a collective whole rather than contending parts, be based on global ethics and more fully incorporate the inward, spiritual dimensions of human experience.”¹⁴⁷²

Here the Bahá’í model of world order can make interesting inroads into International Relations theory, as the reality it describes is not linked to imposition, but rather to emancipation. Emancipation from the bounds of the limitedness of bounded communities, emancipation from overtly material views which promote inequalities, and emancipation from the discrimination based upon the ‘unreal’ dichotomies of race, class, gender, age etc.... This order, furthermore, to be justifiable, has to be created through human agency and consent, which is supported by the assistance of a not fully comprehensible divine and mysterious Being (‘God’). We can also note that the Bahá’í approach assists in giving cosmopolitan ‘purpose’ to IR, by advocating the need for a level of principle (the oneness of humanity), and the value of unity. Namely, the Bahá’í Faith, through the principle of the oneness of humankind, can lend new lenses to IR on how we can possibly view the world. It builds the bridge between the concept of unity, which is now criticised by postmodernism, because of the ideas of totality, domination, and homogenisation, and the concept of diversity of opinions, ethnic characteristics, gender, which can reinforce, and not threaten that unity. Indeed, Bahá’í views reinforce cosmopolitanism by asserting that diversity has been created to contribute to the ‘quality’ of unity, and that both are not irreconcilable. They assert possible avenues of communication to reach the stage of common

¹⁴⁷¹ In this sense, the oneness of humankind is useful in highlighting the artificiality of the concept of a closed and homogeneous nation, and the divisive and insufficient aspects of a material cosmopolitanism, concepts which are both ethically deficient.

understanding, tolerance, awareness of multiplicity of thinking that reinforces the idea of a ‘unity’, which is the result of manifold aspects, and not only that of a domineering, same, and imposing element.¹⁴⁷³

Moreover, the ‘level of principle’ asserts the possibility of solving jingoism, xenophobia, and nationalism (the antitheses of cosmopolitanism) at a spiritual level, and as a basis for unity. This is not only dealt with at a mere theoretical level, but also at a very practical one. ‘Principles’ can serve as a basis for action and transformation; likewise, it can be argued, theories should serve the welfare of humanity, and should exist for a practical purpose. When people recognise the need for unity through the argument of the validity of the oneness of humankind, they are able to deconstruct images of strangeness propounded by the way the world is shaped (that is a world of divided jurisdictions of sovereign states). The way we look at the world is defined by the oneness of humankind, which has the potentiality of transforming parochialism into cosmopolitanism. This shows how the level of principle can assist in promoting cosmopolitan attitudes. This preventive¹⁴⁷⁴ measure is sustained by the fact that there is, as it was elaborated in Chapter Six, another level of world order, which does not relate to the rationality of the human being, but to more divine elements. The Bahá’í Faith shapes a view of the world that reflects that reality (or the world as created by ‘God’) which is cosmopolitan in nature (a description that does not only reflect the global turn of interdependence, but which rests on the oneness and diversity of humanity).

Through this reality of oneness, we can construct an alternative way of building the world, not only because it is possible to do so (a post-positivist view), but because it reflects spiritual/divine reality. The Bahá’í Faith creates another level for the realm of the ‘possible’ in

¹⁴⁷² Cheshmak Farhoumand-Sims & Charles Lerche, “Perspectives on Peace Building”, in: Charles Lerche (ed.), *Healing the Body Politic*, p. 22.

¹⁴⁷³ See Chapter Six, (6.3.1 World Citizenship and Universal Language: Cosmopolitan Communicative Tools).

¹⁴⁷⁴ Preventive in the sense that, by promotion of the oneness of humankind, nationalism and racism become somewhat irrelevant and invalid perspectives.

IR, as opposed to asserting the inevitability of the division of the world into the domestic and international spheres. More importantly, Bahá'í views are not only concerned with deliberating philosophically upon possible ways of looking at the world, but they also impart the choice to act upon principles, which can give meaning to action, and which can foster the unity of humanity. Moreover, the more spiritual/ethical/divine aspects of the Bahá'í Faith can assist in demonstrating the nature of the non-spatiality of our allegiances. The unity of humanity, in the Bahá'í Faith, reveres a non-spatial view of the world, through the 'spiritual' nature of its principles. It belongs to a non-territorial sphere that collapses ideas of inbred division in creation. IR can, thus, be provided with a new basis for defining human solidarity, as the result of the mystical propensity linked to our nature, which shapes the 'reality' of the unity of the species. Finally, Bahá'í cosmopolitan views revolve around the non-statist turn in IR, which refuse to treat the nation-state (as well as realism) as a focal point of the discipline, and thereby provide a more ethical and spiritual view for debating cosmopolitanism; for destabilising dichotomies that feed discrimination; and for imagining a world community that is conscious of its oneness. In the words of Shoghi Effendi, theories, including IR theories should constantly adjust to new global world conditions:

The call of Bahá'u'lláh is primarily directed against all forms of provincialism, all insularities and prejudices. If long-cherished ideals and time-honoured institutions, if certain social assumptions and religious formulae have ceased to promote the welfare of the generality of mankind, if they no longer minister to the needs of a continually evolving humanity, let them be swept away and relegated to the limbo of obsolescent and forgotten doctrines. Why should these, in a world subject to the immutable law of change and decay, be exempt from the deterioration that must needs overtake every human institution? For legal standards, political and economic theories are solely designed to safeguard the interests of humanity as a whole, and not humanity to be crucified for the preservation of the integrity of any particular law or doctrine.¹⁴⁷⁵

The Bahá'í model of world order suggests a transformation in IR, that would reflect flexibility in its approach, the opening of new cosmopolitan avenues, not simply because these reflect the

¹⁴⁷⁵ Shoghi Effendi, *The World Order of Bahá'u'lláh*, p. 42.

'reality' of the oneness of mankind, but also because they are of use to the welfare of humanity. Henceforth, theories are not just there for their own sake, but as a prescriptive means, and to foster the transformation of a world community conscious of its indivisible oneness. The way we look at the world is based on a conception of 'reality' that goes beyond our own minds, where human beings remain principal actors in determining how their world can be constantly improved upon.

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