

**HACKEN**

# SMART CONTRACT CODE REVIEW AND SECURITY ANALYSIS REPORT

**Customer:** Covalent

**Date:** January 10<sup>th</sup>, 2022

This document may contain confidential information about IT systems and the intellectual property of the Customer as well as information about potential vulnerabilities and methods of their exploitation.

The report containing confidential information can be used internally by the Customer, or it can be disclosed publicly after all vulnerabilities are fixed – upon a decision of the Customer.

## Document

<b>Name</b>	Smart Contract Code Review and Security Analysis Report for Covalent.
<b>Approved by</b>	Andrew Matiukhin   CTO Hacken OU
<b>Type</b>	Staking
<b>Platform</b>	Ethereum / Solidity
<b>Methods</b>	Architecture Review, Functional Testing, Computer-Aided Verification, Manual Review
<b>Repository</b>	<a href="https://github.com/covalenthq/Hacken-Covalent-Staking-Contract">https://github.com/covalenthq/Hacken-Covalent-Staking-Contract</a>
<b>Commit</b>	5f522eb8299c78ebd0bbbf8287441c95ec0e5ab0
<b>Technical Documentation</b>	YES
<b>JS tests</b>	YES
<b>Website</b>	covalenthq.com
<b>Timeline</b>	01 DECEMBER 2021 - 10 JANUARY 2022
<b>Changelog</b>	06 DECEMBER 2021 - INITIAL AUDIT 14 DECEMBER 2021 - SECOND REVIEW 10 JANUARY 2022 - THIRD REVIEW



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## Introduction

Hacken OÜ (Consultant) was contracted by Covalent (Customer) to conduct a Smart Contract Code Review and Security Analysis. This report presents the findings of the security assessment of the Customer's smart contract and its code review conducted between December 1<sup>st</sup>, 2021, 2021 – December 6<sup>th</sup>, 2021.

Second review conducted on December 14<sup>th</sup>, 2021.

Third review conducted on January 10<sup>th</sup>, 2022.

## Scope

The scope of the project is smart contracts in the repository:

**Repository:**

<https://github.com/covalenthq/Hacken-Covalent-Staking-Contract>

**Commit:**

[5f522eb8299c78ebd0bbb8287441c95ec0e5ab0](https://github.com/covalenthq/Hacken-Covalent-Staking-Contract/commit/5f522eb8299c78ebd0bbb8287441c95ec0e5ab0)

**Technical Documentation:** Yes

- docs: <https://github.com/covalenthq/Hacken-Covalent-Staking-Contract/blob/master/README.md>
- wp: <https://www.covalenthq.com/static/documents/Covalent%20Whitepaper%20Apr%202021%20v1%20Branded.pdf>

**JS tests:** Yes (included: <https://github.com/covalenthq/Hacken-Covalent-Staking-Contract/blob/master/test>)

**Contracts:**

[DelegatedStaking.sol](#)



We have scanned this smart contract for commonly known and more specific vulnerabilities. Here are some of the commonly known vulnerabilities that are considered:

Category	Check Item
Code review	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>▪ Reentrancy</li><li>▪ Ownership Takeover</li><li>▪ Timestamp Dependence</li><li>▪ Gas Limit and Loops</li><li>▪ DoS with (Unexpected) Throw</li><li>▪ DoS with Block Gas Limit</li><li>▪ Transaction-Ordering Dependence</li><li>▪ Style guide violation</li><li>▪ Costly Loop</li><li>▪ ERC20 API violation</li><li>▪ Unchecked external call</li><li>▪ Unchecked math</li><li>▪ Unsafe type inference</li><li>▪ Implicit visibility level</li><li>▪ Deployment Consistency</li><li>▪ Repository Consistency</li><li>▪ Data Consistency</li></ul>
Functional review	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>▪ Business Logics Review</li><li>▪ Functionality Checks</li><li>▪ Access Control &amp; Authorization</li><li>▪ Escrow manipulation</li><li>▪ Token Supply manipulation</li><li>▪ Assets integrity</li><li>▪ User Balances manipulation</li><li>▪ Data Consistency manipulation</li><li>▪ Kill-Switch Mechanism</li><li>▪ Operation Trails &amp; Event Generation</li></ul>

## Executive Summary

According to the assessment, the Customer's smart contracts are secured.



Our team performed an analysis of code functionality, manual audit, and automated checks with Mythril and Slither. All issues found during automated analysis were manually reviewed, and important vulnerabilities are presented in the Audit overview section. All found issues can be found in the Audit overview section.

As a result of the audit, security engineers found **1** medium and **1** low severity issue.

After the second review security engineers found **1** medium severity issue.

For the third review, security engineers modified the config to change the forking URL to the own alchemy URL to use the archive state node, therefore still **1** medium severity issue is not resolved.

## Severity Definitions

Risk Level	Description
<b>Critical</b>	Critical vulnerabilities are usually straightforward to exploit and can lead to assets loss or data manipulations.
<b>High</b>	High-level vulnerabilities are difficult to exploit; however, they also have a significant impact on smart contract execution, e.g., public access to crucial functions
<b>Medium</b>	Medium-level vulnerabilities are important to fix; however, they can't lead to assets loss or data manipulations.
<b>Low</b>	Low-level vulnerabilities are mostly related to outdated, unused, etc. code snippets that can't have a significant impact on execution

## Audit overview

### ■ ■ ■ ■ Critical

No critical issues were found.

### ■ ■ ■ High

No high severity issues were found.

### ■ ■ Medium

Tests are failing.

4 tests out of 60 are failing. Two of them are failing because of timeout of 20 seconds is reached, but two of them because of unexpected return values.

- `allocatedTokensPerEpoch` is changed only by calling “`setAllocatedTokensPerEpoch`” directly, while test “Should emit redeem reward event with correct number of rewards” expects this to be a sum of “`rewardsAvailable`” and “`commissionRewards`” divided by 100
- in the “Should return number of rewards earned by validator with delegators” it looks like the “`getValidatorsDetails`” was mistakenly called with validator’s address provided.

**Contracts:** DelegatedStaking.sol

**Tests:** redeemAllRewards.js

**Recommendation:** Please either correct tests or fix the code’s logic to make sure all tests are passed.

**Status:** Running “redeemAllRewards” separately, as proposed by the customer, still one test is failing:

```
1 passing (6s)
1 failing

1) Redeem Rewards
   Should return number of rewards earned by validator with delegators:
   ProviderError: project ID does not have access to archive state
```

**Status update:** Changing the forking URL to the alchemy node changed the result, not one test is still failing but the error is different:

```
1 passing (10s)
1 failing

1) Redeem Rewards
   Should return number of rewards earned by validator with delegators:
   Error: too many arguments: passed to contract (count=1, expectedCount=0, code=UNEXPECTED_ARGUMENT, version=contracts/5.4.1)
```





■ **Low**

A public function that could be declared external

**public** functions that are never called by the contract should be declared **external** to save gas.

**Contracts:** DelegatedStaking.sol

**Function:** initialize, depositRewardTokens, takeOutRewardTokens, stake, unstake, recoverUnstaking, addValidator, disableValidator, setAllocatedTokensPerEpoch, setMaxCapMultiplier, setValidatorCommissionRate, setValidatorMinStakedRequired, redelegateUnstaked, transferUnstakedOut

**Recommendation:** Use the **external** attribute for functions never called from the contract.

**Status:** Fixed



## Conclusion

Smart contracts within the scope were manually reviewed and analyzed with static analysis tools.

The audit report contains all found security vulnerabilities and other issues in the reviewed code.

As a result of the audit, security engineers found 1 medium and 1 low severity issue.

After the second review security engineers found 1 medium severity issue.

For the third review, security engineers modified the config to change the forking URL to the own alchemy URL to use the archive state node, therefore still 1 medium severity issue is not resolved.



## Disclaimers

### **Hacken Disclaimer**

The smart contracts given for audit have been analyzed in accordance with the best industry practices at the date of this report, in relation to cybersecurity vulnerabilities and issues in smart contract source code, the details of which are disclosed in this report (Source Code); the Source Code compilation, deployment, and functionality (performing the intended functions).

The audit makes no statements or warranties on the security of the code. It also cannot be considered as a sufficient assessment regarding the utility and safety of the code, bug-free status, or any other statements of the contract. While we have done our best in conducting the analysis and producing this report, it is important to note that you should not rely on this report only – we recommend proceeding with several independent audits and a public bug bounty program to ensure the security of smart contracts.

### **Technical Disclaimer**

Smart contracts are deployed and executed on a blockchain platform. The platform, its programming language, and other software related to the smart contract can have vulnerabilities that can lead to hacks. Thus, the audit can't guarantee the explicit security of the audited smart contracts.